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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of decentralisation in the Sudan both 
as a mechanism for the management of ethnic diversity and for 
development administration. The study focuses on a particular 
period (1969-1983) during the Nimeiri regime when extensive 
administrative reforms were carried out which gave the Sudan 
one of the most decentralised governmental systems in Africa. 
Although decentralisation was applied in the Sudan to achieve 
these twin objectives, its effectiveness fluctuated depending 
on the political situation at central government level. A
case study was conducted to investigate the impact of
decentralisation policy in one district council, W a u . The 
research was particularly focused on education, one of the 
services for which the local authorities were responsible. 
The field research involved the collection of data through a 
structured questionnaire to investigate such variables as:
educational administration, school management, school 
environment and community participation. An analysis of the 
data reveals that all was not well with decentralisation in 
the Sudan. In light of these findings, the last part of the 
thesis reassesses the conditions for effective 
decentralisation policies generally and the Sudan in
particular. Finally, areas for further research are suggested 
based on the findings of the study.
This thesis confirms the following hypotheses:
- The success of state-ethnoregional cohePsion is largely 
dependent on the s t a t e ’s abilty to initiate integrative 
policies.
- A decentralised system of government requires 
effective and active central participation to 
control and guide its implementation.
- Entrusting incommensurate powers to local 
authorities in areas at a rudimentary stage of 
development adversely affects their role as 
participants in development.
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PREFACE
The case study part of this thesis is based on data collected 
during a consultancy engagement with UNICEF in the Sudan. In 
1980 the Government of the Sudan requested UNICEF to initiate 
a primary school development project in Bahr El Ghazal 
province, as a pilot project to provide a model for eventual 
replication throughout the country (Ref. M0/G.H.1; 1 Dec
1980). It was in response to that 8/11 that I was employed by 
UNICEF, Sudan country office, in October 1982 to investigate, 
report and design a project including costing and a plan of 
action. The investigative study revealed a serious problem 
with the educational system in the Sudan which triggered my 
interest in the policies of decentralisation that the 
government of the time was so earnestly pursuing.
I was enrolled as a full time student for a PhD degree at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 
October 1985. I am grateful for my academic supervisors Drs 
Michael Hebbert and Brendan O ’Leary from the departments of 
Geography and Government respectively for their understanding 
of my commitment to the "Eritrean Struggle", which distracted 
me for some time, and for their guidance throughout.
My time with UNICEF in the Sudan was a very happy and fruitful 
one. I admired the efficiency of its operation and the help 
and the collaboration its regular staff rendered to external 
consultants. My consultancy was completed successfully, the 
report I produced having been instrumental in raising funds 
for educational development in Bahr El Ghazal. Sadly, the 
second civil war broke out in south Sudan soon after the 
completion of the report and the planned educational project 
had to be postponed. My thanks go to all the UNICEF staff who 
were at the Khartoum, Juba and Wau offices at the time.
The above consultancy involved many people. Mr John Dut Bol , 
assistant director of education, Bahr El Ghazal province was
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my counterpart. John is an old friend from previous work we 
both were part of and I could not have been more lucky to work 
with him. Eleven education officials from the same province 
were also seconded to the consultant and did a marvellous job 
under difficult conditions. Many education officials at 
local, regional and central level have helped me a great deal. 
All the chiefs, sub-chiefs, community elders, head teachers, 
teachers and students interviewed helped me to understand-iiTg of 
the educational system in Bahr El Ghazal, something that would 
not have come out through formal interviews alone.
Mr Peter Dawson of the department of government, LSE, has read 
an earlier draft of the first chapter and made useful 
comments. Professor David Regan of the department of 
politics, University of Nottingham,took time to introduce me 
to people at the department of planning studies who allowed me 
to attend and participate in their seminars. Dr Malcom
Norris, department of local government, University of 
Birmingham, welcomed me at his office and directed me to the 
vast literature available on the Sudan.
I have the greatest admiration for the library systems in the 
UK. Wherever I went I was met with courtesy and received 
help. The Library lending system is wonderful and saves a lot 
of t ime.
Acknowledgement is due to the Cett.faV* Research Fwnd 
who offered me funds for a research trip to the Sudan in 1986. 
The purpose of this trip was to collect secondary information 
from government sources, teaching institutes and international 
aid organisations to augment the information I already had.
My friends Drs Kamal M. Ibrahim and Berhane Kehase have helped 
me with the production of computerised charts for which I am 
thankful. Mrs Patricia Cantrell helped me with some typing, 
formatting and printing. I am thankful for her prompt work.
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This work is dedicated to Liz, my wife, and, our children 
Hanna and Bemnet, for their unfailing support. Liz has read 
through all the drafts and corrected my English and made 
constructive comments. My mother in law, Eileen Adamson, is 
always helpful and life in England would have been unbearably 
difficult without her.
Finally, this thesis is very much a remembrance to my late 
parents, Woldemichael G. Rufael and HareguG. Selassie, and my 
late cousin, Bemnet G. Amlak, who is affectionately 
remembered. Bemnet was a multi-talented man and he has been 
an inspiration in my educational pursuit.
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INTRODUCTION
General
The north-south divide of the Sudan, which is culturally, 
historically and geographically determined, has plagued the 
country with chronic civil strife and political instability 
since it became independent in 1956. During the Nimeiri 
regime, 1969 - 1985, some progress was made towards
accommodating diversity resulting in the north-south peace 
agreement of 1972, by which the south Sudan became an 
autonomous self-governing region. Unfortunately, the self- 
governing status was unilaterally withdrawn in 1983 by 
President Nimeiri, eventually sparking off the restart of the 
on-going civil war.
The aims of decentralisation in the Sudan, both as a means of 
national integration and development administration, have been 
severely constrained by the ruling e l i t e ’s inability to manage 
state-ethnic relations. For example, the northern ruling 
e l i t e ’s insistence on homogenisation by following policies of 
cultural assimilation have caused the continuation of the 
conflict. This study also demonstrates that socioeconomic 
development in the Sudan has very much depended on the central 
government’s ability to initiate both acceptable and workable 
policies. The knock-on effect of the political situation on 
decentralisation is demonstrated by the fluctuating fortunes 
of the delivery of primary education during the Nimeiri 
regime, as the analysis of the case study in chapter seven 
will show. The period between 1969-1983 of the Nimeiri regime
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has therefore been given special attention in this thesis to 
demonstrate the "make or break" role the central government 
played in the management of state-ethnic relations.
Some clarification is in order of the many administrative 
reforms that have taken place in the Sudan since independence 
and the way regionalisation and decentralisation have acquired 
different meanings. Although the term decentralisation in its 
general usage refers to any transfer of responsibility from 
the centre to lower authorities of a government structure, as 
will be discussed in detail in chapter one, it is useful to 
appreciate the distinction between regionalisation and 
decentralisation in the context of the Sudan. Regionalisation 
in the Sudan refers to the transfer of political authority by 
devolution either in its autonomous form, as was the case when 
the south was a self-governing region between 1972 and 1983, 
or, the semi-autonomous type, when the centre retains some 
supervisory powers. Since the unilateral abrogation of the 
1972 north-south peace accord in 1983, the whole of the Sudan 
has been divided into eight semi-autonomous regions with 
Khartoum province, in which Khartoum town, the capital city, 
lies, attaining a special provincial status (see figure 1.1).
The regions in the Sudan were formed by combining two or three 
provinces together. For example, the Darfur region in western 
Sudan (see figure 1.1) is a combination of north and south 
Darfur provinces. But, the separation of Darfur into north 
and south provinces only occured in 1976; before that it
- 13 -
constituted a single province whose existence went back to 
colonial times. In some cases, therefore, the present regions 
have some historical base in pre-colonial formations like the 
Kingdom of Darfur.
Decentralisation in the Sudan, on the other hand, specifically 
refers to the transfer of power to local governments. Local 
authorities are corporate budgetary units with powers to levy 
taxes and to expend them as they see fit on the services for 
which they are responsible. The "localness" of local
governments in the Sudan, distinguished in the way the
corporate power is legally allocated, has shifted between the 
province and the district. For example, the corporate base of 
local authorities between 1969 and 1981, during the Nimeiri 
regime, was at the provincial level. In 1981, however,
following the motto of "power to the people", the provinces 
were divided into a number of districts which became the base 
for corporate local authority.
Structure and Synopsis of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into four major parts and each part in 
turn is divided into chapters. In general terms, part one
deals with the conceptual framework of decentralisation both 
as a mechanism of national integration and as development 
administration. Part two is a background description of the 
root causes of the north-south divide and of the evolution of 
local government in the Sudan. Part three contains the case 
study which is based on an analysis of the decentralisation
- 14 -
policies of the Sudan as applied in the Southern Region during 
the Nimeiri regime. Finally, part four provides a concluding 
discussion on the policy implications of the south Sudan 
study for the Sudan as a whole and reassesses decentralisation 
in its application to the management of ethnicity and 
development administration in general. The following is a 
chapter by chapter synopsis:
Chapter one: Seeks to define what the term decentralisation
means both in its conceptual and contextual dimensions. 
Conceptually, the different meanings and the patterns that are 
ascribed to decentralisation are analysed in detail. 
Contextually, the focus is on the actual environment under 
which decentralisation operates. The issues of
decentralisation and centralisation are also discussed not in 
abstract terms but in connection with real country situations.
Chapter two: The twin objectives of decentralisation, as a
mechanism for national integration and for development 
administration, are discussed in detail. The chapter is thus 
divided into two sections. In the first section, issues
concerning ethnic-state relations and the coninuing search for 
political and administrative systems in post-independence 
Africa are explored. In the second section, a comparative 
analysis of four countries is made to measure the performance 
of decentralisation as development administration.
Chapter three: Offers background information on the Sudan
- 15 -
and on the root causes of the north-south divide. Since the 
Sudan was forged into a single entity by the Turko-Egyptian 
rule which started in 1820, the north-south relationship has 
always had an element of inequality and injustice against the 
south. With the policies of assimilation successive
governments followed in the post-independence period, the
\
north-south divide widened unabated until the coming to power 
in 1969 of President Nimeiri, who initially embraced the motto 
of unity with diversity. Although the north-south peace 
agreement which followed was short-lived (1972-1983), it 
nevertheless offers, a model upon which future north-south 
relations could be based. Hence this chapter is a detailed 
analysis of the historical developments of north-south 
relations.
Chapter four: The evolution of local administration in the
Sudan, as opposed to the political dimensions covered in 
chapter three, are the issues of concern here. In the first 
section of the chapter, the historical development of local 
administration is discussed and, in the second section, which 
focusses on the period of the Nimeiri regime, the 
decentralisation and regionalisation policies which were the 
hallmark of the regime are discussed in detail.
Chapter five: The social and economic situations that the
decentralised system was expected to improve are the issues of 
concern here. In the first section, aspects of regional 
inequalities are compared and in the second section, an
- 16 -
assessment is made of the level of poverty in south Sudan.
Chapter s i x : Contains three sections; the first describes the
1972 regional government Act by which the south became a self- 
governing region. In the second section an analysis is made 
of the vigorous regional politics which developed a p d , in the 
last section, how the region as a whole was managing its 
affairs under conditions of extreme poverty is discussed in 
de t a i l .
Chapter seven; Is a case study of one Area (District) 
Council; Wau, in South Sudan. It is based on a field research 
study of the management of primary education, for which the 
local councils were responsible. The research findings show 
that Wau council, faced with all sorts of shortages 
financial as well as manpower resources - had serious problems 
managing primary education. In the concluding discussion, the 
wisdom of decentralising substantial power to areas at a 
rudimentary stage of development is questioned.
Chapter e i g h t : In light of the issues raised in the previous
chapters and the research findings of the Wau case study, the 
policy implications and the choices for the Sudan are 
discussed. The Nimeiri regime period is again taken to 
illustrate both successes and failures of decentralisation as 
a means of national integration and development 
administrat i o n .
- 17 -
Chapter nine: Based on the arguments developed in the
previous chapters, a re-assesment is made of decentralisation 
policies in situations where multi-ethnicity and 
underdevelopment are dominant features. The need for a 
central authority that can promote appropriate policies in 
such cases is addressed. Using examples of relatively 
successful decentralisation experiences, the kind of state- 
ethnic relationships that must exist to avoid destructive 
conflicts are suggested. <?nly with political
stability can the development objectives of decentralisation 
be realised.
Finally, suggestions are made on future research needs and how 
they may enhance the study of decentralisation in situations 
where multi-ethnicity and poverty are dominant features.
- 18 -
PART I
DECENTRALISATION: 
CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS
FIGURE 1.1: POLITICAL MAP
THE SUDAN, 1982
36
C2^ Loke 
j  Nubia.
q[Por> Sudo
Dunouiab^l
N o r t l'e r r
bdroh r°
Ad D a m i rCHAD
N o m e
*V\ \ ' \  Kassalc) :o "P e rn  Ko '-cofon  ^ / J J c W c f f p  1 tgB
I ' ^\Wod AHoaan. \ I '
Ay Du * rayrr c y  . V \ y
AI ijbovvd *
White Ni\e\
■ y j  V *  ^  , «>*er— f7  lOcmo*.n* 0? \  Southern. D c rtu r \  o' oa,' a .y  •
V ,v  \  \  Southern K c rd o fc n  .-V O p o K -  - O f
l a B l
s O / u s :  n  E
J u n c ie
\ . /  
W estern  E quc tc ria )k i^  , Eoste
Yamoio —  ju b a ^
'  tq u o to r ia  ,
#  N o i’onc* ;cp.TO 
Reo.oro coo 'o  
o v in c ia i COC'C
— Coicrcc: 
EASTERN Reg tor 
Red Sea Prcv • rce
I Source: United States Government, Sudan Study, 1982
CHAPTER X
WHAT IS DECENTRALISATION ?
Introduct ion
Decentralisation is the latest fashion in development 
administration. It has universal appeal as a subject of 
research and also as a practical tool that can help to 
alleviate many of the general problems, for example, the 
delivery of services. The numerous works published in the 
last decade are indicative of a growing interest (Conyers, 
1984). A widely—held view attributes the shift in interest 
towards decentralisation to the disappointing results of 
centrally managed development plans. In general, the new 
decentralisation advocates allocation to sub-national units of 
the necessary powers for decision-making to enable them to 
tackle the many problems of development from the bottom-up. 
But the allocation of power, being a political decision, has 
varying patterns and degrees of central-subnational 
relationships. Inevitably, there are many, and often
conflicting, theoretical explanations of and prescriptions for 
the determination of central and subnational relationships.
fa
This chapter aims to analytically review some of the concepts,
A
theoretical assumptions and policy proposals of 
decentralisation particulary as they relate to the situation 
in Africa. There are three main sections and each in turn is 
divided into a number of subsections. The first section deals
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with the many meanings and definitions that have been accorded 
to decentralisation. In the second section a detailed analysis 
is made of the complex patterns of decentralisation and the 
third looks at issues concerned with central and local 
administrative relationships and responsibi1itites
This review draws on the literature on decentralisation mainly 
concerned with governmental systems. Decentralisation has 
also been applied in business and other forms of organisations 
and these are outside the scope of this chapter. The main 
interest here is the political environment that determine5the 
extent of decentralisation.
THE MEANING OF DECENTRALISATION 
Use of the term decentralisation is fraught with confusion in 
the literature of social sciences because "it can be used in 
a number of different ways and in significantly different 
contexts" (Conyers, 1984:1987). A major cause for this 
confusion is the convergence of a number of social science 
disciplines upon decentralisation; public administration, 
political science, administrative theory and, now, development 
studies. As a result there has been a considerable borrowing 
of concepts and empirical evidence of decentralisation (Hart, 
1972:605). The general .meaning of the term, derived from its 
Latin roots, is ’away from the c e n t r e ’ (Macmahon, 1961:15). 
This deceptively simple interpretation relates 
decentralisation to the transfer or shifting away of decision 
making or responsibility, for example, in governmental
- 22 -
systems, "by a central ruling group [to] other groups, each 
having authority within a specific area of the state" 
(Mawhood, 1983:4). But the transfer of decision making can be 
organized in different ways and in varying degrees with the 
delegation of responsibility, even in government systems, not 
restricted to the domain of the central ruling authority. 
Smith perceives the concept of delegation of decision making, 
as indication that "decentralisation is an administrative 
technique employed within unitary states; or within the states 
[or regions] of a federal union" (Smith, 1967;1). Smith was 
clear at the time that decentralisation "does not encompass 
the division of government powers within federal or confederal 
constitutions" (Smith 1967:1; see also Mawhood 1983;4-5). 
Smith has however shifted from this position and lately 
attributed to decentralisation a much wider application:
Decentralisation entails the subdivision of the 
s t a t e ’s territory into smaller areas and the 
creation of political and administrative 
institutions in those areas : . . . the countries and 
districts of England and Wales, or the departments 
and communes of France, for example. Another is 
federalism, which presents evidence of two of the 
major constitutional forms which decentralisation 
can take . . . Each of the constituent parts of a 
federation, such as the fifty states of the USA or 
the nineteen states of Nigeria, may be regarded as 
unitary states each with its own internal system of 
local government. Local governments themselves may 
employ various kinds of administrative 
decentralisation within the internal organizations 
of their administrative departments (Smith, 1985:1- 
2 ) .
The definition of decentralisation given in a United Nations 
publication limits its use to two forms of government
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organization: "Decentralisation: this term refers to the
transfer of authority on a geographic basis, whether by 
deconcentration (i.e. delegation) of authority to field units 
of the same department of level of government, or by 
devolution of authority to local government units of special 
statutory bodies" (UN publication No . St/TAO/M/62/Add.2. p . 92; 
see also UN, 1961). Rybicki (1971), quoting the UN 
publication also, expresses agreement that "decentralisation 
is not federalism". Perhaps the most far reaching definition 
of decentralisation is that given by Friedman who referred to 
it as including "deconcentration, delegation, devolution, or 
the assignment of functions to nongovernmental bodies" 
(Friedman, 1983;35-36). A definition not far from Friedman’s 
in the final analysis but expressed with added clarity is that 
provided by Rondinelli:
Decentralisation is ... the transfer or delegation 
of legal and political authority to plan, make 
decisions and manage public functions from the 
central government and its agencies to field 
organizations of those agencies, subordinate units 
of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, 
areawide or regional development authorities; 
functional authorities, autonomous local governments 
or nongovernmental organizations (Rondinelli, 
1981:137).
Mawhood and others (see Mawhood, e d , 1983) regard the 
generalization of the concept of decentralisation into a 
blanket term as unnecessarily confusing (Hamid, 1986;123) 
principally because they consider decentralisation and 
deconcentration as two quite different principles of
government organization:
- 24 -
Within the centrally directed hierarchy of public 
administration ... it is normal practice to shift 
outwards geographically the power to make certain 
types of decision. Every day of his life a field 
official uses his delegated authority to settle a 
range of individual c a s e s , and to regulate the work 
of his own office. It is a useful arrangement, 
every country has it, and there is a universally 
agreed word to describe it: deconcentration ... Far 
different from this, in the structuresof government, 
is the creation of bodies separated by law from the 
national centre, in which local representatives are 
given formal power to decide on a range of public 
matters .... Their area of authority is limited, but 
within that area their right to make decisions is 
entrenched by the law and can only be altered by new 
legislation ... This is the meaning of 
decentralisation (Mawhood, 1983:1-2).
The definitions Mawhood applies follow the continental 
European usage. In France, for example "decentralisation is 
a term reserved for the transfer of powers from the central 
government to an areally or functionally specialised authority 
of distinct legal personality (Fesler, 1968:370). 
Deconcentration on the other hand, is regarded as a technique 
of organization by which powers of decision making are 
delegated to officials within the same administrative 
hierarchy. Mawhood seems to suggest, however, that such a 
distinction is only useful when applied to a political system. 
In his words, "if we were simply making a study in public or 
private management, decentralisation might reasonably by taken 
to cover any shift of decision making outwards from the centre 
- to be identical, in fact, with deconcentration. But when a 
political element is brought in, as it must be in a study of 
government, the sharp difference between the two categories 
comes out" (Mawhood, 1983:2).
- 25 -
Whatever merit there would have been to stick to the "old" 
usage, Fesler (1968:370) is right to assert that efforts to 
obtain general acceptance of the neat French distinction have 
been unsuccessful (Maddick, 1963:23; M a c m a h o n , 1961:15-16;
Conyers, 1984:187; Bray, 1984:5). In many African countries 
it is certainly the case that the term decentralisation is 
used loosely to refer to "any transfer of authority from the 
national level to any organization or agency at the sub­
national level” (Conyers, 1983:101).
Given the diversity in the use of the term decentralisation, 
Macmahon is perhaps right to emphasise the impossibility of 
trying to standardize "by seeking to give it meaning that 
would be acceptable universally” (Macmahon, 1961:15). Some 
writers choose to overcome this problem by considering 
decentralisation as the inclusive term, with its various 
manifestations specified as types (Macmahan, 1961:15-16; 
Furniss, 1974:973; Friedman, 1983:35-36). In other words, to 
lessen misunderstanding when comparing government 
decentralisation systems, the general meaning of the term must 
be supplemented by qualifying definitions for the particular 
use in which it is to be employed (Lundqvist, 1972:13; 
Conyers, 1986:696; Macmahen, 1961:15). In this study also 
decentralisation is employed in its broad sense encompassing 
the terms deconcentration, devolution, delegation, federation 
and the assignment of functions to nongovernmental bodies.
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PATTERNS OF DECENTRALISATION
In political systems, the way in which decentralisation takes 
place, or rather, the way in which authority is delegated from 
higher to lower levels, inevitably differs not only from 
country to country but also within a single country. The 
notion of "away from the centre" inherent in the meaning of 
decentralisation is, however, a common denominator in all of 
its different uses. Six patterns of decentralisation are 
discussed in the following subsections. The distinction 
between them is basically determined by their legal status. 
As mentioned above, the extent of responsibility that is 
delegated can vary greatly from country to country. For 
example, the same term is used to describe the federal systems
TVrp.n fra 1 isation
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Figure 1.2: Patterns of Decentralization
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in Nigeria and the United States but the extent of powers
delegated are quite different. Similarly, forms of local
governments differ from country to country as their
an
responibilities are dependent the discretion of the central 
government (1.1).
Devolution
Devolution occurs when specified powers are delegated to sub­
national territorial units "to make certain decisions in some 
spheres of public policy" (Smith, 1967:1). The essence of 
devolution is "autonomy or system separateness involving the 
legal conferring of powers to discharge specified or residual 
functions upon formally constituted local authority" (see in 
Hamid, 1986:122). Following a similar line, Mullen (1985) 
understood devolution to mean "the transfer of functions or 
decision making authority from central government to legally 
incorporated and autonomous local government such as states, 
regions etc". The implication in this, according to Mullen, 
is "an independence from central government in discharging the 
function and existence of parallel systems of authority in a 
non-hierarchial order (and) often takes place when a function 
e.g. education, is designated as a provincial or local 
government function rather than a central government function" 
(Mullen, 1985:29).
For purposes of clarity, it is useful to discern devolution as 
having two forms: autonomous and semi-autonomous. The
autonomous form, what Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) regarded as
the ’purest form of d e v olution’, has one certain identifiable 
characteristic which is that the local units of government are 
accorded powers which lie "outside that command of the 
structure of central government . . . therefore, implies 
separateness, or diversity of structures within the political 
system" (Hyden, 1983:85; see also Rondinelli and Cheema, 
1983:22). According to the report of the Royal Commission on 
the Constitution of Scotland, produced in 1973 under the 
chairmanship of Lord Kilbrandon, "the more advanced forms of 
devolution involved the exercise of power by persons or bodies 
who, although acting on authority delegated by Parliament, are 
not directly responsible to it or the central government for 
their actions" (quoted by Hamid, 1986:122, H a m i d ’s emphasis). 
In Britain, the autonomous form of devolution is usually 
debated within party politics in reference to the ethnically 
differentiated regions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. How devolution is perceived in the British context was 
highlighted in the 1987 general election party political 
publications. The Labour party manifesto makes the following 
pl e d g e :
We shall legislate in the first Parliamentary 
session to establish a democratically elected 
Scottish Assembly in Edinburgh. This will have a 
wide range of powers over health, education and 
housing and over significant aspects of industrial 
and economic policy. It will take responsibility 
for changes in the structure of Scottish local 
government" (Labour manifesto, 1987:11).
The Social Democratic party and the Liberal party Alliance 
Programme for Government also pledged, using carefully
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selected terms, to recognize the government structure.
We will devolve power to nat ions and regions of 
Britain. We aim to establish an elected Scottish 
Par 1i ament, Welsh Sennet and elected regional 
assemblies throughout England*' (The SDP/Liberal 
Alliance Programme for Government, 1987, emphasis 
a d d e d ).
Among the developing countries, the cases of Papua New Guinea, 
where a substantial degree of political decentralisation at 
the province level is given (Axline, 1984:306; Conyers, 
1981:111; Bray, 1984:32), and the autonomous regional self- 
rule agreement that operated in South Sudan from 1972 - 1983, 
are examples of the autonomous form of devolution. In both 
cases, an elected parliamentary system having legislative and 
executive organs was instituted with its source of powers 
embodied in each c ountry’s constitution. Because of the 
significant degree of power devolved in such cases some 
writers have used the term quas i-f ederal to describe it 
(Axline, 1984:306; Conyers 1981:111).
The semi-autonomous form of devolution is more restrictive, in
that the central government maintains responsibility for the
framework of legislation and for major policy issues. Typical
of the semi-autonomous form is the British local government
system where the constituent units enjoy powers, within the
limits delegated to them, of administration, implementation
and the passing of ordinances having a local application, 
A
(Madick, 1963:23, Seeley, 1978:36). The semi-autonomous form 
k
of devolution is also a common feature of government
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organization in the developing countries where "local 
government units are given responsibility for some functions 
over which the central government often retains some 
supervisory powers and in which it may play an important 
financial role" (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:23). Financial 
control is in fact one of the instruments that all central 
governments use to secure a general conformity to their 
policies among individual local authorities. In Britain, the 
justification for such central control over local government 
finances was spelt out by Lord Bellwin, the government 
spokesman in the House of L o r d s :
Surely it is right for the Government to spotlight 
those authorities who are not willing to conform to 
national policy objectives. I am sure that the 
country at large thinks^right and proper that those 
authorities who refuse to co-operate should bear the 
cost. The Government are entitled to expect the co­
operation of local authorities whose individual 
local interests must be subordinate to the national 
interest (quoted by Duncan and Goodwin, 1985:20)*
Deconcentration
Deconcentration refers to the transfer of administrative 
functions within a government's organizational hierarchy, from 
a higher level to a lower level. A typical example is the 
distribution of administrative responsibilities from 
ministries at the central level to their representatives at 
lower levels. Such an arrangement is administrative in nature 
as the final decision making will remain with the delegating 
authority. Deconcentrating responsibilities can however vary 
widely from a mere shifting of workload at one end of the
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spectrum to the transfer of certain discretionary powers to 
field staff "to make routine decisions and adjust the 
implementation of central directives to local conditions", at 
the other end (Rondinel1i 1981:137; saw also M u l l e n , 1985:29).
Following Rondinelli’s classification, deconcentration can 
usefully be divided into two forms, namely "field
administration" (some writers prefer to call it functional 
deconcentration) and "local administration". Field
administration is a form of administrative organization found 
in many countries whereby areas of government function such as 
electricity, water supply, telecommunication and postal 
services, may be territorially divided according to individual 
administrative convenience and not necessarily follow the 
constituent area divisions (Smith, 1967:12; Howell, 1974:2).
Local administration on the other hand, "is a form of
deconcentration in which all the subordinate levels of 
government within a country are agents of the central
government... Local functions are performed under the 
technical supervision and control of central ministries, and 
the heads of the local administration serve at the pleasure of 
the n a t i o n ’s chief executive" (Rondinelli, 1981:137). Local 
administration may be integrated or unintegrated. When the 
various central ministry field representatives are required to 
function, by the provision of statutory law, in a coordinated 
way under the supervision of a chief executive administrator, 
usually the representative of the ministry of internal affairs 
or local government, this is called integrated local
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administration. Organizationally, the field staff remain 
responsible to their respective central ministries, that is, 
they may be hired and paid by the centre. Administratively, 
however, they are accountable for the efficient performance of 
their duties to the chief executive who also has the power to 
confirm and render reports on them. The French prefectorial 
system of government is usually considered to be the ’’classic" 
case of the integrated form.
In a prefectorial system, such as that established 
by Napoleon, the national government divides the 
country into areas [departments] and places a 
Prefect in charge of each. The Prefect represents 
the whole government, and all specialised field 
agents in the area are under his supervision. The 
several ministries either directly or through a 
central agency issue instructions to the Prefect, 
who then instructs his specialised subordinates, 
after adapting his instructions to the conditions of 
his area. Similarly, communications upward to the 
ministries flow through the prefe c t , .... [The 
prefectorial system] has been widely adopted in 
recent times and has been the dominant pattern in 
colonial administration (Fesler, 1968:374).
In the unintegrated system, the various field staff 
representing central ministries are operationally independent 
of each other. Coordination between the various
representatives, if it exists, is dependent on the competence 
of the chief local administrator. Although the chief local 
administrator in such a case has no legal backing to directly 
control other functional departments, nevertheless his strong 
political position will make him a natural coordinator of the 
field representatives. But the question remains as to what 
actually is, in the unintegrated system, the responsibility of
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the chief executive? "Why should", as Smith (1967) asks, for 
example "the central government appoint a general 
administrator to a province when most central administration 
is carried out by individual departments and ministries"? 
According to Smith, the answer is partly administrative and 
partly political:
It is still politically expedient for some countries 
to maintain an office with general responsibility 
for peace, order and stability in the province. The 
long established traditions of his office and the 
fact that for most people that office is almost 
indistinguishable from the ordinary p e r s o n ’s concept 
of "the Government" means that the Prefect (known as 
governor or commissioner in other countries) may 
enjoy great authority, and a corresponding power in 
his area, despite the absence of legal supremacy. 
This may be extremely useful for a national 
executive wishing to "dampen down" local provincial 
loyalties (Smith, 1967:90).
Tanzania is a country which has experienced various types of 
decentralized government administration and provides a good 
example of why a certain form prevailed at a particular period 
of its history. Tanzania was under British rule during the 
colonial period and by far the most dominant model of British 
colonial administration in Africa was the prefector^al system. 
The basic features of the British colonial administration in 
Africa "were borrowed from India where a system of rule, very 
much inspired by N a p o l e o n ’s (and thus French) ideas of 
government had been established in the nineteenth century" 
(Hyden, 1983:87; see also Friedman, 1983:36). British 
colonial administration in Africa, however, followed the 
unintegrated form which was known as indirect rule or indirect
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administration. Indirect rule "prescribes government by the 
co-operation of indigenous political elements" (Smith, 
1967:85) or, according to Lugard, its principal promoter, the 
idea was to leave the local population to "manage their own 
affairs, through their own rulers, proportionately to their 
degree of advancement, under the guidance of British staff and 
subject to the laws and policy of the administration" (quoted 
in Smith, 1967:85). Usually, an amalgamation of a number of 
Native Authorities (1.2) would form a district which became 
the focus of British colonial administration. The District 
Commissioner, as the chief government representative at this 
level, was responsible for example, for the supervision of 
Native Authority functions, the collection of taxes, 
magisterial duties such as hearing of appeals and, above all, 
ensuring political stability:
The idea (of establishing native councils) was to 
contain budding territorial African nationalism. 
One way to do this was to formalize and localize the 
arena of political agitation, but at the same time 
to do so in a manner that ensured the effective 
control of such institutions by the regime (Oyugi, 
1983:112).
The District Commissioner was a generalist administrator and 
as such had no direct responsibility over the technical 
departments, who were directly answerable to their ministries 
at the centre. Nevertheless, being in a strong political 
position he usually acted as the coordinator of their 
operations (Kasfir, 1983:124-125). As a whole, the
unintegrated form of deconcentrated administration in the
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British colonies, as Niculescu observed, offered "both the 
cheapest and the most efficient system .... at least as long 
as what was wanted was peace, order and, generally speaking, 
a holding of the fort" (Niculescue, 1958:38).
Towards the end of colonial rule in Africa, the British 
colonial administration changed its policy, favouring the 
advancement of democratization of local government (Ola, 
1984:39; Hyden, 1983:88). The shift in policy was the result 
of the coming to power of a Labour Government in Britain whose 
ideas were influenced by the Fabians, a philosophical group 
within the governing Labour Party. "The real point, for the 
Fabians, whether in Britain or in the colonies, was that good 
or very efficient government was not to be preferred to self- 
government" (Ola, 1984:39). According to Ola, "this view of 
the Fabian Society was to become the Labour P a r t y ’s official 
position" (p39). In an important British Local Government 
Dispatch of 1947, the new Colonial Secretary elaborated his 
government’s policy as follows:
Territories should be administered by colonial 
powers as a trust for the Native inhabitants .... a 
primary object of the administration should always 
be to train the native inhabitants in every possible 
way, so that they may be able in the shortest 
possible time to govern themselves. (quoted in Ola, 
1984:38) .
The new policy directives were drastic in nature as they 
implied the end of the Native Authority system and "indeed in 
due course the institutions of indirect rule in many countries
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were replaced by more modern local government structures, in 
many countries based on the English model” (Smith, 1967:113). 
The post of the District Commissioner was in many cases 
abolished along with the Native Authorities and in others, for 
example Tanzania and Nigeria, it was retained although in a 
somewhat different capacity. In Tanzania, the District 
Commissioner was given an ex officio seat in the council and 
as the elected councillors were "business or professional men, 
the District Commissioner’s brief was to represent the 
interest of the less-educated masses" (Mawhood, 1983:79). As 
in many other British colonial governments during this period, 
local authorities in Tanzania were given a wide range of 
responsibilities including powers to directly employ 
department heads and the necessary work force to run their own 
affairs. Thus the last years of the British colonial period 
saw an attempt to establish semi-autonomous local governments 
at sub-national levels and a parliamentary political system at 
the centre that would form the basis for political 
independence (Post 1970:31).The local governments established 
by the British colonial governments in Africa were not to 
survive long after independence. "The speed with which 
decentralized local governments were dismantled after 
independence is surprising ... Their removal was so decisive 
and universal that when Wraith produced the second edition of 
his Local Government in West Africa, he pointedly retitled it 
Local Administration ... He could no longer find any local 
governments with control over their budgets nor any with 
autonomous policy-making powers" (Kasfir, 1983:32). District
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councils in Tanzania too had their powers curtailed soon after 
independence and were headed by political appointees replacing 
the generalist District Commissioners. This arrangement 
itself was only a temporary measure and by 1967 the councils 
were abolished altogether (Mawhood, 1983:87).
The change of the administrative structure in Tanzania was 
hastened in 1967 following the Arusha Declaration wherein the 
ruling party leadership set out their political and 
developmental orientations and in the case of the latter gave 
emphasis to a strategy of self-reliance (Nyerere, 1972:1). 
"The primary objective of the new strategy was to permit a 
less uncertain, a more domestic needs-oriented and a more 
socially responsive utilization of investible resources" 
(Bienefeld, 1982:300. In order to achieve the objective a 
development oriented government structure was devised: "At the 
regional level powers [were] vested in the regional 
development committees, which [were] composed of a combination 
of civil servants, party officials and representatives of 
local organizations. At the district level a new body, known 
as the District Development Council, [was] formed, supported 
by a district development and planning committee. The new 
District Councils, which have replaced the former local 
government council, include locally elected representatives, 
civil servants, party officials and members of parliament" 
(Conyers, 1981:109). At the regional level, Regional 
Commissioners were appointed whose position was given 
ministerial status (Mawhood, 1983:98). As the chief
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representatives of the government the Regional Commissioners 
also acted as chairmen of the Regional Development and 
Planning Committees and, at the district level, similar 
functions were performed by Area Commissioners. Former 
President Julius Nyerere, in a policy proposal document, was 
clear as to why the new integrated form of deconcentrated 
administration would best suit his country:
At present, each functional officer is responsible 
only to his own Ministry in Dar es Salam (the 
capital), so that it is extremely difficult to work 
out a Regional or District development or problem 
solving scheme which calls for co-ordinated action. 
Thus, for example, if all the different functional 
officers based in a District get together to work 
out the solution to a particular village problem, 
each of them has then to apply to his own Ministry 
for any little money which may be necessary, or even 
sometimes for permission to devote his or her own 
energies to that project. Then if one Ministry 
refuses permission, the whole scheme can fall to the 
ground (Nyerere, 1972:1).
Under N y e r e r e ’s policy directive, the Commissioners were 
expected to “devote a great deal of their time to political 
education for socialist development" and were required "to 
think in terms of development, and not in terms of 
administration on the traditional civil service lines" 
(Nyerere, 1972:4-5). Nyerere had also, at least on paper, 
tackled matters of finance and the need to strengthen the 
centre to "co-ordinate Regional activities... [and] to provide 
clear policy direction and planning for the Regional and 
District Authorities" (p.9).
Despite what seemed to be a well thought out development
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oriented government structure adopted by Tanzania in the 
1970s, the outcome is usually associated with failure rather 
than with success (Bienefeld, 1982; Hyden, 1983; Raikes, 
1983). "Economically, Tanzania did no better than her
neighbours, and in many ways worse, during the 1970s . . . .
Management in the rural sector was quite clearly not giving 
the nation what it needed ... [and] by the end of the decade, 
President Nyerere was speaking of an intention to revive the 
elected district councils ..." (Mawhood, 1983:99). 
Accordingly, a new legislation was passed in 1982 by which all 
existing laws on local government were replaced and so the 
pendulum has swung once again towards the semi-autonomous type 
of devolved government.
Federal ism 
*■ e.
- discussing considerations of federalism as a form of
decentralisation it would first be helpful to describe the 
general characteristics of a federal system of government and 
how it differs from other systems.
In a federal system sovereignty is divided between 
two levels of government. The federal government is 
sovereign in some matters and the [provincial] (1.3) 
governments are sovereign in others. Each within 
its own sphere exercises its power without control 
from the other, and neither is subordinate to the 
other. It is this feature which distinguishes a 
federal from a unitary constitution. In the latter 
all sovereignty rests with the central government; 
if provincial governments exist they are subordinate 
authorities, deriving their power from the central 
legislature, which may overrule them at any time by 
the ordinary legislative process*^(The report of the 
Royal Commission on the constitution to Scotland. 
1973:152) .
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"The essential institutions of federalism are in which both 
kinds of governments rule over the same territory and people 
and each kind has the authority to make some decisions 
independently of the other" (Riker, 1964:5). Watt's, following 
W h e a r e ’s ’c l a s sical’ definition, described federalism "as a 
political system characterized by two sub-systems ... in which 
the component governments are co-ordinate, in the sense that 
neither is politically subordinate to the other, but which 
interact with each other at many points both co-operatively 
and competitively" (Watts, 1970:8; see also Duchacek, 
1970:192-193).
Saha and Srivastava (1980:37) have raised opposition to the 
"traditionalist definition", as they called it, arguing that 
the definition merely reflects the constitutional arrangement 
instituted in the old European "settler" colonies of America, 
Canada and Australia. They are particularly critical of the 
traditionalist definition which takes the American 
constitution as a "classical" case and considers all 
departures from it as dilutions of the federal principle, to 
be labelled as quasi-federal; see also Watts, 1970:5). Their 
main argument hinges on the fact that any constitutional 
arrangement reflects certain national particulars which do not 
make it any more or less ’p u r e ’ when compared with others. 
They give two major reasons, for example, for the difference 
between federalism in India and federal systems in Western 
countries. The first fundamental difference, they argue, 
stems from history. In the settler federations like the USA,
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Australia or Canada, they contend that the main objective of 
the federal system was to consolidate and legitimize the 
occupation of new continents by a mainly homogeneous European 
population and to harmonize the conflicting interests of 
different groups within the settler population in the process 
of sharing out the real estate. In India, on the other hand, 
the different sub-national groups with their distinctive 
linguistic and cultural identities have several thousand years 
of continuous historical association and in wanting to 
maintain this unity with diversity, used federalism as a tool 
for weaving into one body politic the different groups.
The second major difference, according to Saha and Srivastava, 
stems from the two entirely different political and economic 
environments in which the American, the Canadian and the 
Australian constitutions on the one hand and the Indian 
constitution on the other, were written. "The three Western 
constitutions were written within the broad framework of a 
dominant political philosophy of free enterprise and of 
minimal state involvement in economic affairs". In contrast 
"the Indian constitution was drafted at a time when the issue 
of greatest contemporary relevance was that of the rising 
expectations of the previously colonised people of reaching 
levels of living comparable to those prevailing in 
metropolitan countries" (1980:38). Furthermore, they implied 
that, in India, central planning requiring extensive state 
control of the economy, and not free enterprise, was the 
dominant political philosophy of the time (p.38). According
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to Mawhood (1984:524) , such a political philosophy "emphasised 
the unitary bias that was given to the new constitution" in 
I ndia.
It is perhaps misleading the way the term federalism has very 
often been unreservedly related with the process of uniting or 
the coming together of different independent territorial units 
(see, for example Wheare, 1963). In fact, the majority of 
federal governments today were not created through the 
amalgamation of independent units, but from a national state 
that already existed and whose central authorities then used 
federalism as a mechanism of sharing power with the 
constituent units. In the United States itself, the original 
signatories of the Union were only thirteen states as most of 
the remaining states were created later from what was a 
federal territory.
Whatever the background in their creation, real differences 
exist between different federal arrangements. In some federal 
government systems, the United States of America, Canada and 
Australia, for example, the division of power between the 
federal government and the provincial governments is enshrined 
in the constitution which cannot be subjected to amendment at 
the sole discretion of either party. Any amendment can only 
be achieved by special procedures designed in such a way that 
the proposed change must have widespread support. To 
Friedrich, it is the "effective separate representation in the 
amending of the constitutional charter itself (that) provide
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reasonably precise criteria for a federal as contrasted with 
a merely decentralized order of government" (1968:6). In some 
other federal government systems, however, for example India 
and Nigeria, the parliaments of the union have such powers 
that they can "increase or diminish the area of any state and 
[they] may alter the boundaries or name of any state" and, 
under certain emergency situations, the parliaments of the 
union may even "convert the union into a unitary state" 
(Wheare, 1963:27-29).
The name apart, the similarity between the federal systems in 
India and Nigeria and that of some decentralized unitary 
nations is striking. In Italy and Papua New Guinea, for
example, the way power is delegated to the territorial sub 
units is such that, as with federal systems, it has mechanisms 
of constitutional protection. Thus, Smith makes the point 
that "distinction between federal and unitary states (is) much 
less clear than it is sometimes believed to be ..." (Smith, 
1985:13). For Ehrlich too, "there is no difference in 
substance" between what he termed as "federal
decentralisation" and other forms of "high level territorial 
decentralisation" (Ehrlich, 1984:360-361). Riker has even 
gone as far as saying that "so difficult is it to distinguish 
federations from other systems of government that it is a 
myth" (see in Smith, 1985:15).
When considering the functioning of federations rather than
the process of their formation, the range of problems they
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experience in intergovernmental relations are, in fact, not 
dissimilar to those found in the unitary states. "To speed up 
economic progress, to eliminate territorially uneven social 
and economic development, and to ensure national security, it 
seems imperative to provide for centralization of economic and 
political powers on which nationally unified policy and action 
may be based. Such centralizing tendencies in federal systems 
have complicated our task of differentiating with any degree 
of precision a federal from a unitary system (Duchacek, 
1970:348). The federal government of Nigeria, for example, 
like many other unitary governments in Africa, has been forced 
to respond to ethnic and regional differences and has 
accordingly reorganized its administrative structure. At 
independence in 1960, Nigeria *» r constituted three states. 
By 1963, a fourth region was added, and in 1967 Nigeria was 
divided into 12 states. Since 1976, 19 states constitute the 
federation of Nigeria (Ikporukpo, 1986:130). In the United 
States too, whatever the original intention of the federal 
declaration was, it is generally agreed that modern pressures 
have caused power to gravitate more towards the centre (Smith, 
1985:13; Royal Commission of the Constitution to Scotland, 
1973). Vile even suggested that in the United States the 
concentration of power at the centre has become so great that 
the country may be moving out of a system of federalism into 
one of decentralized unitary government (Vile, 1973). The 
point is that in the United States there is now greater 
federal involvement not only in the supervision of standards 
and the distribution of funds to state governments, but also,
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in the operation of a number of programmes. As a result, 
there is a continuing debate on the need to "sort out" 
intergovernmental sharing of responsibilities (Posner and 
Fastrup, 1987), subject matters which are commonly discussed 
in decentralized unitary states. Thus, given the similarity 
in the actual operation of governments, it would seem 
unjustified to exclude federalism from the general concept of 
decentralisation. As Smith rightly suggests, "the range of 
levels of decentralisation which federalism itself is capable 
of producing makes it necessary to include federations in 
[the] investigations into decentralized government" (1985:17).
Delegat ion
Delegation occurs when decision-making and management 
responsibility are conferred upon semi-independent 
organizations such as public corporations, regional planning 
and area development authorities (Rondinelli, 1981:138). 
Organizationally, parastatals (state-owned enterprises) do not 
normally come under the direct control of central government 
ministries, nevertheless, they are ultimately responsible to 
the central government (Mullen, 1985:29;). State-owned 
enterprises, as, in - r transport and communication,
national airways, railway services, telecommunication 
services, in — •- • - < public utilities,
electricity, gas and water and large scale state-owned 
enterprises such as mining, manufacturing and finance, are 
organizations which normally receive their powers through the 
mechanism of decentralisation by delegation. In this sense,
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"delegation implies the transfer of creation of broad 
authority to plan and implement decisions concerning specific 
activities ... to an organization that is technically and 
administratively capable of carrying them out without direct 
supervision by a higher administrative unit" (Rondinelli and 
Cheema, 1983:21). A distinguishing characteristic of state- 
owned enterprises from other public organizations under direct 
government control is that they derive their revenue from the 
sale of goods and services because they are self-accounting 
and have a separate legal identity (World Bank Report, 
1983:75) .
Management of state-owned enterprises by delegation has, in 
theory, "a distinct advantage over regular government agencies 
in that they could make decisions more expeditiously, free 
from the red tape and political manoeuvring found in 
bureaucracies .... and could operate outside the constraints 
raised by procurement regulations and civil service 
requirements" (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:21-22). In 
practice, however, state-owned enterprises are "given other 
objectives and exposed to pressures from politically powerful 
sectional interests" (World Bank Report, 1983:50). "The 
challenge is", the World Bank Report of 1983 suggests, "to 
design a system that holds management accountable for results 
while giving it the power to achieve them" (p78).
However parastatal organizations are viewed, their number has 
been on the rise in most countries. "Kenya, for instance, had
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approximately twenty such bodies at independence ... by 1979 
that figure had trebled . . . Nigeria witnessed an even more 
rapid expansion. By 1973 it had some 250 publicly owned
enterprises ... in the late 1970s, Tanzania had over 350 
parastatals covering sizeable operations in all sectors of the 
economy" (Hyden, 1983:97). A wide variety of reasons are 
given for creating semi - independent state-owned enterprises by 
governments:
Whereas some have an ideological preference for 
public control, others have travelled the same route 
for more pragmatic reasons. They may have wanted to 
wrest control of key enterprises from foreign owners 
(Egypt in 1956 and Madagascar in 1974) or from 
minority ethnic groups (Uganda in the 1970s); in 
other instances, enterprises were inherited by the 
state after independence (Bangladesh in 1972) or a 
revolution (Portugal in 1974), or as a result of 
private sector bankruptcies. Governments have used 
nationalization to capture the rents from 
exploitation of minerals and, where national 
security is involved (as in arms manufacture), to 
exercise direct military control. In other
instances, governments have decided to take the lead 
in starting a major new industry in the absence of 
private investors ..." (World ’Bank Report, 
1983:50).
of public administration is another reason 
the Third World, with the support of most 
international lending institutions, have been delegating more 
functions to public corporations and special authorities 
(Rondinelli, 1981:138). The quantitative increase has also 
meant that state-owned enterprises play a major role in the 
economies of most countries. "Information available suggests 
that in the early 1960s the share of the public sector in 
capital formation in Ghana was approximately half of the
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Severe limitations 
why governments in
n a t i o n ’s total ... in Tanzania it was responsible for 80% in 
1978" (Hyden, 1983:99; World Bank Report, 1983). This being 
the case, it is surprising that parastatals receive negligible 
attention (Morrison, 1986) and particularly so in the field of 
study that comes under the umbrella of decentralisation. 
Understanding the important issues in the institutional links 
between government and parastatals would seem necessary 
particularly when decentralisation is seen not in terms of 
administration alone but also as a tool for achieving 
development (Conyers, 1986:598).
Assignment of Functions to Nongovernmental Bodies 
There cannot be a country in the world where nongovernmental 
organizations, of one form or the other, do not exist. 
Leaving aside the question as to why they exist in the first 
place, it is generally acknowledged that nongovernmental 
organizations perform important social and "developmental" 
functions. In Britain, voluntary organizations like Save the 
Children Fund, Oxfam, Help the Aged, the British Refugee 
Council, The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals etc. , are all organizations which play important roles 
both at home and abroad. In the developing countries, 
religious organizations, co-operative movements, self-help 
organizations and farmers associations have been playing vital 
roles in facilitating services and resources. The self-help 
schemes in Kenya, for example, have been involved not only in 
supplementing government efforts in the construction of 
schools and health centres but also directly participating in
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economic development projects with impressive results in terms 
of projects completed (Wallis, 1982:12-13).
Governments have recognised, in many cases, the contribution 
that nongovernmental organisations can make as being 
complementary to their function. Governmental recognition may 
also result in the nongovernmental organizations receiving 
financial, material or expert assistance from central 
authorities. In some cases, formal linkages between
governments and nongoverment organizations may be created 
without the latter being subjected to much central government 
intervention or control. When governments decide to pass part 
of their functions to nongovernmental bodies, decentralisation 
by assignment of function is what takes place. Governments 
may also "decentralize by shifting responsibility for 
producing goods or supplying services to private 
organizations; a process often called privatization" 
(Rondinelli, 1983:24).
Several writers have argued, as Rondinelli does, that "for 
development purposes, the capacity of local governments to 
carry out programmes and projects effectively and through 
reciprocal relationships with other organizations may be more 
significant than their legal status as independent units" 
(Rondinelli, 1983:24; see also Baviskar, 1985). Uphoff and 
Esman have also pointed out that "what makes the most 
difference are systems or networks of organization that make 
local development more than an enclave phenomenon" (quoted by
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Rondinelli, 1985:24). Hyden even goes farther by arguing for 
the need to invest more resources in nongovernmental 
organizations; giving as the reason the failure of the public 
sector to cope with development tasks in many African 
countries. He argued, "even if governments could become more 
efficient and effective in performing their duties, they 
cannot serve as universal dispensers of services and 
resources. Other institutions are needed to complement 
government" (Hyden, 1983:120; Cheema, 1985:226 also makes a 
similar argument).
CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALISATION 
Problems of Measurement
It is important to recognize that "both centralization and 
decentralisation are processes of changes rather than fixed 
states" (Conyers, 1986:30) and in practice neither full 
centralization nor full decentralisation could exist. As 
Fesler remarked in this connection, "total decentralisation 
would require the withering away of the state, whereas total 
centralization would imperil the s t a t e ’s capacity to perform 
its functions" (Fesler, 1968:371). Whether a government 
system is characterized as "centralist" or "decentralist" is 
dependent on some relevant elements that prevail with respect 
to intergovernmental distribution of administrative and 
political powers (Wright, 1984:100). A governmental system 
that seeks to distribute decision making powers from higher to 
lower levels of government with the objective of increasing 
the participatory role of the latter would be considered a
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decentralist system. A centralist system on the other hand, 
would concentrate most of the decision making function in the 
hands of the central authorities (Lyons, 1985:86; Cornford, 
1975:11 ) .
The indicators commonly used to determine relative degrees of 
decentralisation or centralization (despite serious problems 
with this measure as will be discussed below) can be 
conveniently summarized under three headings 
intergovernmental distribution of functions; intergovernmental 
financial relations and central government control mechanisms 
(see, for example, Bulpitt, 1983:20). Firstly, the degree of 
decentralisation will tend to be less when local governments 
powers lack the latitude to carry out important functions. 
The execution of these important functions may instead be 
carried out by agents of the central government. Secondly, 
where the source of revenue allocated to local governments is 
such that their existence is dependent to a large extent on 
central grant-in-aid, it may be indicative of power relations 
which inhibit local independence. Finally, decentralisation 
may be undermined "when the central authorities possess a 
large number of controls over the operations of local 
governments. These controls can be of financial, judicial, 
administrative or legislative character and, if used, result 
in considerable restrictions on the autonomy of local 
authorities as regard the election or nomination of its 
personnel, its decision making process and the nature of its 
policy output" Bulpitt, 1983:21).
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Power sharing is, however, a complex phenomenon which admits 
of numerous possible arrangements and a great deal of 
variation in degree. "It is this that makes available 
measures only a faut de mieux approach to comparing degrees of 
decentralisation among countries or among different time 
periods in a single country" (Fesler, 1965:537). Riker 
(1964:5) has suggested, however, that it would be possible to 
compare federal constitutions by rank-ordering them along a 
minimum-maximum continuum according to the degree of 
independence one kind of the pair of governments has from the 
other kind. At the minimum end "the ruler(s) of the 
federation can make decisions in only one narrowly restricted 
category of action without obtaining the approval of the 
rulers of the constituent units (the minimum is one category 
of action, not zero, because if the ruler(s) of the federation 
rule nothing, neither a federation nor even a government can 
be said to exist)", and, at the maximum end of the continuum, 
"the ruler(s) of the federation can make decisions without 
consulting the rules of the member governments in all but one 
narrowly restricted category of action" (Riker, 1964:5-6). 
Most contentiously, Riker mentions the Soviet Union as an 
example of a federation at the maximum end, and, implicitly 
the United States federation at the minimum end. Fesler 
(1968:371), perhaps adopting R i k e r ’s minimum-maximum 
continuum, has also suggested that "centralization and 
decentralisation are best regarded as opposite tendencies on 
a single continuum whose poles are beyond the range of any 
real political system". Accordingly, "it should be possible
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to compare individual political and administrative systems by 
noting their relative position on the continuum. Fesler adds 
that "it should also be possible to characterize any single 
political or administrative system, over a given time period, 
as moving toward one or the other pole" (1968:371).
Cross-national assessment of centralization and 
decentralisation, as said above, is extremely hazardous 
because of the inherent methodological problems, particularly 
with qualitative methods of measurement (Wright, 1984:99). 
Garrish makes this point clear in his study of centralization 
and decentralisation in England and France where he emphasises 
the danger of comparing two structures without taking into 
account the differences in geography, history and cultural and 
institutional heritage (Garrish, 1986:145). For example, he 
dismisses the contrast often drawn between "a decentralist 
England with more or less self-governing local authorities and 
a centralist France where there was no conception of local 
government ... even before French decentralisation [the 1981 
reform] began", as misleading. He argues that "England has 
always been a highly unitary state" where local authorities, 
"by comparison with other Western countries as well as France, 
exist to the will of Government which is able to change the 
local government map and change the financial support system 
by legislation more easily than would be possible elsewhere". 
Garrish emphasises the point that "everything local governments 
do they can do only because Parliament has given them the 
power. . . [but] what parliament has given it can also take
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away" (p.148). By comparison, according to Garrish, "France 
is more of a corporate state than a centralized one":
[In] France, before or after decentralisation, the 
division of functions between central and local 
government is relatively clear-cut. There are still 
a fair number of control systems within particular 
services but there are very few functions shared 
between central and local government. There is 
therefore less need for a strong State presence on 
the ground and less personal mediation or 
negotiation, particularly with the gradual 
dismantling of specific grant system and the 
technical controls which went with them". (Garrish, 
1986:148) .
The roles of the Prefects and the Maires in the French system 
is another area which leads to the system being perceived as 
centralist (de Forges 1975; Irving, 1975; Machin, 1979; Booth, 
1985). Unlike the prefectorial systems adopted in many other 
countries, particularly in the developing countries where the 
Prefect is usually a political representative whose brief is 
to safeguard the interests of the central government, in 
France, "the Prefect [is] as much the advocate of his 
Department as its controller [and] because of the almost 
universal ’Cumul des M a d a s ', [even] powerful local Maires who 
[are] at the same time Deputies, Senators or Ministers could, 
even while in opposition, exercise great personal influence in 
favour of their towns". In this way, "not only [is] the State 
strong in the provinces but the provinces [are] strong in 
Paris" (Garrish, 1986:149; see also, Booth, 1985). The very 
fact that France has by far the smallest units (36,000 
communes and about 80% of them with fewer than 1,000 
inhabitants) of administration in Europe must mean that the
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individual is also a lot closer to the power of the state 
(Booth, 1985:6). In other words, the system enables more 
people to participate more effectively, which is one of the 
main reasons why pluralists advocate decentralisation (see 
Dunleavy and O ’Leary, 1987:57-70). Taking these points into 
consideration, it would indeed be difficult to outrightly 
claim that the British system is more decentralized than the 
French system. An equally misleading stereotype, as that of 
Riker mentioned above, has been the frequent portrayal of the 
United S t a t e s ’ federal arrangement as the "purest” and hence 
the most decentralized federal system and the Soviet U n i o n ’s 
as the most centralized (see also W h e a r e , 1963; Watts, 1970). 
Leaving aside ideologies and value judgements it would be 
extremely difficult to compare the two systems with any 
certainty as the constitutions of their federal systems have 
started from separate traditions based on historical and 
cultural differences. On the face of it, the constitution of 
the Soviet Union did, in fact, offer a greater degree of 
political decentralisation given the fact that it contains 
provisions recognizing the right of the individual republics 
to territorial self determination including secession from the 
union. In contrast, the American constitution neither allows 
secession by any state nor expulsion of any state by the 
federal government (Duchacek, 1970:218). If the reality of 
decentralisation in both countries were to be measured 
accurately in' terms of the amount of independence enjoyed by 
the sub-national units, it may well turn out to be that the 
United States federal system is relatively more decentralized
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than the Soviet U n i o n ’s federal system, but, the gap may not 
be so much that they would be placed on the opposing poles of 
R i k e r ’s minimum-maximum continuum.
The Role of Centralization in Decentralisation
Critical treatment of decentralisation in terms of its 
shortcomings is very scant in the literature of the social 
sciences. A good deal of what is covered about
decentralisation is usually concerned with what are regarded 
as obstacles to decentralisation and problems of 
overcentralization, implicitly taking for granted that 
decentralisation is "good” and centralization is ’’ba d ” . 
Decentralisation has noble ideals, there is general consensus 
on that, but what seems to be wrong is when decentralisation 
is considered as negating centralization, which would lead to 
anarchy. Decentralisation tends to generate enormous passion 
to the extent of ignoring the fact that, for it to work, there 
must be a centralized organizational set-up in existence 
(Hart, 1972:605). The choice of any one form of
decentralisation is, after all, a political policy outcome 
(Wright, 1984:100; Smith, 1985 preface).
In this connection, Fesler is right to raise some linguistic 
problems and how scientific discussion is handicapped as a 
result. As he said, "we appear to have neither a term that 
embraces the full [centralization-decentralisation] continuum 
. . . nor a term that specifies the middle range where 
centralizing and decentralizing tendencies are substantially
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in balance” (Fesler, 1965:537; 1968:371). Susan Hadden (1980) 
has avoided this problem by using the expression "controlled 
decentralisation" to explain a successful rural 
electrification programme in the Indian state of Rajasthan. 
The rural electrification programme was initiated by a central 
authority but planned and implemented by a local government 
agency. Hadden attributes the achievement of the programme to 
"efficiency", which, in turn, was achieved because higher 
level authorities established enforceable criteria for the 
programme whilst at the same time ensuring that it was 
feasible with the necessary powers delegated to lower level 
governmental bodies - hence, controlled decentralisation 
(Hadden, 1980:172). Hadden further explains the advantages of 
controlled decentralisation as follows:
Controlled decentralisation may retain the best 
features of centralization and decentralisation. It 
employs the long-range perspective of higher level 
bodies that set the technical criteria, while 
incorporating the short-range perspective of local 
officials who set additional political criteria ... 
The best use of controlled decentralisation depends 
on effective use of technical advice by high-level 
officials in the setting of the criteria designed to 
operationalize the economic goals of the programme 
... Controlled decentralisation may lower the cost 
to higher levels of government of control over lower 
levels by making the granting of funds routinely 
contingent upon the fulfilment of certain conditions 
(Hadden, 1980:188-189).
The essence of controlled decentralisation is quite 
straightforward, that is, for decentralisation to be effective 
there must exist an effective "centre" as well. In its 
absence, what results can be discerned from Uma L e l e ’s
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observation in Tanzania ; "one of the lessons learnt from 
Tanzania is that decentralisation creates a demand for a 
strong centre capable of both professional advice and 
coordination of field activities. The Prime M i n i s t e r ’s office 
was unable to perform the latter function because of serious 
staff shortage ..." (quoted by Hyden, 1983:93).
In governmental systems, the subject of decentralisation must 
therefore be one that deals with the relationship between the 
central and territorial units of government in terms of 
whether one or another form of decentralisation is possible, 
feasible or even desirable in any given situation. Annmarie 
Hauck Walsh (1969), having made a comparative study of 
thirteen urban governments in different parts of the world, 
took this issue quite seriously and is worth quoting at 
l e ngth:
Several fallacies are common in the treatment of 
decentralisation by reformers and analysts. First, 
decentralisation is viewed as a singular process 
rather than a multidimensional set of relationships. 
Second, decentralisation and centralization are 
treated as opposites in a zero-sum relation, 
although practical experience suggests that an 
increase in local roles does not necessarily entail 
a decrease in central power, and vice versa. And, 
third, futile attempts are made to formulate optimum 
arrangements for all programmes and all times, 
without regard for variation in values, technologies 
and geography. The advantage to be gained from any 
shift in central-local relations depends upon its 
conformance to feasible division of power and 
practical division of work - practical in terms of 
both the nature of public programmes and the 
resources of existing institutions" (Walsh, 
1969:179).
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The Advantages of Decentralisation
Of all the arguments in favour of a well conceived form of 
decentralisation, the commonest is that decisions made within 
a decentralized framework "can improve the relevance and 
accuracy of planning, and provide greater sensitivity to local 
variations" (Bray, 1984:9; Blunt, 1984:406). Inherent in this 
argument is that local knowledge, and hence participatory 
planning, is essential to meet varying circumstances. Diana 
Conyers (1982:103) provides three main reasons why local 
participation in planning and implementation is considered to 
be so important. "First, it is a means of obtaining 
information about local conditions, needs and attitudes, 
without which development programmes and projects are likely 
to fail . . . Second, people are likely to be committed to a 
development project or programme if they are involved in the 
planning and preparation, because they are more likely to 
identify with it and see it as their project . . . The third 
reason for encouraging popular participation is that in most 
countries it is considered to be a basic democratic "right" 
that people should be involved in their own development".
Former President Nyerere of Tanzania has been a leading 
advocate in Africa of the idea of local planning for local 
needs. He wrote:
The planning and control of development in this 
country must be exercised at local level to a much 
greater extent than at present. Our nation is too 
large for the people at the centre in Dar es Salam 
always to understand local problems or to respond 
with enthusiasm to a call for development work which
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may be to their benefit, but which has been decided 
upon and planned by an authority hundreds of miles 
away" (1972:1).
The idea of local planning for local needs has also been a 
subject of much debate in the industrialized countries. David 
Owen, leader of the Social Democratic Party in Britain, in 
discussing matters of policy, contended that "the task for 
Social Democrats is to try to develop and build a fresh 
decentralized philosophy and put forward a detailed programme 
of legislative and administrative reforms to diffuse power in 
Britain" (Owen 1981:12). He clarified this by saying that 
"this calls for a radical reorientation towards a more 
decentralized society where the immense task ahead is that of 
passing beyond the welfare state, in which people get given 
things, to the kind of society in which they find satisfaction 
in doing things for themselves and for one another" (Owen 
1981:12). At the heart of all this is the idea that "local 
people know best how to utilize the special advantages of 
their locality for their own collective benefit" (Studenski 
and Mort 1941:2; see also, Hart, 1972:606).
A second point of view is that which regards decentralisation 
as a promoter of national unity and political stability. The 
division of Nigeria from four federal states at independence 
into 12 in 1967 and further division into 19 states in 1976; 
and the division of Papua New Guinea into 19 autonomous 
provinces within a unitary framework of government were 
carried out to permit greater diversity and preserve national
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unity and promote political stability.
Another important advantage of decentralisation is that by 
delegating responsibility, the central government may be 
relieved of some of its burdens. The time so saved may then 
allow central officials to deal with the major issues of 
policy and supervision of implementation. In other words 
decentralisation may in this case enhance efficiency in 
central government operations.
A further point that has often been made in favour of 
decentralisation is that "it can increase the flexibility of 
central agencies, field staff and local leaders to deal with 
unique problems in an area or region, to experiment with 
programmes without having to justify them for the whole 
country, to test administrative innovations within a region, 
and to encourage the initiative of local officials and 
political leaders" (Rondindel1i , 1983:14-15). In other words, 
mistakes can be less costly for a country when experimentation 
is carried out in only one local area. Duncan and Goodwin 
(1985) give an interesting case of a British experience with 
such experimentation:
Scotland with its separate legislatative procedures, 
has often been used by central government for 
political and administrative experiment. This is 
because Scotland is relatively remote for the 
English 'and London based establishment and media.
Even parliament interest is low. If the experiment 
goes right it can be extended to the whole country, 
if it goes wrong almost no one who is seen to matter 
will know (pp. 4-5).
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These are only some of the relevant examples from the familiar 
long catalogue of what governments could potentially achieve 
through a well-conceived policy of decentralisation. Since 
most of "the assertions and hypotheses underlying the alleged 
advantages have not all been empirically verified" 
(Rondinelli, 1981:136), it will serve no particular purpose 
here to list the full catalogue.
The disadvantages of decentralisation
For each of the arguments for decentralisation there is a 
counter argument against it. In most cases, however, these 
counter arguments are not in opposition to decentralisation in 
general but a matter of preference of one form from another.
One of the commonly cited is that the far-reaching forms of 
territorial decentralisation, by devolution or federation, 
permit and even encourage ethnic and regional diversity which 
may threaten national cohesion (Bray, 1984:11). For example, 
regional officials may interpret further decentralisation as 
a deliberate move to the centre to weaken their power and a 
resultant disagreement may lead to civil war. Excessive 
decentralisation may also lead to an increase in local 
identity thus weakening national loyalty. Where this local 
identity is based on ethnicity, it may also lead to conflicts 
between areas. Studenski and Mort, in recalling American 
history, wrote that "the vesting of excessively wide powers in 
state governments and totally inadequate powers in the central 
government after the war of independence, produced disunity
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and a breakdown of government. As soon as a strong central 
government was provided under the new constitution, the 
disintegrating tendencies came to an end” (1941:25).
The form of decentralisation that advocates the dispersal of
powers to local communities to increase their participation in
planning and implementation, is another form to .which there is
strong opposition. The argument is that decentralisation can
be counterproductive if programmes focusing on local
communities are not planned at a pace and in a manner
consistent with local realities and capabilities. "The
officials of the small local areas generally have an
exceedingly narrow outlook, and are inclined to be satisfied
with existing conditipns and to resist innovation. They
especially resist ... any projects requiring concerted effort
on their part" (Studenski and Mort, 1941:30); see also
M a w h o o d , 1983:3). David Korton, having studied several
community organizations and rural development programmes in
many developing countries, cam$ to the conclusion that what is
needed is "to provide assistance in ways that respond to local
needs while building local social and technical capacity"
(1980:484). What Korton is pointing to is the fact that
community related programmes in the developing countries tend
*{ve>K«
to work in quite the opposite way their stated aims. The 
stated aims usually expound on how government authorities will 
encourage community participation to help them to help 
themselves, but, instead, they usually end up being the 
mechanism for "untapping" resources from them. This situation
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may produce conflict between local communities and government 
officials. Referring to participation (perhaps to the 
political type rather than the developmental) in Britain, 
C.A.R. Crosland is quoted by Owen as having "questioned the 
reality of the all embracing participatory society” when he 
wrote, "if what he meant by participation is an active and 
continuous process of participation in decision making, then 
all experience shows that only a small minority of the 
population will wish to participate ... the fact is that the 
majority will continue to lead a full family life and 
cultivate their gardens" (in Owen, 1981:21).
Finally, excessive decentralisation may result in inefficient 
management of local affairs and uneconomic expenditure of 
public funds (see in Hart, 1972:605). Extensive
decentralisation by its very nature requires an increase in 
public employment and capital investment and all the financial 
requirements that go with it. In poorer countries such an 
increase can cause great financial strain leading to problems 
in budget allocation. In countries where skilled labour is 
not in abundance, further decentralisation may also create a 
situation where less qualified and trained employees are 
elevated to take important positions which may lead to 
inefficient management. Furthermore, in excessively
decentralized systems, "coordination becomes a major exercise, 
and the result of spreading decision making can be that it 
takes a much longer time to reach a conclusion" (Bray, 
1984:12).
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Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter has been to bring out the 
complexities of decentralisation in both its concept and 
context. The first issue looked at was that concerning the 
confusion that exists over the meaning of the term 
decentralisation which has greatly concerned some writers. 
The point i$, however, that governmental systems differ from 
situation to situation and if decentralisation is used in a 
different way in relation to a different situation this must, 
in fact, be welcome. It will be futile to attempt to find an 
all embracing expression for all situations of 
decentralisation. The second aspect looked at was the 
dichotomization of governmental systems between centralization 
and decentralisation. The tendency to regard decentralisation 
not as a policy mechanism of achieving policy objectives or 
"end-values” but as an end value in its own right (Fesler, 
1965) has transformed it into something "mythical". In many 
African countries the myth attached to decentralisation is 
such that some do believe that its very adoption will somehow 
trigger development. A Sudanese government official attending 
a seminar on decentralisation, for example, argued that "now 
that the Councils (local governments) are accorded with 
sufficient powers (referring to the 1981 Act), it is up to 
them to get on with the job of development" (Woldemichael, 
1983:14). The consequences of "the do nothing" attitude by 
higher authorities in such cases are only too clear 
"uncontrolled decentralisation" or chaos.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MULTI-ETHNIC STATE: POLITICAL AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF DECENTRALISATION
Introduction
Two issues pertaining to the persistent problems of nation 
building that are prevalent in most post-colonial states are 
addressed in this chapter. The first is the nature of ethnic 
diversity and the problems that have bedevilled most post­
colonial states in managing ethnic claims. -Ft— goes wi lliuiH. 
saying that T h .  degree of national political integration, and 
hence the extent of the political stability, in a country is 
a determining factor for socio-economic development. In the 
absence of cohesive and stable national political unity the 
ability of a nation-state to compete in the international 
power game can be seriously undermined. In the second part, 
a comparative assessment of the socio-economic development of 
four states with different political and ideological 
perspectives is made. The purpose is to highlight the link 
between the decentralised power-sharing mechanism devised in 
each of the four states and t-he impact q f thi-s on social and 
economic progress.
ETHNIC-STATE DISCOURSE AND NATION-BUILDING
The Post Colonial State
Most postcolonial states are multi-ethnic in character, 
composed of diverse groups whose ethnic identities are based
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on racial, cultural or regional differences. The territorial 
boundaries of these states were derived from colonial 
partition. The results bore little or no resemblance to the 
territorial frameworks of traditional societies. "They are 
arbitrary political units in geographical shape and size, 
population membership, political identity, and socio-economic 
reality" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984:178). The political 
viability of many of these states, after independence, was 
therefore problematic and ethnicity emerged as a crucial 
political and developmental variable.
In Africa, the attempted secession of Katanga became the 
first focal point for a world crisis (Young, 1983:203). 
Katanga, as a centre of mining in Zaire, was a highly prized 
region and^when it declared itself a sovereign and independent 
state on July 11, 1960, African independent states were
outraged at what they considered to be a foreign inspired 
conspiracy with the intention of not only destroying Zairean 
independence but also of undermininig radical African 
nationalist independence movements: which were struggling for 
independence from colonial rule at the time.
The concern expressed by the African independent states over 
the Katanga issue was not without foundation at least on one 
count. When Mourice Tshombe, the secessionist Katangan 
leader, appealed to the world for recognition and for 
immediate technical, financial and military aid, Belgium, the 
colonial power which had ruled over Zaire, although it
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declined to accord Katanga an outright recognition, 
nevertheless was swift to provide effective material and moral 
assistance. On July 21, 1960, King Baudouin of Belgium
declared that when "entire ethnic groups headed by men of 
honesty and worth . . . ask us to help them construct their 
independence. . . It is our duty to respond favourably" (see in 
Young, 1983:202). B e l g i a n ’s material support to Katanga came 
in military personnel and hardware which was vital for its 
survival in the initial stages. However, as the international 
community became uneasy at the precedent the Katangan 
rebellion could set, a direct military intervention was 
mounted by the United Nations which forced Tshombe to concede 
defeat. In January 1963, he announced that K a t a n g a ’s
aspiration for secession was over.
Fearful of the Katanga type of rebellion repeating itself in 
other parts, the governments of the independent African 
states were quick to conceive and establish, in 1963, an 
organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to 
protect their territorial status quo. Thus the declared OAU 
charter, "fully acknowledged and legitimated the colonial 
frontiers and the principle of state sovereignty within them" 
(Jackson and Rosberg, 1986:277). An important aspect of the 
OAU charter was also the declaration of the principle of non­
interference in the affairs of a sovereign state: "that
frontiers are sacred and what goes on inside them are internal 
affairs" (Worsley, 1984:289). As Jackson and Rosberg 
(1984:184) elaborated:
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Every multi-ethnic state in Africa without exception 
enjoys international legitimacy by virtue of its 
political independence, recognition by other states, 
membership in international bodies, and the general 
protection of international law . No independent 
African Government is in any danger of losing 
international legitimacy as long as it remains a 
good citizen of the world community. Citizenship 
demands little except respect for the independence 
of other states and forbearance from interfering in 
their internal affairs. Severely abusive regimes, 
such as Idi Amin in U g a n d a . ..., were never deprived 
of international legitimacy. Indeed, the invasion 
of Uganda by T a n z a n i a ’s army in 1978-79, which 
resulted in the overthrow of off' A m i n ’s tyranny, was 
censured and not applauded by most other African 
governments and the OAU. According to existing 
international practice, the only conceivable type of 
African regime that probably would be denied 
international legitimacy is either one that 
attempted to alter existing ex-colonial boundaries 
without the consent of the other countries involved, 
or one that was composed of non-African aliens.
International legitimacy has thus benefited the central 
hegemonical authorities of African countries to consolidate 
their power by undermining ethnic politics. After gaining 
independence, African governments took no time to dismantle 
the inherited colonial political and administrative systems 
that provided for widespread political participation involving 
’’integration of autonomous sections living side by side in 
order to consolidate territory and identity groups" (Chazan et 
al , 1988:103). For example, a major provision of the
independence constitution of Kenya was the establishment of a 
decentralised government in which power was shared almost 
equally between the centre and the seven newly established 
regions (Oyugi, 1983:117). Immediately after independence, 
however, the central government started repudiating the 
constitution, bypassing the regional authority, and dealing
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directly with the lower tiers of provincial authorities. The 
aim in doing so was to frustrate the implementation of 
regionalisation in accordance with the constitution. Only a 
year after independence, Kenya, abandoning the multi-party 
system it inherited, became a republic with a strong executive 
President. With a one party system in place, regionalism, as 
a state-ethnic power sharing mechanism, was discarded as an 
unwanted and divisive colonial implant.
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe later articulated the 
typical post-independence belief in the one party system for 
the maintenance of national unity in which all factional 
interests could be absorbed and hence dissolved: "ZANU (The
Zimbabwe African National Union) believes that the principle 
of the paramountcy of the People demands that the national 
concept and the sense of national belonging be made a dogma 
that should submerge and destroy tribal, regionalistic and 
racial animosities" (Mugabe, 1982:3). In a Parliamentary 
debate of 22 February 1984, Robert Mugabe, responding to a 
question regarding a one party system, stated that: "a multi­
party system is what we have inherited, and we do not view 
that system as conducive to maximum democracy and unity under 
that democratic state. . . . ZANU will fight the next elections on 
a platform which will include the One Party State proposition 
and that if the party won those elections, then the party will 
not allow the will of the people to be foiled by the rigidity 
of our constitution" (see Murphree, 1986:162). As in Kenya, 
Zimbabwe became a one party state not long after independence
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with M u g a b e ’s ZANU party assuming power. As in Kenya too, the 
Mugabe government has ever since been, as Mazrui (1983a:210) 
wrote, "searching for a Utopia that knows no tribes".
Thus, the obsession of the post-colonial African state with
monopolising all legitimate politics at the centre is intended
"to facilitate the control not only of opposition but also of
ethnicity: if all rival political organisations are abolished,
then ethnic cleavages are less likely to be politicised and
stability will be easier to achieve and maintain" (Jackson and
Rosberg, 1984:188). What President Siaka Stevens said,
speaking in Sierra L e o n e ’s parliament after the referendum in
1978, sums up the fear that every multi-ethnic African state
has had regarding the multi-party political system (see in
West Africa, April 1982:1115):
After some two score years of politics, it is my
considered view that the multi-party system with
government and opposition, contributes an open
invitation to anarchy and disunity, . . . We have
banned a system which institutionalized tribal and 
ethnic quinquennial warfare euphemistically known as 
elections. . .We have done away with an unnecessary 
sy s t e m .
As the discussion in the following chapter will show, 
President Nimeiri of the Sudan applied the same reasoning as 
the above quotation to abolish the sectarian multi-party 
system that existed in the country.
Patterns of State Control
It is not the formation of a single party system and the loss 
of competitive politics alone which has been the cause for
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much of the rising ethnic conflict in the post-colonial
African State. The brutal means governments employ to
neutralise ethnic diversity, in the name of national unity,
may be a major causal factor for the escalation of state-
ethnic conflict. A case in point is the way successive
Ethiopian regimes have followed deliberate policies of
cultural assimilation, v i 1lagization, resettlement schemes and
administrative reforms as instruments of control and
subordination. With regards to culture as an instrument of
control in Ethiopia, Paul B a x t e r ’s study (1983:136-137) on the
Oromo nationality, the largest ethnic group in the country
numbering between ten and fifteen million, shows how their
language was denied any official status during the Haile
Selassie regime:
It was not permissible to publish, 
preach, teach or broadcast in any Oromo 
dialect. In court or before an official 
an Orom had to speak Amharic (the 
official language of government) or use
an interpreter. Even a case between two
Oromos before an Oromo-speaking 
magistrate had to be heard in Amharic.
In Ethiopia, language has always been an important 
distinguishing factor of ’’Ethiopianess” . As Baxter (1983:136) 
observed, ’’fluent Amharic and an Amhara way of life have
always been, and still are, a pre-requisite for entry to
government employment; and government was, and is, almost the 
only employer .of schooled l abour....an Oromo doctor who had 
been educated overseas and did not write Amharic was refused 
employment because of that” (see also in Knutsson, 1969:96).
Baxter's further remark that for most officials in Ethiopia
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"to civilise" was to "Amharise" is a simple but effective 
explanation of the process of ethnic subordination. It is 
common knowledge in Ethiopia that the late Emperor Haile 
Selassie was by "blood" as much Oromo as Amhara but he never 
portrayed himself as having anything to do with the former. 
Similarly, Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam was an Amhara, only 
by culture being from a minority ethnic group by descent, but, 
the Amharisation drive during his time was no less intense 
than those of previous regimes.
The logic of the policy of assimilation the Ethiopian regimes 
followed compares with that of the French, who, as described 
by Mazrui (1983b:36), regard cultural criteria as 
distingushing factors of "Frenchness". As Mazrui wrote
", . .if a black person became adequately French linguistically 
and culturally, those were grounds for becoming a French
citiz e n . ..Black people could become French --- the key was the
French language and culture". Similarly, in Ethiopia,
Amharic, as the language of political power and a symbol of 
national identity was a prerequisite for "Ethiopianess". For 
example, no other language except Amharic was allowed in 
schools in Ethiopia. The process of national integration was 
therefore tantamount to assimilation into the Amhara culture, 
the state culture (Markakis, 1987:73; Buxton, 1983:137).
Another instrument of ethnic control used by the Mengistu 
regime in Ethiopia was what Niggli (1989:5) called the "real 
nationality policy aiming at creating the ’new Ethiopian’
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without ’tribal’ ties". Niggli is refering to the rural 
policy of collectivization and v i 1lagisation programmes which 
were the hallmark of the Mengistu regime. According to Niggli 
(1985:5), collectivisation was a policy instrument designed to 
integrate the subsistence economic base of the peasantry into 
the state controlled market economy. Villagisation was the 
most clear expression of the collectivisation scheme by which 
the rural population were congregated in planned settlements. 
This social engineering exercise thus enabled the state to 
exercise more effective control.
The resettlement programme was a further social engineering 
policy carried out under the pretext of moving people to less 
drought prone areas. The programme involved the movement of 
two million people from the Tigray province in the north to 
the western provinces of Wollega and Illubabor. Like the 
collectivisation programme, the resettlement programme was 
designed for ethnic control. Tigray province was the power 
base of the Tigray P e o p l e ’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a 
nationalist movement which had become a real threat to the 
government. On the other hand, the provinces of Wollega and 
Illubabor, largely inhabited by the Oromo people, were fast 
becoming politicised with the entry onto the scene of the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1974. The aim of the 
ressettlement programme was thus both to deprive the TPLF of 
its power base in Tigray province and, as the new settlements 
were strategically located in Wollega and Illubabor, "to cut 
the OLF and any other conceivable opposition force from its
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operational areas" (Niggli, 1989:6)
Another ethnic control instrument of Mengistu Haile M a r i a m ’s 
government was the use of administrative reforms. In 1987, 
regions with long-standing historical bases were partitioned 
and rearranged along ethnic and religious lines into several 
"autonomous regions". This policy was most fervently followed 
in Eritrea, which was engaged in a bitter struggle for 
independence from Ethiopian occupation (2.1). In 1987, the 
Ethiopian government passed a decree by which Eritrea was 
divided into two separate autonomous regions - Eritrea and 
Asseb. The latter region incorporated Erit r e a ’s coastal 
province of Dankalia with adjoining areas in Ethiopia to 
correspond with the territory inhabited by the Afar speaking 
ethnic group. In so doing, the government’s aim was to erode 
Eri t r e a ’s established territorial identity and to lessen its 
potential threat to E t h i o p i a ’s occupation by dividing its 
people. However, that policy probably had the opposite 
effect, as events proved later, in fueling the extraordinary 
determination of the Eritrean people to liberate their 
territory, which was achieved by military force in May 1991.
Thus, Et h i o p i a ’s politically motivated centralising thrusts, 
as elsewhere in Africa, have not been particularly effective 
for processes of national integration and nor have they 
created the necessary condition of stability for social and 
economic development. Ethiopia remains one of the bottom 
three poorest countries in the world.
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As in Ethiopia, successive governments in the Sudan had also 
followed policies that aimed for cultural assimilation of the 
southern Sudanese. Again as in Ethiopia, the effects of 
assimilation has had disastwrous effect both politically and 
economically, as will be fully discussed in the following 
c hapters.
The African "Soft S t a t e ”
"If the African state sometimes appears overactive and 
imperious" wrote Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983:56), "it can, 
paradoxically, also display an evident ’s oftness’ and 
ineffectiveness. With respect to the latter aspect, the 
hegemonial option was less a manifestation of the strength of 
the state institutions or of the preferences of the dominant 
political class than a reflection of the frailty of the post­
colonial state in the face of burgeoning pressures. 
Hegemonial institutions and practices tended to obscure the 
reality of limited governmental effectiveness, both in 
managing central affairs and penetrating and regulating 
activities in the hinterland". Former President Nyrere of 
Tanzania was well aware of the existence of such problems in 
his government. In recommending decentralisation as a 
mechanism of development administration for Tanzania, he 
emphasised that "if this decentralisation is to be effective 
at the same time as the nation continues to go forward in 
unity, the Central Government organisation also has to be 
changed in many respects" (Nyrere, 1972:8). A theme that 
Nyrere consistently followed was that "development cannot be
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done for the people; it can only be done by them” (see in 
Jackson and Rosberl^, 1986:209). Frustrated by the
bureaucratic red-tape and inefficiencies in T anzania’s 
governmental institutions, Nyrere (1972:12) sought to change 
the prevailing work attitudes of government officials, party 
leaders and members: "For the really vital element in
decentralisation is that we have to drop our present apparent 
urge to control everything from the centre. At the centre we 
can prod, urge and help, but not control".
The problem that Nyrere was grappling with in Tanzania, the 
inability of the state to govern by delegating sufficient 
powers to its citizenry, is similar to the situation that 
Gunnar Myrdal describes as the "soft State" in his study of 
South Asia. "When we characterize these countries as ’soft 
s t a t e s ’", he writes, "we mean that, throughout the region, 
national governments require extraordinarily little of their 
citizens. There are few obligations either to do things in 
the interest of the community or to avoid actions opposed to 
that interest. Even those obligations that do exist are 
enforced inadequately if at all". The general characteristics 
of a soft state are reflected in the way public businesses are 
conducted: in the absence of work discipline, disrespect for
the rule of law by officials, corrupt practices, evasion of 
responsibi1ty and the like (see in H y d e n , 1983:73).
Most, if not all, African states have these characteristics of 
softness. The African soft state is particularly centralist
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and because its institutions are weak, it lacks the ability to 
promote rapid development. In Bangladesh, Blair (1985:1232) 
points out, "The imperative for stability brings with it a 
strong urge for central administration and control to ensure 
that stability". The failures of decentralisation in many 
African countries (see, for example, Wunsch,1991) can be 
associated with this strong urge to control from the centre. 
Although local authorities in most African countries have been 
accorded substantial powers for decision making and management 
functions, paradoxically, the political elites that gave them 
the powers have also been denying them the necessary resources 
to carry out those powers. The reason is, according to 
Werlin (1992:224) political elites "feel threatened by 
decentralisation because of the danger of intensifying ethnic 
and kinship loyalties". In any case, the central institutions 
of the African soft state are also too weak to facilitate 
support for decentralisation plans. The effect of central 
inefficiency on the functioning of decentralisation was 
graphically described by Nyrere (1972:1): "most frequent
complaint - in the districts and regions is that they cannot 
get answers to their letters at all. They write and write, 
sometimes five times, and hear nothing, yet it is impossible 
for them to visit Dar es Salaam from a place like S u m b a w a n a , 
or even Morogoro, without permission - which they cannot 
get!". As will be discussed in the second part of this 
chapter, central government’s ineffectiveness in managing its 
decentralisation policies have quite serious socio-economic 
developmental consequences.
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The African soft state, as stated earlier, is marked by 
fragile institutes and hence lacks the ability to govern. One 
of the manifestations of this inability to govern is the way 
"dominant political elites. . . . have reacted most forcefully to 
perceived threats from ethnoregional groups" (Rothchild and 
Olorunsola, 1983:7). A case in point is the programme of 
"Red Terror" that was unleashed over the Ethiopian P e o p l e ’s 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), an urban-based organisation of 
radical intellectuals, by the Mengistu regime of Ethiopia in 
1977. Condemned as anti-revolutionaries, members of the 
party and their sympathisers were hunted and "gunned down in 
broad daylight or dragged out of their homes at night and 
killed" (Giorgis, 1989:32). According to Giorgis, thousands 
were executed and thousands more forced to flee for their 
lives by the Red Terror offensive. Such measures of
reprisals, carried out by agents of governments to head off 
real or imagined ethnoregional challenges, are common 
occurrences in Africa . Thus, a soft s t a t e ’s inability to 
govern can exacerbate ethnic discord and in many cases its own 
clumsy actions can cause the eruption of conflict. To return 
to the Ethiopian scene as an example, the armed rebellion of 
the Oromo ethnic group was triggered as a reaction against the 
arbitrary force used to suppress Oromo associations (see in 
B a x t e r , 1983).
The Claims of Ethnic Groups and State Responses
The nature of ethnic group claims may be differentiated
between the distributive claims (claims for equity) and the
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claims for regional self-determination and secession. The 
distributive claims are made within the existing frame work of 
the state and, depending on the situation, there can be tacit 
or explicit support for the dominant political power. Ethnic 
group demands of the distributive kind may also differ, 
ranging from claims for equitable distribution of services to 
more substantial claims for decentralised power sharing. 
With regard to the second category, what Rothchild and 
Olorunsola (1983:10) called the high intensity demand, the 
ethnoregional demand is for self-determination and 
independence. To date, no negotiated settlement has ever been 
achieved over demands for self-determination in Africa and 
conflicts in this category have been particularly destructive.
Claims that seek distributive ends can also be sources of 
destructive conflict if they are not properly managed. 
Political tensions and conflicts can occur either from 
unreasonable demands on the part of ethnic groups or when the 
state is perceived to be acting unfairly in the distribution 
of those powers and resources among the competing ethnic 
groups. In the case of Africa, Rothchild and Olorunsola 
(1983:10) explain that conflicts associated with the 
distributive concerns are less than might have been expected 
given the prevailing scarcities. The reason they give, 
although they admit that this is put forward most tentatively, 
is that "peoples in the relatively disadvantaged areas...make 
fewer demands upon scarce public resources than their 
counterparts in the relatively more advantaged parts of a
- 81 -
country". The significance of the "disadvantaged making fewer 
demands" for state-ethnic relations is further explained as 
follows (1983:10):
If the relatively disadvantaged lack political clout 
and make only limited demands upon the state, the 
government finds itself, by default, in a position 
to put minimising (or "satisfying") policies into 
effect. The soft state can, for the time being at 
least, endure and display a degree of coherency 
precisely because the modest demands of the 
relatively disadvantaged permit somewhat inequitable 
practice in the distribution of scarce resources.
But this is not a new revelation as such and it is precisely 
the neglect and the overly oppressive methods that the 
dominant political groups employ over the disadvantaged ones 
that have been the causes of many ethnic-state conflicts in 
Africa (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984:194). Arbitrary and
abusive treatments may quieten ethnic discontent temporarily 
but never permanently. The trail of discontent they leave 
behind is likely to resurface with added force at an opportune 
moment in the future. The case of the Oromo ethnic group of 
Ethiopia is again a good example. The O r o m o s , in spite of 
their numerical superiority in Ethiopia, have been downtrodden 
for generations by successive Amhara regimes (Baxter, 1983).
The collapse of Haile Selassie's regime in 1974, and the 
uncertainty that followed until the military coup leaders 
consolidated their power, gave the Oromos an opportune moment 
to organise a national liberation movement. As Baxter 
(1983:145) commented in this connection: "... among the O r o m o s , 
many of what were local, sullen resentments have been
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converted into national aspirations . . . [and] the grip the 
Amhara have held over the government of Ethiopia for some 
ninety years is being profoundly challenged". This predicton 
proved to be right as a combined Ethiopian opposition force 
led by the Tigrayan P e o p l e ’s Liberation Front (TPLF), in which 
an Oromo faction also played a part, were able to take over 
power in Ethiopia in 1991. However, the biggest Oromo 
organisat i o n , the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), is demanding 
the right of self-determination for Oromia, a new name the 
Oromos have accorded to the region inhabited by the Oromo 
people. Thus, the people of Oromia have managed to transform 
their struggle into a nationalist movement of such force that 
no power in Ethiopia will ever dictate terms to them.
The high intensity demand by ethnoregional groups, that of the 
right to self-determination, presents a real threat to the
very existence of the African post-colonial state. However, 
although a number of bitter battles were fought "between
central governments and some formidable ethno-regional 
opponents" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984:196) - notably in Zaire, 
Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Chad - no state has suffered a 
break up as a result (2.2). In spite of the arbitrariness of 
state demarcation during the process of colonisation, as
discussed above, self-determination in Africa "is not
perceived to mean the right of every distinct ethnic community 
to secede from an established polity" (Keller, 1983:252) 
The colonial boundaries were legitimised and accepted as 
permanent and inviolable by virtue of the Organisation of
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Africa Unity Charter, which the world community as a whole 
also recognises. Herein lies the problem though. The 
legitimacy of the post-colonial state seems to contradict the 
basic principle of self-determination, which is, that all 
peoples have the right to freely determine their political 
status (Wiberg, 1983:43). What constitutes "a people" has 
been a matter of endless debate and the current anomaly is of 
the existence of miniscule nations like Nauru with a 
population of eight thousand that are internationally 
recognised and, on the other hand, nations like Oromia with 
ten to fifteen million population and a territory twice as big 
as Great Britain that are denied the status of "a people". 
The bitterness and intensity of the ethnoregional based 
conflicts in Africa could therefore be a manifestation of the 
denial of self-determination. That is, ethnic groups are 
being driven to recognise the use of force as the only means 
of gaining total control of their territory (Healy, 1983:94). 
There is a strong possibility in Africa, therefore, that a 
situation may develop whereby the strong break from states 
leaving the weaker ones with little option but to adapt to the 
existing multi-ethnic state as best they can (Rothchild and 
Olorunsola, 1983:12). K e l l e r ’s (1983:255) description of the 
crucial role of state leaders in minimising ethnic conflict in 
Africa is of much relevance here:
The potential for ethnic turmoil which exists in 
most African states demands that state leaders 
conscientiously devise policies to avoid or even 
solve such problems. Brute force alone is not the 
answer; measured, skilful leadership is often a 
better tactic. The latter approach invariably
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includes a contextu.ally relevant mix of positive 
and negative sanctions and a blend of materials and 
symbolic resources. In the end the success or 
failure of the s t a t e ’s policy choices relating to 
the potential for ethnic conflict determines the 
degree to which such potential conflicts might
threaten state coherence.
In promoting such proposals, however, the soft state condition
of many countries in Africa must be taken into account. In
this connection, Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983:20) are right 
to point to the " western-based policy analysis [which] 
assumes an enormous capacity on the part of the state agencies 
to put policies and programmes into effect. The African 
reality allows no such comfortable assumption".
POLITICS AND DECENTRALISATION POLICIES: 
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCES
The Setting
In many of the developing countries,
appropriate administrative, economic and 
a continuing exercise. Many government changes in Africa, for 
example, have been accompanied by the introduction of a new 
set of policies. The incoming leaders, almost always 
professing a different ideological perspective from the one 
before them , take no time to promise a better life for the 
people. The inherited system is likely to be blamed as being 
the cause for the poverty and squalor. In many cases a new 
set of administrative mechanisms is introduced accompanied by 
such slogans as "power to the people". In some unfortunate 
countries, the Sudan, Uganda and Chad, for example, this
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the search for an 
ideological model is
situation has been repeated many times over. The result has 
been that these countries are left bare of any ideological, 
developmental or organisational culture upon which they can 
b u i I d .
Does political ideology matter for development anyway? Ample 
evidence is now available for some judgement to be made on the 
role of ideology on development. Tanzania and Kenya have the 
same historical background of British colonial administration. 
They both achieved independence in the 1960s; were both 
sparsely populated and both had comparable labour and other 
factor endowments. Although Kenya had a stronger economic and 
administrative base at independence, mainly because its 
favourable climate had attracted many European settlers who 
brought investible capital with them, nevertheless, the two 
states were comparable in many ways and have both since been 
objects of interest for research and hence their progress has 
been closely monitored.
India and China are neighbours who also started from a similar
background. "In 1950 both India and China had per capita
incomes of about $50... The two countries initiated their
development operations at about the same time and from the
same type of economic structure. In both, at least 80 per cent
of the working force was in agriculture and small-scale
enterprise" (Maleribaun and Stolper, 1971:123). They both
have large land areas and populations and so again this pair 
%
of countries were comparable in many ways.
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Although each of the above four countries has its own 
ideological pattern, they all have declared decentralisation 
as their major tool for development administration. At this 
point, some questions may be posed: How do the two pairs of
countries compare now in terms of their social and economic 
progress? To achieve progress, must there be a choice of an 
ideologically distinct route? Finally, could any of these 
countries offer a blue print that might be emulated by other 
countries?
Policies of Decentralisation in Tanzania and Kenya 
Tanzania during the leadership of President Nyrere had a clear 
vision of what it intended to achieve by introducing a policy 
of decentralisation. The primary objective of
decentralisation was, as president Nyrere said, "to make a 
reality of our policies of socialism and self-reliance, the 
planning and control of development of this country.." 
(Nyrere, 1972:1). It was these twin political and
developmental objectives of decentralisation which prompted 
Rondinelli (1983:83), on writing about decentralisation of 
development administration in East Africa, to say that 
"attempts to decentralise planning and administration in 
Tanzania cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of 
their political and ideological background".
After independence Tanzania introduced an ingenious one party 
system of government which permitted electoral competition
(2.3). The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the
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party that took power, was eventually constituted as the sole 
party in the country. Although political analysts like 
Crawford Young (1982) and William Tordoff (1984) justifiably 
make substantial ideological distinctions between T a n z a n i a ’s 
type of "populist socialism” and the "scientific socialism" 
of Leninist-Marxism, nevertheless, TANU had vowed to follow 
the principles of comprehensive central planning which is the 
hallmark of communist countries. T a n z a n i a ’s development 
objective made "special emphasis on self-reliance and rural 
development, as well as the expressed need to democratise the 
Tanzanian society " (Mwansasu, 1974:8).
On assuming power, TANU took no time to create a hierarchial
party structure down to village level, the chief party
representative at every level becoming the chairman of the
relevant local body (Nyrere, 1972). According to N y r e r e ’s
policy directive of 1972, regions and districts were to plan
and implement local development activities as well as
administer local affairs with the very minimum of
interference from the centre. But the need for strong central
control to oversee that local bodies functioned within their
allowed limits was not to be overlooked. As Nyrere put it:
To ensure that national objectives and priorities 
are adhered to, and that the policy of gradual 
equalization of well-being between different Regions 
can be implemented, broad general policy guidelines 
will be issued within the framework of which the 
local bodies must make their decisions. The central 
government, in addition to setting the framework and 
giving technical assistance where required, will 
also be responsible for inspecting the performance 
achieved. But otherwise, in the matters for which 
they are responsible, the Region and District will 
be free to make their own decisions about priorities
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and methods of work. (Nyrere, 1972:2-3)
T a n z a n i a ’s distinct system of local administration was 
designed to serve as a vehicle towards revitalising and 
developing the traditional African egalitarian social system
(2.4). Concerning the development of education, for example, 
which was now geared towards the objective of self-reliance, 
the emphasis was on preparing for rural life and cooperative 
endeavour. The aim was to do away with the educational system 
inherited from colonial times which was thought to have 
fostered elitism, inequality and the destabilisation of 
students’ rural background (Young, 1982:108). The local 
government system in Tanzania was thus a vital part of the 
political process which aimed for political stability and 
economic and social development.
Unlike Tanzania, Kenya is a "developing capitalist" state 
having taken the developmental choice consistent with the 
modified version of free enterprise or what some may prefer to 
call liberal market economy. Also unlike Tanzania, the Kenyan 
government did not discard the local administrative system 
that it had inherited from the colonial government. "While 
most other African countries tried to scrap them, the Kenyan 
government streamlined them and encouraged their development" 
(Akivaga et a l , 1985:2).
At the national level K e n y a ’s politics started with a multi­
party system of parliamentary democracy. It was not long
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before it reverted to the Tanzanian model of a one party 
system but it still maintained its developmental strategy of 
a market economy. The single party system does allow 
competition but candidates are carefully vetted for their 
proven allegiance to KANU - the Kenya African National Union, 
the ruling party (2.5).
At the local level, a modified version of the British local 
government model is still practised. A significant departure 
from the British model is that in the Kenyan system councils 
comprise of both elected and nominated members. Furthermore, 
since the one party system was constituted in 1982 "every 
intending candidate for counci1lorship must seek clearance 
from KANU before he/she may stand for election. Without this 
vital support from the party it is impossible to stand 
elections of any kind" (Akivaga et a l , 1985:38). Again, the 
KANU party machinery has the responsibility for granting or 
refusing permission to compete in elections. Where the 
British and the Kenyan local authorities have similarities is 
in the way councillors perform their duties through the 
council committees and sub-committees.
Rondinelli (1983:82-83) explains the elaborate system of local 
planning that exists in Kenya and how, in theory, it was meant 
to link with higher authority plans to form part of the 
national plan'. The problem is, however, as Rondinelli 
(1983:83) further explains: "rural development planning and
administration in Kenya remain centralised, and province and
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district development committees continue to play relatively 
weak roles. The central ministries retain control over 
sectoral plans and budgets, and recommendations from districts 
rarely influence national policy” .
Without measuring the actual power delegated to local 
authorities in terras of their achievements, the structures 
and the control mechanisms of the decentralisation systems in 
both Tanzania and Kenya are in fact not widely disparate. The 
central political influence over the local authorities in the 
two countries are similarly quite strong.
Decentralisation Policies in India and China
The opposing political ideologies that developed in India and 
China and the administrative mechanisms and organisational 
systems that have been instituted to manage their economies 
offer some insight in terms of how the two systems compare in 
their objectives for the elevation of the well being of their 
societies. The historical situations which shaped the 
emergence of their particular ideologies, fascinating though 
they are, will not feature here. The main concern here is 
with the administrative structures that were devised with the 
intention of implementing policy objectives.
India is a federalist state. Federalism was already 
introduced in India during the British colonial administration 
and was thought to offer the best option for the maintenance 
and continuation of the unity of India both during the
transitional period to independence and beyond. Many
nationalist parties were established in the pre-independence 
period. The Congress Party, lead by two of the most prominent 
personalities in India at the time, Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawahral Nehru, was by far the largest. All parties were, 
however, deeply suspicious of British intentions with 
federation. To them, any proposal that could trigger the 
break up of India into parts was not only a "painful one to 
contemplate" , as Nehru said, but also: "it went against all
those deeply-felt sentiments and convictions that move people 
so powerfully [as] the whole nationalist movement of India had 
been based on I n dia’s Unity" (Nehru, 1946:455).
Those sentiments were expressed at a time when the British
government proposed a form of federalism and suggested that
the "constituent assembly or constitution making body of the
states would be a mixture of elected and non-elected elements,
the former chosen by separate religious electorates as well as
by certain vested interests, the latter nominated by the
rulers of the states" (Nehru, 1946:455). Nehru eloquently
expressed his fears about this proposal when he said:
The semi-feudal rulers of the states could nominate 
their own representatives in proportion to the 
population. These nominees might contain some able 
ministers but, as a whole, they would inevitably 
represent, not the peoples of the states, but the 
feudal and autocratic ruler. They would form nearly 
one quarter of the members of the constitution- 
making body, and would powerfully influence its 
decisions by their numbers, their socially backward 
attitude, and their threats of subsequent 
withdrawal" (1946:454-455).
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The Working Committee of the Congress Party made its position
clear in its resolution on the British proposal, which merits
quoting at length:
The Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and 
unity and any break in that unity , especially in 
the modern world, when p e o p l e ’s minds inevitably 
think in terms of ever larger federations, would be 
injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful 
to contemplate. Nevertheless, the Committee cannot 
think in terms of compelling the people in any 
territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union 
against their declared and established will. While 
recognizing this principle, the Committee feel that 
every effort should be made to create conditions 
which would help the different units in developing 
a common and co-operative national life. The 
acceptance of the principle inevitably involves that 
no changes should be made which result in fresh 
problems being created and compulsion being 
exercised on other subnational groups within the 
area. Each territorial unit should have the fullest 
possible autonomy within the union, consistent with 
a strong national state. The proposal now made on 
the part of the British War Cabinet encourages and 
will lead to attempts at separation at the very 
inception of a nation and thus create friction just 
when the utmost co-operation and goodwill are most 
needed. This proposal has been presumably made to 
meet a communal demand, but it will have other 
consequences also and lead politically reactionary 
and obscurantist groups among different communities 
to create trouble and divert public attention from 
the vital issues before the country (see Nehru, 
1946:459. Emphasis added).
The Congress Party took over power at independence and has 
ruled India much longer than any other party since. Three 
years after independence, the modified constitution of 
federalist India, which mirrored the Congress P a r t y ’s 
position, was passed by parliament. India’s federalism has 
been regarded By some as only ”quasi-federal'* pointing to its 
unitary features which even permit the Parliament to change 
state boundaries, "as it thinks fit", and also entrusts the
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centre with such powers that it has made the states in many 
respects dependent 4-e it (Paylee, 1960:154; Mathur, 1983:70).
The history of central and bottom-up planning in India has its 
roots in the thoughts of Nehru, who espoused rapid 
industrialisation and a centralist approach to management, and 
Gandhi, who favoured cottage industry and community 
participation (Natraj, 1981). The constitution empowered the 
central government with wide responsibilities for formulating 
economic and social development policies through its 
functional departments whose line of authority is vertically 
structured. Mathur (1983:70) observed that: "in cases where 
state government interests were weak, the centre seeks to 
strengthen them through financial grants, which means that, 
more often than not, the involvement of the state is 
determined by the amount of funds they receive. Use of 
financial grants in this way not only helps control the 
decentralised agencies but also determines their scope for 
independent action".
Experiments with decentralisation at the local level in India 
began soon after independence. "Community development" became 
the catchphrase of the time and incorporated the ideological 
underpinnings of the Ghandian philosophy of a village-centred 
approach in development. As interest in community
development waned in the 1960s, however, "a nation-wide system 
of local councils was established that was geared to the twin 
principles of direct and indirect elections, and interlocking
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three-tiered government set up, although implementation was 
purposely allowed to vary among the states" (Friedman, 
1983:37) .
Friedman (1983) and Slater and Watson (1985) have cast doubts 
on the ability of the decentralised systems in India to carry 
out their functions on the basis that actions by the centre 
will continue to limit their effectiveness. As Friedman 
(1983:37) said, "central government leaders have been unable 
to resolve the conflict between treating local institutions as 
an extension of the centre and referring to them as autonomous 
u n i t s " .
China has been a communist country since the Mao Zedong led 
revolution took over power in 1949. The communist party of 
China has adopted Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology. 
Initially, C h i n a ’s developmental ideology was based on the 
model of the Soviet Union. From about 1957 onwards, however, 
China adopted its own brand of socialism believing that it 
would be better suited to its cultural and economic conditions 
(Maxwell and McFarlane, 1984). C h i n a ’s broad developmental 
objectives are to achieve equality between people by changing 
the character of social relations and to be self-reliant in 
material needs (Wu and Ip, 1983:163).
China is a unitary, multi-national state according to Article 
3 of its constitution (2.6). Also according to the 
constitution, the organs of local government parallel the
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administrative divisions of the functional departments under 
the central government. Thus there are p e o p l e ’s congresses at 
province, county, district, sub-district, city district and 
town. Except at the lowest local level, where the congresses 
are elected directly, the p e o p l e ’s congresses are elected by 
the congress on the next lower l e v e l . The local governments 
conduct their function through a system resembling the British 
type of council committees called p e o p l e ’s revolutionary 
committees. Counties are divided into communes, "typically 
involving from 10,000 to 50,000 people" and covering "up to 
100 natural villages” (Stavis, 1974:34). The Communes are 
subdivided into production Brigades comprising of about 250 
households each. The Brigades are further divided into Teams 
of about 40 households, which often correspond to villages 
(Howe. 1978:31).
Mention must be made at this stage of the ubiquitous party 
apparatus whose structure goes parallel with that of the 
government at every level. Thus, as Waller wrote, "a 
government department on one level would be responsible not 
only to the corresponding department on the next higher level 
but also to the party committee on the same level" (Waller, 
1981:103).
Lardy (1978) explained the combination of top-down and bottom-
up planning methods that operate in China.
Economic planning in China is a complex process that 
proceeds simultaneously in two partially overlapping 
hierarchical systems. The national economic plan is 
essentially an aggregation of two fundamentally
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different types of economic plans - those that are 
compiled according to vertical, sectoral lines of 
administration and those that are compiled on 
horizontal, territorial lines of administration. 
The sectoral plans are nationwide and cover all 
enterprises under the management of a single 
ministerial system, regardless of location. 
Horizontal plans, on the other hand, are compiled on 
a provincial basis and thus are multisectoral. 
However, they include only enterprises and 
institutions that are managed by local governments 
(Lardy, 1978:16).
Although the horizontal or provincial plans are centrally 
directed and controlled, decisions about production methods, 
what to produce as well as distribution is made locally (Wu 
and Ip, 1983:156). Within the limits set by the plan, the 
management of the T e a m ’s resources is, for example, largely an 
internal matter.
Measures of Performances
Four different developmental models (ideological choices) were 
discussed above: T a n z a n i a ’s ’’popular socialism"; K e n y a ’s
"modified capitalism"; India’s liberal economy and, C h i n a ’s 
Marxist-Leninism. Comparing consequences of the developmental 
choices in these countries is not an easy undertaking 
particularly with some factors that require qualitative 
assessment, for example, human dignity. However, a
combination of several hard facts can assist in qualitative 
assessment. Young (1983) used six sets of criteria to guide 
his judgement on "ideology, the post-colonial state and 
development in Africa", which are: growth, equality, autonomy, 
human dignity, participation and capacity. Following a 
combination of Y o u n g ’s (1983), Malenbaun and Sto l p e r ’s (1978)
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and Uphoff and E s m a n ’s (1974) methodologies, therefore, the 
four developmental models will be comparatively reviewed below 
for the two pairs of countries under consideration. For 
simplification, Y o u n g ’s set of six criteria are narrowed into 
three: Economic growth and distribution, quality of life, and, 
decentralisation and participation.
1. Economic Growth and Distribution: Tanzania and Kenya have
probably received more attention in the international 
development debate than any other countries in Africa. Being 
neighbours and both having had the same colonial historical 
experiences and then taking different developmental modalities 
after independence have obviously induced the interest in 
them. At the heart of this interest has been the question of 
whether the experiences of these countries would provide 
answers to the debate about alternative strategies in the rest 
of Africa (2.7).
Table 2.1. Basic economic indicators
GIF per capita
-----------------------  Average annual rate
\ Average anneal growth of inflation in I
Country DS $ 1989 1965-89 1965-80 1980-89
Tanzania 130 -0.9 9.6 26.1
Kenya 360 2.0 7.2 9.0
India 340 1.8 7.5 7.7
China 350 5.7 -0.4 5.8
Sonrce: extracted froi 'World Developient Report 1991*. The World Bank.
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According to the World Bank (1991) definition, countries with 
GNP per capita below 500 dollars are low income economies. By 
this economic yardstick, Tanzania, Kenya, India and China are 
all among the least developed countries of the world. 
Although growth as measured by GNP per capita alone cannot 
serve as an indicator for performance, nevertheless, there is 
a strong correlation between the extent of poverty in a 
country and its GNP per capita and so it cannot be dismissed 
either (World Bank Staff, 1983:82; Young, 1982:298). In 1989, 
a quarter of a century after Tanzania and Kenya gained their 
independence, the state of their economies (table 2.1) 
remained, in real terms, more or less static in the former and 
with only modest progress achieved by the latter. From table 
2.2, the deterioration of T a n z a n i a ’s industrial and 
manufacturing output can be seen. By 1989, the contribution 
of gross domestic product from the sectors identified was only 
one half of what it was in 1965. The major shift in emphasis 
in Tanzania's economy towards agriculture is clear. K e n y a ’s 
production structure, on the other hand, remained largely 
during the period although the comparatively higher 
in the Gross Nation Product is an indication of the 
that took place in all the sectors (see table 2.2).
unchanged
increase
expansion
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Table 2.2: Structure of Production
Distribution of gross doiestic product (percent)
GDP ..................................
(Millions of $) Agricnltnre Industry Manufacture Services
Country 1965 1989 65 89 65 89 65 89 65 89
Tanzania 790 2,540 46 66 14 7 8 4 40 27
Kenya 920 7,130 35 31 18 20 11 12 47 49
India 50,530 235,220 44 30 22 29 16 18 34 41
China 67,200 417,830 44 32 39 48 31 34 17 20
Source: Extracted froi Vorld Developient Report, 1991. The Vorld Bank.
The suggestion that socialist systems are more egalitarian 
does certainly hold true when the income distribution patterns 
of the two East African countries are compared (table 2.3). 
Whilst in Tanzania the lowest 40% of the p o p u l a t i o n ’s share of 
household income in 1969 was 16%, the comparative figure in 
Kenya in 1974 was only 8.9%. This does not of course mean 
that households in Tanzania are better off than households in 
Kenya because of the overall weakness of the economy in the 
f o r m e r .
T a n z a n i a ’s watchers, left and right, are now admitting, 
pointing to its insurmountable current problems, that its 
self-reliance strategy has been a failure (Jackson and 
Rosberg, 1986; Hyden, 1983). After a spurt of high economic 
achievement in the first decade following independence, 
K e n y a ’s performance has also run out of steam. Ironically, 
some policy prescriptions being suggested by students of the
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two countries have been for complete reversal of their 
political strategies. For example, Hyden (1983) argues that 
the only way out for Tanzania is a return to a market economy 
whilst for Kenya an adaptation of "state socialism" was 
suggested by Leys (1980).
Compared with India, China has achieved remarkable social and 
economic progress, its economy increasing at a rate of 5% 
between 1960 and 1989 (table 2.1). The difference in 
performance could be associated with the proportionately 
greater investment China made in both industry and manufacture 
as the contribution of these sectors to the GDP indicate 
(table2.2). In India, however, "no great priority has been 
given to machine tools since the mid 1960s . .whose poor
performance constitutes strong evidence for structural 
retrogression in the industrial sector" ( see Byres, 
1982:152) .
India’s average annual growth rate between 1965 and 1989 was 
a mere 1.8% but its inflation was running at a rate of 7.5% 
during the same period (table 2.1). The impact of this 
situation on the standard of living would inevitably have been 
graver compared to China which experienced no inflationary 
pressure about that period. Malenbaum and Stolper (1978), in 
their comparative performance study of India and China, which 
covered the period between 1950-59, made a valid observation 
on the difference in approach concerning the management of the 
two countries’ economies.
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The Chinese put more effort into expanding physical 
output as against services [see table 2.2]...the 
degree of utilization of resources, and especially 
labour, was increased significantly. Over the whole 
period, government played a much larger role in 
economic life in China than in India. ..By and 
large, China's economic progress has been steady. In 
India, government adheres to models of growth which 
are permissive; comparatively few restraints are 
imposed on individuals whose usual way of life did 
not in the past generate economic expansion. ..The 
total performance has been less even; the degree of 
plan fulfilment has not increased steadily, for 
example (Malenbaum and Stolper, 1978:124).
Table 2.3: Income Distribution
Percentage share of hoasehold incoie, 
by percentile groups of households
Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest
Country Tear 201 quintile quintile quintile 20! 10!
Tanzania 1969 5.8 10.2 13.9 19.7 50.4 35.6
Kenya 1974 2.6 6.3 11.5 19.2 60.4 45.8
India 1975-76 7.0 9.2 13.9 20.5 49.4 33.6
Lowest 401
China1 1970
- Urban 25 21
- Rural 20 23
Source: Except for China (see note), other figures are extracted froi Vorld 
Bank Report 1983. The Vorld Bank.
Vote: 1. Data not available in Vorld Bank Reports. Intonation froi:
Chen (1982), 'Aspects of Fiscal Policies in China1. Econoiic Bulletin for 
Asia, HI Econoiic and Social Couission.
Concerning the distribution of income in India and China, the 
available data (table 2.3) does not provide a clear picture 
for direct comparison. However, it does help to indicate in 
a general way that income is more evenly distributed in China 
than in India. By Third World countries' standards, it is
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remarkable that the richest 10% of all households in China 
earned less than 30% of the total household income in 1970. 
In Kenya, the highest 10% earned as much as 46% of all 
household income in 1974, in socialist Tanzania more than 35% 
in 1969 and in India, over 33% in 1975-76.
2. Quality of Life: Abizadeh and Basilevsky (1986), applying
what they called "a maximum likelihood factor analysis 
technique", made a socioeconomic classification of 64 
countries using data for 21 variables from the "World 
Development Report 1983" of the World Bank. The variables 
were selected to reflect three major theoretical criteria or 
dimensions: industrial development-underdevelopment, high-low 
income, and quality of life. Abizadeh and Basilevsky’s factor 
analysis on the "quality of life dimension" provides an 
ordered linear ranking, from the lowest to the highest, of the 
sixty four countries. Their findings clearly show that Kenya 
did better than Tanzania on all three counts. A quick glance 
at tables 2.4 and 2.5 will confirm this finding. It can be 
seen that Kenya has a better health service than Tanzania, as 
reflected by the number of physicians available and by the 
lower mortality rate (table 2.4). From table 2.5, the 
indication is also that Kenyans are better fed than Tanzanians 
as a higher ratio of their daily calorie requirement per 
capita was met in 1977. A reflection of the overall health 
situation is also that life expectancy at birth was higher in 
Kenya in 1980 than in Tanzania (table 2.5). In education, 
again Kenya did better than Tanzania judging by the higher
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enrolment ratio in primary education in 1965 and in 1988 
(table 2.4). It was thus the scaling of all these factors 
which gave Kenya a higher rating than Tanzania in the Abezadeh 
and Basilevsky study.
Table 2.4: Health and Nutrition
Daily Calorie Priiary Edncation
Population per Infant iortality supply per cap ----------------
  rate per 1000 in 19771 age group Pupil Teacher
Physician Nurse live births --------  enrolled (t) ratio
Country 1965 1984 1965 1984 1965 1989 Total U 1965 1988 1965 1988
Tanzania 21,700 24,980 2,100 5,490 138 112 2,063 87 32 66 52 33
Kenya 13,280 10,050 1,930 n.a 112 68 2,032 96 54 93 42 41
India 4,880 2,520 6,500 1,700 150 95 2,021 89 74 99 42 n.a
China 1,600 1,010 3,000 1,610 90 30 2,441 103 89 134 n.a 23
Source: Extracted froi Vorld Developient Report 1991 and for (1), froi International Developient 
Association. The Vorld Bank.
Note: (*) should read 'as percentage of requireient*.
India, but not China, was also one of the 64 countries in the 
Abezadeh Basilevsky study. In terms of quality of life, India 
is at a lower scale than both Tanzania and Kenya according to 
the study finding. From tables 2.4 and 2.5, it can also be 
observed that .China does better than India in all aspects. It 
is, therefore, safe to conclude that had China been included 
in the study, the result would have shown a higher quality of 
life scaling in its favour not only over India but also over
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Tanzania and Kenya.
Table 2.5: Social indicators
Priiary Education
\ of cohort persis- Percentage of
Life expect- ting to grade 4 population
acy at birth ------------ Feiales per with access
(years)1 Feiale Male 100 tales ta safe water
1960 80 70 84 70 84 65 88 19752
Tanxania 42 52 82 88 88 89 60 90 39
Kenya 41 55 84 75 84 73 57 94 17
India 43 52 42 n.a 45 ii.a 57 n.a 33
China n.a 64 n.a 76 n.a 77 n.a 84 n.a
Source: Extracted froi the Vorld Developient Report 1991 and,
(1) and (2) froi International Developient Association. The Vorld Bank.
A word of caution needs to be expressed at this stage. 
Demographic and economic variables alone may not be sufficient 
measures of quality of life. Human dignity must also feature 
as an important criterion in the performance assessment of 
states. Repressive and authoritarian measures, lack of 
freedom of expression and all the variables that come under 
the umbrella of human rights could be as important variables 
as the demographic and economic variables in the measurement 
of quality of life. For example, Young (1982:313) has 
suggested that indirect indicators such as the flight of 
refugees from their country of origin should be considered as
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direct evidence of repression. Adding these human dignity 
measures may not have significantly changed the outcome of the 
scaling of the country cases under consideration here but 
their inclusion could make significant difference in other 
c a s e s .
3. Decentralisation and Participation: As discussed above,
the four case countries have embraced decentralisation as a 
mechanism for development administration. Accordingly, all 
have assigned responsibilities for primary education and 
primary health care services to their local authorities. A 
measure of the performance of these services has therefore a 
direct bearing on the degree of decentralisation and 
participation, whatever ideology might exist. The evidence 
(tables 2.4 and 2.5) is that decentralisation performed better 
in Kenya than in Tanzania. This can be contrasted with the 
niceties in the Tanzanian law which empowered the minister 
responsible for local government to promote "meaningful 
involvement of and participation by the people in the making 
of decisions affecting or connected with their livelihood and 
well-being at all local levels" Mawhood (1983:103). However, 
Mawhood (1983:99), in his study on "the search for 
participation in Tanzania", concluded that "economically, 
Tanzania did no better than her neighbours, and in many ways 
worse, during the 1970s. ..Management in the rural sector was 
quite clearly 'not" giving the nation what it needed". The 
decentralisation measures introduced in Tanzania, it is widely 
believed now, "have had precisely the opposite effect from the
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publicly stated [policy]; they have increased central control 
and reduced opportunities for citizen participation” (Tordoff, 
1984:282; Fortmann, 1980:60; Lundqvist, 1981:338).
There was an inherent contradiction in T a n z a n i a ’s 
decentralisation policy because it became clear as it was
being implemented that the scope for such local participation 
was small (Lundqvist, 1981:338). As Hyden (1983:93) explained: 
"people were often consulted by government and party 
officials, but the decisions about priorities and the design 
of programmes remained the prerogative of the officials. Thus 
it is difficult to conclude that the rural people of Tanzania 
benefited in terms of being able to make decisions affecting 
their own future welfare".
K e n y a ’s relative economic superiority over T a n z a n i a ’s should 
not conceal the fact that it is still among the least
developed countries in the world. In 1970, the country 
introduced a major decentralisation reform and, as in 
Tanzania, its main objective was to improve participation by 
local authorities in the identification and execution of
development projects. To implement this objective, planning 
development committees were established initially at the 
province level but later at the district level. But, again as 
in Tanzania, "the planning development committees had no 
influence on national decisions; ministers in Nairobi largely 
ignored their recommendations" (Rondinelli, 1983:81). The 
poor results in tables 2.4 and 2.5 are measures of
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inefficiency, whatever the reason might be, of K e n y a ’s local 
g ove r n m e n t .
Turning to China, it can be seen from tables 2.4 and 2.5 that 
it has done a lot better than India in the delivery of its 
social services. This again is a measure of C h i n a ’s more 
effective decentralisation mechanism as compared to India’s. 
An elaborate comparative case study made on some selected 
Asian countries, including India and China, by Uphoff and 
Esman in 1974 confirms this conclusion. The study was 
designed to find out the impact of "local organisation" on 
"rural development". Uphoff and Esman came to the conclusion 
that "in the Asian context and probably elsewhere, rural 
development measured in terms of agricultural productivity, 
income distribution, and composite welfare criteria is hard to 
achieve without active and effective local institutions" 
(Uphoff and Esman, 1974:97). The study findings show China to 
be among the more organised countries and, compared with 
India, it performed better in almost every aspect of rural 
welfare put under test, including: security of rural people
(the three dimensions considered were, protection from natural 
disaster, protection against violence and access to justice, 
population and employment, and, political-administrative 
participation (see table 2.6).
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Table 2.6: Indicators^ of Rural Political-Administrative 
Participation
Electoral Control of
Total partici- bureauc­ Rnral Developient Resources
Country score ation racy policy influences allocations
China 10 1 4 2 3
India 9 3 2 2 2
Source: Uphoff and Esian, 1974:56.
Note: 1. The coiparative estimates for the four diiensions were scored on 
scales of 0 to 5.
From table 2.6, (note that data 4r9» nearly twenty years old) 
I n d i a ’s comparatively high score could be misleading. The 
score was a reflection of I n d i a ’s democratic political 
heritage but, as Mathur (1983) explained, power is a monopoly 
of a few powerful people at a local level who manipulate it. 
Concerning decentralisation policies, for example, Mathur 
(1983:74) observed that it created a new power base for ’’local 
vested interests" whose strength "determined the extent to 
which administration could be decentralised" to lower tiers.
A measure of C h i n a ’s comparative superiority of 
administrative effectiveness is the high score registered 
under the "control of bureaucracy" criterion as shown in table 
2 . 6 .
C h i n a ’s acclaimed achievement, many observers believe (see 
Stavis, 1974; - World Bank. 1980:78; Kitching, 1982:103), has 
largely been due to the capability of its leadership in 
building on important lessons and on its capacity to adjust 
accordingly (Selden, 1984:2). China is ruled by the Chinese
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Communist Party (CCP). The CCP mobilises society to achieve 
party-determined goals through its cadres whose role is to 
guide and translate party policies. The Party is organised on 
the principle of "democratic centralism": the democratic
aspect of this concept refers to the election of party
committees by the party congress at each level in the 
hierarchy (Waller, 1981:48). The party committees at each 
level are responsible for ensuring the implementation of 
plans and that government organs and peop l e s ’ organisations on 
their levels obey party directives.
From the preceding discussions, it would be hard to claim that 
the decentralisation system of government in India is more 
democratic than that of China. What is the purpose of
decentralisation after all if it is not made to function as
intended to? In other words, the higher score India 
registered on the "electoral" variable in table 6 may not be 
justifiable. One of the differences in local government 
management between China and India is that whilst in the
former administrative control is a mechanism quite openly, 
officially and strictly exercised, in the latter this task is 
to a considerable extent manipulated by "interest groups" and 
so hardly democratic. In the final analysis, therefore, it may 
well be the case that more people participate in local 
government functions in China than in India.
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Conclusion: Underlying Factors
A common trend that emerges from the main themes of nation- 
building, the management of ethnic diversity and development 
administration, discussed above, is that national
integration and economic development are not determined by 
mere adherence to an ideology nor by the acquisition of one 
or other economic model. Political stability and economic 
development are determined by the availabilty of a "strong" 
and interventionist state, even more so in situations where 
multi-ethnicity and underdevelopment are dominant features. 
If a weak state is one that lacks competence, a strong state 
is one with the capacity to draw up workable policies and one 
which is able to respond to arising problems proficiently.
The recent experience of the East European countries provides 
some insight into the kind of problems that may befall many 
African countries. Without imaginative measures to avert the 
impending ethnic problems, "Balkanisation" along ethnoregional 
lines is more a certainty than a likelihood in many African 
countries. The recent Ethiopian experience, where a
combination of ethnoregional forces managed to smash the 
existing hegemonial power may, however, offer some hope for an 
alternative scenario to Balkanisat i o n . The qualification is 
that the forces that took over power in Ethiopia are still 
grappling with establishing a new political order.
From the comparative analysis above, it can be said that no 
simple ideologic-administrative-developmental relationship
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exists. Ideology is, as Plamnatz (1970:15) usefully defined 
it, "a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even 
attitudes, characteristic of a group or community". In 
politics, therefore, ideology is a set of ideas, a vision of 
a preferred, ideal society, that governments may recognise as 
a goal to aim for. Throughout the discussion in this chapter, 
the main interest has been in how the competency of 
governments determines the achievement of a certain ideology - 
a goal. It cannot be the other way round; competence and 
achievement are not determined by ideology.
Jackson and Rosberg (1986) are critical of Ta n z a n i a ’s 
socialist experiment which, they say, "was flawed in its 
conception and that Nyrere's government was the author of some 
of the misfortunes". Some commentators attribute T a n z a n i a ’s 
troubles to inept implementation (Hyden, 1983; Lundqvist, 
1981) but, to Jackson and Rosberg, the root of the problem 
was, "more than most other African political economies,..the 
result of an ambitious rationalist design" (Jackson and 
Rosberg, 1986:217). However, an ambitious design cannot be 
regarded as a rationalist design. Tanza n i a ’s strategy was 
rather based on an ambitious and irrational design (see 
Lundqvist, 1981:341-342). This irrationality is evident from 
the apparent gap between the developmental design and state 
competency to implement it (Fortmann 1980). To Lundqvist 
(1981:339), blame for this incompetence lay with the state 
bureaucracy which became a hindrance in much the same way as 
in T u m a ’s (1988) explanation of "Institutional Obstacles to
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Development” in Egypt
Unlike in Tanzania, C h i n a ’s comparative success story can be
attributed to the capacity of the government leadership to
produce implementable rational designs and to their ability to
translate them into reality. As mentioned earlier, C h i n a ’s
state competency to learn from its mistakes and "to proceed
from C h i n a ’s reality" (Shaozhi, 1982:17) has been a main
factor in its progress. (China is at present undertaking a
programme of economic liberalisation but, as the Tienman
Square incident showed, it has not been accompanied by
political liberalisation. Whether political liberalisation
would bring stabilty in China is, however, questionable).
Malenbaum and S t o l p e r ’s (1978) cogent assessment of these
issues is worth quoting.
C h i n a ’s ties to a Russian model of rapid, large- 
scale industrialization did not impede early 
recognition of the emptiness of industrialization 
without agricultural advancement in a nation where 
most people will long remain rural; of the 
complementarities, rather than the competitiveness, 
of large industry and many types of small 
enterprises suitable to a heavy endowment of labour. 
Important deviations from Communist economic lore 
were soon made in the allocation of large 
percentages of investment resources to agriculture 
and small scale sector. A form of communal
organization was created with continuous and strong 
guidance and controls to assure the change that the 
economy on its own could not generate.
The government of India's models of growth are 
largely derived from the patterns and relationships 
found in Western capitalist societies; neither the 
concepts, nor the values, of the multipliers
relevant ‘to a market-economy in the throes of 
expansion are directly applicable in an
institutionalised and static society. The major
task of rural improvement and growth was placed upon 
a national community development and extension 
scheme. While this action recognised the need,
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especially in the initial years, of injecting into 
rural India a new force for change, government did 
not provide the programmes with sustained, strong 
leadership. (emphasis added)
The imperative of strong leadership needs to be re-emphasised. 
As will be discussed in the case of the Sudan in the following 
chapters, the acute problem with leadership has had dire 
consequences for the processes of nation-building.
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PART II 
BACKGROUND ON THE SUDAN
FIGURE 3.1: POLITICAL MAP 
THE SUDAN AT INDEPENDENCE, 1956
asBSsac
N O R T H E R N
CHAD K A S S A L AAd Com
K H A R T O U M l
K harfoum _K - \
vv°a v I VDARFUR ■^1 \ /  ^ r ^ . io o n 'i^  /
K O R D O F A N
‘J b a w d
VI 0*0*0/
■ BAHR AL G H A Z A L s  i
CENTRAL 1 o * » *  K
AFRICAN 'N 
REPUBLIC V
e . / ^ r ^ r  > v ,
~ v •v  
-r , :
U P P E R
« S i & V v U Ju oa
200 Mil
[3 v W ,  CONGO
' . fW,' KXT' 200KUp»«»»rt
. 2*h;' 30/.' —i_       :__ l— L
—— • » -•ernci'C ^ci c o u n c a i»
——------— Aorr'm .srrc'ive CCU'CC*
 —  5 Cv nc C- b c ^ O C r v
Norn 5c. ' ce-ncrca^ cn >-e
a N cvcpo :cc -o
o °'Cv rc c :cc :c<
C l _ Coiorc:’
Source: United States Government, Sudan Study, 1982
CHAPTER 3
STATE FORMATION AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 
Int roduc t ion
Like all African countries, the geographic entity which is now 
known as the Sudan is a colonial creation. This chapter deals 
with the process by which the Sudan was forged into a nation 
state and the nationalist political movements that emerged and 
eventually took over power. The chapter will also deal with 
the analysis of how the creation of the Sudan brought 
different ethnic groups together and with the conflict that 
developed along the north-south divide.
In 1972, the north south conflict was resolved when the 
warring factions concluded a peace accord in Addis Ababa. An 
understanding of how the peace process was managed and then 
peace achieved is of great importance in any study of the 
Sudan and hence the last section focusses on the political 
commitment which made it possible.
PRE-INDEPENDENCE AND THE ROOTS 
OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE
The Making of the Sudan
Bilad al Sudan, "The Land of the Blacks", is an Arabic 
expression which was used to describe the lands lying south of 
the Sahara in Africa. It was a reference to the fact that the 
first Arab traders came into contact here with the black 
peoples of Africa (see Boateng, 1978:50-51). In modern
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geography, also, the term ’S u d a n ’ is used to describe the belt 
which stretches across Africa approximately between latitudes 
10 degrees and 20 degrees north of the equator, except for the 
part normally known as the Horn of Africa comprising Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti (see Herskovits, 1965:19). The 
present Republic of the Sudan occupies part of this great 
Sudan belt and ’’consists of the territory administered under 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium regime from 1898 to 1955. It is 
a recent administrative creation, whose origin does not go far 
beyond the early part of the nineteenth century" (Beshir, 
1968:1). Beshir ascribes the origin of modern Sudan to the 
Turko-Egyptian rule (3.1), 1820-1885, under which the country 
was administratively united for the first time (see also 
Salih, 1974:13).
Sudanese history before the Turko-Egyptian rule was one "of 
kingdoms and tribes, bonded in the North by the influence of 
Islam" (Norris, 1983:51; Salih, 1974:16). On the other hand, 
little was known of the South Sudan until a successful 
penetration of the Sudd, a swamp covering a large area in the 
South, was made in 1839 by an expedition organized by the 
Turko-Egyptian regime in an effort to discover the source of 
the White Nile. In contrast to North Sudan, Arab and Islamic 
influences were never important factors in the South. "Self- 
contained tribal units with a structure and organization based 
on traditional' African heritage and beliefs are still 
dominant" (Norwegian Church Relief Sudan Programme, Progress 
Report N o .7, 1977:13). The Sudan is normally thought of,
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according to Beshir, "as a country of two peoples and made out 
of two different halves - the North Sudan and the Southern 
Sudan” . "This conception arose” , Beshir wrote, "not only as 
a result of the existence of two physical types of people or 
two different administrative policies followed during the 
condominium administration, but as a result of the different 
physical and climate features obtaining in South and North" 
(Beshir, 1968:1).
The Sudan, however, is a much more complex country in terms of
its geography, ethnicity, and cultural composition and the
generalisation of a north-south divide is highly inaccurate.
This diversity has caused some writers to describe the Sudan
as a microcosm of Africa (Al-Rahim, 1985:228; Voll and Voll,
1985:6). This is not without justification because "the Sudan
contains within its borders representatives of all the major
defined groupings of languages in Africa, except the Khoisan
languages of Southern Africa (Stevenson, 1985:11). Fadlalla
(1979:32) demonstrated the extent of S u d a n ’s linguistic and
ethnic diversity thus:
[In the S u d a n ]..there are about 115 languages, 26 
major ones, 56 ethnic groups subdivided into 597 
subgroups, 43 non-Arabic tribes, more than ten 
Islamic religious sects [and] numerous non-Islamic 
religious s e cts...
In the area now known as north Sudan, the ancient inhabitants 
were of Hamitic origin who became culturally arabacised by 
muslim Arabs entering the country from Arabia and Egypt (Ross, 
1969:4). North Sudan was also influenced by negroid people
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from the south who made their way through tribal conquests 
(El-Mahdi, 1965). The Shilluk, now occupying a relatively 
small area on the western side of the White Nile in the Upper 
Nile Province of south Sudan, had ruled a vast area of the 
north of Sudan. "As late as the mid-nineteenth century their 
northern limit was the island of Aba, thirty years later to be 
the cradle of the Mahdia" ( Holt and Daly, 1988:3). North 
Sudan is today occupied by an admixture of peoples of various 
descent - Hamites, Negroids and A r a b s . In the census of 1956 
only 39 per cent of the population of the Sudan claimed Arab 
descent, 28 per cent of the population were non-Arab 
northerners, 30 per cent were southerners and there were 3 per 
cent others. Also, "despite common language, religion and 
self-identification, Arabs do not constitute a cohesive group" 
(Kaplan, 1982:89). Those who claim Arab descent are 
overwhelmingly dominant in the province of Khartoum, and in 
the Central (some times referred to as Middle) and Northern 
regions and less so but still a majority in Kordofan and 
Darfur regions (see figure 1). The other significant ethnic 
groups in northern Sudan are the Nubians whose homeland is the 
river valley in the far northern Sudan, the Beja speaking 
peoples of the Red Sea and Kassala provinces of the Eastern 
region and the Fur of Darfur province in west Sudan.
As figure 3.1 on the following page shows, the southern Sudan 
contains "a ‘bewildering variety of ethnic groups and 
languages" (Holt and Daly, 1988:3). In the 1955-56 census the
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Table 3.1: Classification of Principal Languages in the Sudan
AFRO-ASIATIC
NIGER-KORDIFANIAN
Semitic
NILO-SAHARAN
Arabic
Tigre
BejaCushitic 
Niger-Congo: 
Benu-Congo: Bantu Bodo 
Huma
Adamava-Eastern: 
Eastern
Kordofanian
Saharan
Maban
Fur
Shari-Nile: 
Eastern Sudanic
Berti
Central Sudanic
Coman
Kare
Bangala
Golo
Zande, Pambia etc. 
Sere-Hundu group
Koalib-Moro gropu 
Teqali-Tagoli group 
Hasakin group 
Kadugli-Krongo group 
Katla, Tima
Zaghawa
Berti
Masalit
Fur
Nubian Group 
Didinga-Murle group 
Tabi (or Ingassana) 
Nyimang, Afitti 
Temein
Tama, Mararit, Sungor 
Daju group
Nilotic:
Burun group, incl. Habaan 
Shiluk, Anuak, Acholi 
DinKa, Nuer 
Bari, Lotuko 
Topotha
Berta
Bongo, Baka, etc 
Kreish
Binga, Tulu, Kara 
Muru-Madi group
Komam Gumuz, Uduk 
Ganza, Gwama, Gule
Note: Highlighted are the lain linguistic groups in south Sudan. Source, R.C. Stevenson, 1985:10
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Nilotes constituted more than three fifths of the peoples of 
south Sudan (Kaplan, 1982:96). The Nilotes are dominated by 
the Dinka ethnic group who constitute two thirds of the 
category. In south Sudan as a whole, the Dinka make up 40 per 
cent of the population and nearly 11 per cent in the Sudan as 
a whole, according to the 1955-56 census. But the Dinka 
people are not a culturally homogeneous society and, 
according to Deng (1973), consist of about twenty five 
independent tribal groups. The next largest ethnic groups are 
the Nuer followed by the Shilluk who again are of the Nilotic 
division. The Nilotic group between them dominate four of 
the six provinces of south Sudan, namely, Bahr El G h a z a l , 
Lakes, Jonglei and Upper Nile. Other major ethnic groups in 
south Sudan are the Bari and the Azande who inhabit the 
Western Equatoria province and the Latuko and Toposa who 
inhabit Eastern Equatoria province.
In what is now the northern Sudan, the coming of the Arabs in 
the seventeenth century and their assimilation into the 
indigenous population made it possible for larger areas to 
acquire a common language and culture and, in turn, to form 
larger social organisations. The kingdoms of Funj and Fur, 
for example, were to control most of what is now northern 
Sudan between them from the early sixteenth century onwards. 
The Funj kingdom had a government structure which in modern 
times would have been called a decentralised system. The 
kingdom was divided into two administrative regions and each 
region in turn was divided into "petty kingdoms” or
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sheikhdoms. The Fur Sultanate was also divided into regions 
with each region in turn divided into districts and each 
district into sheikhdoms. But, unlike the Funj Kingdom, the 
Fur Sultanate had a highly centralised system of government 
where authority was hierarchically structured. Leadership at 
each level of the hierarchy was by direct appointment from the 
centre. Thus, the northern Sudan already had relatively 
highly developed and sophisticated forms of government 
administration when it was invaded by the Turko-Egyptian army 
in 1820. In the case of south Sudan, which was isolated by a 
series of formidable geographical barriers, its distance from 
centres of civilization in the north contributed to the 
relative cultural, material and political underdevelopment of 
its population (Gray, 1961:9).
The Turko-Egyptian Rule
The Turko-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan was carried out in 
stages. The first of the existing kingdoms to fall was the 
Funj Kingdom. It was not until some fifty years had elapsed 
that the Fur Kingdom was finally defeated and its territory 
added to the Turko-Egyptian rule (El-Mahdi, 1965:77-78). The 
invasion of the Sudan by the Turko-Egyptian (3.2) regime was 
for the personal expediency of Muhamed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. 
Muhamed Ali Pasha, who ruled Egypt from 1805-1849, was at the 
height of his fame when he invaded the Sudan in 1820. His 
power was such that the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire 
recognized his rule over the Sudan for the duration of his 
lifetime. That is, ’’the administration of the Sudan was
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independent of the Porte (3.3) and was closely controlled by 
Muhamed Ali himself” (Gray, 1961:3). The main motive for 
Muhamed A l i ’s invasion of the Sudan, as Barbour says, "appears 
to have been to establish an empire for the sake of the 
revenues that he could draw from it, whether in gold or in 
slaves to serve in his army” (Gray, 1961:3).
Whether or not Muhamed Ali P a s h a ’s initial intentions were to 
reap the riches of the Sudan, the Turko-Egyptian regime played 
an important role in the development of the Sudan, almost 
exclusively though in the northern part. During this regime, 
different varieties of crops, fruits and vegetables hitherto
unknown in the Sudan were introduced; ox-drawn ploughs were 
encouraged; boat-building and navigation were developed along
the Nile (Barbour, 1961:266). In later years a number of 
factories were in operation and large plantations were worked 
by slaves (Hill, 1959:70). As Hill also notes, in 
appreciation of the plan Khedive Ismail of Egypt had for the 
S u d a n :
Ismail’s Schemes for the development of the Sudan 
embraced every phase of economic planning known to 
his day. The Sudan company was formed with his 
encouragement in 1863 to build railways and launch 
river steamers as well as to foster the export 
trade... (Hill, 1954:122).
In contrast, the Egyptian role in the development of southern
Sudan was disappointing:
They established a government monopoly in the ivory 
trade and" actively pursued, at least at first, the 
trade in slaves, whom they transmitted to the 
markets of Egypt and Arabia. Later, a perfunctory 
effort was made in 1854 by Said, Viceroy of Egypt, 
to suppress the trade but nothing very much was 
achieved in this direction until 1874 when Gordon
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was appointed to be the Governor of Equatoria. His 
work was certainly aided by the fleet of Nile 
steamers which had been brought to Khartoum after 
1864” (Barbour, 1961:266).
The Turko-Egyptian regime was by no means a popular regime in 
the Sudan. The regime’s ruthlessness in the exaction of taxes 
was strongly resented, particularly by the Northern Sudanese 
who were subjected to heavy taxation on their properties, 
whether on their agricultural produce, their animals or their 
domestic slaves. Another source of conflict between the North 
Sudanese and the Turko-Egyptian regime was the latter’s 
attempt to suppress slavery following international pressure. 
"To the Northerners it was illogical that taxation, which they 
considered unjustified, should be imposed on them while their 
main source of income (slavery) was outlawed" (Deng, 1973:19; 
see also El M a h d i , 1965:79; Hill, 1959:146).
For the southern Sudanese the discontent with the Turko- 
Egyptian rule lay with the r e gime’s record on slavery. During 
the r e g i m e ’s period slave trading in South Sudan reached such 
an extent that it was responsible for causing "far-reaching 
devastating effects on the social fabric of Southern Sudan 
(Wai, 1981:29). Samuel B a k e r ’s observation on his second trip 
to the South (3.4) is a clear account of the effects of slave 
trading in the South. He wrote:
"It is impossible to describe the change that has 
taken place since I last visited this country. It 
was then a perfect garden, thickly populated and 
producing all that man would desire. The villages 
were numerous, groves of plants fringed the steep
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cliff on the river bank, and the natives were neatly 
dressed in the bark cloth of the country. The scene 
has changed. All is wilderness. The population has 
fled. Not a village is to be seen. This is the 
certain result of the settlement of Khartoum 
traders. They kidnap the women and children for 
slaves and plunder and destroy wherever they set 
their foot." (see in W a i , 1981:28).
The discontent with the Turko-Egyptian regime, although 
founded on opposing grounds in North and South Sudan, was such 
that when Muhamed Ahmed declared himself the Mahdi (3.5) in 
March 1881 and "called upon the people to rally with him 
against the Turks" (Abdel-Rahim, 1978:11) his call received
widespread support. The M a h d i ’s support was, as expected, 
stronger in the north but "in some places the southerners 
joined forces with the Mahdists against the Turko-Egyptian 
forces" (Wai, 1981:30; Deng, 1973:20). Under the leadership 
of the Mahdi, "the apparently minor rebellion was rapidly 
transformed into a Jihad (a holy war) and a nation wide 
revolution. After four years of guerilla warfare during which 
the Mahdists won a succession of victories against government 
forces, Khartoum fell to the Mahdi on 26th January 1885 and 
with it the Turko-Egyptian rule in the Sudan was over. Thus, 
the Mahdist rule was the first independent government of 
modern Sudan.
The Mahdist Regime
The Mahdist regime was to last for thirteen years (1885-1898). 
The Madhi himself did not live long; he died suddenly six 
months after the fall of Khartoum. He was succeeded, on his 
own recommendation, by his K h a l i f a , his principal deputy (see
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El Madhi, 1965:101). "The Mahdist regime was essentially 
Islamic and nationalistic .... Islamic law was applied in its 
literal sense and the spread of the divinely-inspired mission 
was vigorously undertaken" (Deng, 1973:20; see also El Mahdi, 
1965:98). The two guiding principles of the Mahdiya
government were that, firstly, Islam and the teachings of the 
Q u r ’an be accepted by all the M a h d i ’s followers and secondly, 
that the Islamic constitution and its laws be adopted (see in 
El Mahdi, 1965:97).
Under the Mahdiya government, the Khalifa was the supreme head 
of state. "He was not only the ultimate authority in the 
administrative system but its prime mover...No political 
decision of any importance could be taken without reference to 
him; indeed throughout his reign the initiative seems to have 
lain with him alone" (Holt, 1970:250-251).
The centre of administration of the Mahdiya state was
Omdurman, one of the three towns that make up Greater 
Khartoum. The frontiers of the Mahdist state were never 
demarcated. War with neighbouring countries and internal 
rebellion led to gains and losses on every side (Holt; 
1970:244). However, the country was divided into twelve
provinces and each province was ruled by a governor (Amir) who 
was directly responsible to the Khalifa. The Amir was, all at 
the same time,' "a political officer, civil administrator and 
military administrator" (Salih, 1974:15). "Under each Amir 
came a number of Umal (singular Amil) who collected the taxes"
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(El Mahdi, 1965:215). The 
establish complete authority 
the South (Beshir, 1968:15-16 
Mahdists in the South was to 
slave trading and anarchy.
Mahdist state was never able to 
or effective administration in 
). This ineffectiveness of the 
open the way to the renewal of
The Mahdist regime was no less ruthless than the Turko- 
Egyptian regime it succeeded. The Mahdists dealt with any 
internal uprisings, and there were several of them, "with 
great cruelty and finality" (El Mahdi, 1965:105). The 
M a h d i s t s ’ rule in south Sudan, for example, left scars of 
bitterness the memories of which were to persist from 
generation to generation. Wai (1981:31) explains:
Scars of brutality inflicted on the Southern 
Sudanese still remain. The Mahdist invasion upset 
the traditional pattern of tribal life and left 
nothing but anarchy and fear - strong enough to 
defeat the Negroids but never sufficiently strong to 
establish their hegemony over them, the Mahdists 
were compelled to raid again and again not only to 
maintain their position but also to secure even the 
most essential supplies. And the only lasting 
result of these continual raids was the Southerners’ 
hatred and fear of the Northern Sudanese".
The events which led to both the success and the downfall of 
the Mahdist era were dictated by events occurring in Egypt 
itself. Firstly, the construction of the Suez Canal just 
before the Mahdist uprising in the Sudan had driven the 
country to near bankruptcy. The Khedive of the time was
unable to meet E g y p t ’s financial obligations to its creditors 
and recommendations made by a committee of inquiry to improve
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the financial situation were rejected by the Khedive as they 
included measures that would have curtailed his power. As a 
result of the protestations of the creditors, the Khedive was 
deposed by decree of the Sultan of Turkey and replaced by a 
"more pliant Khedive" (Fieldhouse, 1966:183). But merely 
replacing the Khedive did not solve the financial problem in 
Egypt and in the ensuing disorder a nationalist uprising was 
to emerge led by Colonel Arabi who, by 1882, had gained 
control of most of Egypt.
It was thus at a time when Egypt was in a state of civil war 
that the Mahdist uprising started in the Sudan. Egypt had, at 
that time, no effective government at home let alone one 
capable of defending its interests in the Sudan. It was at 
the time of the nationalist movement in Egypt also that 
Britain intervened militarily on the pretext of helping the 
Egyptian government against Arabi. In August 1882 Arabi was 
defeated and the Khedive was reinstated. However, as it 
turned out, Britain was to remain in Egypt for the next thirty 
years (1882-1913), effectively controlling it. Feis
(1964:390-391) explains the dual British and Egyptian 
Government arrangement that functioned during this period as 
f o l l o w s :
"The British Consul-General was given authority over 
all the English advisers that were placed in the 
Egyptian ministries. From 1883 to 1907 Lord Cromer 
held this place and, under the Egyptian constitution 
of 1883, was the real governing power of Egypt. The 
Khedive was dependent upon him. The Egyptian 
representative bodies could advise and criticize the 
executive branch of the government but could not
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directly oppose it. ..... The most important of the 
other English advisers was the financial adviser who 
had a seat in the Council of Ministers. Though he 
possessed no vote, the British Government enforced 
the rule that "no financial decision should be taken 
without his consent, which gave him an extensive 
power over all government operations” .
The British presence in Egypt was thus to mark the beginning 
of what was to be called the "scramble for Africa". As 
Fieldhouse (1966:184) explains, "Egypt, therefore, became a 
key factor in the diplomacy of colonial partition after 1882; 
for Britain, hitherto the arch-exponent of a ’hands-off’ 
policy, had broken the ring and had taken one of the plums 
before others had staked their claims. Egypt did not cause 
the partition of Africa but its occupation by Britain 
significantly influenced the latter course of events".
Following the loss of the Sudan by the Turko-Egyptian regime 
with the fall of Khartoum, the British Government adopted a 
policy of non-interference despite the Egyptian Government’s 
displeasure. The idea that whoever controls the Upper Nile 
controls Egypt had always been an Egyptian belief. Samuel 
Baker had written that "a hostile power could readily dam the 
Upper Nile, starve Egypt of water and so destroy the country" 
(see in Robinson and Gallagher, 1981 (ed), p . 283). The
reversal of the British policy of non-interference in the 
Sudan came with the Italian occupation of Eritrea. The long- 
held British view that "the savage tribes who ... rule in the 
Sudan do not possess the resources or the engineering skill to 
do any real harm to Egypt" (see Robinson & Gallagher, 
1981:285) had now become redundant with the possibility of a
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foreign power occupying the Sudan. From November 1889
onwards, Britain adopted, as a general principle, the view 
that all parts of the Nile Valley were essential to the safety 
of E g y p t .
Thus the safety of the Nile had by now become a 
supreme consideration, and the policy was quickly 
put into effect. On 7 March 1820 (Britain) warned 
the Italians off the Nile .... The new strategy also 
forced (Britain) to consider the defensive policy of
the past six years in the S u d a n .........  Three
reasons (were given) for doing so; in the first 
place, E g y p t ’s finances had now turned the corner; 
secondly, the dervish movement has been going 
rapidly downhill; and thirdly, diplomacy could not 
be relied on for ever to ward off other Powers. In 
the end, occupation alone could make certain of the 
Upper Nile. The Prime Minister agreed that sooner 
or later the Sudan would have to be conquered” (see 
in Robinson & Gallagher, 1981:286).
By 1894, the threat of a foreign power occupying the Nile 
Valley had become real. Italy had gained territory by 
defeating the Mahdists in the east. Threats of Belgian and 
French intrusion from the south were also becoming a reality 
(3.6). The British and the Egyptians had no option but to act 
and soon. The Anglo-Egyptian offensive against the Mahdists 
began in 1896 and was completed by 1898 after the fall of 
Omdurman, the Mahdi s t s ’ capital. Thus started the period of 
Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan, generally known as the 
Condominium, which was to last for over fifty years. On 
January 19, 1899, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed by 
which Britain ‘was given the trusteeship of the country based 
on the right of conquest.
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The Condominium Period
Beshir ( 1974:20) contended that the Anglo-Egyptian agreement 
was without precedence in international law. In aswer to the 
question of why and how the agreement was arrived at, Beshir 
(1974:20) explains, quoting Lord Cromer, the British Consul- 
General of Egypt at the time:
England not Egypt had in reality conquered the 
country. It is true that the Egyptian Treasury had 
borne the greater burden of the cost and that 
Egyptian troops, officered, however, by Englishmen, 
had taken a very honourable part in the campaign. 
But, alike during the period of the preparation and 
of the execution of the policy, the guiding hand had 
been that of England. It is absurd to suppose that 
without the British assistance in the form of men, 
money, and general guidance, the Egyptian Government 
could have reconquered the Sudan" . "From this point 
of view, therefore, the annexation of the 
reconquered territories by England would have been 
partially justifiable".
Thus, although the Anglo-Egyptian agreement gave the British 
more than a mere p a r t n e r ’s role, nevertheless this did not 
make the Sudan a British colony. As Beshir (1974:21) says, 
"for all practical considerations the Sudan was an 
’autonomous’ independent state governed by British 
administrators assisted by junior Egyptian officials". 
Internationally, British presence in the Sudan was defended in 
the name of Egypt. It was also in the name of Egypt that the 
French were forced to leave Fashoda (3.7) or else risk the 
possibility of a real war. The anomaly was, however, that 
when, in later years, Egyptian claims over the Sudan were 
gaining momentum, the British removed all Egyptian junior 
officers working in the Sudan to undermine E g y p t ’s influence
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there (see, for example, in Beshir, 1974).
The coming to power of a revolutionary government in Egypt in
1952 was to be the beginning of a new era in the relationship 
between the condominium partners on the one hand and between 
Egypt and the Sudan on the other. The new revolutionary 
government of Egypt was willing to accept Sudanese nationalist 
demands for immediate self-government leading to self- 
determination in due course. An Anglo-Egyptian agreement was 
signed in February 1953 to this effect. "The transitional 
period of self-government preceding self-determination was 
limited in the agreement to a maximum of three years from the 
’appointed d a y ’" (El Mahdi, 1965:147).
Parliamentary elections were held in November and December
1953 and, at its first sitting on 7 January 1954, a Prime 
Minister was elected to lead the transitional government. By 
19 December 1955 the House of Representatives had passed a 
resolution declaring the independence of the Sudan. Three 
days later the Senate concurred. These parliamentary 
decisions were recognized by the condominium partners and on 
1 January 1956 independence was officially declared and the 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan became the Republic of the Sudan (see, 
for example, Beshir, 1974:182; El Mahdi, 1965:150-151).
Santi and Hill* (1980:1) have provided a good summary of what
the new Sudan inherited from the condominium regime:
The condominium rebuilt the framework of government 
destroyed by the Mahdists, retaining certain Turko-
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Egyptian institutions and adding the political, 
legal, economic, technical and cultural apparatus of 
a British dependent territory. The effective 
direction of policy lay with the British and, for a 
great part of its existence, the condominium was 
autocratic modified by the introduction of 
consultative, and an approach to representative, 
institutions towards the end of the regime.”
In the field of economic development, the condominium regime’s 
achievements were, however, less than impressive. As Barbour 
(1961:265) commented: "If the factors that really brought
about economic expansion be studied, it may prove truer to say 
that parts of Sudan were already beginning to be affected by 
world trade when the Egyptians ruled the country before the 
M a h d i ’s revolution, while other areas were scarcely touched by 
fifty years of British rule". But perhaps more than the 
developmental inequality, it was the political imbalance 
between the north and the south which was to become most 
damaging. Already, a year before independece was declared a 
mutiny of southern soldiers from the Equatoria Corps, an all- 
southern section of the army created forty years earlier and 
stationed at Torit, a military garrison town in eastern 
equatoria province, south Sudan, took place, an event which is 
accredited as being the starting point of the seventeen year 
civil strife that followed.
National Political Developments
During the interwar period, nationalist feeling was taking 
ground in many African colonial countries. As a result, "the 
fear of the possible implications of self-government for the 
colonies began to be felt in earnest in the metropolis.
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...Before the end of the second world war, there is evidence 
of the first recognition of the distant but eventual 
possiblity of successful independence demands in Africa" 
(Mayo, 1975:30). Following the Second World War, this became 
a reality and colonial governments were racing against time to 
develop a political system of their choosing in the colonies. 
The central purpose of the British colonial policy, for 
example, became "...to guide colonial territories to 
responsible self-government in conditions that ensure to the 
people an orderly social system, the highest possible standard 
of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter" 
(Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, quoted in Snyder, 
1962:129). Politically, the British wanted the colonies ". .to 
remain stable and friendly to the western world" (Snyder, 
1962:129). Accordingly, local political institutions were 
allowed and encouraged to develop in line with the political, 
economic and social standards of the "mother country".
A reflection of the new position in the Sudan immediately 
after the the Second World War was the mushrooming of 
political parties in the north. However, the Sudan became 
independent, earlier than most other colonial countries in 
Africa, more because of the mistrust between its joint rulers 
~ Egypt and Britain - than the pressure of nationalist demands 
(Hamid, 1986:127; Woldemichael, 1987:10). Nothing akin to the 
nationalist movements which preceded independence in most 
colonial African countries existed in the Sudan. The 
nationalist movements that emerged before independence in the
- 135 -
Sudan were all north-centred and dominated by the two 
traditionalist Islamic religious sects, the Ansar and the 
Khatmiya, whose loyalty to the emerging Sudanese political 
nation-state was marginal (Khalid, 1987:115-116; Woodward, 
1979:44). Nationalist consciousness in the southern Sudan was 
at an even lower ebb than in the north and "one could hardly 
say that the south had given its full consent and support to 
the birth of the Sudanese nation-state” (Russell and McCall, 
1973:39). Paradoxically, therefore, during the time of 
decolonisation, nationalism, the most basic ideology for 
national integration (Mazrui, 1969:18), played no role as a 
uniting factor in the development of national consciousness 
and national loyalty in the Sudan. Instead, "consensus 
developed on two regional levels, north and south" (Wai, 
1983:316). Hence the clash that occurred when independence 
brought the two together.
The two major parties to emerge in the pre-independence period 
in the north were the Umma Party, and the Unionists. Each of 
these parties were under the patronage of one of the two main 
religious establishments in north Sudan. The Ansar religious 
sect or the Mahdiya as it is interchangeably called, was the 
patron of the Umma party and the Khatmiya of the Unionists. 
Because of the influence the two major religious sects have on 
the north Sudanese societies, smaller parties that emerged 
eventually gravitated towards one or the other for patronage 
and joined their respective parties (Woodward, 1979).
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The political positions of the two major religious sects on 
the future of the Sudan in the pre-independence period were 
diametrically opposed. The Khatmiya favoured union with 
Egypt, while the Ansar sect, "agreed to participate in the 
constitutional developments proposed by the British 
administration" (Beshir, 1974:168). The British
administration proposal was the establishment of a 
transitional government which would be empowered to exercise 
the right of self-determination through democratic means 
(B e s h i r , 1974).
The other important parties that emerged in the north were 
the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (SMNL), later to 
become the Sudanese Communist Party, and the Moslem 
Brotherhood Organisation. Both these parties were extensions 
of parties with similar names in Egypt and initially both drew 
their support from the University of Khartoum students. In 
later years, support for the Communist Party grew among trade 
union movements.
Whilst these political developments were taking place in the 
north, no political movement of any description appeared, 
before independence, in south Sudan. At the approach of 
independence, "southern apprehensions was manifested in the 
formation of informal associations among the nascent 
intelligentsia, dubbed "political committees" (Markakis, 
1987:149). Some of them went as far as giving political names 
to their groups: such as the "Southern United Party" and the
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"Southern Sudan Federal P a r t y " , but these groups lacked 
"coherent political organisations through which Southern 
interests could be articulated and defended" (Niblock, 
1987:212). Even when the country was conducting important 
talks with the co-dominii governments on the eve of 
independence, there was no southern political party claiming 
to speak in the name of the South (Beshir, 1968:71). Niblock 
(1987:215) outlines the north-south political imbalances, 
thus :
...the s o u t h ’s political interests could be, and 
were, subjected to the overriding concerns of the 
northern political elite. No southerner had been 
invited to take part in the discussions which the 
northern political parties had held with the 
Egyptian government prior to the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement. Southerners remained peripheral to the 
debate over independence arrangements during 1955, 
except when their votes were needed in parliament.."
Table 3.2: Seats Gained in the 1953 Elections for the House of
Representatives, by Privince (Territorial Constituencies only).
UNP UMMA
Socialist
republicans
Southern
Party
Others Total
Blue Nile 6 10 2 0 0 18
Darfur 2 6 1 0 2 11
Kordofan 11 6 0 0 0 17
Bahr El Ghazal 1 0 0 2 4 7
Equatoria 0 0 0 5 2 7
Kassala 6 1 0 0 1 8
Upper Nile 4 0 0 2 2 8
Khartoum 9 0 0 0 0 9
Northern 7 0 0 0 0 7
Total 46 23 3 9 11 92
Source: Sudanese Elections Commission, Final Report on the 1953 Elections 
(Government Printer, Khartoum, 1954:27).
Elections for S u d a n ’s first parliament took place in November 
and December 1953, with the National Unionist Party scoring a
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decisive majority win (see table 3.1). The elected members 
from the South, most of them claiming to represent the 
"Southern Party", were politically and numerically too 
insignificant for their views to have any impact in the 
national assembly. The Southern members did make some 
progress towards creating a new party which they called the 
"Liberal Party" but, lacking in organisation and leadership, 
the Liberal Party, "never became very much more than a 
parliamentary number. . .almost continually divided by disputes 
over policy and leadership" (Howell, 1978:122). However, the 
call that the Liberal Party made for federation at its first 
meeting in Juba in September 1954 was to become "a rallying 
cry of the South and a fixed item on the political agenda of 
the Sudan ever since" (Markakis, 1987:150).
Roots of the North-South Conflict
Several factors contribute to the north-south conflict. The 
main ones are cultural, historical and colonial-policy 
f a c t o r s .
The portryal of the Sudan in terms of Arab north and African 
south has been a source of misguided Sudanese identification 
and, hence, of conflict. Gray (1963:12), for example, states 
that "the decisive, distinguishing factor between north and 
south seems to be a sense of belonging which has its roots in 
history and is confined by birth... the southerner feels 
himself to be an African, while the northerner is proud of his 
Arabic connection". However, the term "Arab" in reference to
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racial character cannot be used in the case of the Sudan. 
Arabism in the Sudan, as already discussed above, is an 
acquisition of culture rather than racial heredity (Ahmed, 
1984:28). The term "African'* too, in the racial sense it is 
used, has been misleading. "Africa is essentially a
geographic term; it has almost no distinctive linguistic, 
political, traditional, institutional, or other cultural 
references" (Jackson and Roseberg, 1984:179). The African 
people are composed of several races - Semitic, hamitic, 
nilotic and so on - and hence there is no such thing as 
"African" race. It is obvious from the various shades of skin 
and colour of the Sudanese people that extensive intermixing 
has occurred (Beshir, 1984:9). It appears, therefore, that 
cultural differences were the basis for the social 
stratification used in the Sudan. The point is, however, that 
what may have started as stratification by culture has lead 
the northerners and the southerners to "treat one another as 
if they belonged to racially distinct groups" (Russell and 
McCall, 1973:107). Russell and McCall could not have been 
more accurate when they wrote in this connection that 
"subjective racism, however much it may rest on a mistaken 
conception of real racial differences, can be as potent a 
source of discord and inequality as objective differences of 
race" .
A second soured of conflict between the north and the south 
has its roots in the historical past. The southerners regard 
the northerners as their traditional enemies becase the latter
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had always invaded the south for slaves. The slave trading 
period remains a historical fact of significance in terms of 
north-south perceptions and attitudes. However, it is not 
only memories of past misdeeds which have been affecting 
inter-regional perceptions but also the persistence of 
northern attitudes of superiority over the south. Southerners 
continue to suffer real social discrimination in the Sudan 
(W o l demikael, 1985; see also Sudanow, June 1986).
The third source of conflict could be regarded as the colonial 
policy factor. During the Sudan's long colonial history 
(1820-1955), the two regions were administered differently, 
developed differently and treated differently, and because of 
this differential treatment over a long period, social, 
economic and political developments also took different routes 
which all added up to the development of a distinct line of 
divsion between the north and the south. The most far 
reaching action the British authorities took, for example, as 
far as the north-south relations were concerned, was the 
adoption of the law by which the movement of people was 
controlled. The promulgation of the Passports and Permits 
Ordinance, empowered the Governor General to declare any part 
of the Sudan a "Closed District". By this order, northern 
Sudanese were forbidden to trade in south Sudan, preventing 
normal social and cultural intercourse from taking place 
(Beshir, 1968:42). In a 1930 memorandum dispatched from the 
Civil Secretary in Khartoum to the Governors of the three 
provinces in the south, which came to be known as the southern
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policy, the government of the d a y ’s intention to isolate the
south from the north was made clear:
Whereas at present Arabic is considered by many 
natives of the south as the official and, as it 
were, fashionable language, the object of all should 
be to counteract this idea by every practical means 
(see in Beshir, 1968:118)
One practical means used to counteract the spread of Arabic
was to allow education develop differently in the north and in
\
the south as a result of the different policies the regime 
introduced. In the north, a western-style three level system 
of general education was introduced with Arabic as the medium 
of instruction for the first two levels. The education policy 
in the south during the earlier period of the Condominium 
regime was based on the recommendations that emerged from the 
conference held at Rajaf (in the south) in 1926. Following 
the Rajaf conference recommendations, six vernacular languages 
were used in the first four years of primary education in the 
respective areas and English became the lingua franca of the 
south (Thomas, 1978:13-14). "Arabic, and even the use of 
common Arabic terms, were to be discouraged" (Holt and Daly, 
1986:139). In the south, the colonial authority’s direct 
involvement with education was comparatively minimal and 
instead, it gave freedom to the various Christian missionary 
societies to found and administer schools with religious 
education receiving much emphasis (UNICEF, 1980:1). The 
effect of the various government policies on north-south 
relations was clearly explained by Holt and Daly (1986:139) :-
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The combination of the closed district system, 
indirect rule and education policy encouraged and 
increased the differentiation of north south which 
had already existed. The southern policy entailed 
both the progressive separation of the south and the 
fostering of particularism within it” .
There were various reasons for adopting different policies in
the northern and southern Sudan. Firstly, the British
authorities were undecided on the future of the south until
1946. A policy dispatch of 1945, for example, states that:
"It is only through economic and educational development that
these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the
future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the northern
Sudan or with East Africa - or partly with each - (see
appendix 2 in Beshir, 1968:119). Secondly, the policy of
encouraging missionary activity in the south was partly to
control the influence of Islam from spreading southward into
the British colonies of East Africa. In the end all these
came to nothing as the government was to completely reverse
its policy in 1946:
The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the 
southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the 
peoples of the southern Sudan are distinctively 
African and Negroid, but that geography and 
economics combine to render them inextricably bound 
for future development to the middle-eastern and 
arabacised northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure 
that they shall , by education and economic 
development, be equipped to stand up for themselves 
in the future as socially and economically the 
equals of their partners of the northern Sudan in 
the future (see in Beshir, 1968:120-121).
The reversal of the Southern Policy, Wai states "was the 
beginning of a new chapter in Afro-Arab relations in the
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Sudan" and, he argues: "it is difficult to comprehend how
southern interests were to be served when intense hostility 
existed, having been deep rooted in north-south relations 
since pre-colonial times" (Wai, 1980:384). British
administrators serving in the south were also aghast at the 
new policy, particularly Richard Owen, who accused the Civil 
Secretary of "sacrificing his conscience" and warned that the 
northerners will "dominate the southerners and treat them as 
their fathers did and that the sins of the fathers shall be 
visited upon their children unto the third and fourth 
generation" (see in Wai, 1980:384). Despite strong
opposition, the policy was adopted and in 1947 the government 
convened a conference in Juba to discuss the s o u t h ’s 
representation in the proposed national assembly. The 
southern Sudanese who participated were handicapped for this 
purpose, most of them being illiterate local chiefs and some 
junior clerks serving in the Administration. Present at the 
conference were also the Civil Secretary and his assistant, 
the governors of the southern provinces, the director of 
establishments and six delegates from the north representing 
various political parties. The imbalance in the level of 
sophistication in political negotiations between the northern 
delegates and those from the south, in favour of the former, 
is clear from the minutes of the conference. However, the 
southerners, illiterate though they might have been, and with 
no experience in negotiations, showed a remarkable sense of 
r espons ibi 1 t y . It is recorded that one of the chiefs 
"regretted that he was not ready for these discussions as he
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had not been able to consult his people before coming to
Juba". It is further recorded that the same chief said:
. . .a girl who has been asked to marry a young man 
usually wants time to hear reports of that young man 
from other people before consenting; likewise before 
coming to any fixed decision about relations with 
northerners. The ancestors of the northern Sudanese 
were not peace loving... the younger generation 
claim that they mean no harm, but time would show 
what they would in fact do. He agreed unification 
with the north but insisted on the southerners’ need 
for protection and for further time to consider the 
matter...An immediate decision could not be taken 
now ( the minutes of the Juba conference, 1947; see 
in Beshir, 1968).
The southern participants at the conference repeatedly 
stressed that they were being pushed too hurriedly. As one of 
them said:" the north wanted immediate southern representation 
in an assembly which would legislate for the whole Sudan. 
Southerners were afraid of this because they felt that, 
through lack of understanding [language barrier, for example], 
their representatives might agree to laws which would prove 
harmful". To a suggestion put forward by one of the southern 
delegates that a southern "Advisory Council" be established, 
the Chairman [the Civil Secretary], ironically "deplored the 
tendency to regard any suggestion that southern problems 
should be treated in a different manner from those in the 
north as a conspiracy to divide north from the south" (minutes 
of the Juba conference, 1947).
Sudan became independent in January 1956 without heeding the 
s o u t h ’s fear of domination by the north thus putting in 
jeopardy any chance of lasting unity from the very start.
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During the S u d a n ’s self-rule period between 1952 and 1955, the 
south, having previously failed to "dissuade the British 
authorities from uniting the two regions under a single 
unitary government was persistently arguing for a 
constitutional safeguard in the form of federation" (Wai, 
1983:307; M a l w a l , 87:11). In the end the southern demand for 
federalism as a compromise was also rejected after cursory 
examination and the minimal safeguards which they requested 
were not incorporated into the S u d a n ’s constitution" (Wai, 
1983:308).
At the eve of independence, educated southern Sudanese "were 
too few to form a significant elite, or to give southerners a 
fair share of the jobs which were becoming available as a 
result of Sudanisation" (Thomas, 1978:25). During the 
transitional period between 1953 and 1956, for example, not a 
single southern Sudanese occupied a senior administrative 
position in the south itself (Sanderson and Sanderson, 
1981:345). As the positions were occupied by northern 
Sudanese, Sanderson and Sanderson (1981:345) believe that the 
resentments created as a result of northern domination were 
the root cause of the disturbances that erupted in 1955 (see 
chapter 4).
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POST-INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOUTH SUDAN QUESTION
Escalation of Conflict
Since independence the Sudan has experienced frequent changes 
of government, the pattern varying between parliamentary 
democracy and military rule. In the first two years (1956- 
1958), democratic party politics continued to prevail through 
the parliament system. The National Unionist Party, which was 
victorious in the first election for the transitional 
government, continued in power for two years after 
independence until it was defeated when some of its members 
crossed the floor and joined the opposition (Beshir, 
1974:207). A coalition of parties led by the Umma party then 
took over power for two years under difficult conditions with 
members changing allegiances. In November 1958, the 
military, led by General Ibrahim A b o u d , took over power in a 
bloodless coup. The military rule in turn was swept aside by 
general civil unrest in October 1964 and, after a short period 
of transitional government, the parliamentary system was 
restored once again (1965-1969). However, no single party had 
a majority sufficient to form a government on its own and an 
unstable coalition of parties became the norm. The political 
rivalry within and amongst the parties was such that between 
May 1965 and May 1969 there were four changes of government. 
By this time the country was in a state of chaos both 
politically and economically. Pledging to restore order in 
the country, the military, led by Gaafar Nimeiri, took power 
in May 1969.
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Before the Nimeiri regime, north-south relations continued to
deteriorate culminating in open hostility with the emergence
of an organised armed movement in the south, the Anya-Nya,
which, literally translated, means "the snake venom" in one of
the local languages, Madi (see Wakason, 1984:125). Mohamed
Omer Beshir (1976:20) provides a good resume of the causes of
the escalation in the north-south conflict after independence:
...successive governments failed to address 
themselves enough to the issues involved. The 
policies adopted regarded the diversities as if they 
did not exist. In addition to this, the general 
attitude was that the promotion of the culture of 
the majority would ultimately lead to integration 
and the establishment of national integration. 
Assimilation, rather than the recognition of 
diversity and equality of cultures was seen as the 
way to national unity. The result of these policies 
and attitudes was the [start of the] w a r . ..and the 
emergence of groups and organisations with 
regionalist and separatist tendencies.
In post-independence Sudan, northern politicians and scholars 
have been so preoccupied with the exposition of what they
regard as the "mischiefs" of the British during the colonial
rule that it has prevented any search for an alternative
approach to the north-south conflict. The philosophy and the 
policies that emerged from the anti-British-rule fixation, as 
far as north-south relations were concerned, was that since 
all that the British did in the south was wrong, the opposite 
would be right. Accordingly, Arabic and Islam were vigorously 
promoted and contact between the north and south intensified 
(Deng, 1987:60). Examples include "the decision by the north 
to close down vernacular schools in the south and replace 
them with Arabic schools; the closing down of Christian
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missionary churches and setting up in the same village of 
Muslim Qoranic centres" (Malwal, 1981:2). Most provocative of 
all was the imposition in the south of Friday as the weekly
holiday instead of Sunday. The final blow came in March 1964,
when the military government of the time passed a decree by 
which all missionary activities in the south were stopped and 
all foreign missionaries expelled within seven days (see in 
Malwal, 1981:66). There was a belief in the north during this
time, as expressed by Sadiq El Mahdi , leader of the Umma Party
and Prime Minister following the overthrow of the military 
government in 1964, that "the failure of Islam in southern 
Sudan would be the failure of the Sudanese Muslims to the 
international Islamic cause. Islam has a holy mission in 
Africa, and southern Sudan is the beginning of that mission" 
(see in Malwal, 1981:4). A leader of the Islamic Charter 
Front, Dr Hassan El T u r a b i , went even further by arguing that 
"the south had no culture, so this vacuum would necessarily be 
filled by Arab culture under an Islamic revival" (Alier, 
1973:24; Heraclides, 1987:218). As Lesch (1985:419) also 
wrote: "Those groups and political figures who have called for 
an Islamic state and Arabisation of all the people believe 
that the only proper course is to assimilate the non-Arab and 
non-Muslim peoles into the Muslim Arab face of the Sudan.
K
They view the south as a fertile field for conversion and 
press for Arabic as the sole language for administration and 
instructions throughout the country". However, the
"aggressive programme of Islamization and Arabisation" as 
Hamid (1986:128) called it, "was to further alienate
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southerners [from northerners]"
The impact of the oppressive rule in the south was etui t e 
dramatic. The more the north pushed the implementation of its 
expressed policy of cultural assimilation the more opposition 
it met. As Wai (1983:309) wrote, "somehow, the brutality of 
northern reprisals seemed to inspire rather than discourage 
resistance". As the Anya- N y a ’s activities intensified the 
reprisals of the army led thousands of southerners to flee to 
neighbouring countries as refugees and, under the shield of 
safety, they soon began to organise themselves into political 
groups. In Uganda, a group of southern refugees comprising 
Father Saturnino Lohure, Joseph O d u h o , Aggrey Jaden, Alexi 
Mbali and Pancrasio Ocheng founded The Sudan Christian 
Association in 1961 (Wakason, 1984:184). In Zaire, The Sudan 
African Closed District National Union was formed under the 
leadership of Joseph Oduho in 1962. This party changed its 
name in 1963 to the Sudan African National Union (S A N U ) under 
the leadership of William Deng. SANU became the most enduring 
of the three parties and was instrumental in petitioning major 
international organisations like the United Nations and the 
Organisation of African Unity and in promoting the activities 
of the Anya-Nya (Beshir, 1974:220). Another noted activity by 
SANU was that in 1964 it organised a conference in Kampala, 
Uganda, seeking to restructure itself in order to make it more 
effective. Aggrey Jaden became the new president and for the 
first time SANU sent emissaries to eight countries. SANU also 
started propaganda publications in French and in English.
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Impressed with S A N U ’s activities, a group of educated 
southerners living in Khartoum attempted to establish a party, 
the Southern Sudan Front (SSFP) and declared their allegiance 
to SANU. The intention was that SSFP would function as a 
mouthpiece for SANU inside the country although it never 
worked qui-%o that way.
However, although SANU was acting as a political wing of the 
A n y a - N y a , this was not on any formal basis. Disagreements 
among its leadership and between it and the Anya-Nya became a 
serious handicap for effective functioning of the 
organisation. Joseph Oduho broke away from SANU and founded 
his own party in early 1966 which he called Azania Liberation 
Front. The external political movements were in tatters by 
this time and in an effort to bring them and the Anya-Nya 
closer, a convention was held at Angundri in August, 1967. At 
this convention, a provisional south Sudan government (SSPG) 
was declared. The headquarters of the provisional government 
was decided to be inside the south Sudan.
Internal rivalry among the SSPG leadership became rife and 
necessitated holding the 1969 convention at Palgo-Bindi, near 
the Sudan-Zaire border. The two main resolutions that were 
passed at this convention were to change the name of the SSPG 
to the Nile Provisional Government (NPG) and to stress its 
basic policy to be the separation of the south from the north.
After the formation of the NPG a proper re­
organisation of the whole movement was instituted. 
Provincial commissioners were appointed for all 
southern provinces, helped by junior administrators.
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Every region had its own commanding officer directly 
responsible to the commander-in chief of the region 
who worked in close coordination with the Secretary 
of Defence of the whole movement. At the regional 
level there was close coordination of the activities 
of the fighting forces and the civil administration 
(Wakoson, 1984:199).
It was all very well that the NPG had a proper governmental 
structure but in reality it never functioned as envisioned 
because of internal fuctional rivalries based on, according to 
Wakoson, "tribalism” and "regionalism". The whole movement 
was at the stage of disintegration, when in July 1970, Colonel 
Joseph L a g o , who was then an area commander and an arms 
procurement officer of the Anya-Nya, declared the formation of 
the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. By this declaration 
the Anya-Nya became the sole authority in the south and all 
other existing political organisations both within and ouside 
the country were asked to join. The Nile Provisional 
Government steped down and declared its allegiance to the 
leadership of Joseph Lago. Others followed suit and either 
joined in or dissolved themselves. "Those who showed some 
signs of opposition to L a g o 's government were dismissed from 
active participation in the movement" (Wakoson, 1984:202).
The Search for Peace and Unity
For nearly a decade after the Sudan became independent, no 
government that came to power sought a political solution to 
the South Sudan' question. By the time the first military 
government was overthrown by popular revolt in October 1964, 
having been in power for six years, the conflict in the South
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had gone deeper than at independence. The October revolution 
brought to power a transitional civilian government with a 
mandate to prepare the country for parliamentary elections. 
The transitional government was in power for only eight months 
but nevertheless this was a period of great significance in 
the relations between the North and South Sudan. For the 
first time since independence, the Prime Minister of the 
transitional government declared his intention to resolve 
S u d a n ’s intractable problem in the South by political means. 
As Beshir wrote in this connection, "the government was 
convinced that violence and armed measures would not solve the 
problem” (1968:89). As a sign of good-will the new government 
appointed Clement M ’boro, Ezbon Mundiri and Hilary Paul 
Logali, all prominent southerners residing in Khartoum at the 
time, to the cabinet. Clement M ’boro was given one of the 
most important portfolios as Minister of the Interior. The 
new government also made contact with the southern parties in 
exile and declared a general amnesty to all Sudanese who had 
fled the country including "those who were tried in absentia 
or wanted for trial on any political charge" (Beshir, 
1968:89).
These moves by the transitional government were welcomed by 
the various Southern political parties that had emerged both 
inside and outside the country since independence. A proposal 
put forward by SANU to hold a conference and discuss North- 
South relations was agreed following negotiation concerning 
the venue and conditions. On March 16, 1965, the Khartoum
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Round Table Conference was convened with all the main parties 
of both regions represented. Six African countries, Algeria, 
Egypt, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda sent delegates to the 
conference as observers.
From the addresses delivered by the representatives of the 
Northern political parties, it was clear that the northerners 
regarded the mistrust by the South to be the result of the 
role the British and the missionaries played in the past 
(Beshir, 1968). All the speakers from the North renounced the 
use of force and spoke for a peaceful political solution by 
negotiation. However, "all of them were emphatic that any 
agreement reached on the constitutional relations between the 
North and the South should be within a united Sudan, and 
should in no way generate separatist forces" (Beshir, 
1968:93). This main theme was made clear in the joint 
proposals tabled by the Northern parties for the settlement of 
the Southern question. Concerning the constitutional
relationship between the two regions, the N o r t h ’s proposal 
provided for the South a semi-autonomous regional government 
with limited executive and legislative powers. According to 
this proposal, the regional government so established would 
have constitutional guarantees including freedom of religion, 
freedom of missionary activity for Sudanese nationals, freedom 
of movement, equal opportunity in employment and no 
discrimination for reasons of religion, language or race (see 
Beshir, 1968: appendix 16).
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There was no consensus of opinion among the southern political 
parties on the political solution of the conflict. Three 
different proposals were presented at the conference. Agrey 
Jaden, a representative of the most militant wing of the 
southern exiles, is said to have pointed out that "the north 
and the south had never been one. Any unity that there had 
been between the two was always imposed by outsiders and 
maintained through the use of force .... the only viable 
proposition to discuss at the conference was the separation of 
the south from the north and how the north would hand over 
power smoothly to an independent south . . . otherwise the 
struggle for independence by the south would continue" 
(Malwal, 1981:106). The second proposal called for a 
plebiscite in the south under international supervision, thus 
allowing the southerners to vote freely between federation, 
unity with the north, or independence and separation (Salih, 
1984:68; Beshir, 1968:94; Malwal, 1981:107). The third 
proposal was for a straight federation between the north and 
south. This last proposal being the position of the weakest 
southern party, Sudan Unity Party led by Santino Deng and 
Philimon Majok, was not one for any serious consideration at 
the time.
Intense negotiations continued for some days after these 
positional proposals were put on the conference table but, 
neither side showing any sign of compromising their stated 
position, a deadlock was reached. The Southern point of view 
was that the north did not show a sincere desire to resolve
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the conflict. The stance the north took, that the south 
should first declare its commitment to the unity of Sudan for 
serious discussions to proceed, was seen by the south as a 
non-negotiating position. As Malwal says "after all, the 
south was fighting the already existing ’onen e s s ’ of the Sudan 
in which it had no say in the running of the affairs of the 
country” (1981:106). To the northerners, on the other hand, 
the southerners’ unpreparedness "to produce proposals which 
would exclude separation or independence and meet the [their] 
proposals half way" (Beshir, 1968:95) made the discussion 
simply not worthwhile. In the end it was realised that it was 
impossible to resolve the differences at the time and instead 
an agreement was reached to continue the dialogue in the 
future. A committee representing all the parties was set up 
to review the proposals and to set an agenda for a second 
conference in three months time. But events soon changed and 
no second conference was ever convened.
Northern and southern writers give credit to Sir El Khatim El 
Khalifa, the Prime Minister of the transitional government, 
for creating the conditions for the conference to take place. 
All sides also agree that the Prime Minister was sincere in 
his desire to end the conflict by political means. In his 
introductory address to the conference he expressed his 
"sincere belief in democratic means, the open acknowledgement 
of previous mistakes and full recognition of the racial and 
cultural differences between the North and the South.." 
(Albino, 1986:116-117). Although a Northerner, he knew the
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South well as he had served there as an educational officer 
for a number of years. But he was only selected to the job of 
Premier by the northern parties for the duration of the 
transitional period, that is until national elections should 
take place. Despite the Prime Minis t e r ’s sincerity, it was 
perhaps over ambitious and even ill founded to presume that a 
political solution could be reached whilst a "care-taker 
government" was in power. No northern political party, it 
appeared, could commit itself to any radical policy from the 
conference that might hamper its prospects in the election 
which was to be held two months later. After all, a tough 
stance against the South was still regarded as a vote-catcher 
in the North (Malwal, 1981).
In April 1965, a general election was held and brought back 
parliamentary rule with the traditional northern parties in 
dominance. Beshir described the governments that ruled after 
the 1965 election as follows:
The parliamentary regimes of 1965 to 1969 were thus 
characterized by chaos, intrigue and lack of 
purpose. The successive governments representing 
the traditional parties and groups failed to carry 
out what they set out to do. Crisis followed crisis 
and their impotence became obvious (Beshir, 
1974:226) .
With such regimes in power, as Malwal (1981:110) stated, "no- 
one thought again of convening the Round Table Conference". 
But, the 1965 Round Table Conference was not a total failure. 
The fact that it took place was in itself a demonstration that
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both sides had the desire to resolve their differences by- 
negotiation. The conference also enabled both regions to know 
where the other party stood in the conflict. Beshir (1968:94- 
96), for example, writes how the conference enabled the 
Northern political parties to realise that "the Southerners 
looked upon them as nothing more than descendants of Arab 
slave traders and colonisers" and that the northerners "were 
shocked to find how history and facts were being distorted and 
that they were blamed, more than British colonial policy, for 
the backwardness of the southern provinces".
However, whatever impact the conference might have made on 
individual participants this did not translate into any 
meaningful action to correct the situation. With no party 
able to secure an overall majority, shifting coalitions and 
changes of governments became a feature of governing the 
country. Given such a situation, the parties became greatly 
preoccupied with the art of staying in power, leaving the 
north-south conflict to further deteriorate (Salih, 1984:69).
It was against the background of the Sudan in such political 
chaos that a group of young officers, led by Major General 
Gafaar El Nimeiri, took power on May 25, 1969. It became
immediately clear that the new government’s policies and 
attitudes departed in enrrfre a major way from those of any of 
the previous governments. In two statements simultaneously 
broadcast to the nation on the day of the power takeover, 
President Nimeiri spoke of the dominant traditional political
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parties "functioning on wrong conceptions". He was scornful 
of these parties for "having had no ambition other than that 
of power [and for failing] to find a solution to the Southern 
Problem". Nimeiri promised "to save the nation from the 
destructive elements" and to achieve that end he warned that 
"the revolution will crush any attempt by any person who tries 
to stand in the face of the tide..." (Nimeiri, May 25, 1969). 
Two weeks later, the new government announced a ’policy 
statement on the Southern qu e s t i o n ’. It emphasised the 
following points (see in Beshir, 1975:155):
A recognition of the October 1964 revolution which 
brought down a repressive military government and of 
the transitional government that followed which 
accepted for the first time that a southern problem 
existed and the steps that it took to resolve it.
An acceptance of the historical and cultural 
differences between the North and the South and the 
right of the Southern people to develop their 
respective cultures and traditions within a united 
S u d a n .
A call to all Southerners at home and abroad to see 
that peace and stability prevailed in the South so 
as to ' ehable the new government to carry out its 
p o l i c y .
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A promise to create a special economic planning 
board for the South and prepare a special budget for 
the South, to aim at the development of the Southern 
provinces in the shortest possible time. To attain 
this end, the Government would create a Ministry for 
Southern affairs to coordinate efforts and training 
of personnel would commence in preparation for 
auton o m y .
There were two crucial points in the statement that created 
the impetus for the eventual negotiations to take place. The 
first was the government’s "public recognition of diversity 
and that it [was] not incompatible with national unity" 
(Beshir, 1984:16). The second was the commitment the 
Revolutionary Government had made in emphasising that, unlike 
previous governments, it would deliver what it promised. This 
was boldly made clear in the policy statement that "the 
revolutionary Government is confident and competent enough to 
face existing realities".
It was three years, though, before the new policy of 
regionalisation could be realised. The revolutionary
government had first to deal with internal political 
opposition. The traditional northern parties were not only 
opposed to the special status the government was granting the 
south (Khal id*, 1985:42) but also to the new government’s 
declared socialist orientation. The Government dealt with all 
the oppositions and uprisings in a decisive way (Hamid,
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1986:130). It was only when the opposing forces were put down 
that the dialogue with the south commenced in earnest. That 
done, southern leaders in exile were approached and with the 
governments’ improved relations with neighbouring countries, 
and the diplomatic efforts it was waging to promote the peace 
p r o p o s a l , the pressure was on the Southern leadership to enter 
into negotiation (Salih, 1984:73).
In the South itself, the government was proving its sincerity 
in the implementation of its programmes. As promised, the 
Ministry of Southern Affairs was established and, following 
the 1971 Act, by which powers were decentralised to local 
councils, President Nimeiri appointed three southerners, for 
the first time ever, as Commissioners of the three Southern 
provinces. The President also appointed, as pne of the three 
vice-presidents in the country, Abel Alier, a southerner, who 
was also the Minister in charge of Southern Affairs. 
Attitudes were changing as even ’’the Army began to take a 
positive interest in the areas of construction by contributing 
towards the construction of roads and the setting up of co­
operative societies" (Beshir, 1975:82). All these measures 
and activities made a positive impact on the Southerners and 
soon the "great bulk of Southern public opinion was in favour 
of the new government policy of regional autonomy" (Salih, 
1984:73).
On 16th February, 1972, negotiations started in Addis Ababa 
between the Sudan Government and the Southern Sudan Liberation
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Movement, the political wing of the Anya-Nya. Both sides 
would have been aware of the price of failure from the 1965 
attempt at reconciliation. This was evident from the flexible 
attitude each side adopted in the preliminary negotiations. 
For example, the north dropped its earlier condition that the 
venue for the negotiations be inside the Sudan and the south 
did not insist on the cessation of hostilities. As Salih said 
in this connection; "both sides realised that an unyielding 
attitude could preclude cooperation with possible disastrous 
results" (1984:74). But the positions of the two parties were 
quite different from those at the time of the 1965 attempt. 
The Anya-Nya was by this time the undisputed voice of the 
South and, equally, with the crushing of the communists and 
the outlawing of all political organizations in the country, 
the new government’s power was at that moment unchallengeable 
(Albino, 1987:120). It was thus this aspect of the situation 
which made it possible for both sides to abandon "their 
hardline positions and agree to a regional autonomy scheme for 
the Southern Region" (Wai, 1983:317; see also Khalid, 1985:43; 
Hamid, 1986:130). The agreement was signed in Addis Ababa on 
February 27, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the text of the
agreement was, by Presidential decree, made part of the 
Permanent Constitution of the Sudan. In return for acquiring 
internal autonomy as well as proportional representation in 
the National Assembly, the South relinquished its demand for 
secession. Thus ended the seventeen year civil conflict and 
for the first time in their history, the two regions were set 
to operate in harmony under the framework of a unified Sudan.
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Several factors contributed to bringing the conflicting 
parties to the negotiating table and to the successful 
conclusion in Addis Ababa. The war had already cost the Sudan 
enormously. Some estimates put the number of dead up to one 
and a half million (Manifesto, Sudan P e o p l e ’s Liberation 
Movement, 1983:9). The war was also causing much damage to 
the economy as "funds which might have been allotted to 
development projects were used to finance military operations 
in the South" (Salih, 1984:72). For the Anya-Nya external 
factors were also working against them. Libya was putting 
pressure on Idi Amin of Uganda to sever diplomatic relations 
with Israel and expel all Israeli military advisors from 
Uganda which he eventually did in early March, 1972. The 
Sudanese and Ugandan governments had also reached agreement on 
the expulsion of "elements hostile to the other state” from 
their territories. This was the time also when Emperor 
Haileselassie of Ethiopia was playing an active role as 
peacemaker in Africa and in order not to jeopardize his image 
he was withholding support to the Anya-Anya (see Woldemichael, 
1987). Given these situations, the countervailing pressure 
proved more significant (Niblock, 1987:277). As Niblock says 
"unable to use Uganda either as a safe base for organization, 
or as a channel through which Israeli military aid could reach 
the Anya-Nya, the South Sudan Liberation Movement would have 
encountered difficulty in maintaining a strong military 
campaign". There was thus an earnest desire by both sides to 
see an end to the fighting. President Nimeiri had 
participated in the civil war having served in the South from
- 163 -
November 1966 to December 1967 as an army commander, an 
experience which might have helped him to realise that the 
country could not survive much longer simply by resorting to 
force.
An important factor during the time was also "the availability 
of a mediating body which enjoyed the confidence of both sides 
of the conflict" (Niblock, 1987:275). The rapprochement was 
facilitated by the World Council of Churches and the All 
African Council of Churches who worked hard for a number of 
years to bring the two sides together to negotiate. The two 
mediators (instead of chairman) at the Addis Ababa conference 
were representatives of these bodies and the fact that "both 
were Africans (from Ghana and Liberia) contributed to their 
success in their role" (Beshir, 1975:275). Beshir explained: 
"Notwithstanding the fact that they both represented church 
organizations, they were accepted by the Northern 
representatives. Their "African-ness" was more influential 
than their Church connections - hence their acceptability" 
(1975:128) .
The important thing was that a peaceful settlement was 
reached. Unlike other ethnic conflicts in Africa, Biafra and 
Kinshassa for example, where the conflicts were resolved on 
the battlefields, the southern Sudan question was resolved at 
the negotiatTrig "table (Salih, 1984:81). International
response to the agreement was unanimously favourable. The 
Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, for
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example, described the agreement "not only as a resounding 
victory for the Sudan, its people, Government and President 
but also, and above all, as the beginning of a new era in the 
peaceful settlement of African conflicts” (quoted by Beshir, 
1975:108). The New York Times of March 30th, 1972 went even 
further by claiming that "if successful, S u d a n ’s new 
experiment in unity with diversity might even offer a useful 
guide to many other underdeveloped nations similarly afflicted 
with racial, religious and other domestic division” .
National Politics, 1969-1983
Between 1969 and 1983, two significant phases can be 
identified. The first phase was between 1969 and 1977. 
During this phase distinctly radical policies were followed 
with the declared intention to save the country from political 
stagnation and to bring to an end the north-south conflict. 
During this period^too, the political ideology of the regime 
was defined, modelled on the Arab Socialist Union, N a s s i r ’s 
single-party orgnisation in Egypt (Markakis, 1987:203; 
T a r t t e r , 1982:225).
The Nimeiri re g i m e ’s inherent socialist outlook was 
accentuated "by the fact that the communist party and its 
supporters then enjoyed a uniquely dominant position in 
governmental and policy-making processes" (Abdel-Rahim, 
1978:24). "Scientific socialism" was declared as the guiding 
principle of the regime because, it was claimed, "capitalist 
methods had led the economy to a dead end" (Markakis,
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1978:204), Accordingly, a series of nationalisation decrees 
were passed and several foreign owned companies and local 
financial and banking institutions were affected. However, 
the alliance with the Communist party was not to last long. 
President N i m e i r i ’s intention to create a single political 
movement, which was to effectively exclude all existing 
parties, including the communist party, was not one many
members of the communist party and its sympathisers within the 
military junta itself were willing to accept. "These
differences, and others, lay behind the coup of July 1971. . .in 
which the communist party was swiftly implicated, and after 
which the Soviet Union quickly recognised the regime" 
(Woodward, 1986:68). The coup had alarmed Egypt, Libya, with 
whom negotiations were under way to form a union, and the
Western nations over the Soviet U n i o n ’s involvement.
Therefore, troops loyalist to Nimeiri launched a successful 
counter attack and managed to release the imprisoned president 
unharmed. Severe reprisals followed swiftly; several of the 
coup leaders were executed and many others were imprisoned.
Following the 1971 coup attempt, President N i m e i r i ’s 
preoccupation became the consolidation of the power base of 
his regime. In August 1971, barely a month after the 
Communist Party lead coup was foiled, an interim constitution 
was proclaimed by which the Sudan became a "democratic 
republic" a n d * e ’ ""socialist state". A presidential form of 
government was constituted effectively replacing the 
collegiate type of leadership that existed under the
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Revolutionary Command Council with Nimeiri now occupying the 
office of the presidency.
Events were moving fast and by January 1972, a National 
Charter was drawn up at the Founding Congress of the Sudan 
Socialist Union - the SSU (Woodward, 1986:68). The Charter 
spelled out the basic principles of the SSU which was to 
become the guiding force of the government. Much like the 
system in China, discussed in chapter two, the S S U ’s party 
structure was to run parallel with that of the government down 
to village level to exercise control over state organs, to
encourage popular participation, and, to guide the
implementation of programmes.
In May 1973, the permanent constitution of the Sudan was 
declared which completed the process of institutionalisation. 
The power bestowed upon the president, "custom-made for Gaafar 
Nimeiri” (Markakis, 1987:207), was much enhanced. Not only 
was the state president empowered to proclaim a state of 
emergency "as he saw it necessary" but he could single- 
handedly veto any legislation passed by an elected P e o p l e ’s 
assembly. An important aspect of the "permanent" constitution 
was that it included the Addis Ababa peace agreement, a 
measure of the seriousness the Nimeiri regime attached to it.
Throughout thi'S first phase, the Nimeiri regime had "shown a 
consistent determination to exclude the leaders of the
traditional parties and their generally right-wing supporters
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from the political arena" (A b d e1-Rahim, 1978:28). Decisive
action was taken against any threat to national stability even 
against establishments revered for their religious status. In 
March 1970, the island of Aba, base of the heir to the El 
Mahdi and a spiritual leader of the Ansar, his son Imam al 
Hadi al Mahdi, was bombarded from the air following a violent 
demonstration against Nimeiri during a visit to the Ansar 
bases in the White Nile (Khalid, 1985:19). Another version 
has it that the bombardment followed an attempted 
assassination of the President during the visit (Malwal, 
1981:128). The Imam managed to escape from Aba Island but he 
was pursued by the army who caught up with and subsequently 
killed him near the Ethiopian border.
After the incident with the Ansars and the systematic 
elimination of the communist threat, N i m e i r i ’s political 
control over the country became absolute. However, Nimeiri 
had many enemies outside the country. His political
adversaries had taken refuge in neighbouring countries from 
where they organised acts of destabilisation and, at least on 
one occasion, July 2, 1976, an attempt was made to oust the 
regime by force. A group of Ansar followers of Sadiq El Mahdi 
and the National Front led by Sherif Hussein El Hindi and 
Sadiq al Mahdi himself, attacked Khartoum and fought a pitched 
battle for twelve hours before they were defeated. The 
attackers were believed to have received their training in 
Libya, by now at loggerheads with the Nimeiri regime for 
siding with N a s s e r ’s successor, Anwar Sadat of Egypt.
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In spite of the sporadic attacks and challenges to the regime 
during the first phase, however, "the road seemed clear for an 
earnest start to economic and social development" (Malwal, 
1981:154). The nationalised companies were either returned to 
their previous owners or compensation paid. As will be fully 
discussed in subsequent chapters, the indications are that the 
Sudan achieved impressive progress in development during the 
first phase more than at any other time in its history.
In 1977, Nimeiri took a political gamble and decided "to 
introduce open political engagement to public life by 
persuading his adversaries - even those who plotted against 
his life in the 1976 coup attempt - to return to the domestic 
political arena" (Tartter, 1983:222-223). 1977, therefore,
signifies the start of the second phase of President N i m e i r i ’s 
rule. Under a plan Nimeiri termed "National Reconciliation" 
his political adversaries were permitted to contest elections 
to the national legislature although competition was only 
allowed under the ticket of the SSU. In the elections held 
in February 1978, the opposition groups together won nearly 
half the seats. Nimeiri kept his promise of National 
Reconciliation and went as far as appointing Sadiq El Mahdi, 
leader of the Umma party and head of the Ansar religious sect 
(3.2), to the political bureau of the SSU (Malwal, 1981:164; 
Tartter, 1983:229). Nimeiri also made a surprise move in 
appointing Dr* Hassan El T u r r a b i , leader of the Moslem 
brotherhood, as attorney general, and another leading member 
of one of the former traditionalist parties as Controller of
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the P e o p l e ’s National Assembly - a position which was "the 
nearest thing to an institutionalised opposition in the one 
party state" (Africa Contemporary Record, vol XII, 1979-80: 
B104-B105).
Whatever the reasons were for the declaration of National 
Reconciliation, however, it was to mark the beginning of the 
erosion of all that President Nimeiri had previously stood for 
(see in Khalid, 1985:226-227). As Malwal also explained:
National reconci1iation ... rather than becoming 
healer of old wounds, which President Nimeiri 
obviously intended [it] to be, it seemed to have had 
the opposite effect. Such issues as multi­
partisanship, sectarianism and the official religion 
of the state, with Islam being regarded by some as 
an inseperable part of national policies, have re- 
emerged. Many had thought and hoped that the 
country had left behind it all these old and 
traditional slogans. They have now become matters 
of heated public debate (1981:155).
Regionalisat ion was another preoccupation of the Nimeiri 
regime during the second phase (see chapter 4). Unlike the 
first phase when regionalisat ion was successfully applied as 
a means of national integration, during the second phase, 
Nimeiri "looked upon regionalisation from the point of view of 
continuing in power rather than on rational and objective 
grounds" (Beshire, 1984:25). In 1983, the south was divided 
into three regions by presidential decree in contravention of 
all the existing legal frameworks agreed upon in Addis Ababa. 
The 1983 declaration brought the south to parity with the 
other regions of the north and thus reversed the motto of
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"unity with diversity" which was the hallmark of the 
regionalisation policy in the first phase.
The re-division of the South was carried out in the name of 
"further decentralisation" but this time it became the cause 
for sparking off the civil war and for turning the clock back 
to the times of bitter animosity between the two halves of the 
c ountry.
Conclusion
The Sudan has been suffering from destructive, long, civil 
strife because northern political leaders at the centre, who 
have styled themselves as Arabs, although this is more
imagined than real, want to impose their cultural hegemony by
force over the peoples of the south. President Nimeiri
attempted to put the illusion of Arabism in the north under 
check for the first few years of his reign. The slogan of 
"unity with diversity" was earnestly promoted thus paving the 
way for negotiations to take place between north and south 
which culminated in the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement.
The Addis Ababa Agreement could not have come to fruition had 
the central government of President Nimeiri not taken
decisive action in dismantling the archaic political system 
that it inherited. By doing so Nimeiri achieved what all 
government’s bef'oi^e him failed to achieve. The prospects for 
lasting peace and unity in the Sudan did indeed look 
promising.
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President N i m e i r i ’s reversal of his political convictions in 
the second phase was a terrible blow to the healing process of 
the North-South divide. Only history will show the eventual 
effect but the S u d a n ’s very existence will balance on a knife 
edge should the political organisations in the North fail to 
accommodate the diverse requirements of the Sudanese people. 
The Sudan need look no further for solutions as it has all the 
lessons to be learnt from its own history.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EVOLUTION OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
Introduc t ion
Local administration has passed through many changes in the 
history of the Sudan, particularly so during the Nimeiri 
regime when decentralisation was the guiding principle. During 
the 1 9 7 0 ’s, the responsibility for local administration was 
bestowed upon the provincial authorities. In the 1980s, the 
district became the corporate unit of administration going 
back, to the system the Sudan inherited from the Condominium 
Regime at independence. Regionalization also became part of 
the decentralisation equation as a means of securing national 
cohesion.
This chapter has two main sections. The first section 
describes the colonial heritage of government administration 
both from the time known as the Turkiya and that of the 
condominium regimes. The Sudan offers a fascinating case for 
the study of decentralisation as different regimes 
restructured local administration, not only to suit their 
ideological stances, but also to resolve the challenge of 
extending government influence over a vast and diversified 
country.
The second part of the chapter is, to a large extent, a 
description of the decentralisation reforms that the Nimeiri 
regime introduced. During this time the Sudan became a
countr^®e- with one of the most decentralised systems of 
government in the world. The implications of these reforms 
will be analysed in the case study of south Sudan in Part II 
and an appreciation of the decentralisation policies and what 
they were intended to achieve is important at this stage.
THE COLONIAL HERITAGE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
Local Administration Under the Turko-Egyptian Rule 
The present geographical entity of the Sudan, as previously 
discussed, is a recent creation. Before the advent of 
colonisation the different "tribal" areas had their own 
indigenous forms of rule although, as mentioned in chapter 
three, they differed in sophistication from area to area. It 
is important to realise at this stage that whilst the 
successive colonial governments were able to make use of the 
existing well developed social organisations in the north, in 
the south new institutions had to be created and with every 
change of government different new institutions were 
introduced.
The Turko-Egypt ian government system at the time of the 
invasion of the Sudan was modelled on the French system. 
Egypt had inherited this system following Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
occupation of *tKe"country in July 1798. The French heritage 
seemed to suit the ruler who took over from the French, 
Muhamed Ali Pasha, a man renowned for his appetite for power.
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When Muhamed Ali invaded the Sudan, he divided the lands he 
conquered into provinces and each province was headed by a 
governor, directly answerable to Cairo. In due course, 
however, "the Viceroy, realizing the weakness of 
decentralisation, of provincial governors, isolated from one
another, taking their orders from Cairo, appointed ......  (a)
Governor General with his capital at Khartoum" (Hill, 
1959:37). The system of government that developed in the 
Sudan under the Egyptian rule was described by Holt (1970:13) 
in the following way:
During sixty years of Egyptian rule an elaborate 
bureaucrasy developed in the Sudan. At the head of 
the administration was normally a single governor- 
general, although as in 1882 the Sudan might be 
broken up and the administrative system 
decentralised. These attempts of decentralisation 
were made to prevent the excessive accumulation of 
power and influence in the hands of a governor- 
general: the remoteness of Khartoum from Cairo
offered temptations to the ambitious which the 
viceroys of Egypt were quick to suspect. For the 
same reason few were allowed to remain long in 
office. Between 1825 and 1885 there were twenty 
five governors or governors-general in Khartoum, 
only three of whom held office for more than five 
years. Thus Egypt administration in the Sudan was 
unstable and relied upon an opportunist and 
vacillating concept of polity.
Hill (1959:37) mentions "an interesting feature of the 
Egyptian administration in the Sudan" which was "the use it 
made of agents in Egypt". Hill explains this further by
saying that "not only the Governor General but each provincial 
governor had his personal agent in Cairo". And the ag e n t s ’ 
duties were to translate "all manner of routine business for 
their principals in the Sudan but (they) kept their hands off
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matters of policy”
At the provincial level, the governors had a dual 
responsibility as administrators and as heads of the military 
wings in each province. The provinces were divided into 
districts and headed by a district-shiekh (Omda). Below the 
districts were paramount sheikhdoms and below them town or 
village sheikhdoms. Thus the system was well suited to 
accommodate the traditional patterns of the north which the 
government was quick to exploit for purposes of tax collection 
and other functions.
As the Turko-Egypt ian rule expanded to the south, however, its 
administrative mechanisms were to prove unworkable for the 
situation there. "Here in the primitive south, a close, 
formal administration would have been impossible. All was 
expediency, improvisation" (Hill, 1959:139). Hill explains 
"the peculiar difficulties", as he called it, of adapting the 
Turko-Egyptian forms of government to the Southern condition: 
"the very terminology was different in the south where the 
chief administrative division of the province was not the Qism 
(District) as in the north, but the Idara (area) " (Hill, 
1959:139).
Thus, although the Turko-Egyptian regime was determined to 
establish regular administration in the South, it never 
managed to do so. The viceroy was, for example, at one time 
forced to take drastic action by appointing a prominent slave
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trader as governor of Bahr El Ghazal . This followed the 
defeat of a government contingent sent to crush the slave 
trader, who had a claim over Bahr El Ghazal as his area of 
influence. The appointments of Europeans (4.2) at different 
times as governors in the south also illustrates the 
difficulty the Turko-Egyptian regime had in establishing its 
authority in the South.
One novelty of the Turko-Egypt ian rule in the Sudan was the 
introduction of money. The Funj and Fur Sultanates struck no 
coins and most of the internal trade was by barter. "The 
coming of the Egyptians brought a great increase in external 
trade, and with it, a vastly extended use of money (Hill, 
1959,  p . 3 7 ) .
The Turko-Egyptian government’s accounting system in the Sudan 
followed the established practice in Egypt. At first "central 
and provincial accounts were rendered to Cairo monthly and 
annually but were balanced only annually" (Hill, 1959, pp 35- 
39). Hill quotes an interesting example of how authority was 
exercised, when the Viceroy stormed at one unfortunate 
governor; "Hasten to remit to the treasury the accounts of 
your province .... You will be assuredly punished if a like 
delay recurs, for it is due entirely to your carelessness and 
neglect" (see in Hill, 1959, pp 38-39). About 1836, however, 
with the establishment of the Governor-General’s office, a 
centralised Sudan accounts service was introduced in Khartoum 
which was only answerable to the Viceroy.
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The Turkiya government can be characterized as a highly
centralised system with supreme power resting in the hands of
the Viceroy and his successors in Cairo. Their method of
control was not only by the kind of threat mentioned above but
also by their way of dealing with officials who were
’’frequently replaced to keep them under check" (Deng,
1973:18). This method of control was extended right down to
the village sheikhdoms. Although the Turkiya maintained the
tribal system, the chiefs were now puppets under central
control and never enjoyed the autonomy they had had during the
Funj and the Fur periods. This loss of tribal independence
might indeed have contributed to the deep resentment the
Sudanese had against the Turkiya government:
Egyptian rule was unpopular, not merely its faults 
but by its very nature, since it was alien, 
unremitting, and exacting. The explosion of the
Mahdiya is partly to be explained by this deep- 
seated frustration although the form which the 
revolution took proved in the end more hostile to
tribalism than either the Egyptian rule which
preceded it or the condominium which followed (Holt, 
1970:17).
Condominium and the Development of Local Government 
When the condominium regime took over from the Mahdiya, the
country was in "a state of complete collapse and bankruptcy" 
(Hinden, 1980:197). The prime objective of the new
administration was, therefore, to secure peace and stability 
and in order to achieve this a workable administrative machine 
had to be established quickly.
During its long history in the Sudan, the condominium r e g i m e ’s
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administrative structure passed through three major phases. 
The first phase took the form of direct rule, the second, 
indirect rule and the last, self-government rule. Each of 
these phases reflected the particular historical events of the 
p e r i o d .
The first phase was the period of consolidation, internally to 
restore law and order and externally to engage in treaties 
defining boundaries. "At the outset, therefore, conditions 
necessitated a semi-military administration carried on by a 
small number of British provincial governors and inspectors 
and a subordinate clan of Egyptian administrative officials" 
(Hinden, 195*0, p. 197). This was, in many ways, a re- 
introduction of the administrative system of direct rule which 
the Turko-Egyptian government had applied in the country 
before. The provincial administrative divisions of the 
country under Turkiya rule were also retained. Sub-divisions 
of provinces took account of the maintenance of ethnic 
territorial units.
A memorandum by the first Governor-General (Kitchener) to his 
subordinates gives some insight into the purpose and method of 
his administration. In it he stated:
" ..... the task before us all is to acquire the
confidence of the people, to develop their resources 
and to raise them to a higher level. This can only 
be effected by the District Officers being 
thoroughly in touch with the better class of native, 
through whom we may hope gradually to influence the
whole population.......  it is to the individual
action of British officers, working independently,
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but with a common purpose, on the individual natives 
whose confidence they have gained, that we must look 
for the moral and industrial regeneration of the 
Sudan ......
"All insubordination must be promptly and severely 
repressed. At the same time, a paternal spirit of 
correction for offences should be your aim in your
relations with the people ..... " (see in Beshir,
1974:23) .
What is important to remember here is that, by the Anglo-
Egyptian agreement of 1899, the Sudan government was 
constituted an autonomous government absolutely separate and 
distinct from the Egyptian government (see, for example, 
Beshir, 1974:21). Unlike the Turko-Egyptian period when the 
Sudan was a province of Egypt with its rulers having limited 
power, the condominium regime was granted wide ranging powers 
by the agreement. Internally, authority for decision-making 
descended in a hierarchical line from the capital to the
smallest and remotest administrative unit in the country. 
Tribal chiefs played no part in the government system during 
this phase. According to Salih, "the new Government did not 
want to give power to any native who might create a new
fanatic national leadership to wage another Mahdist war 
against it" (in Howell, 1974:22: see also Norris, 1983a:51). 
However, such fears did not prevail for too long and by 1914 
local sheikhs had already been given responsibilities in the 
judicial sphere to deal with minor criminal offences. This 
concession was "Motivated less by the desire to strengthen 
these authorities than by the need to lessen the burden to the 
administrative officials" (Hinden, 1950:197; see also Bakheit, 
1974:26-27).
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The real shift from the first phase (direct rule) to the 
second phase (indirect rule) came following the Milner 
Co m mission’s report immediately after the first World War. 
The ’k e y n o t e ’, as Marshall (1949:15) called it, of the Milner 
report was that "a centralised bureaucracy is wholly 
unsuitable for the Sudan". More elaborately, Milner wrote: 
"Having regard to (the) vast extent (of the Sudan) and varied 
character of its inhabitants, the administration of its 
different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the 
hands of the native authorities wherever they exist under 
British supervision" (see Salih, 1974:22). The Milner report 
was thus to form the basis for the Indirect Rule policy of the 
Sudan which was implemented by enacting a series of laws. 
"This policy was accelerated by two important events: the
expulsion of the Egyptian civil servants in the Sudan in 1924 
and the world depression of 1929-33. The former necessitated 
involvement of more Sudanese in the administration to fill the 
gap left by the Egyptians, and the latter called for economy 
in administration" (Salih, 1974:23).
Under the Indirect Rule policy, which was to last for two 
decades in the Sudan, Native Authorities were fostered in
earnest; their judicial powers were extended, simple 
administrative work was devolved to them, they were also 
allowed to participate in the administration of local
services. In contrast to the initial government reservation
about tribal organisation, the policy now was "not only to 
restore but to increase the prestige of tribalism ."
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(Marshall, 1949:6). In this the government was no doubt 
influenced by the theory of indirect rule, administration 
through the instruments of indigenous institutions, expounded 
by Lord Lugard, which at that time provided the guiding 
principles for many of the British colonies.
Native administration was found to be unaccommodating to the 
reform and change required for development. Salih (1974:23) 
has explained this in clear terms thus:
" - native administration proved to be, in the late 
1 9 3 0 ’s, a rigid system of administration favouring 
only the unchanging conditions of medieval tribal 
life. As life developed in the larger villages and 
t o w n s , and in parts of the country where economic 
progress began to create more individual freedom, 
and as external and internal migrations began to 
disintegrate many tribes, old tribal influences 
began to decay. In some areas where they could 
survive, they became an anachronism hampering 
evolution and advancement of the people. The tribal 
administration, for example, had neither the desire 
nor the capability to provide urgently needed public 
services such as education, sanitation and public 
w o r k s ."
"In response to these shortcomings and to the increasing
frustration of the nationalist elite ...... the British
began to adapt ’native administration’ into ’local 
government' - an administration no longer according to 
the tribe a man belonged to, but according to the place 
he 1ived in” .
In 1937, the third phase in the history of the development of 
local government began. Three local government ordinances 
were passed in that year dealing with municipalities, 
townships and rural areas and, together with their subsequent 
amendments, they were to be the legal basis for administration 
in the country until 1951 (see in Hinden, 1950:200; Marshall,
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1949:7). It was significant that by the terms of these laws, 
’Local Government A u t hority’ was exercised either by a single 
person or a body of persons which made it possible to grant 
"local government powers not only to the former native or 
local administration heads, but also to Local Government 
Councils" (Hinden, 1950:200). What is significant about this 
is that the laws were designed to accommodate the different 
local circumstances.
With the intensification of demands for self-government in the 
1940s, it became necessary to introduce a new uniform system. 
For this, Dr. A.H. Marshall, an expert in local government, 
was invited to advise the government. His brief was "to 
enquire into and report on the policy and practices of Sudan 
Government in respect of Local Government and to make 
recommendations". Dr. M a r s h a l l ’s report was completed in 1949 
and "his recommendations were implemented almost in total in 
one comprehensive Local Government Ordinance, 1951, which 
repealed and superceded the former laws" (Salih, 1974:24).
In 1950, the political climate in the Sudan was such that it 
was predictable that sooner or later the country would be 
self-governing. A clear intention in the passing of the 1951 
Local Government Ordinance was therefore to lay the foundation 
of government in a future self-governing Sudan. Indeed, the 
foundation wasr laid as the 1951 Ordinance was to remain the 
legal force of the local government system in the Sudan until 
it was replaced by the military government of General Aboud in
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1960, four years after independence. 
The 1951 Local-Government Ordinance
The 1949 Marshall report, which formed the basis of the Local- 
Government Ordinance of 1951, was a remarkable piece of work 
by all considerations. Since independence in 1956, the local 
government system in the Sudan has undergone several changes 
and the influence of the Marshall report has been 
considerable. As Salih (1974:33) rightly said "any
understanding of local government in the Sudan today must 
start with an examination of the system which evolved from the 
1951 Ordi n a n c e " .
Marshall was the city treasurer of Coventry City, England, 
when he was invited to carry out the job. That he was 
strongly influenced by his personal experience in England is 
clear from his references throughout the report but he seemed 
to be too much of a realist not to be aware of the special 
situation he was dealing with in the Sudan. The following, 
from his report, tells of his thinking:
"  E n g l a n d ’s local government, though admittedly
one of the best in the world, has features which are 
not so praiseworthy such as dependence on the single 
tax, the craze for uniformity and the legal 
obstacles which deter local authorities from 
undertaking any tasks other than the conventional 
ones. Then there are aspects of English local 
government which, in their setting are admirable but 
would not bear transplantation, for example the 
peculiar position of the town clerk who is able in 
England to carry out sufficient co-ordination though 
not possessing formal powers of supervision over 
other departments" (1949:75-76).
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Local authorities were already well established on the British
model when Marshall did his study and the thrust of his report 
was not for a major change but for improving the system taking 
account of S u d a n ’s peculiarities. For example, Marshall 
recommended that a network of autonomous local government 
units be established which would be "primarily devoted to the 
provision of services to the public and divorced from the 
major stresses of national politics" (Norris, 1983a:53). 
However, his mere approval of the existing model was not given 
without considering other models. For example, he rejected 
"pyramidism, that is, making the central government the apex 
of a pile of authorities beginning with village councils and 
passing upwards through local districts and province councils, 
each layer being subject to the layer above" (pp. 13-14) on 
the grounds of economy. His reasoning became clear when he 
compared two-tier with single-tier systems of local 
government. Marshall (pp 26-28) gave three reasons why a two-
tier system of local government should not be adopted for the
S u d a n :
1. ". . . . those functions normally performed by an upper
tier authority in other countries, such as main 
roads, either do not exist in the Sudan or are
services such as hospitals and secondary schools
which are likely to be local functions for many 
years to c o m e " .
"The system would saddle the country with a 
double battery of executive staff. In any
case it would be some years before sufficient 
staff was available. If the two tiers shared 
staff then all the evils of divided loyalty 
and part-time employment arise".
3. "In so far as the system multiplies the number 
of authorities, it confuses the inhabitants. 
The upper tier authority could hardly collect 
its own t a x e s ...........It is one of those
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technical financial difficulties which would 
have to be solved if the two-tier system was 
thought to be desirable for other reasons” .
Taking his basic assumption that there should be ’’autonomous 
local authorities not tangled up with central government", 
Marshall recommended the following principles upon which the 
local government structure in the Sudan should be built 
(pi16):
1. "Local authorities should be corporate bodies 
answerable to a local electorate.
2. "The system of local government must be sufficiently 
flexible to allow for the widely divergent 
conditions in the Sudan.
3. "New powers should be granted piecemeal to local 
authorities as they show themselves capable of 
assuming additional responsibility.
4. "Local authorities should be allowed as much freedom 
as possible.
5. "Local authorities must have independent tax 
revenues.
6. "There must be adequate central supervision with 
power to suspend the recalcitrant or inert 
authority.
7. "A system of grants-in-aid should be instituted.
8. "Units of local government should be financially 
stable, and able to attract the best personnel as 
members and officers.
9. "A halt should be called in development of local 
authorities’ duties until they have been provided 
with adequate executives".
With regard to the method in which the state should discharge 
its continuing duty concerning its relations with local 
governments, Marshall raised some important points:
"Upon the central government must rest the ultimate
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responsibility for the government of the country and 
for the quality of work of local authorities. The 
central government will wish to ensure minimum 
standards of performance in such services as
education and health, and will wish to be assured
that local authorities are conducting their affairs 
in accordance with their constitution and in a 
business-like manner free from abuses and
corruption. The central government must therefore 
not only supervise local government but must lay 
down the framework in which local authorities shall 
work. It must retain power not only to stimulate 
the reluctant local authority but to supersede any 
local authorities whose behaviour is detrimental to 
the public interest. Local authorities should look 
to the centre for advice and guidance, and the 
central departments should continuously place at the 
disposal of the local authorities expert knowledge 
and the experience of other local authorities.
Further, the central government must always be ready 
to step in financially to assist the weaker 
authorities. In the south, for example, unless the 
state is prepared to take a very generous view 
towards local government, there will be many areas 
unable to support local government for a long period 
a h e a d .
"The task of the central government in a country 
which varies so much in conditions is particularly 
difficult, demanding a flexibility of control and 
catholicity of outlook. Any attempt at uniformity 
of local government in the interests of convenience 
at the centre, would be fatal to the idea of local 
self-government. Nor can the attitude of the 
central departments to local authorities be 
standardised; the smaller authority with its limited 
resources and relatively inexpert staff will need 
more help than its larger neighbour" (pp.16-17).
To emphasise the importance of the points Marshall stated that 
"the responsibility does not cease when local government is 
established". He made detailed recommendations on central- 
local relationships and suggested the line of authority. He 
favoured the establishment of "a ministry of local government 
which would exercise field supervision through its own 
inspectorate" (Norris, 1983a:55).
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As to the place of native authorities in local government, 
Marshall described it to be "the most fascinating, the most 
intricate, the most elusive and the one liable to be 
misunderstood" (p.40). As described in previous sections, 
native authorities played an important role throughout the 
history of the Sudan. How to settle the proper relationship 
of tribalism to the new local governments was therefore a 
matter to which Marshall gave great consideration. After a 
careful study of the advantages and disadvantages, he came to 
a compromise solution by recommending "a policy of gradual 
differentiation", as Norris (1983a:55) called it, which was 
"confining the tribal leaders to native court work, tax 
collection and certain ceremonial functions".
On the powers and duties of local authorities, he urged the 
"undesirability of the state confining local authorities to 
the traditional duties of local government in Europe". He 
explained this by saying that "in Europe the state is nearer 
(geographically) to the people and often there exists an army 
of associations - voluntary and otherwise - concerned with the 
welfare of the inhabitants". Due to the different situation 
prevalent in the Sudan, "the Local Authority alone must fill 
in the gaps in the public services" (p.51). Marshall then 
laid down what he called "the principles which should 
determine the allocation of duties to local authorities" as 
f o l l o w s :-
"Having created local authorities with proper 
administrative machinery the central government must 
adopt a bold policy and not merely grudgingly hand 
over to local authorities part of the services
- 188 -
previously undertaken by central departments. Upon 
local authorities should be placed the 
responsibility for all local services, except those 
which are so highly technical that the state must 
administer them direct, or those such as the post 
office which must clearly be under one management 
throughout the country. Whenever a central
department suggests the setting up of local 
departmental machinery, the onus should be upon it 
to prove why the duty cannot be carried out by the 
local authority. The argument in favour of allowing 
local authorities to administer as many services as 
possible, is particularly strong in so large a 
country and one where, because of the differences in 
districts, so many adaptations of services are 
needed. Finally, from the financial point of view 
alone, the state cannot afford to create an 
elaborate administrative machine and then neglect to 
utilize it to the full" (pp.50-51).
Following these principles, Marshall recommended that local 
authorities in the northern provinces should be responsible 
for provision of primary education. Marshall did not find a 
local authority strong enough to handle this in the south, 
but, he said, "whatever principles are applied in the northern 
provinces should eventually be applied to the south", that is, 
"when fully fledged local authorities come into existence". 
Other functions that he recommended should be local government 
responsibilities were water supplies, agriculture and forestry 
services, community health (clinics etc., but not hospitals), 
welfare work, maintenance of local roads, and town planning 
and building works. Marshall also maintained that "whilst the 
primary object should be the rendering of services and not the 
making of profit, power to use surpluses in aid of the general 
expenditure should not be denied the local authorities (p.58). 
He gave, as examples, electricity, water supplies and the 
running of ferry services. Concerning the "economic
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activities", Marshall’s view was that "local government 
administration is not ideally suited for trading operations, 
and local authorities should participate in ordinary business 
activities only when other agencies are failing to meet the 
needs of the community". The example he gave was that in 
areas like the South where shopping facilities were 
inadequate, local authorities might set up in business as 
retailers. Obviously, it was not possible for Marshall to 
give precise details of all that local governments should do 
as their functions vary from area to area according to the 
different needs of local communities.
Local government finance was the area on which Marshall most
extensively reported. In an introductory passage on this
subject, he said:
"Since it has been usually the financial aspect of 
the problem which has remained undetermined, a 
dangerous but natural belief has arisen that, as 
soon as local government finance is reorganized, an 
idealistic equilibrium between local authorities and 
central government will be reached. Now it happens 
that the one aspect of local government which never 
reaches finality is the financial relation of local 
and central government; the centre thinks the local 
authorities expect too much, whilst the local 
authorities believe themselves to be robbed of their
deserts........ (thus) a universal acceptable
financial relationship is impossible of attainment"
(p.81).
And, on the importance of local governments being self- 
supporting :
"The corollary of placing duties on autonomous local 
authorities is to put taxes at their disposal. If 
local authorities are merely fed by government 
subventions, whoever determines the amount of the 
available funds is in fact ruler of the area; self- 
government does not exist" (p.81).
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Marshall (1948:82) brought his own experience to this analysis 
when he said, "the golden rule in dividing taxes between the 
central and local government is not to leave the local 
authorities with only a single tax, or with taxes which are on 
so constricted a basis that no expansion of activities is 
possible without help from the central government". As an 
example, he said, "this is why English local authorities, 
confined to a single tax, have always looked with envy on the 
range of taxes available to German and American cities".
With regard to the revenue source of local authorities in the 
Sudan, Marshall urged that the "taxes directly collected at 
the local level should be assigned to the local authorities, 
including Ushur (tax on rain-fed land), irrigated land tax, 
date tax, poll tax and property rating tax in urban areas" 
(Norris, 1983a:55). Although he acknowledged that many local 
governments in the Sudan would be largely dependent on central 
assistance, nevertheless he urged that the aim of financial 
policy should be to keep cases needing equalisation grants to 
a minimum (p.87).
During the transitional period to independence (1951-1955), 
the 1951 Local Government Ordinance was followed in earnest. 
Local governments were created in stages strictly reflecting 
local needs, that is, avoiding uniformity, as Marshall 
prescribed. ,rFor~the least developed or civically conscious 
areas", as Salih and Howell called them, "the Ministry of 
Local Government issued an order appointing a local government
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inspector as the statutory local government authority" (in 
Howell, 1974:34). The inspector had no independent budget 
initially but in the second stage he acted with a budget. At 
the third stage the local government inspector delegated his 
powers to a council and his role was then supervisory; at the 
fourth stage a council was created by warrant but the chairman 
was appointed by central government. Finally, the last stage 
was reached by amending the warrant of the fourth stage 
empowering the council to elect its own chairman. The 
chairman of the council was elected annually (see Salih, 
197434-35; Norris, 1983a:55). But, of course, the creation of 
the councils and their eligibility for onward promotion was 
very much dependent on the merit of the individual councils, 
that is, "local government councils could have been promoted 
from the first stage to the fourth or fifth without undergoing 
other stages" (Salih, 1974:35).
Salih and Howell provide a clear picture of the nature and
composition of the councils:
"The composition of councils varied in detail and 
members but not in principle. The number of 
councillors usually ranged from ten to forty in 
number. Some of them were elected and the remainder 
nominated - the latter never exceeding one third of 
the total number of councillors as a rule. Each 
council area was divided into a number of single­
member electoral wards in which elections might 
either be direct or indirect. Appointed members 
were nominated by the governor of the province, and 
they were normally chosen to represent tribal, 
economic or other special interests which did not 
come by elections to that specific council" (in 
Howell, 1974:35).
The fact that all these stages existed, elections of
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councillors, appointments of chairman etc., illustrates that 
the central government machine was functioning fully. The 
story of local government in the post-independence period is 
quit -^ different. The ineffectiveness of the central machine, 
as discussed before, crippled the function of the existing 
structure. Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit described the decline 
of local government activity in the post-independence period 
as follows:
" ..... after independence, the tendency of the
Government to soften was coupled by internal
conflicts among the organs of the State as to their 
relative powers and fields of jurisdiction.
Administrative vacuums occurred as a result of 
structural changes and often apathy and inaction 
became the prominent symptoms of administration. 
The outcome of this deterioration in field 
administration was that supervision played a very 
minor role in the relationship between officers of 
the central government, including those responsible 
for supervising native courts, and their agents, the 
native authorities. In the few cases where
supervision was maintained it was no more than an 
appearance; a show intended for its own sake and not 
to serve any real purpose.
"Co-ordination also suffered from the instability of 
central government organs, and native
administrations found that they were dealing with 
not one administration but with half a score of 
sovereign departments each jealous of the other. In 
particular, the Police, Judiciary, and the Ministry 
of Local Government were at loggerheads.
"Owing to the lack of authority, supervision and 
coordination, the indirect influence that in the 
past had sustained orderly administration, became 
less effective. Insurrections, tribal flights, 
refusal to pay taxes, and general lack of civic 
discipline became frequent. The Government
authority depended more and more on coercion, and 
where that could not be effectively used, government 
authority became only nominal" (in Howell, 1974:46- 
47) .
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So, what went wrong? In an attempt to understand the problem 
and rectify it, the military government that took power in 
1958 appointed the Abu Rannat Commission with a brief to 
investigate decentralised government and identify "the best 
system from all points of view". After all, the military 
regime s proclaimed policy was "to end anarchy and corruption 
in all the s t a t e ’s organs" (el-Beshir, in Howell, 1974, p.81). 
Based on the Abu Rannat Commission’s report, the Provincial 
Administration Act of 1960 was declared.
Table 4.1: Evolution of decentralisation in the Sudan
Year
Level of authority and responsibilty
Centre/Region Province District Lover
1951
- Minister of local 
gov. with supervisory 
powers
Governor 
Field Agencies
- DUtrie
couisBLoner 
-  Urban and rural 
councils: corporate 
bodies with;powers to 
levi taies
- Native
adiinis-
tration
(chiefs
and
sheiks
etc)
1960
- Ministries with 
supervisory powers 
over provincial 
authorities
- Province council 
chaired by central ;
gov. representative
-Sleeted and aoainated 
rounciiors:!
- District 
coaaissioner coordi­
nates work of field 
representatives
N.A. with
liaited
powers of
running
local
courts
1971
- Sane as above 
(After 1972 Southern 
Regional Gov. 
responsible for 
provincial council)
-Coaaissioner
appointed by president 
- People's executive 
connril with elected 
aeabeis
- Corporate todies
- Local council 
powers delegated by 
province
councils
at
village
and
aarket
levels
1981
- Central and regional 
Ministries (regions 
created in north 1980)
- Coaaissioner with 
liaited supervisory 
powers
ir Local councils with 
corporate powers and 
budgetary units
The saae
Note: Shadowed area signifies the locat on of the local authorities with corporate powers.
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The Provincial Administration Act, 1960
The Abu Rannat Commission was not overly critical of the 1951 
Act; on the contrary, it reported finding the system "sound in 
terms of structure and organizations". However, the
commission was very critical of many elected council members 
"who degraded the standard of membership itself". A second 
point the Abu Rannat Commission criticized was the problem of 
coordination between the functional departments and the local 
authorities. According to the commission’s report, "the
present organization which incorporated side-by-side two 
systems under two different ministries, the one being a 
centralised administration system represented by the Governor 
and the District Commissioner, and the other a local system 
functioning on the basis of councils, resulted in a 
duplication of work, undefined responsibility, delays in 
execution, overlapping of duties and extra expenses in the 
cost of general administration" (Norris, 1983a:59).
The finding of this lack of coordination appears to have been 
the triggering point for the military government to pass the 
Provincial Administration Act, 1960. "The aim was to create 
a structure through which the different departments of central 
government and local institutions operating in the provinces 
could be co-ordinated" (Norris,1983b:211). The main feature 
of the Act was the creation of a middle tier authority at the 
provincial level with its function divided into two - policy­
making and executive. The policy-making body, called the 
prcTVince council, was chaired by an appointed government
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representative and members of the council included the heads 
of the different department representatives in the province, 
members elected by the local government councils from amongst 
their members and experienced and qualified members appointed 
from amongst the inhabitants of the province. "Province 
Councils were granted their own source of revenue and a 
supplementary block grant" (Norris, 1983b:211). The Executive 
Council, constituted by a warrant of establishment granted by 
the Council of Ministers, had amongst its members the heads of 
all government units and the chairman was the representative 
of the Ministry of Local Government who also acted as 
secretary of the Province Council. Apart from its executive 
function, the Executive Council prepared the proposals for the 
budget which it submitted to the Province Council for 
approval.
It will be remembered that Marshall, in his 1949 report, had
considered a two-tier system of government but had rejected it
because all the services which he recommended should be local
responsibilities could be handled by an "all purpose
authority". Whether the Aboud regime felt that the local
authorities were over-burdened by duties they could not
adequately perform and hence needed a second tier to share the
responsibilities, was not clear from its declaration. El-
Beshir (1974:81-82) thought though that it was more for
political ends than anything else:
"The adoption of the Provincial Administration Act of 1960 
was, in fact, not so much a step towards more democratization 
of the government process, than a deliberate policy on the 
part of the military dictatorship to achieve a greater degree
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of political control over the activities and attitudes of the 
civil servants at the local level .... each province council 
was essentially a political body entrusted with the 
responsibility for explaining and promoting the policies and 
objectives of the regime. Its members were appointed, in a 
large part, on the strength of their support and enthusiasm 
for the regime".
The structure of the 1960 Act remained in force for the life 
span of the Military regime. "With the fall of Aboud in 
October 1964, however, the Act was, to all intents and 
purposes, assigned to the scrap-heap" (Salih, 1974:43). Not 
entirely so, however, as, although the civilian government 
that took power amended the Act, nevertheless, the province 
was by then established as a higher tier of the local 
government system. The amendment which was made was that the 
Provincial Authority now became the Executive Council, 
representing departmental heads under the chairmanship of the 
Provincial Commissioner who was the representative of the 
Ministry of Local Government.
Despite the creation of a higher tier of administrative 
function at the provincial level by the Aboud Government in 
1960, later amended by the civilian government that succeeded 
it, the position of the local authorities remained more or 
less unchanged until 1971. By this time a military government 
led by President Nimeiri was in power.
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THE NIMEIRI REGIME AND THE ACCELERATION 
OF DECENTRALISATION REFORMS
The 1971 People's Local Government Act
During President N i m e i r i ’s period in office the structure of 
local government was subjected to several changes. It started 
with the declaration of the 1971 P e o p l e ’s Local Government 
Act. The aim of the 1971 Act was, according to a report on 
decentralisation prepared by a committee chaired by Nimeiri, 
the "uprooting of social and economic backwardness, supporting 
of national unity and modernising of administrative patterns 
in a manner that would enable authorities concerned to have a 
clear conception of the needs of the citizens, and strive for 
their satisfaction" (Nimeiri, 1979, p . 18). The same report 
provides four points which it called "the basic features of 
the P e o p l e ’s Local Government Act, 1971" - in summary, it:
"1. Removes the understanding prevailing under the
Local Government Ordinance, 1951, and under 
the Provincial Administration Act, 1960, that 
there were two governments - a local 
government and a central government.......
2. Widens the base of popular democracy.........
3. Ensures the right of women to membership of
the P e o p l e ’s Local Government o r g a n s.......
4. Removes the duality in providing services 
between the local council and the province 
council on the one hand and the local 
government and the central government on the 
other" (p .18).
Thus the Act was not solely about provincial administration. 
The Regional Government of South Sudan, for example, gave its 
own interpretation of the Act as follows: "This structure (of
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the Act) aims to spread the democratic rule from the base to 
the top by allowing citizens to participate in development and 
to solve problems in local ways in accordance with the local 
traditions and customs" (The Six Year Plan of Economic and 
Social Development, 1977/78-1982/83, Directorate of Planning, 
Southern Region, 1977, p.330).
The structure outlined in the Act took the form of a pyramid 
with the Provincial Council at the apex followed by District 
Councils and, below them, Town and Rural Councils and finally, 
at the base, Village and Neighbourhood Councils.
The 1971 P e o p l e ’s Local Government Act, however, might best be 
explained as creating two parallel hierarchies, political and 
administrative, linked at the provincial level under the 
leadership of the Commissioner who was also the Chairman of 
the Council. The Commissioner was appointed by the President 
and was responsible to him through the Minister of Local 
Government (Articles 6, No (1) & (2)). (After February 1979, 
the Commissioner was directly responsible to the President 
following the abolition of the Ministry of Local Government). 
The Commissioner, as chief representative of the Government in 
the province, was empowered by the Act "to be responsible for 
the execution of the general policy of the Government and for 
fostering and consolidating the revolutionary and socialist 
regime of the May Revolution and for the functional 
organizations and shall see that these organizations are 
responsive to the general policy of the Government" (Article
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6(3) )
The Province People’s Executive Council, of which the
Commissioner was the chairman and treasurer by virtue of his 
office, was a corporate body established by a warrant by the 
Council of Ministers (Article 7(1)). The Council was composed 
of representatives of the functional organizations (village 
and town development committees), which should constitute the 
majority, as well as representatives of the heads of
departments in the province (Article 9(1) & (2)). The
Province Council was empowered to administer virtually all the 
services in the province including agriculture, health, 
education up to senior secondary level, roads, housing, town 
planning and general security. By the Act, the province 
council was authorised to establish, control and supervise the 
functions of the local councils in districts, towns and rural 
areas within its jurisdiction (Article 15(2)). In addition, 
the Province Council was entrusted with the overall
administrative responsibility for resources - financial and 
manpower - not only for the budgets and manpower needs of 
local councils but also for all government agencies coming 
under its authority. The provision of this wider function to 
the province was intended to decentralise power from Khartoum 
and, to a less«r extent, from Juba, the regional capital of 
South Sudan, to the provincial capitals.
The Province P e o p l e ’s Executive Council was authorised to 
delegate some of its powers and functions to the local
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councils (District, Town and Rural) which functioned under its 
supervision. These local councils were not corporate bodies, 
that is, they did not have an independent budget and a general 
seal. The members of the local councils were chosen by 
election from amongst the bodies representing the functional 
organizations. Persons serving in the government at this 
level were also chosen as members in the manner prescribed by 
the Province Executive Council. The Chairman of the local 
council was appointed by the Minister of Local Government or 
by the appropriate Minister at the regional level in the case 
of the South. The local councils, with the consent of the 
Province Executive Council, were allowed to impose fees or 
rates of a local nature upon members of the public in their 
area for the finance and administration of local self-help 
schemes.
Unlike the two previous major local government acts (1951 and 
1960), whose formulation was preceded by the production of 
reports, the 1971 had no such precedent. It is therefore 
difficult to identify precisely what prompted the government 
in its choice of this particular pattern. H o w e l l ’s comments 
along this line, however, are of interest, thus:
"It would be both wrong and unfair to be too 
sceptical towards the intentions of the Sudan
Government ..... Certainly, the reform of local
government is part of the Gove r n m e n t ’s strategy of
broadening its base of political s u p p o r t   there
is a genuine, and well-based, fear that completely 
open local government elections would provide the 
old political parties with a fifth column which 
could surely hinder the G o v e r n m e n t ’s work at 
provincial and local levels. And there is a
- 201 -
genuine, populist desire to break what is considered 
to be the conservative stronghold of traditionally 
powerful families" (Howell; 1974:73).
There may well be some truth in H o w e l l ’s assessment, at least 
for the initial period of N i m e i r i ’s regime. Whatever the 
reasons were, Nimeiri was all set for decentralisation, and 
further decentralisation. That he was committed to this was 
mentioned in his 1979 report: "it is a step that will be
followed, God willing, by other steps in support of the 
decentralisation of government and administration". These 
other steps appeared in the form of the Regional Government 
Act, 1980, which will be discussed in the last sub-section of 
the chapter, and, the the Local Government Act, 1981.
The 1981 Local Government Act
The passing of the 1981 Act was yet another occasion during 
the Nimeiri regime when the country suddenly found itself 
confronted with a major structural reorganization. By the 
1981 Act, the Province P e o p l e ’s Councils were abolished. 
Instead, as mentioned above, the Act gave the power to the 
Regional Executive Authority to establish a number of Area 
(District) Councils (Article 5(1)). The Area Councils in turn 
were empowered by the Act to "establish P e o p l e ’s Local 
Councils for towns, rural areas, quarters, villages, camps, 
industrial areas and markets; and shall delegate to them such 
powers and limited financial resources as it deems necessary 
for performance of services" (Article 7).
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deligated from District
Nomad Village Market Neighbour­ Industrial
Council Council Council hood council area Council
Source: SUDANOW, January 1982
Figure 4.1 The Structure o f the Decentralised Government in the Sudan -1981.
The Area Councils assumed many of the functions of the 
previous Province Councils including primary and intermediate 
education, public health, roads, drainage and water supplies, 
agriculture and veterinary extension work; culture and 
sports; social affairs and self-help schemes; labour and the 
regulation of employment; licensing, price and commodity 
control; and the maintenance of public order.
The Act specified that the functional organizations were to be 
represented and it authorised the Area Executive Authority to 
prescribe a reasonable number of seats for women. With the 
recommendation of the Commissioner, the Area Executive Council 
could also appoint to the Council experienced members of the 
public who had an interest in the public work provided that 
the appointed members did not exceed ten per cent of the total 
membership (Article 11(3)). The Act also stipulated that the 
Council should elect a chairman from amongst its members at 
its first sitting, "provided that such sitting be chaired by 
a person to be chosen by the Commissioner for the said purpose 
(Article 11(5)). "The large councils established on this 
basis, such as Omdurman, have a membership of fifty, thirty- 
five being elected members, ten from the Alliance of the 
P e o p l e ’s Working Forces (functional organization), and five 
nominees" (Norris, 1983, p.217). The councils in the South 
consisted of thirty members only but with similar proportions.
The Councils had a policy-making and an executive organ. The 
executive organs were chaired by the most senior
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administrative officer who was also, by virtue of his office, 
the C o u n c i l ’s secretary, treasurer and supervisor of employees 
in the Council (Article 12(3)). The Council had been allowed 
by the Act to make a job structure for its executive organ 
with the assent of the Commissioner and appointment was by 
secondment from the Regional Executive Authority or from the 
National Government through the Regional Executive Authority 
(Article 12 (1)).
The role of the Provincial Commissioner was radically 
redefined. He was no longer directly responsible to the 
President but to the Regional Executive Authority. The powers 
of the Commissioner were specified by the Act, and briefly, he 
was responsible: 1., for the security of the province; 2., for 
the supervision of the police, the prisons and the fire 
brigade; 3., administratively, for the heads of the executive 
organs in the Area Councils and the procedures of secondment 
of all employees in the public service organs of the Area 
C o u n c i l s .
The method of control by both the Regional Authority and the 
Commissioner over the Councils was specified by the Act. Any 
Regional Minister could inspect the work of the Council and 
the Commissioner too could "revise the work of the Council and 
of the P e o p l e ’s Local Council" (Article 34(3)).
The Commissioner had also a supervisory role over the Councils 
as he was authorised to "present to the Regional Executive
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Authority periodical reports on performance of the Councils" 
(Art icle 34(4)).
The Regionalisation Drive
President Nimeiri made a distinction between political and 
administrative decentralisation. Political decentralisation 
was equated with the transfer or devolution of power to the 
regions and its main objective was "to lay a solid basis for 
building a Sudanese nation wherein all tribal and racial 
groups, whatever their origin of beliefs, shall be fused in 
one united national personality" (Nimeiri, 1979:23). 
Regional isat ion was thus a form of decentralisation which 
aimed to preserve national unity.
1983+
1 Northern Region 4 Khartoni Province 7 Darfnr Region
2 Eastern Region 5 Central Region 8 Eqnatoria Region
3 Kordofan Region 6 Upper Nile Region 9 Bahr el Ghazal Region
Northern Sudan
Table 4.2: Bvolntion of regionalisation in the Sndan 
I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Bvolntion of Regionalisation
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The notion of regionalisation for national integration is
reflected in the writings of Sudanese academics and experts on 
governmental issues. Mohamed Omer Beshir (1980) entitled an 
article he wrote in Sudan Notes and Records "Ethnicity, 
Regionalism and National Cohesion". Beshir described the 
implications of regionalisation for national integration as 
f o l l o w s :
The concept of regionalism - though understood 
differently by different groups - was for the first 
time accepted and endorsed by the political 
leadership in the north and the south as the only 
means that would satisy the legitimate aspirations 
of the south, remove southern grievances and at the 
same time dispel the fears of the north that the 
south would secede at some time in the future. It 
was the beginning of conferring legitimacy on 
ethnicity.
Mohammed Beshir Hamid (1986), following a similar line of 
analysis, wrote, in an article entitled "Regionalisation, 
devolution and National Integration in the Southern Sudan", 
about the distinction between regional government and local 
government and the former as involving ’"more complex set of 
relationships that necessarily entails a measure of autonomous 
rule through the creation of executive and legislative organs" 
(Hamid, 1986:124).
Rafia Hassan Ahmed (1984:7) defined regionalism as "a cultural 
and political movement seeking to protect and foster 
indigenous culture and to promote autonomous political 
institutions in a particular region". President N i m e i r i ’s 
understanding of regionalism was along similar lines. About 
the experiece gained from regional self-governent in the
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south, Nimeiri wrote (1979:22):
There is no doubt that the system of regional self- 
government has achieved tremendous success and has 
attained positive results from the political point 
of view. Perhaps the most important are that it 
created national unity, ended the civil war, 
attained peace, and that it satisfied the 
aspirations of the citizens of the southern region, 
gathered them together and fused them in the 
forefront of national work for development, progress 
and prosperity of the region.
It was clear that President Nimeiri regarded the successful 
implementation of regionalisation as a political necessity for 
maintaining national unity and decentralisation to local 
governments as a mechanism for development administration.
Taking the south Sudan experience into account, President 
Nimeiri, in February 1979, announced a series of Presidential 
Orders which were, according to Alassam (1983:113) " to
reshape government powers and structure through the devolution 
of authority to provincial councils” (see also Africa 
Contemporary R e c o r d , '1979-80:B 1 0 5 ). Seven central ministries 
(4.3) were abolished and their powers transferred to the 
province authorities. In their place two new ministries (4.4) 
were created to execute functions not transferrd to the 
provinces" (Alassam, 1983:112). Four other ministries (4.5) 
had their powers curtailed. At the same time, President 
Nimeiri was made the "Patron of Local Government" and an 
office for local government affairs was created inside the 
presidential cJffice. According to the new arrangement the 
provincial commissioners became directly answerable to the 
pres i d ent.
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Whilst these changes were being introduced, two committees 
(one national and the other technical) were set up to make 
specific recommendations for the creation of regional 
governments in north Sudan. The technical committee toured 
the various parts of the country, except the south which was 
outside its term of reference (Beshir, 1984:24), in order to 
sound local opinion (Alassam, 1983:112). In its final report, 
the technical committee endorsed the general principle of 
regionalism as a suitable system of government for the Sudan 
but there was disagreement among its members "on the issue of 
the numbers of regions to be established, the pattern of 
implementation and the detailed structure" (Beshir, 1984:25).
Some members of the technical committee, for example, argued 
against immediate implementation having taken into 
consideration the lack of human and financial resources at 
the time and the unfavourable economic conditions. However, 
"these views were not accepted since President Nimeiri was 
determined to have immediate regionalism irrespective of any 
possible disadvantage " (Beshir, 1984:25).
In July 1980 the constitution of the Sudan was amended to 
incorporate the new Regional Government Act in replacement of 
the previous provincial local government Acts. The regional 
system devised for the north Sudan was the semi-autonomous 
type. Unlike in the south, the national President retained 
the authority to appoint the governors, deputy governors and 
the regional ministers. The Governor, his deputy and the 
ministers were responsible for the executive function of the
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regions. The legislative functions were vested in the 
P e o p l e ’s Regional Assembly. The regional assemblies were 
designed to have between fifty and seventy members, the 
majority of which were to be selected by geographic 
constituencies and others nominated by w o m e n ’s, youth, village 
development, and other functional organizations. The
president was also empowered to appoint 10 per cent of the 
members. The Bill gave the President a power of veto over 
regional legislation.
Section six of the Regional Government Act 1980 forbids the 
regional governments from encroaching upon the following 
central government functions:
a) National defence and security
b) Foreign affairs and internatinal diplomatic 
representat ion
c) Nationality, immigration, passports and aliens affairs
d) Public audit
e) Judiciary, public prosecution and advocacy
f) Transit means of communication and transport
g) Inter-regional water supply resources and the 
electricity network
h) Currency and coinage
i) Export and import trade
j) Weights and measures
k) Natural resources and mining
1) National and regional elections
m) Educational planning
n) Any other matters regulated by national legislation
The regional governments were made responsible for the general 
good of their respective regions and for the maintenance of 
law and order. Section eight of the Act spells out the 
functions and powers belonging to the regional governments, 
which include:
a) The development and utilisation of regional financial
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resources
b) The fostering, development and supervision of local 
government councils
c) Supervision and control of police and fire services
d) Fostering of social and regional religious 
ins t i tut ions
e) Regulation of commerce, supply, co-operation and 
regional industry
f) Utilisation of water resources
g) Development of regional communications and
transportation
h) Supervision of public services personnel in the region
i) Development and control of land use and town planning
The P e o p l e ’s Regional Assembly was empowered to approve its 
own budget, levy taxes and impose fees and charges but it was 
not to levy or collect any of the following:-
a) National taxes on import and export
b) Excise duties
c) Capital profit tax
d) Public service benefits (pension)
With the creation of intermediate government at the regional 
level, the position of the provinces became unclear, barely a 
year after their powers had been increased with the abolition 
of some central ministries. To remove the anomalies which 
existed between the Regional Government Bill 1980 and the 
P e o p l e ’s Local Government Act 1971, the 1981 Local Government 
Act, discussed above, was passed.
Conelus ion
Local administration in the Sudan passed through unprecedented 
upheaval during the Nimeiri regime. Considering the vast 
extent of the country and the diversity of its population, 
decentralisation policies in the Sudan were hailed as 
revolutionary in Africa (Moharir, 1986). However, judgement
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on the merits of the extensive decentralisation may be 
dangerous without consideration of its impact both as a means 
of national integration and development administration. The 
case study of Part II will thus assess the implications of 
decentralisation policies in south Sudan between 1972-1983, 
that is, during the life of the Addis Ababa peace agreement..
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CHAPTER 5
DIMENSIONS OF SCARCITY AND POVERTY
Introduct ion
One of the declared aims of decentralisation in the Sudan was 
"to accelerate economic development at the local level by 
enabling the citizens of the different regions to determine 
what is best suited to their regions, and how best to utilize 
it for their own good" (Nimeiri, 1979:27). Since
decentralisation was, therefore, planned to serve as an 
instrument of economic development, it is imperative that in 
the first instance, the socio-economic condition it was 
expected to improve, and the means available for so doing, are 
clearly understood.
Thus, this chapter reviews the nature of S u d a n ’s economy in 
general terms, analyses the prevalent inter-regional 
disparities, and, in order to expose the extent of the 
problem, an in depth analysis is made of frh-e- poverty ■si-t-oat ioa 
in South Sudan.
MEASURES OF DISPARITY
Some Cross-National Comparisons
"The Sudan ranks twelfth among the so called least developed 
countries with' a' pcer capita income in the area of $300" (ILO, 
1984:5). But, it is generally agreed that GNP per capita 
provides a poor guide for measuring and comparing social
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progress both within and between countries (Chennery et a l , 
1974;xv; T o d a r o , 1987:137-138). Given the socio-economic
concentration within the Sudan in the Khartoum - Kosti 
Kassal triangle (central eastern), the inadequacy of GNP per 
capita as a representative measure of development is only too 
clear. Better indicators do exist, however, for assessing 
development performances of countries. The physical quality 
of life index (PQLI), a composite of life expectancy, infant 
mortality, and literacy is one such (Sharif, 1986:567). 
Another indicator, the infant mortality rate - the number of 
deaths before the age of one for every 1,000 live births - is 
one particularly favoured by UNICEF as "the most sensitive of 
all indicators . . . because it reflects such progress as 
education, water supply, health care, and nutrition for both 
the mother and the child" (Grant, 1983:7). Grant believes 
that "when taken together with per capita GNP, the use of 
social indicators - either the infant mortality rate alone or 
the composite PQLI index itself - reveals a much more three 
dimensional picture of development in a given country than 
either economic or social indicators standing alone".
In 1981, UNICEF, quoting the United Nations statistical 
office, estimated that the infant mortality rate in the Sudan 
was 125 per 1,000 (UNICEF, 1981:4). UNICEF acknowledged, 
however, the wide variation between the north and south of the 
country: "by 1he most recent population model developed, the
infant mortality in the south is 170 per 1,000 compared to 100 
per 1,000 in the north" (UNICEF, 1981:4). Another UNICEF
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report on the southern region of the Sudan estimated that, in 
1981, the annual per capita income was $75 and child mortality 
rate under five years of age was as high as 400 per 1,000 
(Sclafani, 1981:11).
Abizadeh & Basilevsky (1986), applying a ’maximum likelihood 
factor analysis technique’, show the socioeconomic
classification of 64 countries. On the list for ’quality of
life f a c t o r ’ beginning from the lowest value, the Sudan stood
7th (pl40) and on the ’industry-agriculture split scaling’, 
ranked from the lowest to the highest, the Sudan again stood 
at 7th position (p.106). According to Abizadeh and
B a s ilevsky’s classification the first 21 countries in the 
industry-agriculture scaling represent the highly
’’underdeveloped’’ countries (p. 103).
Table 5.1 on the next page shows the comparatively 
underdeveloped structure of S u d a n ’s economy with the 
manufacturing s ector’s contribution to GDP showing less than 
10%, that is, lower than the average share of manufacturing in 
GDP of the low-income countries. Since non-industrialised 
countries, according to Ali (1985:7), are those whose 
economies have a value-added share of the manufacturing sector 
of less than 20 percent, the Sudan is both a non­
industrialised and an underdeveloped country.
- 215 -
Table 5.1: Sudan's Econonic Structure, 1982
Percent share of GDP
Country Group Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services
-Sudan 36 14 7 50
-Lov-incoie countries 37 32 14 31
-Middle incoie countries 23 35 15 42
-Upper-iiddle incoie 
countries 11 41 25 48
-Industrial narket econoiies 3 36 30 61
Source: (World Bank. 19841.
1. Note that nanufacturing is a sub-sector of industry.
The discussion below will show the existence of 
disproportionate distribution of the economy in the Sudan and 
the south has come off worse by most of the indicators. But, 
if the Sudan as a whole is ranked the 12th least developed 
country in the world on the basis of its $300 GDP per capita 
and about the 7th on the basis of both quality of life and 
level of industrialisation, the south with only $75 per 
capital and an infant mortality rate of 170 per 1,000 etc may 
well compete for ranking as the least developed region in the 
world. The implications of the state of the economy for the 
policy of decentralisation in the Sudan is quite significant, 
a point which will be raised later.
Inter-regional Inequalities
The North-South diversity in the Sudan is reflected not only 
in g e o g r a p h i c .apd, ethnic differences but also in social and 
economic development. In the history of the Sudan as a 
nation, there has always been a North-South differential in 
development in favour of the northern part. Tosh (1981:275)
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argues that "the major obstacles to the S o u t h ’s economic 
development lay in the intractability of its environment and 
human geography: the shortage of good arable land, the
scattered population, and above all the extended and costly 
communications with the outside world". Tosh is far from 
being right in his assertion of a shortage of land and a 
scattered population in the South but the lack of 
communication, as discussed before, has been an acknowledged 
development obstacle. Whatever the reasons, however,
successive governments have failed to make any headway in 
tackling the development problems of the South. During the 
Turko-Egyptian regime, whilst the North was regarded as one of 
the provinces of Egypt and thus development efforts were made 
accordingly, the South was only regarded as an area of 
influence reserved for its riches - ivory and slaves (Barbour, 
1961:266; Hill, 1959:70). The condominium government too was 
not interested in balanced economic growth and concentrated 
its development efforts on irrigated agriculture and the 
railroad system in the north (Whitaker, 1983:142). By all the 
usual yardsticks of development, therefore, the South Sudan 
had little to show when the country gained its independence 
(Tosh, 1981:275; Ross, 1969:40). Joseph G a r a n g ’s explanation 
of the situation is clear enough; he said:
The consequence of 58 years of British rule was that 
the South entered independence having only five 
university' graduates, one secondary school, a 
handful of secondary school leavers, five junior 
administrative officers - and no doctors, engineers, 
agriculturalists or other experts; and no 
industries, trade, or any economic projects. On the 
other hand, there were thousands of northern
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educated men, hundreds of rich merchants, thousands 
of workers. There were railways, cities and a 
developed agriculture and some industry (see in Horn 
of Africa, Vol.3, N o .1, 1985).
The North-South developmental imbalance continues to be a 
serious problem in post-independence Sudan too. In spite of 
the limited data (an acknowledged problem in the Sudan), some 
general picture of the disparity may be provided. Generally 
speaking, there is a North-South decline in infrastructure 
measured in terms of educational and health services, road and 
railway, electric supply, bank and post and telecommunication 
facilities. In 1976, the South, making up about 30 per cent 
both of population and surface area, had ’’little more than 10 
per cent of existing dispensaries and dressing stations, a 
similarly small percentage of post and telegraph offices and 
only 5 per cent of bank branches" (ILO, 1976:199). As table 
5.2 below shows, the general pattern of the South being more 
underdeveloped than the North is evident.
Despite these identifiable disparities, and the political and 
social problems such inequalities are capable of creating, it 
was only recently, since 1970 to be exact, that the central 
government became interested in formulating definite regional 
policies. The main interest in planning before then was at 
the sectoral level. For instance, the first Ten Year Plan 
(1961/62-1970/71) had no regional component in it (see 
Mirghani, 1983:74"). The amended Five Year Plan (1970/71- 
1976/77) marked the beginning, at least in theory, by 
referring to the role of the local Councils in preparing
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economic development plans and how these plans were to form 
part of the national plan. In fact, local governments were 
empowered by the 1971 Act to conduct studies and research in 
order to identify and prioritise development needs, thus, 
"ascertaining the role of the local and regional institutions 
in self resource development and positive contribution towards 
national development p l ans” (Ministry of Planning, 1977, 
Vol.l, p l 5 3 ).
Table 5.2: Sq m  socio-econoiic and health indicators by province, 1977.
Province
Percent
distribntion
of
■annfactnre
Per Capita 
incoie (£s)
Percent
Urban
Percent Feiale 
literate above 
10 years
Percent of 
children 7-9 yr 
olds never 
attended school
Popnlation 
per doctor
forth
Khartou 73.2 377 68.2 44.9 40.3 3,200
Bine Rile 8.6 288 10.6 24.3 56.1 28,500
Kordofan 7.7 229 9.5 7.4 68.9 45,300
Oarfnr 1.4 251 11.2 10.8 70.5 43,900
Rorthern 2.4 258 12.3 31.1 40.0 20,300
Kassala 6.2 293 10.0 25.6 53.5 18,800
Red Sea - 238 33.4 25.3 54.0 16,800
Sonth
B.E. Ghazal 0.5 134 7.8 1.7 93.2 74,600
Upper Rile - 147 4.6 4.7 83.4 63,300
Eqnatoria - 157 9.5 11.7 72.5 62,200
Source: Farah. 1983:18-20 in Sedan Jonrnal of Powlatioi Stndiei.
Rote: 1. Urban defined in t e r m  of towns with popnlation of over 10,000.
2. B.E. Ghaxal = Bahr El Ghazal.
However, the ministry of planning admitted that "the Five Year 
Plan (1970-75) had limited effects on regional economic 
structure and on the standard of living". The ministry 
identified the problems which hampered p r o g r e s s  a s  being "the 
meagre financial resources and limited number of trained
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planning personnel and the absence of information and 
sufficient data required for proper regional planning” 
(Ministry of planning, 1977, Vol.l. ppl45-146). In spite of 
these shor t-comings, however, much emphasis was made on the 
importance of regional development in the Six Year Plan 
(1977/78-1982/83). Accordingly, the development strategy of 
the Six Year Plan aimed to achieve the following goals in 
regards to regional development (Ministry of Planning, 1977, 
Vol. 1, ppl45-146):
* Realisation of equality among all groups of people, 
and of balanced growth between the various regions 
and provinces.
* Widening the base of income distribution so as to achieve
social justice specially between the low income and poor 
groups, in distributing the fruits of development.
* Raising the general standard of living of all people in
the provinces and minimising the income differentials 
between the various regions.
* Assurance of proper distribution of the services among
the various geographic regions - particularly the rural
and desert areas - and in a just manner.
But these were statements of intent which merely reflected the 
aspirations or wishes of those who drew up the plan rather 
than strategies for implementable development action
(Woldemichael, 1983:8). A study of employment and the income 
distribution aspect of rural development in the Sudan in 1978 
points to the "apparent lack of income growth in the 
traditional sector and the likelihood that regression is more 
probable than improvement" (Keddeman, 1978:3). As will be
discussed below, this was proved to be true in connection with
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the s i tuat ion in South S u d a n . A clear indicator of the 
widening imbalance in inter-regional development has been the 
continuing concentration of industrial investment in the 
Central-Eastern Sudan. In 1983, "about 60 per cent of large- 
scale and 30 per cent of small-scale firms were located in 
Khartoum province alone, with about two thirds of industrial 
employment and about half of the investment of the industrial 
sector" (UNIDO, 1985:21). Abu A f f a n ’s study (1981:84) on the 
development of the public industrial sector shows that of the 
ten firms established between 1977 and 1981, five were located 
in the Central region (already the second richest), and one 
each in the remaining regions of Northern, Eastern, Darfur, 
Kordofan and Southern.
The extent of the North-South inequality was explained in 
House and C o h e n ’s study (1986:7) on the Socio-economic and 
Demographic Profile of the population of urban Juba, the 
capital of the Southern region: they wrote:
[The] mean monthly per capita income [in Juba was 
found] to be £s64 and the median per capita income 
to be £s32. The poorest 20% of households receive 
less that £sl6 per capita whilst the richest 20% 
receive more than £s70 per capita per month. In 
1981 GNP per capita per month for the whole of Sudan 
is estimated to have been £s40.5, an income level 
which is exceeded in 1983 by only 40% of the 
households in urban Juba. Given that cash incomes, 
as well as real incomes, are much greater in Juba 
than the rural areas, these data are indicative of 
the extent of relative and absolute deprivation in 
Southern ‘Sudan compared with the rest of Sudan.
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Inequalities in Skilled Manpower
A survey made to determine the ’total stock of high-level 
p e r s o n n e l ’ in the Sudan, in 1973 showed the disproportionate 
regional distribution that existed (table 5.3). Taking into 
account the size of population in each region, it can be seen 
from table 5.3 that the South fared badly in the distribution.
Table 5.3: Percentage regional distribution 
of high level personnel, 1973.
Region Percent
Khartoum 44.0
Central 9.6
Eastern 5.6
Northern 4.8
Kordof an 2 . 6
Darfur 1.5
Southern 1.8
Source: Yacoub Sam m a n i , 1978:22.
The unavailability of qualified personnel in South Sudan had 
been such that in, 1977, one third of all the established 
posts within the regional public sector were unfilled (Mills, 
1977:121). Of the 11,450 unfilled posts "8,500 required 
people with primary education and above. At least 5,000 
required people with junior secondary schooling and above, 
4,300 with senior secondary and above, and 622 with graduate 
and post graduate training" (Mills, 1977:130-131). In spite 
of the critical shortage in manpower, Mills observed that many 
projects in the, Southern Region Six Year Development Plan 
(1977/78-1982/83) were prepared "on purely financial grounds 
and without consideration of the supply of manpower to 
undertake such projects" (Mills, 1977:121/131). The same
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argument could be made of the 1981 decentralisation policy (by 
which the districts were made the units of local government, 
replacing the 1971 Act under which the provinces formed the 
units) which did not seem to have taken account of 
considerations of the multiplying manpower needs and the 
financial implications (see table 5.4 below).
Table 5.4: Vacant posts in the Southern Region public sector 
of major occupational groups in 1976
Occupation Group Vacant Posts
Primary school teachers 1,747
Unclassified manual labourers 1,514
Police and detectives and related 881
General office clerks 604
Medical assistants 559
Professional nurses 544
Government executive officials 302
Prison guards, watchmen and related 289
Book-keepers and related 265
Total 6,718
Source: Mills, 1977:126.
Mills (1977:133) had calculated the total skilled manpower 
required in South Sudan during the duration of the Six Year 
Plan (1977/78-182/83) based on the growth rate anticipated at 
the time and came up with the following figures:
- Graduates 2,400
- Diploma/certificate holders 12,000
- Senior secondary sckool leavers 5,000
- Junior secondary school and training 3,000
- Junior secondary school leavers 8,000
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The Southern Regional Government had, however, neither the 
means nor the capacity to produce the required manpower, 
particularly those above the senior secondary level. Hence, 
the lack of high-level educated manpower in South Sudan 
continued to be a major impediment to the expansion of 
classified posts in the public sector (South Sudan Monthly 
Review Bulletin, 1980:10-11, Regional Ministry of Information 
and Culture, 1977:83). The irony was, however, that the 
supply of university graduates in north Sudan had been 
outstripping demand resulting from the absorptive weakness of 
the economy (Gelaleldin, 1985:26). But the Southern Region 
had a separate personnel system with its own procedures for 
appointment and dismissal and transfers of personnel between 
North and South had never been a common practice.
THE EXTENT OF POVERTY IN SOUTH SUDAN
The Subsistence Economy of South Sudan
The economy of the southern region, as already explained, is 
predominantly agrarian "with most of its production 
subsistence-oriented" (Southern Regional Ministry of Health, 
1976:15). As was indicated above too, more than 90% of the 
population live in rural areas in poor social and economic 
conditions. In other words, the level of productivity of 
subsistence agriculture is so low that it only enables 
survival and very'little else. A good summary of the economic 
structure of the south is provided in a book prepared by the 
Southern Regional Ministry of Health (1976:16).
- 224 -
As in any subsistence agrarian economy, there are 
few employment opportunities outside agriculture. 
Two-thirds of the rural population own some cattle 
in addition to their cropland. There is no 
shortage of land although the more fertile areas 
have a concentration of population. Large
landowners do not exist, nearly all land being held 
by customary tenure based on past use.
Crop yields are extremely low, reflecting the lack 
of modern agricultural techniques. Shifting
cultivation is almost universal. The soil is 
prepared almost extensively by hand tools. There 
has been virtually no government agricultural 
service to farmers during the war years [1956-1972] 
and technical executive staff have been limited.
In their work on income distribution in Kenya, Collier and Lai 
(1984) identify the sources of growth in smallholder farming 
as improved resource allocation, capital formation and 
innovation. In the case of southern Sudan, House (1985b) 
explained the constraints that exist in all these areas and 
hence the "almost stagnating economy" (p.48). Generally 
speaking, therefore, "Southern Sudanese economy has remained 
not merely relatively underdeveloped but has been left largely 
undeveloped and the contribution of the re g i o n ’s people to the 
economy of the Sudan as a whole has been marginal" (Daly, 
1985:77) .
Dimensions of Rural Poverty
One way of determining the level of poverty in any given 
situation is by assessing the standard of living that allows 
for the satisfaction of the minimum basic needs of life. 
Basic needs are defined in terms of food, shelter, clothing, 
health, education, water, sanitation, and opportunities for 
mental, psychological, and social development. No systematic
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study has been carried out to determine the absolute level of 
subsistence in rural south Sudan but a number of scattered 
studies from different parts of the region are available and 
provide indications of the poverty situation.
The ’length-for-weight’ or the ’age-for-weight ’ index of 
measuring the nutrition and health aspects of children are 
useful methods for assessing poverty levels. The first method 
is specially helpful in societies where parents do not easily 
recall the ages of their children. Those who are found to be 
under 80% of the standard are usually considered to be at risk 
of malnutrition (House, 1985b:50). Using the weight-for-age 
standard, a survey that was carried out in Yei River District 
found that between 30 and 40 per cent of children between 1 
and 5 years were at risk of being malnourished (Eaton-Evans, 
1980). A similar problem was also found to exist in Mundri 
district (Eaton-Evans, 1982). "In 1981 the villages of Logire 
and Oluro in Eastern Equatoria were surveyed and 30% of the 
children were found to be malnourished. In Juba rural 
district almost 50% of children under 5 years were found to be 
less than 80% of standard weight for age" (House, 1985b:57).
Other studies have tried to determine absolute household 
incomes both to expose poverty levels and for comparisons with 
other areas. A household survey from Gogrial district of Bahr 
El Ghazal provihcfe in 1977, for example, found that the per 
capita income was only £s 29.8, less than one-third of the 
national figure for the same year (Southern Regional Ministry
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of Agriculture, 1978:10). Perhaps the most comprehensive 
rural study ever undertaken in South Sudan was that by House 
and Phi 11ips-Howard (1985) in the Acholi area of Eastern 
Equatoria province. According to House and Phi 11ips-Howard 
(1985:150) the Acholi area is "a fairly typical cross-based 
subsistence economy in Southern Sudan". In their concluding 
remarks they pointed out that "at the most aggregate level, 
the great majority of households are in absolute poverty in 
the sense that the barest minimum of basic needs - in having 
inadequate access to clean water, education, food, security, 
health and nutrition - are largely unfulfilled". House and 
Phi 11ips-Howard's Acholi area study is even more revealing 
when seen in a national context. As they said (p.150):
Our estimates of cash income in the area which, 
under a generous assumption that each income 
reflects only 10% of real income suggests that only 
10% of Acholi households attain the mean per capita 
income for the whole of Sudan. If our estimates of 
cash income in fact represent more than 10% of real 
income, then a greater proportion of the local 
population is much more deprived. *
Dimensions of Urban Poverty
In 1973 there were only three towns (Juba, Malakal and Wau) 
that qualified as urban in south Sudan, taking the standard 
United Nations definition of a population of more than 20,000. 
The 1983 census suggested that another three towns (Aweil, Yei 
and Yambio) had grown to urban status by the same definition 
(House, 1985a:7). The population influx to urban settlements 
since the 1972 north-south peace accord has been astronomical; 
to take J u b a ’s (the capital of the southern region) case, its
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population has been increasing at an average rate of "8% per 
annum with two-thirds of the population having been born
outside the town (House, 1985b:43, see also Woldemichael, 
1981:32).
Categorising the Juba labour market into formal and informal 
sectors, House (1985a:135) pointed out that nearly one-half of 
all the males and one-quarter of all females were employees in 
the former. A major constraint on the expansion of the
informal economy has been access to capital. "Neither formal 
access to banks nor informal capital market . . . appear to 
exist in Juba" (House, 1985b:47). As House (1985a) also 
found, a reflection of the overall underdeveloped state of the 
Juba economy was the narrowness of the distribution of
occupations: "Only 4% of the employed labour force are
professionals and only 10% are skilled and semi-skilled manual 
workers" (House, 1985a:136).
House and C o h e n ’s (1986) comprehensive study on the socio­
economic profile of the population of urban Juba provides 
information on the extent of poverty. Using the weight-for- 
age and the length-for-age standard methods of assessing 
children’s welfare, they found that, overall, 27% and 16% of 
the children respectively fell below the 80% acceptable 
standard. What is surprising about these results is that they 
were comparable to the poverty incidence found in the rural 
areas discussed above.
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Research by a medical team from Juba University in the 
Atlabara area of Juba, where a sample of 127 new born babies 
was monitored during the first 12 months of life, showed that 
the b a b i e s ’ weight gain during the first three months of life 
was satisfactory. But their growth rate then slowed and 
deviated from the mean for healthy babies so that by 12 months 
the mean for the survivors equalled the third centile for 
healthy girls, twenty eight per cent of the sample were below 
80% of standard weight for age and were considered moderately 
malnourished while 5% were less than 60% of the standard and 
their condition was severe (Woodruff et.al, 1984).
Health problems with children in Juba must be seen against the 
general sanitation conditions "where 79% of households are 
without access to any form of toilet. This proportion rises 
to around 90% for the poorest 30% of households, but even some 
of those in the richest decile have no toilets" (House and 
Cohen, 1986:54; see also Nichols, 1982).
House and Cohen could well be the first to have attempted to 
determine how poor, in some absolute sense, households with 
low cash incomes in Juba were. For this they reverted to a 
method of measurement developed by Crawford and Thorbecke 
(1978). Basically, the method assumes a poverty level diet 
that each household adult equivalent (children under 15 
counted as one-half of an adult) requires, taken to be a daily 
intake of 2250 calories. Based on this assumption, House and 
Cohen (1986;66) found from their survey study of Juba, that a
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household (found to consist of five adult equivalents) needed 
to spend £s 8.58 per month per equivalent adult on food to 
satisfy the minimum daily calorie intake. "Accordingly, 
between 10% and 20% of households, and between 12% and 25% of 
persons, in Juba fall below [this] absolute poverty line. And 
6% of households do not receive enough income to meet the 
minimum food requirements contained in [the] absolute poverty 
line" (House and Cohen, 1986:67) A survey conducted in 
1979/80 in fact showed the situation to be worse even than 
House and Cohen found. About 30% of children under 5 years 
showed signs of chronic malnutrition (Kurup, 1984).
A reflection of the poor health, nutrition and sanitation 
conditions in Juba is that almost one-half (45.6%) of all 
women under the age of 35 years in House and C o h e n ’s sample 
survey (1986:54) have lost at least one child and at least 
two-thirds of women under the age of 35 years with five and 
more children have lost at least one child.
It is to be expected that if the situation was so bad in Juba, 
the capital town of the southern region of the Sudan, the 
situation in other towns was unlikely to be better.
Conclusion
This chapter began by explaining the nature of the economy in 
the Sudan and of the obstacles hampering its progress. In the 
second part of the chapter, we saw the glaring inter-regional 
economic disparities and this despite government policies to
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the contrary. In the third and last part of the chapter, an 
attempt was made to show the extent of poverty in South Sudan. 
The aim was to emphasise the importance of a broader horizon 
of understanding when dealing with issues of decentralisation.
House and Phi 11ips-Howard (1985:50) have raised a significant 
point in relating unfulfillment of basic needs not only to the 
low labour productivity but also "to a social organization 
which cannot provide its citizens with access to the full 
cultural, social and economic possibilities that are 
available" (emphasis added). Given the depressing socio­
economic situation in South Sudan, decentralisation policies 
have neither been successful in narrowing inter-regional 
inequalities nor have they served as instruments for dealing 
with poverty. Rothenberg (1980:146) was right to ask, 
therefore, "whether decentralisation is desirable or even 
feasible in all organizational settings...". Accordingly, the 
justification for the widely acclaimed policy of 
decentralisation in a poverty stricken Sudan should be 
questioned.
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PART III
CASE STUDY: 
IMPLICATIONS OF 
DECENTRALISATION POLICIES 
IN SOUTH SUDAN, 1972-1983
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CHAPTER 6
THE SOUTHER REGION: PROVISIONS, POLITICS AND CHALLENGES 
Introduction
Regionalisation, in the form of devolution, in South Sudan, as 
previously established, was a political settlement prompted by 
geographical, historical and cultural factors. Under the 
"Southern Provinces Regional Government Act, 1972", the south 
became a self-governing region with a substantial degree of 
legislative and executive power. As a way of giving 
permanence to the regionalisation peace agreement, Article 2 
of the 1972 Act stated that the law could not be amended 
except by a three-quarters majority of the P e o p l e ’s National 
Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a 
referendum held in the three Southern provinces. The creation 
of a powerful intermediate tier between the central government 
and the provincial authorities thus took decentralisation of 
authority in the Sudan a stage further (Howel, 1974:74).
This chapter analyses the nature of the power delegated to 
South Sudan and of the central-regional relationships 
envisaged by the 1972 act. Three major sections make up the 
chapter. The main aspects of the regional government 
structure are outlined in the first section. In the second 
section, an analysis is made of the source and application of 
regional and local finances. Finally, the third section looks 
at the practice of development planning in the southern region 
of the Sudan.
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Regional Legislature
The law, the 1972 Act (see appendix III), provided the 
Southern Region with a legislative organ, the P e o p l e ’s 
Regional Assembly (Article 5), which, at its inception, 
consisted of sixty members (later enlarged to 110) elected by 
Sudanese citizens residing in the Southern Region (Article 8) 
by direct secret ballot (Article (9). The elected members in 
turn elected one of their colleagues as Speaker. Under the 
Act, the Regional Assembly was empowered to legislate in a 
wide range of areas such as public order, internal security, 
efficient administration and in socio-economic development of 
regional application (Article 1). Particular areas of 
regional authority established by the Act included the 
organization of regional and local administration; powers to 
legislate on traditional law and custom; promotion of trade 
and the establishment of local industries and markets; 
establishment, maintenance and administration of public 
schools at all levels in accordance with national plans; 
establishment, maintenance and administration of public 
hospitals and environmental health services; town and country 
planning; land use in accordance with national laws and plans; 
promotion of self-help programmes; and other matters delegated 
by the President or the P e o p l e ’s National Assembly.
In addition to its legislative powers, the Regional Assembly 
could, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to
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postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view 
of the members, would adversely affect the welfare and 
interests of the Southern Region (Article 14). The Regional 
Assembly could also, by a majority of its members, request the 
President to withdraw any bill presented to the National 
Assembly which in their view would affect the interests of the 
Region (Article 15(i )0. However, the same Act empowered the 
President to veto any bill passed by the Regional Assembly 
which he deemed contrary to the provisions of the national 
constitution (Article 28). The Act was vague in some areas; 
for example, it implied that the national president had 
limitless power when it said that only "if he thinks fit" 
could he accede to a Regional Assembly request to postpone 
from coming into force laws which may affect the interest of 
the Region (Article 14).
The central and regional relationships were regulated in such 
a way that neither the Regional Assembly nor the High 
Executive Council were allowed to intrude on what the law 
specified as matters of national nature which were national 
defence, external affairs, currency and coinage, air and 
i n t e r - r e g i o n a l  t r a n s p o r t ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  a n d
telecommunications, customs and foreign trade, nationality and 
immigration, planning for economic and social development, 
educational planning and public audit (Article 7).
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Figure 6.2: The government structure in the Southern Region, 
1972-1981
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Local Gov. Insp., Executive 
Officers, Asst. E.Os, Junior 
Administrators.
People's Province 
Executive Council
District Council
Town Cs Rural Cs
Village Administration ]- Village Councils 
Neighbourhood Cs
Direct elections on limited Directly
franchises,controlled noiinations to elected on
village councils, indirect elections limited
k noionations froi gov. eiployees at franchises
other levels.
The hallmark of the regionalisation agreement being to 
preserve the nation against disintegration, the Act called on 
the Regional Assembly to "strive to consolidate the unity of 
the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National constitution" 
(Article 31).
The Executive System
The executive organ of the Southern Regional Government 
comprised the Regional President and Ministers which 
collectively formed a body known as the High Executive 
Council. The President of the High Executive Council was 
appointed and relieved of office by the National President on 
the recommendation of the Regional Assembly (Article 28).
Likewise, members of the High Executive Council were appointed 
and relieved of office by the National President on the 
recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council. 
However, the Regional Assembly had the power, by a three-
quarters majority, to request the National President to
relieve the President or any member of the High Executive 
Council from office, to which the National President had to 
accede (Article 13).
The term of office of the High Executive Council as well as 
the Regional Assembly was four years. The High Executive 
Council, which, according to the Act, would "act on behalf of 
the National President (Article 17)", was empowered to 
specify, supervise and direct the duties of the various
departments in the Southern Region (Article 3(v) and 18). On
- 238 -
matters relating to Central Government agencies in the Region, 
however, the President of the High Executive council or its 
members could only act with the approval of the National 
President (Article 18). The High Executive Council was 
responsible to the national President and the regional
assembly for efficient administration in the Southern Region 
(Article 21).
The nature of the relationship between the High Executive 
Council and the central ministries was left to the discretion 
of the National President. As stated in Article 23 "the 
President shall from time to time regulate the relationship 
between the High Executive Council and the central
minist r i e s " .
Administrative Organization
The machinery of the Regional Government administration was 
organised under a number of executive ministries, whose names 
indicated the services they rendered. By and large, the
composition of regional ministries was based on the central 
pattern and in 1977 their number had reached thirteen. Some 
of the most important regional ministries were, the Ministry 
of Decentralisation Affairs (formerly Ministry of 
Administration, Police and Prisons); the Ministry of
Agriculture, Animal Resources, Forestry, Fisheries and 
Irrigation; the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare; the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning; the Ministry of Co-operatives, Community Development
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and Rural Water. Regional Ministers were political appointees 
and professionally the ministries were headed by Directors or 
Director Generals. The big Ministries were divided into a 
number of Directorates each headed by a Director. In such 
cases, the Directors were responsible to a Director General 
who, in turn, was responsible to the respective Regional 
M i n i s t e r .
The organizational structure of the Regional Ministries was 
pyramidal in form, with authority and responsibility 
increasing gradually towards the apex. The Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning, for example, was divided into 
two directorates, namely the Directorate of Finance and the 
Directorate of planning. The Directorate of Finance on its 
own consisted of the following departments and sub-sections 
(Regional Ministry of Information and Culture, 1977:80):
1. Departments of Auditing, Finance, Accounts, Taxation 
and the Regional Institute of Accountancy. Each of 
these departments was headed by an assistant 
direc t o r .
2. Subsection Departments of: Estate, Auditing,
Revenue, Budgeting, Accounts, Taxation, Purchases. 
Each of these subsections was headed by a senior 
inspector,
3. Each of the subsections indicated above was 
subdivided into smaller units which were headed by 
an inspector or assistant inspector.
The laws w i t h , r e g a r d  to the administrative relationship 
between the regional and local governments in the Southern 
Region were vague in many areas (Southern Regional Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, 1977:331). The 1972 peace
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accord was enacted in such, haste that its ramifications on 
existing laws were not properly realised. In other words, the 
1972 Regionalisation Act was imposed over an existing 
structure, the 1971 Local Government Act, without clearly 
defining the relationship between them. A case in point was 
the position of the Provincial Commissioner under the 1972 
Act, who had ministerial status and was directly answerable 
to the national President under the 1971 Act (Badal, 1980:13).
Table 6.1 : Changing Adiinistrative Divisions by region and province since 1972, south Sudan.
Period Region Province
1972 - 1976 Southern Region
Babr el Ghaxal
Bgnatoria
Upper Kile
1976 - 1983 Sonthern Region
Bahr el Ghaxal
Lakes
Wester Eqnatoria
Eastern Eqnatoria
Upper Rile
Jonglei
1983*
Babr el Ghaxal
Eastern Bahr el Ghaxal
Western Bahr el Ghaxal
Lakes
Eqnatoria
Western Eqnatoria
Eastern Eqnatoria
Upper Kile
Upper Kile
Jonglei
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The legal status of the provincial commissioners remained 
unclear until the introduction of the 1981 local government 
Act (6.1) by which they were made accountable to the President 
of the High Executive Council (Article 10a). However, the 
1981 Act still had some gaps in connection to the position of 
the provincial commissioner. Although Commissioners were made 
responsible to the President of the High Executive Council, 
their position with regards to the Ministry of 
Decentralisation Affairs, the authority responsible for local 
governments, was not defined by the Act. Again the practice 
was that the commissioners acted as subservients to the 
Minister of Decentralisation Affairs (see in K h a m i s , 1982:28).
Representatives of the different functional ministries at 
provincial and Area (District) levels were administratively 
responsible to the Commissioner and the Chief Executive 
officer respectively under the 1981 Act. The technical 
supervision, however, remained with their respective 
ministries. Taking the Ministry of Education as an example, 
the province Inspector of Education, as representative of his 
ministry in the province, was technically responsible to it 
but administratively responsible to the commissioner. His 
duties were to supervise the functions of the Area Education 
Inspectors whose responsibilities in turn were to supervise 
the functions of the Rural/Town Council Education Inspectors. 
The following diagram gives the general picture of the line of 
author i t y :
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Figure 6,3; Line of administrative responsibilities of the Executive branch 
in the southern Region, 1972-1983
President of HEC
I •----1
Ministry of Decentralisation Technical Ministries
Affairs
Commissioner
General Administration Provincial Technical 
Inspectors
Chief Executive Officer
General Administration Area Technical 
Inspectors
Executive Officer
Rural/Town Council 
Technical Inspectors
General Administration
REGIONAL POLITICS
Articles (6) and (7) of the Permanent Constitution of the 
Sudan spelled out that the decentralised administration system 
was to be guided by the principles of the Sudan Socialist 
Union - the SSU,  ^One of the SSU principles referred to was 
the requirement that election to the national or regional 
assemblies and to p e o p l e ’s councils at local level was only 
possible for members of the SSU, However, the SSU mechanism
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was not strongly entrenched in the South and strict vetting of 
candidates for election to Regional Assembly was not employed.
During the life of the autonomous southern Regional 
government, two dominant political factions developed around 
two personalities. One faction was lead by Abel Alier and the 
other by Joseph L a g u . Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu were the 
chief negotiators at the Addis Ababa agreement, the former 
heading the government negotiating team and the latter, as 
leader of the Anya-nya movement, representing the south. Abel 
Alier had remained in the country during the civil war and 
once served as secretary-general of the Southern Front 
Political Party which operated from Khartoum and had a 
following of southerners living there, especially civil 
servants and students. The party "advocated the s o u t h ’s right 
to determine whether it would be part of Sudan or an 
independent State" (Kaplan, 1982:220). When Nimeiri was 
elected to the office of the presidency by popular vote in 
1971, Abel Alier was appointed as a second vice-president in 
the national government.
After the Addis Ababa agreement, Nimeiri appointed Alier as 
head of the southern High Executive Council for the duration 
of the transitional period until the first assembly elections 
in November 1973. However, Alier was nominated in advance by 
Nimeiri as the sole SSU candidate to the office of the 
president of the High Executive Council and at its first
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meeting, the regional assembly duly elected him unopposed 
(Malwal, 1981:237).
The Regional Government had a daunting task to tackle. As 
discussed in chapter 5, the socio-economic situation in the 
south as it emerged from the seventeen years of conflict, was 
at "the most rudimentary stage of development" (Sclafani, 
1981). During the transitional period, the government had 
more pressing tasks to perform before it could even begin to 
think about long term developmental issues. The first task 
was to set up the basic administrative structure through which 
the implementation of the responsibilities delegated to the 
region could begin. The second task was the integration of 
6000 former Anya-Nya fighters into the p e o p l e ’s armed forces 
and the rehabilitation of the remainder. The third task was 
the repatriation and rehabilitation of returnees from 
neighbouring countries and of internally displaced ones. This 
task involved the movement of about a million people, one 
third of which were outside the country (Malwal, 1981:210).
A considerable number of the returnees who had previously been 
employed in the public sector were reinstated. The fourth 
task during this period was to construct schools for the 
returnees’ children. In carrying out these tasks, the 
government was helped by the UN system and many aid 
organisations.
The Regional government’s efforts to speed up socio-economic 
development were, moreover, handicapped by many factors. The
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following were cited as the major obstacles to its development 
effort (Government of Sudan, Southern Regional Ministry of 
information, 1977:85):
1. Lack of basic statistical data for purposes of 
planning
2. Uncertainties about financial resources 
both in terms of quantity and timing of 
f lo w .
3. Continuing shortages in trained manpower, 
and the problems of mobility and 
communicat i o n .
There were many other problems as well but the working 
relationship between the regional and National governments was 
at its best and genuine efforts were made to resolve any 
arising questions (see in Malwal, 1981:213).
Alier remained as president of the High Executive Council 
until the 1978 election when his supporters were defeated by 
the opposition who contested under the Joseph Lagu ticket. 
During the election, six ministers and leading members of 
A l i e r ’s government were defeated. According to Malwal 
(1981:236), a long serving cabinet minister in N i m e i r i ’s 
government, "the whole Central Government, and the north in 
general were all alarmed at the news from the south" and, "to 
spare the south any further divisions, the President sent 
his First Vice-president to the south with a message to Abel 
Alier, asking him to step down from the contest and to give 
his support t q .Jqseph Lagu". The P r e sident’s intervention 
would also avoid the risk of Abel Alier, who was the national 
vice-president as well, losing to Joseph Lagu in an open 
contest in the parliament hall (Malwal, 1981:236).
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A remarkable feature of the 1978 elections was that no 
factionalism along ethnic lines occurred. Alier is a Dinka, 
who constitute about half the population in the South, and 
Lagu is a M a d i , numerically an insignificant ethnic group. 
The divisions that became apparent during the elections were 
more along party lines, most of L a g u ’s support coming from 
old members of the Sudan African National Union (S A N U ), and, 
A l i e r ’s from the Southern Front Political Party. The defeat 
of Alier by Lagu, therefore, showed the potential of ethnic 
diversity in politics. Also, "the fact that a former 
commander of the Anya-Nya could become president of the High 
Executive Council with the support of the central government 
represented a major transformation of the southern problem" 
(Voll and Voll, 1985:87) .
The government of Joseph Lagu was beset with problems from the 
very start. His vice-president, Samuel Aru B o l , confessed to 
misappropriation of funds and alleg.ations of corruption 
surrounded Lagu himself. Accusations and counteraccusations 
became rife between supporters and opponents of Lagu in the 
parliament. He also became "embroiled in a struggle with his 
own former supporters, among them the speaker of the regional 
assembly, Clement Mboro, whom he forced out of office in July 
1979. Lagu personally took over as speaker in a step of 
questionable constitutionality" (Kaplan, 1982:221). As Lagu 
was not an elected member of parliament, his action in fact 
had no constitutional support. With the complaints against
- 247 -
him mounting, Nimeiri intervened and dissolved the Regional 
Assembly and with it L a g u ’s government in February 1980.
The elections that followed in March 1980 brought Alier back 
into power as president of the High Executive Council. During 
the election, L a g u ’s faction was represented by Aru Bol who 
received only thirty-five assembly mem b e r s ’ votes as against 
sixty-seven votes that went to Alier.
Regional politics following the 1980 elections were dominated 
by issues relating to north-south relations. A major 
political crisis arose in the southern regional assembly when 
a draft bill of the national government suggested boundary 
changes so as to incorporate the "oil rich lands” (6.1) of the 
South with the regions newly created in the north (Badal, 
1986:144). A committee of enquiry was set up by the national 
government to assess the situation and, following its 
recommendation, the offending section of the bill was 
withdrawn by Nimeiri (Malwal, 1985:32). Another controversial 
issue which generated just as much heat in the south was a 
proposal to construct an oil refinery at Kosti, in the north, 
instead of at the site of the oil wells, in the south. 
Nimeiri was supportive of the Kosti site arguing the 
infrastructure advantage Kosti has, being located on a major 
railway line and on the river Nile (Lesch, 1986:415). 
However, it was precisely because of the s o u t h ’s relatively 
underdeveloped structure that the regional government wanted 
the refinery site located in the south. In the end, the
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central government abandoned the idea of the Kosti site and 
decided instead to export the crude oil directly from the 
production site to the Red Sea port through a 1400 kilometre 
pipeline (see in Lesch, 1986:415).
To many northern politicians, the s o u t h ’s protective posture
over its resources was seen as a first step towards separation
and southern autonomy as an anomaly in the central-regional
relationships (Malwal, 1985:30). The first hint of Nim e i r i ’s
intention to undo the southern autonomy came in late February
1981 when, in an opening address to the meeting of the central
committee of the SSU, he said:
The south has led the Sudan successfully on the path 
to regionalisation. Now that the devolution of 
powers has become a reality in the north, which now 
has five regions, is it not time that we consider 
the possibility of developing administration in the 
south itself? It would, for example, bring 
administration nearer to the people and make 
government more efficient given the vastness of the 
region. This would be in keeping with the 
revolution’s resolve to hand power to the people.
A division of the south into more regions might be 
a good way of avoiding domination of the southern 
re g i o n ’s administration by a single ethnic group. 
However, I do not intend to let this issue become a 
source of contention (Sudanow, April 1981).
Ethnicity did become a major source of contention and the 
south was soon aflame, with its people divided into two camps 
- the divisionists and the unionists. Heading the divisionist 
camp was, of all people, Joseph Lagu who complained of Dinka 
dominance in the regional government (Lagu, 1981). The reason 
for his advocacy of division was made clear in an interview he 
gave to Sudanow when he said: " Regionalism has now been
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understood and hence the North divided into five regions. 
There is thus now no need to keep the south as a block" 
(Sudanow, April 1981:16). Thus, with central government 
support behind him, Lagu managed to amass support for division 
in Equatoria, his home province.
However, the central government sponsored divisionist idea had 
provoked outrage among its many opponents. Southerners in the 
national assembly produced a booklet entitled "The Redivision 
of the Southern Region: Why it must be rejected" in which they 
refuted L a g u ’s arguments point by point. Firstly, they argued 
that redivision was simply against the terms of the southern 
regional a g r eement. The second a rgument, concerning the 
accusation of Dinka dominance, was that division would condemn 
smaller tribes to perpetual dominance. L a g u ’s achievements, 
first the leadership of the Anya-Nya and then the presidency 
of the southern regional government, were cited as proof of 
the advantages of remaining united. The third, and last, 
major point was the economic unfeasibility of maintaining 
additional regional bureaucracies, when the south was finding 
it difficult to make ends meet as it was.
The debate was gathering momentum and proponents of division 
were urging Nimeiri to "overlook the legal restrictions on 
his powers and to order the creation of more southern regions 
on grounds of public interest" (Wai, 1983:323). On October 5, 
1981, he suspended the government of the South led by Abel 
Alier and, in its stead, installed a caretaker government lead
- 250 -
by a military governor, General Gismalla Abdalla Rassas. He 
was appointed to head a new selected High Executive Council 
for a period of six months during which time a referendum was 
to be held to decide on the division issue. However, the 
referendum idea was abandoned and Nimeiri suddenly decided to 
hold fresh elections to the regional assembly. Elections were 
held in April 1982 and resulted in members who were divided 
into three major groupings:
Party vote remarks
-Divisionists 34
-Unionists 49
-Change two 24 -politically closely 
related to the unionists
- Others 4 -nominated members of the 
army, police and prisons.
Total 115
They abstained from voting 
during the election.
The election for the office of the presidency of the High 
Executive Council was delayed for one month, according to 
Malwal (1985:33.34), to give time for lobbying the unionist 
groups to support the divisionist candidate. On 23 June 1983, 
amidst allegations of bribery and coercion of the unionist 
M P s , Joseph James Tambura was elected President of the High 
Executive Coursei,l^by 62 votes against the 49 votes that went 
to Clement M b o r o , the unionist’s candidate (Arou, 1988:179). 
The distribution of the MP votes by ethnic allegiance, table
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6.2 below, shows that support for the divisionists came from 
all the main ethnic groups in the south whilst for the 
unionists, the power base was clearly among the D i n k a s .
Table 6.2 : Election of regional president: distribution of MP votes 
between divisionists and unionists, June 1983
Ethnic Group for Divisionists for Unionists
Dinka 13 37
Bari Speaking Groups 13 1
Zande 12 -
Nuer 9 4
Shilluk 4 1
Northern Sudanese 3 2
Moru 2 -
Acholi 2 -
Latuko 1 1
Didinga 1 -
Banda 1 -
Murle 1 -
Topossa - 2
Jur - 1
Total 62 49
Source: Arou, 1988:180-181
The election results provided the central government with what 
it wanted. "The propaganda machine then thundered into 
action, endeavouring to give the country and the world the 
impression that the whole south had opted for division, that 
the majority of its freely elected members had voluntarily 
chosen the candidate who favoured division, and that the south 
had supported Nimeiri wholeheartedly" (Malwal, 1985:34). In 
June 1983, the south was declared divided into three regions. 
Those who supported redivision were rewarded with political 
appointments in the newly created regions and Joseph Lagu was 
made national vice-president.
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In September 1983, only two months after the division of the 
south, Nimeiri passed a decree effectively making the Sharia 
(Islamic law), the penal code of the whole Sudan. As 
Heraclides (1987:227) said: ’’the sharia decision drove at the 
very heart of the tenet of unity with diversity which had 
inspired the Addis Ababa understanding". The impact of the 
cumulative central government actions was thus the restart of 
the north-south conflict in 1983.
REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES 
Financial Inequality
One of the greatest failures of local governments in the Sudan 
has been the lack of finance and this is even more acute in 
the South. Many analysts have been voicing concern about the 
state of affairs of local government finances in the Sudan; 
that the reforms of decentralised administration have been 
accompanied by no commensurate financial decentralisation 
(Badel, 1979: Malik, 1981: Fadlalla, 1984). As Malik
(1981:16) said, "the legal sources assigning revenues to the 
councils have not substantially changed since the local 
Government Act 1951, and the tax base has remained constant 
with little or no change". In South Sudan, this problem has 
been compounded by the nature of its relatively underdeveloped 
economy which has no appreciable tax base as discussed in 
chapter five (see also in Malik, 1981:16; Yongo-Bure, 
1987:45). But one of the reasons for the emphasis on 
decentralisation in the Sudan during the Nimeiri regime was
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"in order to cut down on the economic and social disparities 
existing between areas" (Ministry of Planning 1977:145). The 
statement seemed to imply that the government was committing 
itself to a policy mechanism of ’redistribution with g r o w t h ’. 
The underlying implication being that equity would be secured 
by granting more aid to the relatively backward areas.
The reality of decentralisation was, however, one of 
disappointment to many observers (Sudanow, March 1979:12). 
Firstly, the central government was accused of delegating 
responsibilities to the regions/local authorities without 
giving them the necessary financial power to carry out their 
responsibilities. Secondly, despite the rhetoric on
considerations of equity, the government had no workable 
formula to enforce the distribution of revenues equitably 
among the various local government authorities (Fadlalla, 
1984:213). The Sudan had been using a deficit financing 
system which traditionally encouraged local councils to send 
in inflated budget estimates, in the knowledge that they would 
be cut down. A typical example was provided by Sudanow (March 
1979:12): "In 1975-76, Darfur Province Council estimated its 
needs at £s7 million; it received £s5.5 million. The 
following y e a r , it raised its estimates - presumably to secure 
more than the previous year - to £sll million; it still 
received only £s5.5 million".
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Table 6.3; Local G o m n i e n t  Revennes and Central Grants, 1979/80 Fiscal Year
Region1
Local Revenue 
zlOOO £s
Central Grant 
z 1000 £s
Total 
zlOOO £s
4 of Grant 
to total;
Population 
z 1000
Per Capita 
of total £s
Northern 3,655 23,906 27,561 87 1,008 27
Eastern 8,532 17,284 25,816 67 1,426 18
Central 16,676 29,837 46,512 68 4,859 10
Kordofan 8,492 21,069 29,561 71 2,419 12
Darfnr 5,229 18,593 23,822 78 2,632 9
Khartom 12,293 17,346 29,639 53 1,626 18
North 54,880 128,036 182,916 71 14,473 13
Sooth 7,141 19,800 26,943 73 3,359 8
Source: adapted froi Moharir, 19 B4:251 and Malik, 1982:42. Po pulation figures are froi 'Sudan Statistical
Abstract, 1983'.
1. The regions in the north were created in 1980 and the data refers to the provincial and local 
anthorities that are nov within their bonndries .
The dependence of local authorities on central grant is clear 
from table 6.3 above. In fact the level of dependence 
continued to increase in later years. In the case of the 
local governments in South Sudan, it had gone up to 85% by 
1981/82FY (Malik, 1982:42). Table 6.3 also shows the unequal 
distribution of the central government grant to the various 
areas; the South and Darfur, the two poorest regions getting 
less of it than the rest. Table 6.3 also permits a comparison 
of the distribution of grants to local authorities on a North- 
South basis; for every pound transferred to the South the
- .■ i
North received £s 1.6.
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Sources of Revenue
The legal basis of the Southern Region sources of revenue was 
as specified in the 1972 Addis Ababa north-south peace accord 
and in the ’revenue of taxes and duties for Southern region of 
the Sudan Act, 1 9 7 2 ’ or, the "Presidential Order No. 39", as 
it is generally known. The revenue sources of the Southern 
Region consisted of three main categories:
1. Transfers from the central government
2. Tax and non-tax revenues (local resources)
3. External assistance
1. Transfers from central government were by far the most 
important source of revenue to the Southern Region. As 
specified in the Addis Ababa peace accord (article 25 (iv))
the central government was made responsible for meeting the 
costs of established services in the south. This
responsibility included financial support to local authorities 
which was channelled via the Southern Regional Government. In 
the absence of a workable formula, however, the amount of the 
financial transfer was subject to negotiation between the 
central and regional governments on one hand and between the
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Figure 6.4: Sources of Finance of Southern Regional Government
regional and local governments on the other. Table 6.4 below 
shows the proportions of the annual central government 
transfers to the two levels of governments between 1973/74 and 
1981/82 fiscal years. Significantly, the substantial increase 
in central government transfers to local governments beginning 
in the 1979-80 fiscal year was a result of President N i m e i r i ’s 
decree in that year by which seven Central Ministries were 
abolished and their functions decentralised to lower levels of 
g overnments.
Table 6.4 : Financial Transfers from central to the Southern Region (in 
millions £s)
Year
to the 
regional 
government
to the 
local 
government
total
per cent of 
local to total
1973-74 5.50 n.a 5.5 -
1974-75 6.39 n.a 6.39 |
1975-76 8.30 6.70 15.00 44.7 |
1976-77 10.73 7.07 17.80 39.7
1 1977-78 12.72 8.08 20.80 38.8
1978-79 14.20 9.30 23.50 ' 39.5
1979-80 16.20 19.80 36.00 55.0
1980-81 19.29 20.71 40.00 52.0
| 1981-82 21.96 26.04 48.00 54.3 |
Source: adapted from Sodhi, 1981:48-49
Another form of resource for the South emanating from the 
centre was funding for projects that were centrally planned 
and implemented. Planning for economic and social development 
was one of the items, according to the Addis Ababa agreement, 
over which the Southern Regional Government was not allowed to 
exercise any power as it was regarded as a matter of national
- 258 -
nature (Article 7 (vii)). Consequently, the central
government development budget covered development expenditure 
for the whole of the Sudan, including the south. One of the 
reasons that the central government assumed responsibility for 
planning economic and social development was that it would 
allow it to maintain inter-regional equality. As already 
discussed in chapter 5, however, the South had lagged behind 
in the allocation of central government resource distribution 
creating a serious economic grievance against the central 
government (Mawson, 1984:521). In addition, the central 
government sponsored projects in the south had an even more 
serious implementation problem than the general national trend 
discussed in chapter five.
H o w e v e r , the Southern Regional Government was empowered by the 
Accord ”to prepare a supplementary special development budget 
for the region", which was to be financed from three sources: 
direct transfers from central government; regional savings 
from recurrent expenditure, and, external assistance. 
According to the Regional Ministry of Finances and Economic 
Planning, "the level of implementation of the projects which 
were financed by the special development budget always fell 
below expectation", and, "the major single cause, for the 
shortfall [was] lack of financial resources" (Regional 
Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1977:227). The Southern 
Regional Government was finding it difficult t.o keep pace with 
the increase in public expenditure (mainly the personnel 
budget) and thus could not make savings towards the special
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development budget as expected. Consequently, almost the 
whole of the Special Development Budget provision every year 
had to come from central government (Regional Ministry of 
Finances and Economic Planning, 1977:227). But again the 
Regional Government had difficulties in receiving the Central 
Government subventions consistent with the budgeted amounts 
(see table 6.5 below).
Table 6.5 Central Grants for special Development Budget 
(in millions Sudanese pounds)
1 " 1 
I Year amount
budgeted
actual
amount
released
per cent 
released to 
budgeted
1973-74 7,330 0,676 9.0%
1974-75 7,136 1,696 23.8%
1975-76 7,164 1,624 22.7%
1976-77 15,332 4,226 27.6%
1977-78 32,490 6,125 18.9%
1978-79 22,500 7,822 34.8%
1979-80 20,500 10,305 50.3%
1980-81 20,500 12,804 62.5%
Source: acapted from Sodhi, 1981L:49
2. The second of the southern reg i o n ’s sources of resource 
was the tax and non-tax revenue originating in the South 
itself. As specified by Presidential Order No. 39, the tax 
revenues consisted o f :
a. taxes imposed by central government but collected 
by the regional government and retained for its own 
use ;
b. taxes imposed and collected by the central
government but shared with the regional government;
c. taxes imposed and collected by the Southern Regional 
Gove r n m e n t .
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The taxes which were imposed by the central government, but 
collected by the regional government and retained for its own 
use mainly consisted of the following three items:
Personal Income Tax
Land Rental Tax
Business Profit Tax
Although the collection procedures of these taxes were 
governed by national laws, the Southern Region was empowered 
by Presidential Order No. 39 to levy tax from individuals and 
firms working or operating in the south. The administrative 
machinery of the Southern Regional Government was, however, 
not sufficiently developed to organize tax collection systems. 
As an illustration, the yield from personal income tax 
amounted to only £s 500,000 in 1976/77 (Sodhi, 1981:44).
Another major problem was that the fiscal relationship between 
the regional government and local authorities was not clearly 
defined by law in many areas leading to the use of the same 
tax base by both levels of governments. Sodhi (1984:44-45) 
explained the practice of collecting Business Profit Tax in 
the southern Region; tax from traders with an annual income of 
more than £s 1000 was collected by the regional government and 
from those with an income less than £s 1000 by the local 
authorities. According to Sodhi, this "practice of having 
both a ’Regional l i s t ’ as well as a ’Provincial l i s t ’ [of 
traders] ... led to large scale evasion of tax". Following a
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Taxation Enquiry Committee in 1974, the Regional Government 
decided that the entire Business Profit Tax would be collected 
by the Regional Government and that it would transfer 60 per 
cent of the yield to local government authorities. In early 
1981, however, this decision was reversed and the 
responsibility for collecting Business Income Tax was passed 
on to the provincial local authorities in its entirety. But, 
with the reform of local government structure in May 1981, by 
which the focus of local government was shifted from the 
provincial to the district level, the collection of Business 
Profit Tax was once again in a confused state.
The second group of tax revenues, taxes imposed and collected 
by the central government but shared with the regional 
government, was composed of the following:
- Excise duties
Consumption duties 
Export duties
Corporation Tax on new projects, and 
Profit on sugar.
This group of taxes was classified as indirect taxation by the 
central government tax system. The revenue the southern 
region was able to derive from this group of taxes were very 
low even after the regional government was empowered, by the 
Excise, Duties and Consumption Act, 1977, to levy and collect 
taxes on goods produced and consumed in the region and 
assumed responsibility for maintaining all the communication 
services (mainly postal and telegram) in the south. During
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the 1977/78 fiscal year, yields from indirect taxes 
represented about 34% of the total locally raised financial 
income of £s 6.2 million of the Southern Regional Government 
(see Sodhi, 1981:58). This was unlike the situation with the 
central government, where, as mentioned in chapter 5, up to 60 
per cent of its current revenue had been coming from indirect 
taxation. Table 6.6 below shows the static nature of indirect 
taxes as a source of income in South Sudan.
Table 6.6: Yields from indirect taxes of the Southern Region
| Fiscal Execise Consumpt ion Export
| Year Duties Dut ies Duties |
1974-75 190,000 300,000 5,000
1975-76 300,000 350,000 6,000
1976-77 300,000 400,000 6,000
1977-78 1,700,000 400,000 6,000
1978/79 1,100,000 580,000 6,000
1979/80 1,100,000 580,000 6,000
1980/81 1,100,000 580,000 6,000
1 1981/82 1,700,000 580,000 6,000
S o u r c e : S o d h i , 1981:45
The Southern Regional Government had great expectations of 
increasing its yield from excise duties during the period of 
the Six Year Development Plan (1977/78 - 1982/83). The
expectation was based on the assumption that Wau Beer Factory 
would start producing 20,000,000 bottles per annum, thus 
generating, on average, £s 4.05 million per year in revenue to 
the Regional Government. According to the Six Year
Development Plan, the total yield of the excise duties alone 
in the 1981-82 fiscal year would have been £s 5.5 million 
(Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Pl a n n i n g , 1977:80).
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Of the three tax groups, those imposed by the regional 
government and also collected by it were relatively the most 
profitable, accounting for over 50% of the total tax revenue 
(Doornbos, 1986:281). These taxes were collected from a 
variety of sources and the largest part of it came from 
development tax. The regional government was empowered by the 
Addis Ababa agreement to impose development tax on residents 
in the south for the acceleration of economic and social 
development (Article 26 (iv)). Making a "liberal use of this 
privilege" (Sodhi, 1981:46), the Southern Regional Government 
promulgated a law (Finance Act, 1974) by which development 
levies were imposed on a number of goods and services. Since 
then yields from development taxes had steadily increased - 
from a mere £s 860,000 in the 1975-76 fiscal year to over £s 
5 million in 1980-81.
Non-Tax Revenues: The non-tax revenues were raised by
different Ministries and Departments of the Southern Regional 
Government from goods sold and services rendered by them. The 
major part of these revenues were collected by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Ministry of 
Communication, Roads and Transport and the Ministry of 
Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism (see Sodhi, 1981:48). The 
yields from non-tax revenues were small in comparison to the 
yields from tax revenues. In the 1979-80 fiscal year, for 
example, the proportion of actual non-tax revenues to tax 
revenues was 1:3.5 (see figures in Sodhi, 1981:58).
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3. The third category of revenue source comprised of
external assistance and loans that the South negotiated but 
which had to be channelled via the central government. 
"External assistance plays a crucial role in development 
planning and financing in the Region in so far as it helps in 
bridging the gap between demand and supply of critical inputs 
for development projects” (Regional Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, 1977:44). External assistance to the 
Southern Region came from three sources: Multinational
organizations, bilateral assistance and voluntary 
organizations. By its own admission, the regional government 
had no satisfactory machinery to record the flow of external 
assistance and so its exact contribution was not known. When 
the Six Year Development Plan (1977/78-1982/83) was drawn up, 
however, committed external assistance alone accounted for £s 
21.1 million representing 7.3 per cent of the total planned 
outlay (Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
1977:52). But, since firm agreements with donors were 
concluded on a yearly basis, the actual contribution was
expected to have been much higher (Southern Sudan Monthly
Review, 1978:11).
Regional Patterns of Expenditure
Budgetary outlays of the Sudanese financial systems are 
divided into three major sections which are known as 
’C h a p t e r s ’. All personnel expenditures (salaries and wages) 
are classified in Chapter I, all service expenditures 
(allowances, transportation costs, fuel, stationery etc) are
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classified in Chapter II and expenditures on development in 
Chapter III. Of the three, budgetary outlays on Chapter I 
were the biggest in the Southern Region. The rate of growth 
of Chapter I (see table 6.7 below) during the time of the 
north-south peace accord in the South was such that the 
regional government was unable to generate surpluses towards 
development expenditure.
Table 6.7 : Rate of growth of Chapter I 
between 1972/73 and 1977/78 Fiscal Years
Year Percentage 
Increase |
1972-73 -
1973-74 26%
1974-75 30%
1975-76 17%
1976-77 26%
1977-78 31%
Economic Planning,
inance 
1977:62
and
The dominance of Chapter I in the Southern Regional recurrent 
expenditure is shown in the following table. Up to 83 per 
cent (6.4/7.7x100) of the total actual expenditure of the 
Regional Government in the 1975/76 fiscal year was spent on 
Chapter 1 alone. The amount spent on development projects 
(Chapter III) by the Regional Government was almost negligible 
in the 1975/76 fiscal year and this pattern did not alter 
significantly in subsequent years (see B a d a l , 1979:46-49).
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Table 6.8: Budgeted and actual expenditure of the Southern 
Regional Government in the 1975/76 financial year
1 Category
Approved
Budget
Actual
Expenditure
Per cent actual 
to budgeted 
Expenditure
Chapter I 7,953,087 6,429,259 81%
Chapter II 5,462,975 1,240,219 23%
Chapter III 124,626 25,497 21%
Sub-total 13,540,688 7,694,975 57%
Grants-in-Aid to
Local Authorities 7,217,460 4,480,125 62%
Total
i------------------- 20,758,148 12,175,100 59% 1
Source : Badal, 1979:48
The approved budget in the above table did not signify that 
that amount was available to the regional government for 
expenditure. As mentioned previously, the Regional
G o v e r n m e n t ’s annual budgets tended to be inflated with the 
expectation of attracting a higher rate of transfers from 
central government. In effect, therefore, the actual
expenditure represented the R e g i o n ’s total resources for the 
particular fiscal year.
Moharir (1986) raises the problem of auditing of accounts in 
the Sudan generally, which has been more acute at regional and 
local levels. For example, "in January 1983 accounts in 
Eastern Region had not been audited since 1973" (Moharir, 
1986:257). The Southern Region had suffered from the same 
problem (see Malik, 1982:102) and because of it, information 
on the actual distribution of expenditure on a department by 
department basis is hard to find. However, the approved 
ordinary budgets do provide, if not accurately, at least an
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indication of the pattern of distribution among the different 
Regional Ministries and Departments as shown in table 6.9 
b e l o w .
Table 6.9: Approved Ordinary Budget for 1975/76 Ministry-wise
for the Southern Region of Sudan
No. Hinistry/Departient Budget As 4 of Total 
Approved
1. Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
Aniial Production and Forestry 734,182 3.61
2. Regional Ministry of Coiiunications, Transport 
and Roads 947,222 4.61
3. Regional Ministry of Cooperative and Rural 
Development 371,564 1.84
4. Regional Ministry of Education 1,003,233 4.94
5. Regional Ministry of Infonation, 
Culture, Youth and Sports 401,945 1.94
6. Regional Departient of Vildlife Conservation 
and Tourisi 343,670 1.74
7. Regional Ministry of Housing and Pnblic Utilities 620,847 3.04
8. Regional Ministry of Health and Social welfare 2,754,659 13.44
9. Regional Ministry of Finance and Econoiic Planning 288,404 1.44
10. Regional Ministry of Couerce, Industry and Supply 110,873 0.54
11. Regional Ministry of Adiinistration, Police
and Prisons 4,426,346 21.54
12. People's Regional Asseibly 256,754 1.24
13. Central Regional Services 760,701 3.74
14. Regional Ministry of Public Services and 
Adiinistrative Refori 395,622 1.94
15. Grant-in-Aid to People's Local Governient 7,217,460 35.04
- Total 20,633,482 100.04
Source : The Deiocratic Republic of The Sudan, Priiary Health Care Prograue
Southern Region Sudan, 1976:2
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The Regional Ministry of Administration, Police and Prisons 
(later the Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs) was the 
biggest employer in the Southern Region. Almost 60% of the 
public sector posts in the Region were accounted for by this 
Ministry alone (Mills, 1977:117). The Ministry of
Decentralisation Affairs was not only the biggest employer but 
was also the biggest spender of the Southern Regional 
Government departments (table 6.9). The reason for this was 
that local government expenditure, which included salaries of 
the technical departments’ staff such as primary school 
teachers, agricultural and health workers, were budgeted for 
by that ministry. According to Mills (1977:119) the dominance 
of the Ministry of Decentralisation in employment was a 
reflection of "the vast size of the Region, the state of 
economic development and the relatively undeveloped nature and 
range of public sector employment within the Region” .
If the actual expenditure had followed the percentage pattern 
of the approved budget allocations as shown in table 6.9, the 
share of the Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs would have 
been £s 2.6 million. Following the same assumption, however, 
the expenditures of some of the Ministries and departments in 
the South would have been so small that they would not have 
been in a position to engage themselves in any developmental 
activities. Taking the Regional Ministry of Industry and 
Supply as an example, its actual expenditure in the 1975/76 
fiscal year would have only amounted to £s 61,000.
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Some Aspects of Local Government Finance
Sources of Local Revenue: Local governments in the Sudan
derive their revenue from three main sources. Firstly, and 
most importantly, is grants-in-aid from the central 
government; secondly, there are locally imposed taxes; and 
thirdly there are miscellaneous receipts derived from fees and 
charges. A main feature of local government finance during 
the Nimeiri regime was the continued financial dependence on 
central grants. The table below shows the growth of grants- 
in-aid to local authorities in South Sudan for the years 
1977/78 to 1981/82. It can be seen that in the 1981/82 fiscal 
year, 85% of the local authority finance came from outside 
their local revenue.
Table 6.10: Local Government Revenue Resources in south Sudan
Year
Total 
Budgeted 
Revenue (£s 
000)
Local 
Revenue 
(£s 000)
Percent of | 
Local 1 
to Total I 
Revenue j
1977/78 15,671 7,307 46%
1978/79 17,241 7,418 43%
1979/80 29,990 7,143 23%
1980/81 37,853 7,362 20%
1981/82 55,443 17,396 15% j
Source: Adapted from Malik, 1982:42
Another feature of local government finance in the Sudan since 
independence has been that, in spite of the many changes that 
took place in administrative structure, the base of local 
revenues has remained virtually unchanged. In the main, the 
law by which local governments are assigned their tax revenue 
sources has been the Local Government Appropriation of Taxes
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Ordinance which was passed in 1954, that is, from the pre­
independence period. The following are some of the sources of 
finances for local governments under the provision of the 1954 
Tax Ordinance:
1. Poll Tax. This is sometimes known as Social Services Tax 
and is collected from every male adult resident in a local 
authority. Poll Tax is a crude form of taxation as it bears 
no relation to the individual’s ability to pay. According to 
Ali (1974:109): "the original reason for such a tax was to
entice people to work for money, and hence, eventually 
transform the traditional (subsistence) sector in undeveloped 
countries into the change (money) economy". It "being 
generally regarded as inhuman to tax a person for his sheer 
existence ... most underdeveloped countries have begun 
abolishing [poll tax]" (Ali, 1974:109-110). In the Sudan, Poll 
Tax is still one of the important sources of revenue for the 
lower tiers of local councils that is, Town and Rural 
Counc i1s .
In South Sudan, the collection of Poll Tax has always been 
beset with problems. The method of collection has been 
through the traditional chiefs who are allowed to retain a 
certain percentage (up to 20 per cent) of the amount they 
collect. However, as Badal wrote, quoting an anonymous 
source: "among chiefs misuse of taxes is frequent: they come
back to tax payers asking them to pay again and call the next 
payment as arrears" (Badal, 1979:63). Failure of payment is
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normally dealt with by confiscating property or imprisonment 
of the defaulter. But, as discussed in chapter 5, the plain 
truth is that the South is so poor and unproductive that 
little money can be squeezed out of the people by taxes or 
otherwi s e .
2. Property R a t e s : These are taxes levied on land, building
and ground properties owned by individuals or business 
enterprises. The amount to be collected depends on the
location of the property and of its value. In South Sudan, 
this type of rating is only applicable in the urban areas. 
The land rating in urban Juba is, for example, divided into 
five classes but the local authority there uses a flat rate, 
based on the lowest value, to avoid administrative complexity.
Even at that rate a survey team in 1977 found that non-payment
of property taxes in Juba was very high (Mumtaz et al ,
1977:22) .
3. U s h u r : Ushur is a tax levied from commercially-marketed
crops. It is collected from farmers when crops are sold at 
grain markets. Since volume of revenue from Ushur is a 
function of the volume of commercial agricultural production 
in an area, income from this tax in South Sudan is very small.
4. Gibbana: Gibbana is a tax on agricultural produce and is 
charged to producers at markets for weighing, use of market 
place by producers and other services. Gibbana has proved to 
be a valuable source of revenue to local governments in South
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Sudan (Mumtaz et al , 1977:22). In Yei Area Council, for
example, it was reported that 50% of its income has been
derived from Gibbana (Pickering and Davies, 1985:30).
5. Fees and Charges: Local authorities have certain powers
to impose fees and charges for services or facilities provided 
by them. They also have some powers to charge fees for 
licences and permits issued by them. Although the revenue 
from these sources varies in magnitude from one local
authority to another yet they form a source of revenue to all
of them. There are four main categories of fees an charges:
a) Trading and occupational licences: This includes
licences issued to traders and licences issued to 
regulate the small professions and small works like 
dress-making, carpentry, local liquor production etc.
b) Health Licences: Licences and inspection charges to
regulate occupations like butchering, restaurants and any 
similar occupations linked with public health.
c) Vehicle and Driving Licences: These licences are
designed to regulate the different uses of vehicles and 
the profession of driving (Iman, 1976:87).
d) Charge on Services or Facilities Provided: These are.
items such as court fines, stamp duties, use of market
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place, slaughtering and charges on water and electricity 
services e t c . ,
As an illustration, the following table shows the sources of 
income of one Area (District) Council, Yei Area Council, in 
the Eastern Equatoria province of South Sudan. Yei Area 
Council is made up of two rural councils (Yei Rural and Kajo- 
Kaji Rural) whose sources of income are delegated to them by 
the Area Council. Thus the revenue generated by these local 
councils is not included in the table below.
Table 6.11: Estimated and actual revenue sources of Yei Area Council in 
1982/83.
Source
Revenue (£s)
Estimated Actual 1
1 General Administration
1 -Business Profits Tax 10,000 10,932
-Gibbana 86,265 55,000
Licences:
-Firearms 100 81
-Liquor 750 650
-Motor Vehicles & Drivers’ 100 131
-Others 50 48
-Fees and Charges 1,100 - I
-Other receipts 1,000 412
Sub Total 9,365 67,254
-Receipts from Agriculture
and Forestry 79,250 59,250
Total 178,615 126,504
lource: Pickering and Davis, 1985:28
The above figures are indicators of the poor contribution made 
by the technical departments in realising revenue resources in 
Yei Area Council. During the same financial year (1982/83),
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the overall budgeted revenue estimate of the Area Council was 
based on the assumption that the two local councils under it 
would generate most of the finances as follows (Pickering and 
D a v i s , 1985:27 ) :
Budgeted Area Council Revenues = £s 178,615
Budgeted Yei Rural Council Revenues = £s 395,000
Budgeted Kajo-Kaji Rural Council Revenues = £s 101,701
Total: = £s 675,316
Unfortunately, Pickering and Davis do not give information on 
the source of the revenues of Yei and Kajo-Kaji Rural Councils 
for the 1982/83 fiscal year. This would have been useful to 
complete the financial picture of the Area Council as a whole 
for that year. Nevertheless, the two authors have compiled 
information of the actual revenue raised by one of the Rural 
Councils (Yei Rural) in the 1983/84 financial year which 
provides insight into its revenue base.
Table 6.12: Actual Revenue Sources of Yei Rural Council 1983/84
j Source Actual Revenue Percent
-Social Services Tax (Poll Tax) 
-Agricultural Produce Tax 
-Licences
-Fees and Charges, including 
market fees 
-Various receipts
-Charges for public health services
31,444
85,643
35,300
114,905
38,395
218
10.3%
28.0%
11.5%
57.6%
12.5%
0.1%
Total 305,903 100.0%
B s r s B B S B S s s s s s s a B s s a s s s s s B s a a a s s a a a s a B S B S s s ^ ^ B ^ B s e a B a B B s
Source : adapted from Pickering and Davis, 1985:29
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The inadequacy of the source of revenue in Yei Rural Council 
becomes apparent when looked at in the context of its 
population. In the 1983 population census, Yei Rural 
C o u n c i l ’s population was registered as 267,082. Accordingly, 
the annual local resources of Yei Rural Council were 
equivalent to only £s 1.2 per head which does not appear to be 
compatible with the decentralized responsibilities entrusted 
to it.
Local Government Expenditure In theory, Local Governments in 
the Sudan, as previously explained, are corporate bodies with 
wide powers over local taxation including powers to approve 
their own budgets. Badal (1979:50), however, argued that the 
reality was quite different from the theory. According to 
him, Local Governments in South Sudan have had "little 
autonomy in budgetary and financial matters". Badal further 
e xplained:
The budgets of the P e o p l e ’s Executive Councils 
[local governments] are subject to ratification by 
the Regional Government and the procedure can be 
quite lengthy. The Councils submit their budget 
proposals to the Regional Ministry of Administration 
in the first place. The Ministry forecasts the 
revenues of the different Councils including 
subventions from Central Government. These budget 
proposals are next discussed by the High Executive 
Council which in turn presents them to the Regional 
Assembly for full debate. The Assembly then 
considers each budget proposal item by item, 
sometimes making drastic cuts.
Block grants made by Central Government to [local] 
administrations . . . through the Regional Government 
. . . are earmarked for specific functions such as 
established services: education, health, housing,
agriculture and administration. As such [local 
governments] have no rights to vary these sums.
- 276 -
Legally speaking, the Councils have discretions only 
over the use of 12% of the total revenue estimate in 
any one year... (Badal, 1979:50-51).
With little real power coming their way, Local Government 
initiatives in south Sudan have been suffocated (Malik, 
1982:101). The following table shows the precarious financial 
situation of Yei Area Council.
Table 6.13: Summaries of Budgeted and actual Revenues and Expenditures in 
Yei Area Council, 1982/83.
Budget Revenue £s Expenditure £s 
Chapter I + Chapter II
Deficits £s 8 
(exp. -Rev. ) 1
Estimated 178,615 1,381,420 1,202,805
=(1,105,420+276,000) |
Actual 126,504 795,208 668,704 |
Source: extracted from Pickering and Davis, 1985:27-28.
From table 6.13 it can be observed that the budget deficit of 
Yei Area Council for 1982/83 was 87%. This financial 
situation of Yei Area Council was not in any way atypical. 
Pickering and Davis (1985:26) mention, for example, that a 
similar study undertaken in Eastern Area Council (Kapoeta 
Area) in 1983 indicated the budgeted deficit to have been 96%. 
But, as with the differences in the budget and actual revenues 
discussed previously, wide disparities also existed between 
the budgeted and actual expenditures. In the case of Yei Area 
Council, the actual expenditure was 58% of the budgeted 
expenditure and only 16% of this expenditure was covered by 
revenue raised from its own resources.
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The pattern of expenditure 
closely resembled that of 
not even a small 
Chapter III 
it can be 
expendi ture 
Chapter II 
expenditure in the Southern 
half of their budgets were 
and almost all of this was 
the 1978/79 fiscal year 
for education was £s 
G o v e r n m e n t ’s approved 
1979:51) .
Local Governments in South Sudan 
Regional Government except that 
were available to them for 
From table 6.12 above 
of Yei Area C o u n c i l ’s 
(Personnel) and the remaining to 
feature of Local Government 
was also that more than 
by educational services 
teachers’ salaries. In 
the total expenditure 
of a total Local 
190,883 (Badal,
of 
the
amount of funds 
(Development Expenditure), 
seen that most (80%) 
went to Chapter I 
(S ervices). A
Region 
consumed 
spent on 
, for example, 
7,308,254 out 
budget of £s 13,
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING 
The National Context
The importance the Nimeiri regime attached to planning was 
expressed by the establishment of a fully fledged Ministry for 
the first time in the history of the Sudan. In theory, the 
ministry of planning was responsible for the allocation and 
utilisation of the c o u n t r y ’s resources in a coordinated manner 
(Idris, 1979:189). The method of planning adopted was 
declared as "scientific" which was that the policy making and 
implementation were not to be the responsibility of the 
national government alone but local authorities were to be
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given opportunities to participate in key decisions related to 
the future pattern of development (Idris, 1979:190).
In practice, however, neither decentralised planning nor the 
central planning mechanism worked in the way it was intended 
to (Moharir, 1986:258-259). This was admitted in the Six Year 
Plan (1977/78 - 1982/83) where the experience of planning was 
raised not in terms of malfunction but in terms of "the 
absence of regional planning in the Sudan" (p.145). In 
addition, the Six Year Plan admitted that the absence of local 
planning led to the "disorderly growth of urban centres and 
the concentration of these centres in certain a r e a s " . In an 
attempt to rectify the situation, the Six Year Plan set out a 
strategy of regional development which again was based on 
"scientific studies and on sound understanding of the various 
regions and localities" (p.146). One of the Six Year P l a n ’s 
main objectives was "the introduction of regional planning as 
basis for comprehensive national planning, giving more 
emphasis to decentralisation in implementing those 
developments which have a regional or local nature" (p.150). 
To achieve the proposed strategy, the Plan suggested "the 
establishment of a regional planning body in all the 
provincial headquarters". Ironically though, this planning 
body was to be "accountable to the central Minister of 
National Planning" (p.152) and not to the regional 
governments.
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Case studies on regionalisation in northern Sudan by Fadlalla 
(1986) and Moharir (1986) explain the attempt that was made by 
regional governments there to establish planning units. Both 
studies show the confusion that arose as the units were 
accountable to two authorities at the same time - the central 
Ministry and the Regional Government. As Fadlalla .(1986:219) 
said in the case of the Eastern Region: ’’The assistant
Director of Planning is very much tied to the central Ministry 
of Planning from where he was seconded, and the terms of 
reference for his relationship with the regional government 
are vague and imprecise. This fact, plus the fact that to 
date there are no departmental or regional bodies with which 
he can coordinate his activities, made his job altogether a 
rather precarious on e ” . According to Moharir (1986:258) also, 
"although regionalisation of economic and social planning is 
the crux of decentralisation for development, little 
importance has been given so far to this function at the 
regional level". Moharir (1986:258) thought this was because 
the central Ministry was not willing to decentralise 
responsibility doubting "the ability of most regional 
governments to undertake the regional planning exercise on 
their o w n " ).
As a result of all this, Moharir (1986:259) asserted in his 
study on the eastern region, "the planning function at the 
regional level was interpreted mostly as management of the 
limited development budget granted to the region, and liaison 
with central government ministries for the release of funds".
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Studies from other regions in north Sudan (Fadlalla, 1986) 
also portray similar problems and the centralising tendency of 
the planning process appeared evident in all of them.
Development Planning in South Sudan: At the Regional Level 
The Southern Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning was one of the first portfolios created following the 
formation of the autonomous region in south Sudan in 1972. 
The Ministry was made up of two directorates: Finance and
Planning. These were further organised into departments, the 
planning division consisting of:
a) General economic planning
b) Sectoral planning
c) Manpower planning
d) External assistance
According to the first Six-Year plan of Economic and social 
development of the Southern Region, which was drawn up 
concurrently with the national six-year plan, "the 
organization for development planning [was] built on the 
assumption that the most competent body to propose development 
shall be those who ultimately implement the projects". As a 
step towards realising this philosophy, the Regional Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning passed directives to the 
various ministries and parastatal bodies in 1974 to organise 
Planning committees and Planning Units (Six-Year Plan, 1977- 
42). A year later, Presidential Decree No. 210/1975
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Regional Plan for Development and the Structure and Competence 
of the Regional Planning Organization was enacted. The decree 
formally established a Regional Planning Council, Planning 
Committees and planning Units at the High Executive and 
Ministry levels, government corporations and institutions 
(Six-Year Plan, 1977:42).
The objective of the Directorate of Planning, as the central 
planning authority in the Region, was to appraise the existing 
and potential resources, give guidance to the various 
governmental bodies and coordinate development programmes (The 
Ministry of Regional Administration Police and Prisons, Annual 
review 1981-1982: annex xi-ii). In practice, however, as the 
Six-Year Plan readily admits (p43), "the planning Committees 
and Planning Units have either not been organised or, where 
organised, have not seriously applied themselves to the tasks 
specified for them". A progress report by the President of 
the High Executive Council in 1977 identified four main 
obstacles which impeded the "efforts of the Regional Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning to speed up the tempo of 
economic development in the region". These were:-
1) Lack of transport, especially vehicles, spare parts
and f u e l .
2) Lack of machinery, equipment and building materials.
3) Lack of skilled manpower.
4) Lack of liquidity.
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As a result, the planning function at the regional level in 
south Sudan was relegated, as was the case in the "North, to 
the preparation and appropriation of the limited annual
budget. Reference was made earlier to the problem of flow of 
liquid funds from Central Government to meet the planned 
development budgets in the regions, a particularly severe 
problem in the south; chasing funds from the centre was a 
major preoccupation of the regional government (Deng,
1978:12).
Development Planning at Local Government Level 
During the Nimeiri regime, development arguments formed part 
of the reasoning for entrusting local government organs with 
powers to carry out the functions provided for in their
warrants of establishment. Decentralisation was emphasised as 
the mechanism for transferring decision making to local 
authorities and was intended to open avenues for their
participation in the development process. In practice, 
however, the decision making authority of the local bodies was 
limited and, in the field of development, their activities 
were confined to the maintenance of some services and the 
implementation of a few small scale projects, mostly in the 
agriculture sector.
Although the Regional Government of South Sudan had from its 
inception adopted planning as a means of tackling development 
problems, no effective organizational framework for planning 
was established below the regional level. Following the
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presidential decree 210/1975, the regional government 
attempted to establish planning units at province level and 
went as far as appointing Assistant Commissioners of planning 
in each of the six provincial capitals in 1976. However, as 
a United Nations advisor to the Directorate of Planning 
o b s e r v e d :
The A/Commissioners of Planning - appointed or 
acting - [were] hampered in their work by frequent 
changes in duty-stat ions and lack of support staff 
. . . A/Commissioners of Planning are senior 
administrators - besides being development planners 
- and therefore [had] authority over the other 
A/Commissioners [heads of functional departments]. 
On the other hand however, this seniority had led to 
the fact that the administrative workload took 
virtually all their time because of the shortages of 
experienced administrators (Wessels, 1981:62).
Going by the various governmental declarations, the provision 
of the wider function to local authorities was intended to 
decentralise power from Khartoum and, to a lesser extent, 
from Juba with an aim to "spread the democratic rule from the 
base to the top by allowing citizens to participate in 
development..." (Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, Directorate of Planning, 1977:330). Taylor
(1979:15) was perhaps the first one to clearly express doubt 
on the effectiveness of decentralisation in the Sudan having 
assessed its actual working in South Sudan. He said:
The theory and even the law relating to public 
administration in the Southern Region indicate the 
existence of a sophisticated local government 
system, a decentralized structure of regional 
administration and tiers of development planning 
committees reaching right down to the basic units of
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community life. Recent high level statements . . . 
point to popular participation in government and 
development planning at many levels, with 
sophisticated horizontal and vertical integration. 
But these are statements of intent rather than 
definitions of reality. What is actually seen on 
the ground reveals a high degree of departmentalism 
and the predominance of the project approach to 
government operation . . . No evidence of effective 
participatory planning or consultation with the 
people at large was discernible ... (emphasis 
a d d e d ) .
Conclusion
The decentralisation system in the Sudan is fraught with 
contradictions. On the one hand is the existence of a
sophisticated and impressive organizational structure
cons t i tuted by law and rigorously promoted by the central
government. On the other hand, the very author ity that
created the decentralised system appears to deny i t the
necessary resources to work. From the analysis of the
financial situation of South Sudan it was established that the
region was in no position to carry the burden of the
addi t ional expenditure brought about by the policies of
decentralisat i o n .
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CHAPTER V
THE WORKING OF DECENTRALISATION:
THE DELIVERY OF PRIMARY EDUCATION 
IN SOUTH SUDAN
Int roduc t i on
This chapter deals with the implications of the 
decentralisation policies during the Nimeiri regime for the 
delivery of primary education. ’’The ultimate goal governing 
the process of decentralisation in the Sudan” , wrote President 
Nimeiri, ”is the handing of power over to the people so as to 
enable them to govern themselves by themselves" (Nimeiri, 
1979:iv). But how effective was the policy of
decentralisation as development administration and what 
benefit did this "handing over of power" bring to the people? 
Based on field research findings, how decentralisation worked 
in Wau district council of south Sudan will be analysed in the 
second part of the chapter. The first part will describe the 
development of the educational system during the Nimeir 
period. The divergent development of education in the north 
and the south during the colonial era was noted in chapter 
t h r e e .
BACKGROUND TO EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Educational Development During the Nimeiri Years 
The dominant perspective of many countries on acquiring 
independence was that heavy investment in education was 
regarded as the primary instrument for modernisation (Lulat,
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1982:235). The Sudan experienced rapid expansion of education 
after independence, not only because of the need to promote 
rapid economic growth but also to satisfy the growing public 
desire for increased opportunities for education (Sudan 
Government, Education Sector Review, 1977:9). However, the 
expansion of schools, teachers and enrolment in the Sudan has 
disproportionately been in favour of the urban centres 
(B e c h t o l d , 1976:14; Kaplan, 1983:129). Whilst 79% of the
total population of the Sudan is said to live in rural areas 
(7.1) the ratio of their share in primary education 
distribution is less than 30% (Sudan Government, Education 
Sector Review, 1977:31). The rural and urban differentiation 
is even more pronounced in the south which has only three 
settlements that fall in the latter category and has therefore 
a relatively small and very scattered educational 
distribution. In addition, the civil war that erupted in the 
south on the eve of independence and the expulsion of foreign 
missionaries in the mid-1960s all contributed to further 
widening the gap in educational distribution between north and 
south (Sudan Government, Regional Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, Southern Region, the six-year plan 1977/78- 
1982/83, 1977:204; Southern Regional Government, Peace and
Progress 1974-1975:21).
When the Nimeiri-led government took power in 1969, it carried 
out an extensive review of the educational system that it 
inherited with an intention "to further improve the level of 
education, both in quality and in the number of schools and
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students, so as to meet the basic needs of development" (Sudan 
Government, the Six-Year Plan, vol. II, 1977:129). Under the 
specifications of the Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social 
Development, 1970/71-1974/75, an extensive reorganisation of 
the educational system was proposed (Betchtold, 1976:147). 
Administratively, provincial councils were given the powers, 
by the 1971 Act, to resume responsibility for primary, 
intermediate and secondary education. An Assistant
Commissioner of Education, supported by a small staff of 
professionals and administrators, was made responsible for the 
general management and implementation of educational policies 
of a province. Beneath the provincial authority were the 
district councils which, as corporate bodies and budgetery 
units following the 1981 Act, became responsible for primary 
and intermediate levels of education. "Provincial authorities 
still retained direct control over secondary schools as they 
were limited in numbers" (UNICEF, 1980:5). The main 
educational responsibilities of the provincial authorities 
were in school supervision, inspection, staff allocations, 
school location planning, provision for school buildings, 
furniture and equipment, and the school calendar.
Educational data during the amended Five Year Plan (7.2), 
1969/70-1976/77, show the great expansion that took place at 
all general education levels, and especially in primary 
education, in this period of the Nimeiri regime as shown in 
the table below.
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Table 7.1: Development of Primary Education During 
the Amended 5 Year Plan
Stage School Classes Enrolment
1969/1970
1976/1977
Increase:
- number
- %
- % Annual Av.
1,716
4,685
2,969
173%
24.7%
10,663
26,916
16,253
152%
21.7%
578,865
1,254,497
657,632
116%
16.6%
Source:The Six Year Development PISH', 1977/7 8-1982/83,
vol 11,1977:130.
The achievement in primary education during the amended Five 
Year Plan was by no means a small one. In a matter of seven 
years, the enrolment in primary education had more than 
doubled. The Nimeiri regime had no doubts that these 
achievements were attributable to the "application of 
decentralisation in educational services" (Sudan Government, 
The Six Year Plan, 1977/78-1982/83, vol. II, 1977:129).
During the amended Five Year Plan, primary education consumed 
the largest portion of the educational budget in the Sudan. 
In 1975/76, expenditure on primary education was over 45% of
the total education budget, 
Table 7.2: Education expenditure
as table 
oy level in
Level
Expenditure 
(x 000 £s)
Per cent
- Primary
- Junior Sec.
- Senior Sec.
- Administration ,
- Higher Edu.
35,074 
14,932 
10,993 
. 5,432 
11,036
45.3
19.3 
14. 2
7.0 
3.4.2 |
Total 77,472 100.0 |
Source: Education Sector Review, 1977:177
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The share of central government in the total expenditure, 
table above, was just over 14%, of the local governments 
nearly 82%, of self-help 1% and of all external sources 3.2% 
(Education Sector Review, 1977:177).
In 1975, an Educational Sector Review Commission was. set up by 
the Government of the Sudan whose responsibility was "to 
survey the state of education in the country and its relevance 
to development goals, and to formulate guidelines for 
educational development (Hajjar, 1983). The Commission’s 
Educational Sector Review was produced in report form in 1977 
and the recommendations contained in it were, by ministerial 
decree (G S M / 1/A/5/4/, dated 5/6/1977), adopted as the official 
educational policy of the country. In effect, also, the 
recommendations of the report were to form the basis for the 
education sector plan of the National Six Year Plan of 
Economic and Social Development, 1977/78-1982/83.
The 1977 Educational Sector Review was an attempt, according 
to the commission, "to study the future of education in the 
Sudan during the coming twenty five years" (page ix). Some 
of the main features of the education sector r eview’s policy 
recommendations concerned with primary education were the 
f o l l o w i n g :-
- universalisation of primary education, that is, the 
attainmer\t , of full school enrolment of all 7 year old 
children, by 1991.
- promotion of administrative performance in schools, 
regional offices and central units, and coordination of 
their efforts..
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definition of administrative responsibilities and 
appointment of suitable persons to appropriate 
pos i t ion s . . .
- promotion of financial decentralisation to go hand in 
hand with administrative decentralisation...
Following these policy guidelines, the National Six Year Plan 
set out specific targets to achieve for the development of 
education. Concerning primary education, the Six Year 
Development P l a n ’s ambitious target was to raise the ratio of 
those registered in primary schools from 35.5% in 1976/77 to 
60% in 1982/83 and reaching this target was to require the 
opening of 5466 new schools during the plan period.
The Six Year Development Plan placed much emphasis on 
community participation for achieving the educational target. 
Compared to the previous National Plan, primary education had 
an increased share of the total educational budget. The plan 
anticipated, however, that out of the total primary education 
development budget , which was planned to take 55% of the total 
educational budget, 34% was to be met by self-help programmes 
(vol. II, p . 155).
The plan to achieve universal primary education through 
decentralisation by 1991 was an over ambitious programme 
(Hajjar, 1983). Unlike the real accomplishments registered 
during the Amended Five Year Development Plan period of 
1970/71-1977/78, the Six Year Development Plan period actually 
witnessed a slow down in the annual growth rate of primary 
enrolment as shown in diagram 7.1 below. The actual ratio of
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enrolment in primary education by the end of the Plan period 
(1982/83) was only 46% and the ratio of the primary one intake 
was just over 48% against the planned intake ratio of 87% 
(Ministry of Education, Education Statistics, 1982/83:13).
Figure 7.1 Progress in Primary Education in the Sudan in the period 1970/71-1982/83.
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The South Sudan Experience
The responsibility of the Southern Regional Authority 
concerning education, as spelt out in the 1972 Addis Ababa 
agreement for Regional Self Government, was the 
"establishment, maintenance and administration of public 
schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for 
education and economic and social development" [Chapter V,
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Article II/v]. Following the 1981 Act, the Area (District) 
authorities were required by law to comply with the general 
policy, plans and programmes made by the regional executive 
authorities [1981 Act, chapt.III, 8/1]. The regional 
authorities in turn were responsible to the central authority. 
Thus, a well defined line of responsibility and legalised 
relations among the different levels of the government 
hierarchy was set in place (Sudan Government, Education Sector 
Review, 1977:83).
Education was one of the most urgent problems that the
Regional Government decided to tackle after acquiring self-
rule (Sudan Government, Regional Ministry of Culture and
Information, Peace and Development in the Southern Region,
1973-74:16). After a year in office, the daunting task that
the High Executive Council had in managing education was
frankly explained in its progress report:
This first year has presented the new Regional 
Ministry of Education with many problems and 
difficulties. It has been difficult even to get 
full information about those schools in existence 
when the Regional Ministry took over. The need to 
absorb Anyanya schools into the educational system, 
the influx of returnee students seeking school 
places, the difficulties of obtaining educational 
supplies, many damaged schools needing repair or 
rebuilding - all these have put a heavy demand on 
the limited staff and resources of the Ministry 
(Sudan Government, Peace and Progress, 1972-73, 
Report of the High Executive Council of the Southern 
R e g i o n ) .
Despite the various impediments facing it, the Regional 
government was willing to tackle the problem "as quickly and 
as systematically as the resources, the experience and the
- 293 -
time at [its] disposal, would allow" (Sudan Government, Peace 
and Progress, Report of the High Executive Council of the 
Southern Region, 1973-74:18). To resolve the shortage of 
teaching staff, the regional government even went as far as 
enlisting volunteers, like clerks, accountants and university 
graduates including "some senior officials and the minister of 
education" to teach during the day and in the evenings 
(Report of the High Executive Council, 1973-74:17).
The South Sudan having come out of seventeen years of civil 
strife in 1972, it could be argued that any input was likely 
to result in an improvement in the educational system. But 
the pace of progress following the peace accord was such that 
it would be difficult to deny credit to the regional 
government. In the 1971/72 school year, the total primary 
school enrolment was 49,248 and during the following four 
years of self-rule, two hundred and fifteen new schools were 
constructed with enrolment rising to 109,552 pupils which was 
an increase of 122.4% (see Southern Regional Government, Peace 
and Progress, 1972-1976/77, 1977:23). The regional
gover n m e n t ’s explanation was that these achievements were due 
to "the exemplary spirit of cooperation between the voluntary 
organisations, the parents and the government" (Southern 
Regional Government, Peace and Progress, 1972-1976/77, 
1977:22;).
Concurrent with the national Six Year Plan, the Southern 
Regional Government had also produced its own plan of economic
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and social development. Concerning primary education, the 
regional g o v ernment’s target was to achieve between 41% and 
45% of the primary school age population enroled in schools. 
In order to achieve "this basic development policy", as the 
plan called it, 557 new schools were to be constructed and 
equipped (Southern Region, the Six Year plan of Economic and 
Social Development, 1977:214). Unlike the National Plan, 
however, where the implementation of primary education targets 
was to rely to a greater extent on decentralisation, the 
Regional Plan was to rely on central government financial 
support (p .215).
However, educational development in south Sudan followed the 
national trend. As the figure below shows, primary education 
in the South experienced steady growth up to the 1976/77 
academic year, but for the next six years between 1977/78- 
1982/83, that is, during the entire duration of the six Year 
Plan, only minimal progress was made. Whilst primary 
enrolment between 1972/73-1976/77 grew at a staggering annual 
average rate of more than 23%, the annual average growth rate 
during the Six Year Plan was only about 5% ( See Regional
Ministry of Education, anual statistics review, 1976/77 and 
1982/83) .
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Figure 7.2 Primary Education in the Southern Region of Sudan in the period 1972/73 - 1982/83.
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Regional Minstry of Education, department of statistics, annual reports.
CASE STUDY: THE MANAGEMENT OF PRIMARY 
EDUCATION IN WAU AREA COUNCIL
The Research Methods
Explanatory Note: The field work for this case study was
conducted in two stages. The first stage, which was part of 
a consultancy undertaken by the author for the United Nations 
C h i l drens’ Fund (UNICEF) (7.3), was conducted between November 
1982 and August 1983. In early 1982, UNICEF was formally 
invited by the Government of the Sudan to assist in the 
promotion of primary education in those provinces where the 
enrolment of primary school age children fell short of the 
national average. It was in response to this call that UNICEF
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appointed a consultant to investigate the overall situation of 
primary education in Bahr El Ghazal province. The
investigation involved the collection of data through a 
structured questionnaire (appendix 1) in the whole province. 
Wau Area Council, one of four local authorities before the 
1983 reorganisation, is subjected to close examination for the 
purpose of this study.
An important aspect of the first stage of the study was that 
thirteen high ranking officials from the provincial education 
authorities of Bahr El Ghazal were seconded to the research 
programme. The officials were not only the source of much 
invaluable information through interviews but also 
participated as enumerators in the data collection. The 
research work schedule followed was as shown in figure 7.3 on 
the next page.
The second stage of the field work was conducted in 
February/March 1986 and was made possible by a grant received 
from the University of London, Central Research Fund. This 
second stage was intended to augment the data already 
collected in the first part. In the main, it consisted of 
gathering information from primary official documentary 
sources and various aid agencies who operate in the country. 
Much of the literature referred to throughout this study was 
collected during this time. In addition, the second stage also 
permitted informal interviews of government officials and 
other ’expe r t s ’ in the field and provided useful illumination
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of some of the issues that had arisen from the 
analysis of the data collected in the first stage
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Questionnaire Design: The questionnaire designed for the Bahr
El Ghazal study was a comprehensive and structured one 
intended to investigate many aspects of the educational 
system: administrative; school management; quantitative and
qualitative aspects of education; community participation; 
availability of teaching aids and physical conditions of the 
schools, furniture and equipment (See Woldemichael, 1983).
The relevant variables of the questionnaire extracted for 
the purpose of this study are as shown in the table below.
Table 7.3: Variable Analysis: The Impact of Decentralisation on 
Primary Educational Development in Wau Area Council.
A. Policy Making and Implementation
1. Statutory framework for decision making
2. Relationships, control and responsibilities
3. Financial and material resources
B. Impact on School Environment
1. Effects on management
- Working climate
- Teacher participation
- Leadership qualities
2. Teaching and Non-teaching Staff
i) Status variables
- Level of qualification
- Professionalism
ii) Process variables
- Motivation
- Attitude
3. Effects on Students
- Enrolment
- Achievement/Motivation
C. Impact on Community Participation
- Measures of community participation
- Attitudes towards school
- Rural/Urban differentials
Testing of Questionnaire: The draft questionnaire was tested
in five schools for practical applicability in the field.
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This exercise was found to be very useful in refining the 
final version. The draft questionnaire was very long and the 
wording of some items was either not easily understood or 
rendered the question difficult to answer. Shortening and 
simplification of ambiguous questions had therefore to be 
carried o u t .
It was during the testing of the questionnaire too that the 
need for interviewing chiefs and village communities became 
apparent. As a result the questionnaire form was redesigned 
to accommodate any relevant information that could be 
gathered by conducting such interviews.
The testing of the questionnaire also helped in the selection 
of the enumerators. Some were found to have difficulties 
conducting interviews or to be generally incapable of 
completing the questionnaire and therefore replacements had to 
be found.
Training of Enumerators: Twelve enumerators, who were all
civil servants holding responsible jobs as council education 
officers and senior teachers, from the provincial education 
authority of Bahr El Ghazal (7.4) were selected for the task.
The enumerators were given two weeks of intensive training on 
the application of the questionnaire and the testing of the 
questionnaire served as part of the training schedule.
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Data/Information Collection and Processing: The enumerators
were assigned to predetermined strategic centres from which 
they carried out the survey of the schools in their allocated 
areas on bicycles. In this way, all the one hundred and 
twenty three primary schools of Bahr El Ghazal province (later 
divided into East and West Bahr El Ghazal as shown below) were 
surveyed. An assistant Director of education from the same 
provincial headquarters was assigned by the provincial 
authority to work as a counterpart to the researcher (UNICEF 
consultant) and assisted in the supervision of the data 
collection.
Most of the data processing was done by hand using a desk top 
calculator including the extraction of information from the 
questionnaires which was done by means of a coded card system 
as no computer facilities were available in the field at the 
time. This method was a lengthy and tedious process and it 
imposed a number of limitations on the kind of information 
that could be extracted from the questionnaires. It was not 
found to be necessary, however, to reprocess all the data so 
calculated for the purpose of this study as they provide 
sufficient information. Nevertheless, computer aid was sought 
where graphical and tabular presentations would explain 
certain situations better.
Mention must be made of the importance of the formal and 
informal interviews conducted with government officials, 
teachers, chiefs and village elders which provided a wealth of
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invaluable information. For example, senior education
officers in the south (at the regional level) gave the 
impression before the survey that assigning teachers to the 
locality from where they originally came was a good thing. 
The reason given was that a teacher was better suited to serve 
in the environment he/she was accustomed to and hence would be 
more effective. This was found to be not necessarily so as 
many teachers interviewed expressed a preference to serve 
outside their locality because of them being regarded as only 
one of the sons or daughters by their kinfolks and so found it 
difficult to maintain respect from and authority over their 
students. This in turn had implications for enforcing 
discipline in the schools. The p a r e n t s ’ preference likewise 
tended to be for an outsider because, as one village elder 
said, "they find it difficult to point a finger of any wrong 
doing if the teacher happened to be from the local area".
The involvement of the 13 government education officers in the 
research survey had many advantages. The officials were very 
instrumental in clarifying several questions that arose during 
the field survey and two week-end workshops. The first 
workshop was held immediately after the completion of the 
field survey and the second one after the completion of the 
priminary analysis of the data
The Study Area: Wau Area Council (the study area) was one of
the seven Area Councils (Districts) which made up the Bahr El 
Ghazal region following the 1983 administrative reorganisation
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(see table 4.2 and figure 6.0). Wau town, which is the second 
largest town in south Sudan, is the regional as well as the 
Wau area capital town being the seat of both administrative 
authori ties.
The selection of Wau Area Council for close examination was 
for two reasons. Firstly, although as indicated above the 
investigative study in the first stage covered the whole of 
Bahr El Ghazal province, a comparative sample data analyzed 
from each of the four Area Councils revealed no significant 
difference in the type of the problems they face and hence the 
decision to concentrate on only one of them. Secondly, Wau 
Area Council includes Wau town and therefore it is possible to 
investigate some urban/rural differentials in the educational 
sys t e m .
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
Statutory Framework for Decision Making
The responsibility for laying down the guidelines of 
educational policy during the Nimeiri regime rested with the 
central ministry of education, a practice common in many 
countries not only because education is believed to promote 
"fusing together of local groups" (Sudan G o v e r n m e n t , Education 
Sector Review, 1977:23) but also, at least in theory, in order 
to correlate the overall national economic and social 
development wi jth, financial capacity and manpower resources and 
requirements. The importance of central control on major 
educational policies was, for example, unambiguously expressed 
in the 1972 north-south peace agreement, in that neither the
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Peoples Regional Assembly nor the Southern Regional High 
Executive Council could legislate or exercise any powers on 
matters of educational planning (Article 7.1). The role of 
the regional directorate of education was thus limited to the 
execution of nationally determined plans (Sudan Government, 
report of the Sudan education sector review, 1977:84).
The practice was, however, found to be quite different from 
this. For example, in what could, strictly speaking, amount 
to a breach of the peace agreement, the regional government in 
1976 passed a resolution for the introduction of local 
languages as the medium of instruction for the first four 
years of primary education. The organisation of language 
teaching for the primary schools in the south as determined by 
the regional government was as follows (Southern Regional 
Ministry of Information and Culture, Peace and Progress, 1972- 
1976/77, 1977:26) :
a) Rural Primary Schools
P1-P4: Local language as medium of 
instruction. English and Arabic as
foreign language.
P5-P6: Arabic as medium of instruction
and English as second language.
b) Urban Primary Schools
P1-P6: Arabic as medium of instruction.
English as second language. Instruction 
of children in their respective local 
languages in the afternoons.
» ■ i
The introduction of local languages in the southern schools 
was in contravention to the central government’s policy which 
aimed to spread Arabic and to remove the obstacles which
- 304 -
faced the use of Arabic as the language of education in areas 
where Arabic was not the mother tongue (see Sudan Government, 
education sector review, 1977:132). These conflicting 
policies had dire consequences on the development of 
education in South Sudan as will be discussed in detail below. 
The problem was that neither the central or regional policies 
were based on realistic assessments in terms of the available 
capacity for their implementation. Barbara W a r d ’s (1963) 
observation on the over-emphasis of plan formulation in India 
is strikingly applicable to the situation in the Sudan:
”It is not unfair to say that from the beginning, 
Indian planning has been stronger on formulation 
than implementation - or less pompously put, on 
thinking things out rather than getting things 
d o n e " .
In the Sudan also, in spite of the central government’s policy 
of adopting Arabic as the medium of communication in all 
schools, no effort had been made to blend the Arabic language 
into the specific local environment so as to make it 
acceptable to its users as an alternative language. A report 
by a provincial government official of the department of 
education itself makes this point clear:
In the past, local languages were the basic 
languages of instructions in primary schools. . .After 
independence Arabic was introduced....To a child in 
the rural area, Arabic is not only strange but very 
difficult l,arjguage to understand. This obliges many 
pupils in rural schools to give up learning as the 
young untrained Arabic teachers who use classical 
Arabic in the class-rooms seem of no help to them 
(J.D. B o l , 1983).
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On the other hand, the regional government’s pronouncement on 
the use of vernacular languages was not only ’’illegal" but 
also unrealistic in terms of the possibility for its 
achievement. No school in Wau Area, for example, was found to 
be teaching in any vernacular language. There was no teacher 
training for it and there were no teaching aids available. In 
the heartland of the Dinka speaking people of Gogrial 
District, Bahr El Ghazal province, only two schools were found 
to be teaching the local language as a subject. These schools 
happened to have one teacher each who served during the 
condominium period and who happened to have kept their old 
note b o o k s .
The value of promoting vernaculars in the Sudan was doubted as 
long ago as 1954 when an International Education Commission, 
which was invited to make recommendations on the system of 
education reported that:
It would be a waste of time and energy to try to
teach the children of the South in their own
vernacular in which they will not be able to pursue
any reading after they leave school. Such
vernaculars have no literature and cannot be used as 
culture media" (see in Beshir, 1968:74).
The impact of the conflicting central and regional policies 
was that the schools in the South were left to decide by 
themselves what medium of instruction to use. Table 7.4 below 
shows the confused situation with the language of instruction 
in primary education in South Sudan. The multiplicity of 
languages in primary schools, seen against the background of
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the general lack of resources, was a major factor in the lack 
of progess in education.
Table 7.4: Primary Schools (gov. & nongov.) by Medium of Instruction
Provinc Arabic Eng Arab/Eng Verna. Eng/ver
... ---
Eng/Ver
B.E.G 92 1 - - 32 -
E .Equat. 25 45 16 5 1 182
Jonglei 87 - - - - _
Lakes 16 - - - 46 i
Upper Nile 123 - - - - -
W .Equat. 7 15 9 - - -
South 350 61 25 5 79 183
X 50 9 3.5 1 11 26
1982/83.
Note: Eng. = English; Ara= Arabic; Ver= Vernacular; B.E.G.= Bahr El Ghazal; 
E. Equat= Eastern Equatoria, and, W. Equat= Western Equatoria.
The strong feeling that was found to exist against the use of 
Arabic as a language of instruction was partly explained 
because officials saw the policy as imposition from above. 
According to one provincial official, " the southern delegates 
who signed the agreement with the central government in Addis 
Ababa, should have consulted the southern Sudanese people 
before agreeing the terms for peace. . . and had that been done, 
no southerner would have agreed that educational policy be 
decided from the centre".
The provinces bordering north Sudan (B.E.G and Upper Nile) 
have most of their schools teaching in Arabic. However, Wau, 
the study area, is a district of Bahr El Ghazal and no
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evidence was found to suggest that the reason for many of the 
schools there teaching in Arabic was because of any active 
central government involvement. The reason was more because 
that the influence of Arabic in those areas was greater than 
in the other provinces. It is interesting to note from table 
4, for example, that the number of Arabic schools decreases 
according to the distance from the border area (123, 87 and 25 
for Upper Nile, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria respectively, 
and; 92, 16, and 7 for B.E.G, Lakes and Western Equatoria
respectively). The availabily of more English schools in the 
southern-most provinces could also be because during the long 
conflict before the Addis Ababa agreement much of the 
population from those areas took refuge in the neighbouring 
East African countries (Kenya and Uganda) where English was 
the medium of instruction in schools.
Whatever the differences were between the provinces, there 
were convincing arguments in favour of Arabic as a language of 
instruction in primary schools for the whole country had the 
central ministry of education actively promoted its use. The 
first was that, if students from non-Arabic speaking areas 
were to effectively compete at higher levels of education, it 
was to their advantage to take the challenge of learning 
Arabic at an earlier stage. The issue of language was a 
serious problem in the development of education in the South,
* ; -*c
the setting and marking of school examinations being the 
responsibility of the Central Ministry of Education (see 
Johnson, 1986). The second point, and an even stronger
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argument for the use of Arabic considering the poor economic 
situation, was that the Sudan could not afford to promote
vernaculars on account of the sheer extent of ethnic
divers i t y .
The problem with the implementation of central policies can 
further be explained. Of the thirteen education officials 
interviewed at the provincial level, it was found that none 
had ever seen or even heard of the central government’s 
Education Sector Review, 1977. This is the document which 
sets out both the government’s educational philosophy and the 
guidelines for achieving it. The 1977 Education Sector
Review was based on thorough studies by pedagogic experts and 
when, in the process of this research the provincial 
authorities were shown a copy, they confided that it would not 
have been of much use to them anyway even if they had acquired 
a copy. The reason for this was that few officials had the 
opportunity to develop their reading and comprehension skills 
and they therefore would have found it difficult to extract 
the main information from a lengthy and ’’expertly-written"
document. Their expressed preference was for an easily
readable and understandable document.
At the central and regional levels of the education 
administrative hierarchy, no mechanism was found to exist for 
effective problem diagnosis and monitoring. The planning 
capacity at each level was very weak, uncoordinated and 
functionally preoccupied with the production of annual
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quantitative statistical data which, by themselves, were not 
able to explain existing problems. There was no system for 
gathering qualitative information from schools in the Sudan as 
a whole and hence knowledge remained fragmented and very 
locali s e d .
Relationships, Control and Responsibilities
Norris (1984) makes a useful observation with regards to the
eagerness that existed in South Sudan following the 1981 Local
Government Act.
Lack of realism arises in the immediate expectations 
of the structure, the haste for decentralisation of 
services, and assumptions concerning implementation 
that seem to ignore the hard facts with which local 
government has come to terms...The widespread 
assumption that Area Councils are fully prepared by 
strength of the legislation alone, are ready made to 
bear the burdens passed on by Regional Governments, 
even perceived to be capable of taking on the role 
of some external agencies in the relatively near 
future, gives cause for serious concern. Some 
Councils seem innocent of their own limitatios, 
accepting without question responsibilities with 
serious implications.
Some councils might have been innocently accepting
responsibi1ty without questioning but there were several who 
warned of the impending problems. In a council chairmen 
seminar organised by the regional ministry of 
decentralisation, it is recorded that several of them asked " 
if it would be possible for the Area Councils to sustain the 
burden of education, especially in view of the poor state of 
so many schools" (Regional Ministry of Decentralisation 
Affairs, 1982:41). At the same seminar, the Council Chairmen 
also raised concerns about their capacity "to maintain the
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Health Care Centres, and get drugs for dressing stations, 
especially in view of the need for foreign exchange to buy 
drugs” . These concerns were not heeded by the Regional 
Ministry of Decentralisation, and the Area Councils were still 
expected to implement the full provisions of the 1981 Act, as 
can be seen throughout the discussion of this case study.
The division of the provinces into three or four Area Councils 
by the 1981 Act had an impact on the distribution of resources 
(7.5). The newly created Area education offices, for
example, had to share the personnel of the former provincial 
Education authority between them. The provinces themselves 
did not have an adequate number of personnel and the shortage 
problem of the newly created Area Councils had, therefore, to 
be resolved by promoting unqualified staff to new positions.
Of the five people occupying "senior" positions in the Wau 
Area education administration, for example, only the Area 
Education Officer had some experience in management by virtue 
of his long service at the provincial education office as 
assistant commissioner. The remaining were teachers elevated 
to fill the newly created posts.. The following table shows 
the number of personnel planned for the Wau Area education 
office and the actual number of staff in employment in the 
1982/83 fiscal year.
Table 7.5 below gives some indication of the problem the 
management of education at the Area level was faced with. Of 
the sixteen posts planned, only seven posts were occupied and
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five of those had no previous training or experience in a 
similar job. But this alone does not tell the whole story. 
Nearly a year and a half after the declaration of the 1981 
Act, the Area Education Officer had no office space at the Wau 
Area Council headquarters and, on his own admission, he had 
not been able to undertake his responsibilities. The 
remaining Area education administrative staff were all 
sharing one office under cramped conditions.
Table 7.5: Education Administrative personnel of the Wau Area
Council in 1982/83 FY
K Planned positions Occu­
pied
Unoccu­
pied
experience
Yes No
- Area Education officer X X
- Deputy Ed Officer X
- Wau Town Council Ed. officer X X
- Assistant to above X
- Wau Rural Council Ed Officer X X
- Assistant to above X
- Area Adult Ed Officers x(2) x(2)
- Assistants to above X
- Head Staff Clerk X
- Senior Clerk X
- Clerk x(2) x ( 1 ) x ( 1 )
- Strore Keeper X
- Book Keeper X
Total
^ M C x B a n = = a B a » « a a a a a = T n r T r i - i - - ' -  r - -  i
7 9 2 5
Note: numbers in parenthesis show the number of employees under
that category.
The Area education administration had no budget of its own to 
manage and, because of the general lack of resources, no 
inspections of schools were being done (Wau Town council state 
of education report, 1982/83). The Wau rural and Wau urban 
education officers confirmed that, because of lack of 
transportation, they had not been able to conduct inspections
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of schools. The Wau urban education officer, for example, 
asked that provision be made in the budget for a bicycle for 
inspection purposes, the schools under his responsibi1ty being 
in close proximity; he did not get it.
By the time the research survey upon which this study is based 
was conducted, two years after the declaration of the 1981 
Act, the Area council authorities had not set up an education 
sub-committee to oversee the management of education. The 
employment, assignment and transfer of teachers, was still 
being handled by the provincial director of education. The 
Area Authorities’ sole educational responsibility was the 
payment of teacher’s salaries, the money for which came to 
them from the region at irregular intervals.
A UNESCO discussion paper on community participation in 
education makes a useful observation concerning the need for 
support to local leadership:
Decentralisation to local leadership is an essential 
prerequisite for effective community participation. 
...[but] the administration must actively support 
this and, if it does not do so, little will be 
accomplished (UNESCO, N.S. 102, 1982).
The lack of support from higher authorities for the policy of 
decentralisation in Wau Area Council was such that the Area 
education officer complained of the "power without substance"
V , i 4C
that was accorded to him. The Wau Area education officer was 
so worried about the state of decentralised education that he 
asked " how anybody could not have thought through that there
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was no money to run the system"? This sentiment was clearly 
expressed by the executive officer of Wau Area council in a 
paper he presented at a seminar on decentralisation held in 
Wau town:
In any system no official can be made accountable to 
any higher authority, by mere delegation of 
responsibility and assignment of task, without 
handing over the required resorces to enable the 
person in question to achieve that particular 
target. This is the case with us who have been 
seconded to these newly created Area Councils 
without or with limited resources (Kuckon, 1985:45).
During a discussion period at the same seminar, the Director
General of Services (7.6) was quoted as saying that "the
consequences of the 1981 Act had been detrimental to the
provision of services, and that the Act was incompatible with
the social values and political structure in the Southern
Regions". He was particularly critical of considerable
numbers of absentee Councillors. The extent of power that
the 1981 Act accorded to the local governments was felt by the
majority of the Wau Area education officials to be unrealistic
given the lack of trained personnel and the overall level of
poverty prevalent in the Area. An assessment made by the
director of administration and local government of the
ministry of regional affairs and administration, Bahr El
Ghazal Region, concerning the mechanism of administration
following the 1981 Act was of great interest in this case:
...the majority of the councillors are illiterate 
and cannot cope with the demands of modernisation 
and change. Consequently they tend to bog the 
administration down with petty problems that they 
may not have relationship with their roles as 
Counci1l o r s ..(D o t , 1985:22).
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Wau Area C o u n c i l ’s administrative problems were not only with
its councillors but also with its technical officers. An 
account by the Executive Officer of Wau Area in the above 
mentioned seminar paper described the lack of responsibility 
by the technical officers to the council authorities. In it, 
he said:
...some technical officers care less of the contents 
of the 1981 Act. The technical officers identify 
themselves with their ministries and, more often 
than not, they tend to ignore that the Office of the 
Chief Executive Officer is responsible for them 
financially and administratively” (Kuckon, 1985:47).
As far as many of the Education officers interviewed were 
concerned, their position was that they should not be 
expected "to feel obliged", as one of them put it, as long as 
they do not get their salaries regularly,. The assistant 
director of education who participated during the research 
period of this study as a counterpart representing the 
department of education, put it more succinctly when he said: 
"It is not whether the technical officers identify themselves 
with this or with that body which is the issue, it is in fact 
whether any body has any moral duty left in him to continue 
working under the current situation"
Financial and Material Resources
Wau Area Council was largely dependent on grants-in-aid from 
the regional government for its budgeted expenditure. 
According to the Area Executive officer, grants-in-aid 
amounted to 85% of the total revenue in 1981/82 fiscal year. 
Threequarters of the total resource of the Area Council was
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spent on Chapter I (salaries and wages) in the 1981/82 F Y , the 
remaining one quarter being spent on services (fuel, transport 
costs etc). No funds were available for Chapter III, which 
was development expenditure.
In a joint paper presented at a Juba conference on 
decentralisation, two local government inspectors from Wau 
Area Council were clear about the problems facing education:
After more than one year of exercising powers 
transferred to them by the Local Government Act, 
1981, the reports coming from all the Area Councils 
are that there has never been any development plan 
executed because of lack of funds...In addition to 
that, most of the Area Councils have not received 
their grants-in-aid for many months, because of 
cash shortages from the Regional Ministry of 
Finances. This has greatly affected Primary and 
Intermediate schols. Since the salaries are not 
paid to the teachers, education is also being 
imparted irregularly to the pupils. If this
situation continues for long then education under 
the Area Councils will be in great danger (Nyuol and 
B o l : 1984:53).
However, Nyuol and Bol might not have realised that education 
had already reached a critical stage by then as the following 
analysis will further illustrate.
The scarcity of primary school teaching materials in Wau Area 
Council was found to be a serious problem. Except for some 
materials that were supplied by an aid agency (UNICEF), there 
had been no other source for many years. As one Council 
Education Officer recalled, the last time schools in Wau Area 
council had received a provision of textbooks was in 1974.
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It was not surprising, therefore, that many teachers
attributed the decline in the standard of education to the 
lack of teaching materials. As one teacher expressed: "It is 
alright to teach under a mango tree but only when you have the 
materials to teach your students with". One of the
enumerators who participated in the field survey of this study 
also remarked about his observation in a report:
All the schools in the province have serious shortage of
teaching materials. Wherever I went, teachers cried for 
help. the attitude of many teachers is that there is 
nothing they can do to improve the standard of education 
without text b o o k s . ..without the presence of these basic 
tools, teachers are not able to do their job effectively 
(Bol, 1983).
No school in Wau Area council was found to be keeping a daily 
attendance record of students because they lacked the 
attendance ledger book. There was a general lack, non­
existence was perhaps more correct, of all items and teaching 
aids in all the schools. It was not unexpected, therefore,
that in answer to the question of what main problems face
schools, the following were given in descending order of
p r i o r i t y :
1. Lack of teaching materials
2. Lack of school facilities
3. Problem with feeding programmes for students (7.7). 
Impact on School Environment
School Management: The most detrimental factor in the decline
of the educational system in Wau Area Council was perhaps the
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management of the schools. The headteachers had no training 
in administration whatsoever and promotion to the post of 
headmaster was normally on the basis of long service alone 
rather than ability. The average length of service in 
teaching of all headmasters in Wau Area was just over 20 
years and that of teachers 7 years. By level of education, 
only 20% of all headmasters in Wau Area had completed senior 
secondary education, 50% had only Junior Secondary School 
qualification and the remaining 20% had only completed primary 
level education.
A measure of the ineffectiveness observed in the school 
management system was that the headmasters did not exercise 
authority over their teachers. Reprimanding for wrong doing 
or, for that matter, reporting for good work, was not the 
norm. In Wau Town Council, out of the 147 teachers in 
employment in the 1982/83 acadamic year, only 111 teachers 
were physically present during the field survey. That is, 
nearly a quarter of the teachers were not on duty. The 
situation was even more alarming in Wau Rural Council where 
only 50% of the teachers were on duty, 91 out of 180. The two 
main reasons that were given for this absenteeism were sick 
leave and attending the funerals of relations. A typical 
example observed by one of the enumerators in the field survey 
can be mentioned:
It is really a pity to get a school with the 
headmaster and his assistant sick-listed for a 
number of months. This encouraged the other masters 
to absent themselves too - as I got only two masters
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in the school” (Anthony Arop, about Mayo school)
The ratio of absenteeism per teacher in Wau Area council for 
the academic year 1982/83 is shown in table 7.6 below. A 
marked difference was found in teacher absenteeism between 
those in Wau town council and those in Wau rural council, 0.27 
and a staggeringly high ratio of 0.59 respectively. In other 
words, on average, a teacher in Wau Town Council only worked 
for 73% of the working days in the 1982/83 academic year and 
a teacher in Wau Rural Rural Council for only 41%.
Table 7.6: Teacher absentisi in Van Area Connell
Total No. Vorking days Total teacher Total working Ratio of
of teachers in acadeiic working day days absent absenteeis
Local year
Council (a (b) (c)=(a)x(b) («) (0) - (c)
V.T. 147 200 29,400 7,917 0.27
V.R. 180 200 36,000 21,215 0.59
V.A. 327 200 65,400 29,132 0.44
Rote: C = Council; V.T. = Van Town; V.R. = Van Rnral; V.A. = Van Area.
Examples of administrative ineffectiveness and managerial 
malpractice were something of which there was no shortage in 
Wau Area council. Officially, El Genina school in Wau town 
council had three separate schools, boys, girls and evening 
schools with the full allocation of teaching staff for each.
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However, there was only one school functioning, co-education 
and in a single shift. The teachers for the evening and 
girls schools were found not to be working for "lack of 
teaching space" in the El-Genina school. But El Genina school 
is in Wau town, the administrative centre, which illustrates 
how the administrative machine was not coping with "the 
complexity of the educational enterprise" (see World Bank, 
1980:53) .
Thus, the educational problems of Wau Area Council may not be 
attributed solely to lack of finances as was widely believed. 
The mismanagement of the existing resources was also 
contributing to the problem. The wasteful use of scarce 
resources in Wau Rural Council can be illustrated by the way 
the schools were run. As shown in table 7.7 below, the 
teacher/class and student/teacher ratios in the schools both 
show unacceptable levels by any standard.
Table 7.7: Teacher/Class and Student/Teacher Ratios in Wau
Area Council Primary Schools in 1982/83
1 Teacher/Class Student/Teacher
j Council Rat io Rat io
I Wau Rural 1 .46 13.6
] Wau Town 1.37 37.9
1 Wau Area 1 .46 24.5
But with such generous teacher/class and student/teacher 
ratios, particularly in Wau Rural Council, a high educational 
standard would have been expected which was not found to be
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the case as will be discussed below.
Finally, a sign of the mismanagement crisis was the lack of 
discipline observed among teachers during the survey. On a 
number of occasions, the writer came across teachers behaving 
in a manner not compatible with their responsibility, 
especially relating to alcohol abuse during working hours. 
When one head teacher was asked if he was to take action 
against an offending teacher, his answer was "how can I 
discipline a hungry m a n ” , a reference to the delay in salary 
p a y m e n t .
Teaching and non-teaching staff: The survey analysis of
primary schools in Wau Area Council provides some significant 
insight into their profile (see table 7.8 below). Nearly 40% 
of the teachers in Wau Rural Council and 24.5% in Wau Town 
were untrained. The urban bias in the number of trained 
teachers was therefore very clear. Many of those in the 
untrained category were newly recruited teachers with no 
experience. But the idea of providing statistics concerning 
teachers on a trained and untrained basis had no relevance 
whatsoever. A UNICEF consultancy study on training teachers 
in south Sudan gives a grim picture of the standards of the 
existing teaching institutes (Mwajombe abd K i n u n d a , 1981).
Beset by the kind of problems general education was faced 
with, the students who come out from the teaching institute 
themselves were not better equipped than those who qualified
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Table 7.8: Teacher's profile
Council
Van Area Van Tovn
Descri ption No. \ No. 1
17 - 20 7 3.9 1 0.7
21 - 30 98 54.4 93 63.2
31 - 40 31 17.2 32 21.8
Age Range 41 - 50 23 12.8 19 12.9
in years 50 - 60 15 8.3 2 1.4
61* 6 3.3 0 0.0
Total 180 100.0 147 100.0
0 - 10 131 72.8 105 71.4
11 - 20 12 6.7 19 12.9
Service 21 - 30 23 12.8 21 14.3
in years 31 - 40 10 5.5 2 1.4
40+ 4 2.2 0 0.0
Total 180 100.0 147 100.0
Male 165 91.87 72 49.0
Feiale 15 8.3 75 51.0
Sex
Total 180 100.0 147 100.0
Married 100 55.6 73 49.7
Marital Single 80 44.4 74 50.3
Statns
Total 180 100.0 147 100.0
Trained 109 60.6 112 75.5
Untrained 71 39.4 35 24.5
Training
Total 180 100.0 147 100.0
P.S.L.C. 21 11.7 1 0.7
J.S.L.C. 73 40.5 89 60.5
Qualification* S.S.L.C. 86 47.8 57 38.8
Total 180 100.0 147 100.0
Local 69 38.3 - -
Teacher's Mon-local 111 61.7 - -
residence
Total 180 100.0 - -
• P.S.L.C.= Priiary school leaving certificate
J.S.L.C.: Junior school leaving certificate
' M.S.L.C.: Senior school leaving cerificate
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from academic schools. In any case, with no books to teach 
with, no libraries to refer to etc. the indications were that 
the teachers in primary schools, whatever their background, 
were lapsing into semi-1iteracy.
In Wau Rural Council, 27% of the teachers had been employed 
since the formation of the Area Council. As mentioned 
earlier, the Area Council had not taken responsibi1ty with 
regards to employment and distribution of teachers. As this 
function continued to be in the hands of the provincial 
education authorities, the Council Authorities had to adjust 
their budget constantly to accommodate payment of salaries.
It was interesting to find that about 30% of the teachers in 
Wau Rural Council were teaching in the locality they 
originally come from although, as mentioned earlier, this was 
found to have no advantage to the school system.
Only 15 of 180 teachers (8.3%) in Wau Rural Council were 
female. The picture is different in Wau town where just over 
half (nearly 51%) were female.
The investigative survey also included qualitative questions
to find out what the teachers regarded as the main problems
facing them. The following answers emerged in order of their
* .- / -*c
importance:
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1. Delay of salary payment
2. Lack of means of transportation
3. Accommodation
4. Lack of market at work place
As already discussed, there was a problem meeting regular 
salary payments in schools which became a pretext for many to 
abandon their work places. However, even when salaries 
eventually came, many teachers were still relttctant to go to 
their centres, giving various reasons. One of the
enumerators’ o b s e r v a t i o m i n  Lietnhom school was typical of the 
situation with staff absenteeism in schools:
This school only has two classes but has 5 teachers 
and 7 labourers allocated to it. Most of the 
teachers never reported and likewise the labourers 
are not there. Frankly, these 12 employees are 
redundantly paid which is complete waste of national 
resources (Bol, commenting about Liethnom school).
Every school in Wau Area had a number of non-teaching staff 
(average number being 7) employed for a variety of reasons - 
as watchmen, messengers, labourers, cooks etc. The rate of 
absenteeism among the non-teaching staff was even worse than 
that of the teachers. Out of the 163 non-teaching staff in 
employment in Wau rural schools, only 23 of them (14%) were 
physically present at their places of duty during the survey. 
Given the economic situation of the Area Council and the 
unavailibility of sufficient administrative staff, as mentioed 
earlier, the maintenance of the large number of teachers could 
be questioned.
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Lack of means of transportation was the second main reason for 
teacher’s absenteeism. It was true that this was a problem 
but the main cause was the endless transfers of teachers. 
When teachers were ’’officially” transferred or when new ones 
where employed, the general expectation was that means of 
transportation should be made available to them. However long 
it took until that was done, it was one of those unwritten 
laws that they would continue receiving their salaries.
Lack of accommodation was considered by teachers as one of the 
main problems for two reasons. The complaints of the urban 
teachers were mainly because of the house rent payments they 
had to meet. On average, a teacher was paying about one 
fourth of his/her salary per month in Wau town and, building 
ones own house was becoming out of a teacher’s reach.
To understand the complaints of accommodation in rural 
schools, the nature of the traditional hut, mostly provided by 
the community, needs to be appreciated. More than other types 
of buildings, the traditional hut is susceptible to rapid 
deterioration if it is not continuously inhabited 
(Woldemichael, 1980). As many of the teachers were absent
from their work place for long periods, they would find the 
huts needing immediate maintenance or totally uninhabitable.
The fourth point, lack of a market at work place, seemed to be 
a legitimate grievance. Indeed, some of the schools were far 
from any market centres. However, this was a reflection of
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the overall development situation of the region and not one 
for which there was any solution in prospect.
No inspection, no proper school management and all the 
grievances the teachers had add up to a depressing impression 
of the school system in South Sudan. Some of the older 
teachers spoke of the old days with nostalgia when, as one 
teacher said, "the school used to be a centre of learning” . 
As it was, there was nothing left in the school environment 
which would motivate t eachers’ effectiveness. A measure of 
this ineffectivenes was the state of the students, as will be 
shown below.
Effect on Students: The effect of all the problems with the
educational system in Wau Area Council expressed itself with 
such indicators as the ratio of repeaters (those who fail end 
of year school tests and are allowed to repeat the year again) 
in classes, dropouts and examination results. Table 7.9 below 
shows the enrolment and repeaters by grade in Wau Rural 
primary schools. The average percentage rate of repeaters was 
18.1% which indicates the poor quality of education given the 
fact that stude n t s ’ performance is related to the quality of 
education they receive. Girl students seemed to do better in 
schools than boys judged from the ratio of repeaters, that is 
, whilst the male/female ratio in enrolment was 2.8 
(1811/643), the ratio in male female repeaters was 3.2 
(337/107). The female student enrolment in Wau town schools 
was found to be much higher, at 42%, than in Wau rural schools
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(26.2%) but the rate of repeaters showed the same trend 
(Woldemichael, 1983).
Table 7.9: Enrolient and Repeaters by Grade in 24 Priiary Schools 
in Man Rnral Council in 1982/83
Enrolient Repeaters \ of Repeaters
Grade Male Feiale Total Male Feiale Total
by Grade
PI 465 160 625 98 37 134 21.6
P2 370 157 527 90 35 125 23.7
P3 285 123 408 51 16 67 16.4
P4 309 103 412 50 10 60 14.6
P5 217 66 283 29 8 37 13.1
P6 217 34 199 19 1 20 10.1
Total 1,811 643 2,454 337 107 444 18.1
\ 73.8 26.2 100 75.9 24.1 100 -
A further indicator of the wastage rate of the educational 
system in Wau Area Council was that of the 1833 students at 
primary grade one level in 1977/78 scholastic year only 658 of 
them completed grade 6 education in 1982/83, that is 65 per 
cent of those who started dropped out. The student
input/output ratio of 2.9 (1883/658) in Wau Area Council must 
rank among the highest in the world as a World Bank Study on 
17 low income developing countries in 1975 showed the median 
of their student input/output ratio to be 1.98 (World Bank, 
1980:30).
Table 7.10 below is constructed from examination results from 
two academic years, 1980/81 and 1982/83. As can be seen from 
the table, education in Wau Area Council worsened both in
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quality and quantity in 1982/83. Quantitatively, the number 
of students who completed primary education in Wau Area 
Council dropped from 877 in 1980/81 to 658 in 1982/83 and 
qualitatively, the percentage drop from 45 to 37 of the 
students who passed the primary school leaving examination 
must be an indication of the decline in standard.
Table 7.10: Priiary School Exaiination Results of 1980/81 and 
1982/83
1980/81 Acadeiic Tear 1982/83 Acadeiic Tear
Council Sat Passed \ Sat Passed 1
Van Rural 261 144 55 120 79 65.8
Van Town 616 255 41 538 165 30.6
Van Area 877 399 45.5 658 244 37
Source: Constructed froi a circular letter by the A/Couissiouer 
for education to headiasters, Babr El Ghaxal, Ho.PEHG/ 
BGP/18.F.2/ dated 5th June 1981,and, priiary School final 
exaiination results 1982/83, province education headquarters, 
Van, dated 22nd June, 1983.
The worsening situation in student enrolment since the 1981 
decentralisation reforms can further be examined. The figures 
in table 7.11 below are self explanatory and show that student 
enrolment had been on the decline for several years and that 
the 1981 reform rather than improving it, in fact, 
exacerbateed it.
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Table 7.11: Total Student Enrolment by Year in Wau Area Councils.
| Year
Council
Wau Rural Wau Town Wau Area j
1977/78 n.a n.a 7,947
1978/79 n.a n.a 8,422
1979/80 5,678 2,781 8,459
1980/81 5,907 2,990 8,897
1981/82 5,814 2,592 8,406
1982/83 5,565 2,257 7,904 j
1977/78 to 1980/81; the rest, from the school survey results
According to the results of the third population census of 
1983, the population of Bahr El Ghazal was increasing at a 
rate of 3.1% and, therefore, student enrolment as a percentage 
of school age population must have been declining at an 
alarming rate.
Impact on Community Participation
In south Sudan, performing village duties communally is a 
daily way of life and therefore a tradition. The heavy work 
of tilling the land, hunting expeditions, constructing houses, 
seasonal movements among the pastoralists, are all carried out 
communally. This tradition in communal work has in recent 
years extended to participation in the provision of 
educational facilities, schools and accommodation for 
teachers.
All the schools surveyed in Wau Area Council had p a r e n t s ’
- . /
associations. The active involvement and awareness of the 
community in education was evident from the number of schools 
that were built ( table 7.12 below) on a self-help basis in
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Wau Area Council.
Table 7.12'.Responsibility for Building Schools in Wau Area Council.
School 
built by
Council
Wau Rural Wau Town
No. % No. %
Government 6 25.0 10 55.5
Community 10 41.7 3 16.7
Church 7 29.2 2 11.1
Aid Agency 1 4.1 2 11.1
Others 0 0.0 1 5.6
Total 24 100.0 18 100.0
From interviewing chiefs, community leaders and teachers, 
however, the impression received was that the communities’ 
involvement and interest was losing its momentum. Two facts
came to the forefront as the main causes:
1. The endless disruption in the function of schools had
left both parents and students disenchanted, leading to 
loss of confidence in the public administration. One of 
the enumerators noted the following about a school he 
visited: "Teachers have kept away from the school and
yet they receive their salaries. . . the community is eager 
to work but is discouraged by the teacher’s bad 
performance and the role of the administrative staff" 
(Bol, commenting about Yiil-Ador School, Gogrial). About 
another school in a similar situation, the same
enumerator--wFote that: "the existence of a school of such 
nature causes serious damage to the communities’ morale 
as well as the children to learn" ( Bol, on Liethnom
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sc h o o l )
2. The schools built by the communities on a self-help 
basis were built from locally available materials and 
because of lack of technical knowledge (7.2), fire 
accidents, termite attacks, etc., the communities had to 
construct the school buildings frequently. With the 
local materials getting scarcer every year the 
communities were getting weary of this endless exercise.
The decline in community participation was clear from the year 
of establishment of schools in Wau Area Council. No new 
school had been established for three years when the survey 
was conducted (table 7.13).
Table 7.13: Year of Establishment of
Primary schools in Wau Area Council
j Year Number %
1 1910-1940 7 16.7
1941-1950 9 21.4
1951-1969 5 11.4
1961-1970 11 26.2
1971-1980 10 23.8
1980-1983 0 0.0
Total 42 100.0 |
In the two years following the declaration of the policy of 
further decentralisation in 1981, not only were no new schools 
established but maintenance work was not being done on the 
existing ones. As one sub-chief said on this issue "people 
have lost confidence of the school system for many years and
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it will require some convincing action before the community 
could participate in school activities again" (sub-chief on 
Gettan school).
The finding of the year of establishment of schools in Wau 
Area Council was puzzling on one score. The South Sudan 
having been in a state of civil war for most of the period 
between 1951 and 1970, it was surprising that so many schools 
(38%) were built during this time. With only 10 schools 
established between 1971 and 1980, .the expansion rate was much 
lower than expected especially considering that the target of 
the Regional Six Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83) was to establish 
557 new schools in south Sudan. Roughly speaking, if the 557 
schools were divided equally among the 25 Area Councils in the 
South, something like 20 new schools should have been 
established during the Plan period in Wau Area Council.
Conclusion and Discussion
It would be an understatement to say that primary education in 
Wau Area Council was in a poor state. It was, in fact, on the 
brink of collapse. The school as a teaching centre was 
failing to interest and inspire students and parents were 
losing faith in the school system as they were not getting any 
economic reward by keeping their children there; the high 
dropout and repeater rates were factual evidence of that.
The question this chapter has addressed was the role of the 
policy of decentralisation in the problems exposed by the
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research findings. In the first part of the chapter, the 
historical development of education was analysed. The
impressive progress of education for the first few years of 
the Nimeiri Regime was noted. The progress that was achieved 
during this period, far from being coincidental can be related 
to three main features that created an environment conducive 
to progress. Firstly, this was the period when the Nimeiri 
regime declared its commitment to unity with diversity and, to 
achieve this, N i m e r i ’s government took the decisive action, as 
discussed in chapter three, of dismantling the sectarian 
political parties which were, through their policies of 
assimilation, the cause of the continuation of the north-south 
conflict. The removal of the divisive political systems had 
the effect of creating a relative political stabilty in the 
Sudan. Secondly, the unit of local government during this 
period of achievement was the province. Given the nature of 
S u d a n ’s social and economic underdevelopment, there was a 
realisation at the time that the country simply did not have 
the resources to cater for numerous district councils. 
Thirdly, and more crucially, much like the Chinese case 
discussed in chapter two, the central government was committed 
and effective enough to see through the implementation of its 
policies.
The case study also shows that from 1977/78 onwards, the 
reversal of principles on the part of the central government 
concerning decentralisation had a direct and negative effect 
on educational development. Ironically, 1977/78 was the start
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of the Six Year Development Plan and the year when President 
Nimeiri declared his commitment to further decentralisaton, 
producing a report entitled: ’’Study on consolidation of
decentralisation” . In effect, the 1981 Act was therefore a 
formalisation of the policy of decentralisation which was 
enshrined in the Six Year Development Plan. But why did the 
development of education and all the other economic indicators 
during this period show a decline in progress? Again, this is 
related to the political developments at the centre. Firstly, 
the declaration of national reconciliation in 1977, by which 
the sectarian perties were invited to participate in the 
political life of the country, diverted the government’s 
attention from concentration on nation building to the game 
of political manoevring for survival. Secondly, with the 
sectarian parties well entrenched in the political system of 
the country, N i m e i r i ’s commitment to unity with diversity was 
on the decline. Thirdly, decentralisation policies during 
this period were, as already described, for political ends 
rather than for developmental realities. For example, in 
south Sudan, six local authorities during the period of 
relative achievement - were divided into twenty five new 
local authorities following the 1981 Act. It will be recalled 
from the discussion in chapter four that the Marshall report 
had warned of the impending problems with whole-sale 
decentralisation policies that do not match local capability. 
Clearly, Wau had neither the resources nor the capability to 
cope with the powers imposed on it. The case study is 
therefore an illustration that decentralisation policies must
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be commensurate with the capacity and the general availability 
of resources both nationally and locally, in fact in line with 
what Marshall had recommended for the Sudan before
independence in 1949.
The important point that became clear from the case study is 
that the central government must be every bit as involved in 
a decentralised system of administration. In other words, 
decentralisation should not mean the negation of 
responsibility by the centre. At all times, decentralisation 
policies will only succeed with commitment from the centre. 
Conversely, lack of central commitment can only lead to the 
kind of spectacular collapse the school system experienced in 
Wau Area Council.
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PART IV
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: 
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING 
OF DECENTRALISATION FOR 
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER B
APPROACHES TOWARDS REALISM IN THE SUDAN
Introduction
The problems of political instability in the Sudan, as 
discussed in chapter three, have been portrayed as reflections 
of the ethnic differences between the Arabicised and Muslim 
North and the African and Christian South. More often than 
not, government policies have magnified these differences as 
diversity was considered incompatible with national 
integration. Assimilation and cultural homogenisation were 
thus looked upon as desirable and actions taken to that 
effect. However, what such policies have achieved has been 
the intensification of the conflict and to drive the Sudan 
into the depths of ungovernability. An exception to this 
trend was the brief period during the Nimeiri regime when 
unity through diversity was taken as a guiding principle, and 
decentralisation as a mechanism for achieving it.
The experience of the Sudan offers an interesting insight into 
the creation of two opposite environments, resulting, on the 
one hand, in the intensification of echnic conflict and, on 
the other, its resolution. This dhapter will thus appraise, 
using the information developed in the preceding chapters, the 
implications of ethnic management policies in the Sudan and 
draw lessons of experience from them.
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In the first place, it is imperative that the obstacles that 
have obstructed the search for peace and stability in the 
Sudan are clearly recognised. The inability of the Sudanese 
state to manage ethnic conflicts, it will be argued, has been 
the main cause for the political instability that has plagued 
the country since independence. It will further be argued 
that national integration cannot be achieved in the Sudan 
without a fundamental shake up of the system of governance in 
which all ethnoregional groups have a part to play.
CAUSAL FACTORS OF STATE-ETHNIC CONFLICT
State Weakness
The Sudanese state has shown all, and to a large degree, the 
characteristics of softness that most African states portray 
(as discussed in chapter two, pp. 77-80). Since the Sudan 
became independent in January 1956, power has been in the 
hands of the economically and politically dominant elites who 
come from the central part of the country, mainly from the 
provinces of Khartoum, Kordofan, White Nile and Gezira. 
Although Arabism in the Sudan is a myth rather than a reality, 
the Arabic language and the Islamic religion have become the 
hallmarks of ethnic identification of the political elites. 
Apart from the brief period during the Nimeiri regime 
mentioned above, Arabic and Islam have been the only accepted 
state language and religion.
The softness of the Sudan state is particularly apparent in
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its inability to realise the internal and external 
repercussions of its policies. Internally, its inability to 
advance the collective interests of all has had the effect of 
generating resentment and discontent among the impacted 
ethnic groups. The state sponsored discriminatory policies of 
Islamisat i o n , for example, had the effect of widening the gap 
of misunderstanding in the north-south relationship. 
Externally, policies like Islamisation and the application of 
the Sharia penal code on non-muslim groups have tarnished the
image of the State. On both counts it is the state that has
been suffering the consequences; internally, from the 
resultant escalation of the conflict and, externally, from 
diplomatic isolation by the international community. The 
insensitivity of the Sudan to the principles of equal justice 
and protection has also had the effect of generating sympathy 
for the cause of the south.
A major problem in S u d a n ’s ethnic relations is the way the
affairs of the state have been dictated by the.ruling elites. 
The perceived cultural superiority of the ruling elites is not 
only protected by state laws but also enforced on others and 
used as a means of subordination or neutralisation of cultural 
diversity. In pursuit of their assimilation policies, the 
ruling elites have mostly taken an uncompromising "come hell 
or high water" position even when the effects seemed to 
threaten state coherence. It was the reaction to assimilation 
policies which lead to the birth of the Anya-Nya movement in 
the south (see chapter three, pp. 1438-150).
- 339 -
How the north-south conflict might eventually be concluded is 
difficult to predict but, as some groups in the south have 
already started claiming, the issue of self-determination is 
more likely to feature on the agenda when the next round of 
negotiations for peace start (a splinter group of the 
SPLA/APLM is now demanding separation of southern Sudan). 
That is, whilst regional autonomy was an accepted formula for 
peace in 1972, it is probable that the cost of peace for the 
state next time round will be even greater concession to the 
demands of the south.
Southern Weakness
The reason the principle of self-determination has not 
featured more prominently as a claim by the south is related 
to the ethnic fragmentation that exists within the south 
itself. In spite of the shared historical experiences among 
the various ethnic groups in south Sudan, no clear and unified 
national identity could be said to have ever developed. The 
seventeen years of civil war before the Addis Ababa peace 
accord did bring the Southerners closer to fight a common 
enemy, but still, the Anya-Nya movement was more of a military 
organisation and did not have a developed political expression 
which could unite the various ethnic groups in the region. 
The lack of political cohesion in the south (as discussed in 
chapter three, pp. 137-139; and, in chapter six, pp. 243-253)
• r 4C
has thus enabled the central ruling elites to wedge discord 
between the various conflicting groups and to apply divide and 
rule tactics. The s o u t h ’s political weakness has therefore
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been an obstacle to national integration as a more 
politicised, united and assertive south would have defended 
its claims better and thus shortened the life of the conflict.
The S o u t h ’s weakness is of course related to its level of 
underdevelopment (discussed in chapter five, pp. 224-225). 
Given the social and economic deprivation of the south, it is 
to be expected that the struggle for survival has affected the 
development of a unified and strong regional-nationalist 
movement. The fact that the south has not given itself an 
appropriate name that could label it as a distinct identity is 
a measure of its weakness. This is not insignificant because 
people from that area still prefer to identify themselves by 
their tribal affinity. For example, one will say he/she is a 
Dinka or a Nuer but not the cumbersome name of "Southern 
Sudanese".
However, in spite of its political, social and economic 
underdevelopment, the south's resistance against the north has 
not only endured brutal repression but is increasing in 
strength. It is not impossible to imagine that in time the 
S o u t h ’s resistance will convert itself into a national 
aspiration and that a politicised and unified "pan-south 
Sudan" nationalist movement will emerge. As discussed in the 
case of the Oromo of Ethiopia in Chapter two, "power" speaks
•  .. r *
more than anything else in ethnic discourse and if the South 
manages to build its strength, the voice of its people is not 
going to be ignored.
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The Problems of Leadership
Many Sudanese writers (see Wakoson (1987); An-Naim, 1987; 
Khalid, 1987) have presented the north-south conflict in terms 
of differences of identities between Arab north and African 
south. The cultural assimilation drive by the north is viewed 
as having a religious objective for Islamising the south. 
Such a notion misses an important point by interpreting the 
conflict solely as a religious issue. As discussed in chapter 
two with regard to Amharisation in Ethiopia, which was a 
mechanism of consolidating and protecting the power base and 
wealth of the ruling class, acculturation in the Sudan has had 
the same purpose. To relate the north-south conflict just to 
cultural differences, therefore, underestimates the salience 
of competing interests and the defensive hostility by the 
ruling elites to protect their positions of privilege.
Take for instance the oil find within the borders of south 
Sudan discussed in chapter six (p. 248). The attempt made by
the Nimeiri regime to incorporate the ’’oil lands" into the 
north in 1980 indicates the policies primacy of interests. 
The border issue and the question of how future oil wealth was 
to be shared thus became a major source of conflict between 
the Nimeiri regime and the Southern regional government. One 
explanation why Nimeiri made a complete reversal of the 
regionalisation policy as concluded by the peace agreement in 
Addis Ababa and his subsequent declaration of Islam as the 
state religion in 1983 was to revert to the old ways of 
preserving the hegemonic right of the ruling elite
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{Woldemichael, 1987). To reiterate, acculturation was 
believed to promote unity and hence offer a better chance for 
the hegemonic continuity of the ruling elites. The bottom 
line of the north-south conflict has therefore more to do with 
competition over the allocation of power and the control of 
resources than that of cultural differences. In the Sudan and 
elsewhere, it may not be the ethnic cultural differences that 
determine the viability of a nation but how the competing 
groups within it can agree to share power and resources 
equi t a b l y .
Power-sharing as an integrative factor in ethnic relations has 
not been a favoured formula in Sudanese politics. The
position of the National Islamic Front (NIF), a conservative 
Islamic fundamentalist party whose power base has considerably 
increased since Nimeiri entered into some sort of a pact with 
it in 1980, can be mentioned as an example. In its 1987 
Charter, a manifesto entitled "Sudan Charter: National Unity
and diversity", an article on " the sharing of power" states 
that regional i sat ion is to be based "on the principle of 
assigning to regional authorities the right of legislative 
initiative and executive autonomy with respect to certain 
matters, without restraining the central authority from 
legislating on the same matters with absolute authority that 
overrides regional law" (emphasis added). The N I F ’s policy by 
dictation rather than accommodation aims to deny regions the 
right of power sharing in the national political structure. 
As far as the south is concerned, it has already rejected
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President N i m e i r i ’s similar policies in 1983, and, a Charter 
which advocates the maintenance of hegemonic power at the 
centre cannot be expected to be an acceptable proposition.
It is useful to ask here why it is that the northern political 
elites continue to advocate disintegrative rather than 
integrative policies; and how it is that a state that claims 
to have legitimate control over an area and the people that 
live in it can hope to maintain its hold by following policies 
so abhorrent to those to whom they are applied. Does the 
theory of the lust for the preservation of hegemonic interest, 
through the idea that unity is achievable by acculturation, 
explain the situation when its effect seems to be bitter 
resistance and even the possibility of disintegration, that 
is, the opposite of what is intended. In the Sudan, the 
explanation for the obsession with acculturation may lie in 
the inability of the political elites to separate political 
loyalties from cultural loyalties given the intertwining of 
these two as discussed in chapter three. Even so, to have had 
any chance of success, then the policy of acculturation should 
have been based on the logic of winning the "hearts and minds" 
of those targeted. In the case of the southern Sudan, as the 
discussion in the previous chapters has shown, brutal 
repression and social and economic deprivation have not made 
being an integrated part of the Sudan apparent at all
. „• r *
attractive.
If the ideal of unity and diversity, that is, political unity
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and cultural diversity cannot find a place in the Sudan, it is 
clear that national integration will not be possible to 
achieve without such drastic and repugnant action as the 
wholesale eradication of the southern population. As this 
cannot be a viable proposition in the modern world, the 
S u d a n ’s only hope for unity is a respect for diversity. 
Here, there is no better example than the S u d a n ’s own 
experience both with integrative and the disintegrative 
processes of decentralisation during the Nimeiri period.
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE: THE NIMEIRI YEARS
THE YEARS OF HOPE
An exception to the turbulent history of north-south relations 
was the brief period that followed the Addis Ababa peace 
Accord when the country as a whole enjoyed relative political 
stability and created favourable conditions for the 
enhancement of national unity. The determining factor was the 
availability at the time of a political leadership that came 
to realise the futility of the past policies. The Addis Ababa 
agreement was a negation of the assumption that unity 
depended on assimilation. As discussed in detail in the 
preceding chapters, President Nimeiri not only preached the 
ideals of unity and diversity but he also had the will to 
d eliver.
m. y i AC
Nimeiri consistently argued during this period that his 
government’s actions were influenced by two overriding
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concerns: "a scientific approach to problems and the sense of 
national responsibility” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sudan, 
1973:125). Nimeiri needed both of these essentials, firstly, 
to contain the northern politicians and their supporters who 
were working to frustrate the ongoing regionalisation process 
and, secondly, to convince the south of his sincerity about 
peace. In the case of his northern opponents, as mentioned 
earlier, Nimeiri had no other option but to deal with them in 
a ruthless manner. As a northerner himself and an army 
colonel who served in the south, convincing the southerners 
was not that easy. However, true to his convictions, Nimeiri 
undertook an extensive public relations campaign to "sell” the 
Addis Ababa agreement and such symbolic gestures as attending 
mass in Juba cathedral were important exercises. President 
N i m e i r i ’s gesture, however symbolic, must have left, as 
Khalid (1985:45) rightly commented, "an indelible mark on the 
minds of the worshippers". In defiance of his critics, 
Nimeiri even went as far as declaring the date the Addis Ababa 
agreement was signed to be a national holiday.
However, agreements by themselves are only statements of 
intent and what brought the two halves together was the 
political commitment to make them work. If the Sudan before 
Nimeiri was a soft state, the same Sudan during the first 
phase (1969-1977) of the Nimeiri Regime may be called anything
•  ,• r X
but soft. The strength of the state can be shown not only in 
the way it reformed local administration in the whole country 
but, perhaps even more impressively, in the ability it showed
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in guiding implementation. For the first time since 
independence, Nimeiri came to appreciate that the size of the 
country, ethnic diversity and the social and economic 
inequality between regions could only be tackled by 
decentralising commensurate powers. At the same time, he was 
aware of the need for central control if those differences 
were not to lead to the break up of the country.
The administrative revolution that was declared in 1971 (the 
1971 Act) was envisaged to fulfil two major objectives. The 
first was to lay the basis for effective local government. In 
the philosophy of the Nimeiri regime, politics and 
administration were regarded as inseparable elements for the 
process of development and nation-building. The second 
objective of the Act was to break the power base of the 
traditionalist political parties by allowing only members of 
the Sudan Socialist Union or individuals who held certificates 
of "non-objection” candidature for council elections. 
Whether intentionally or coincidentally, the local government 
structure devised by the 1971 Act was similar to that of China 
discussed in chapter two. As in China, the 1971 Act was not 
solely about local government administration but also about 
the development of popular participation which was intended to 
serve as an instrument for the execution of revolutionary 
programmes. Again as in China, the Sudan Socialist Union 
(SSU) was not only a party for political mobilisation but was 
also a mechanism for supervising the achievement of targets. 
In addition, the SSU had a programme for augmenting local
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efforts in organising self-help groups through which the 
potential of the rural population could be exploited to 
improve living standards. All in all, the Nimeiri regime 
during this time was a government of action.
The Nimeiri regime’s achievements during the years of hope 
were quite remarkable. To start with^the country had never in 
its independent history enjoyed the kind of peace and 
tranquillity that existed during the years of hope, not only 
in the south but in the north as well. With peace reigning 
in the Sudan, the Nimeiri regime was able to turn its 
attention to long term national development programmes. A 
measure of the Nimeiri r e g i m e ’s "non-softness" was that 
progress indicators of the time show that impressive 
achievements were registered by every department. For 
example, the Sudan became one of the very few African States 
to produce food in excess of its own needs. Another 
impressive achievement of the period, as discussed in detail 
in the preceding chapter, was the great expansion that took 
place in primary education.
Perhaps the best available information on the probable reason 
for the progress the country made during the years of hope is 
the current expenditure. Remarkably, defence and security 
expenditure fell from 48 Million Sudanese Pounds in the 
1970/71 FY to 42f million pounds in the 1974/75 FY (Government 
of Sudan, The Six Year Plan, 1977/78-1982/83, Vol. 1, 
1977:12). In contrast, and, it cannot be doubted, as a result
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of the peace dividend, there were substantial increases in 
social and economic services and in transfers to local 
authorities. As mentioned in chapter one, finance is one of 
the areas where central governments exercise control over 
local authorities and the substantial increase in the central 
government contributions over the same period (from.17 Million 
in 1970/71 FY to 47 Million in 1974/75 F Y , in real prices) may 
be explained in terms of the transformation that had taken 
place in central and local government relations.
The Years of Gloom
During "the years of hope" in the Sudan, the south became 
self-governing and local governments were accorded substantial 
power by the 1971 Act but central power was by no means 
diminished. On the contrary, as the President had all the 
authority to make or break the powers of lower authorities, 
N i m e i r i ’s actual power was much enhanced. So why did Nimeiri 
take the road of "national reconciliation" in 1977 that le4 
to the undoing of his own achievements and eventually his 
downfall? One theory has it that national reconciliation 
was a ploy or a political trap which Nimeiri instigated to 
lure opposition politicians back to the country, to engage 
them in his own system of politics and by so doing eventually 
to diminish their importance. Another theory points to 
N i m e i r i ’s long standing state of ill-health suggesting that it
. v . jC
might have reduced his capacity to maintain the momentum he 
set himself. And yet another relates it to the oil find in 
the south and his desire to consolidate his power base in the
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north as the Southern Regional government had become too 
assertive. Whatever the reasons were, the declaration of 
National Reconciliation, which was made without any 
consultation with the Southern Regional Government, was the 
beginning of the erosion of N i m e i r i ’s political commitment to 
decentrali sat i o n .
In the post National Reconciliation period, Nimeiri appeared 
to become increasingly autocratic. His old ways of reaching 
decisions based on "scientific approaches" and his proclaimed 
overriding principle of putting "national interest first" 
took a different turn. His unconstitutional meddling in the 
internal affairs of the Southern Regional Government, the 
harbouring of the Muslim Brotherhood in his government, the 
decision to close down a number of the functional departments 
at the centre in the name of decentralisation, his attempt to 
tamper with the north-south borders and, finally, his division 
of the south and his declaration of Islam as a state religion 
were some of the decisions Nimieri made that neither 
scientific rationality nor national interest had any influence 
over. Thus, if the first phase represented the "years of 
hope", the second phase represented just the opposite - "the 
years of g l o o m " .
The unfortunate aspect of the years of gloom was the erosion
-  r r . wC
of the confidence building that had gone on in north-south 
relations during the years of hope. The southerners long 
standing fear that "a northerner will always remain a
- 350 -
northerner” was confirmed again. N i m e i r i ’s return to Islam 
was the final blow to their relations and a reversal of the 
healing process that preceded it. North-South relations thus 
returned back to where they were before he came to power with 
acculturation very much in the fore as a government policy for 
the maintenance of unity.
During the years of gloom, all the characteristics of state 
softness emerged and were in place in no time. The
government lost the political will to govern and 
decentralisation became merely a way of enhancing the 
presidential system. The knock-on effect of the situation on 
the fortunes of the state was as dramatic a down-turn as was 
the up turn during the years of hope. As the case study in 
the previous chapter has shown, the clearest indication of 
the failure of decentralisation in the second phase of 
N i m e i r i ’s rule was the decline in the provision of the 
services for which the local governments were responsible. 
The impressive development in the first phase is in sharp 
contrast with the downward dive of educational development in 
the second phase. The trend was the same in all sectors and, 
unlike during the years of hope, the economy during the years 
of gloom registered a negative growth rate, turning the high 
hopes of earlier years into an economic nightmare.
In all the reorganizations that were made during the years of 
gloom, it was always declared that the purpose of 
decentralisation was to give more power to the people and to
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achieve participation and democratisation. But, as Mansour 
Khalid (1985:207) revealed, from his inside knowledge as a 
former senior Minister, Nimeiri had a hidden agenda: "His
concern, apart from widening the domain of patronage, was 
bas ical ly to take the respons ibi 1 i ty of the col lapse of 
services off his back. Another concern was to destroy central 
government’s authority, that is, the authority of the 
Ministers around him. Nimeiri never wasted an opportunity to 
tell his ministers that the days of empire builders were 
numbered. There should only be one empire and one emperor". 
This happened, as mentioned in chapter 3, when Nimeiri 
abolished central Ministries and declared their 
responsibilities transferred down to the provinces in 1978. 
By the same declaration Nimeiri was made patron of Local 
Government.
When the aim of decentralisation became holding onto power, 
the effect on the performance of the local councils was quite 
dramatic. With no effective central control, no additional 
finances to support the increasing bureaucracies created by 
further decentralisation reforms, and a declining economy, the 
result was the sorry state of which the educational 
development discussed in the previous chapter, was an example.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
THE CHOICES FOR THE SUDAN
- i .
The main issues raised in chapters one and two, that is, the 
political and developmental policy objectives of 
decentralisation, may now be assessed in terms of their
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practical applicability for the situation in the Sudan. It 
was argued in chapter two that, in a multi ethnic situation, 
a s t a t e ’s ability to regulate power-relations between the 
various competing groups is crucial when the ultimate desire 
is national unity and political stability. As a policy 
objective for the management of state-ethnic relationship, the 
applicability of decentralisation in the Sudan was 
demonstrated by the success, albeit brief, of the autonomous 
regional government that operated in the south. On the other 
hand, the subsequent hegemonic choice was a miserable failure 
as the s o u t h ’s sustained resistance to subjection 
demonstrated.
The Sudanese study also suggests that the decentralisation of 
power should not mean the containment of power such that the 
regions do not have a say in the central decision making 
mechanism. Whether in a single or multi-party system it is 
essential, if unity is the ultimate objective, that the 
subnational units should be equitably represented at the 
ce n t r e .
The experience of the Sudan with decentralisation as a 
mechanism for development administration proves two important 
points. Firstly, that decentralisation is only effective if 
it matches the local capacity and capability and, secondly, 
that, in a decentralised system, the c e n t r e ’s ability to guide 
and control is an equal determinant in its success. In other 
words, decentralisation should not be a mechanism for escaping
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responsibility or, more directly stated, should not be used as 
a mechanism passing the blame for policy failures to others.
The two contrasting periods during the time of President 
Nimeiri offer both a warning and a solution to the S u d a n ’s 
ethnic conflict and the management of its local 
administration. Concerning the north-south conflict, it is 
imperative that the political elites appreciate the choices 
available to them, which are unity or the eventual breakup of 
the country. Taking the choice of unity will require no less 
than accepting the south as an equal partner. There are two 
aspects to this. The first is equity in power sharing which 
should be based on an appreciation of the concrete reality of 
the situation at any given time. For example, the current 
situation in the Sudan may dictate that any political solution 
within the framework of unity would have to be not merely a 
devolution of power to the south, such as that entailed in the 
Addis Ababa agreement, but the sharing of central power 
itself. It has been the lack of power sharing at the central 
level, for example, which has reinforced the Southerners’ 
deep-rooted suspicion of northern politicians. The second 
aspect of equality is the acceptance of the south for what it 
is and what it stands for. There is no likelihood that the 
hegemonic choice of assimilation will ever work in the Sudan 
and it needs to be publicly discarded as unrealistic. There 
will obviously be many who would continue to espouse its 
values and no less than a revolution may be required to revive 
and build upon what Nimeiri had started in the years of hope.
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The horrific civil strife which led to the disintegration of 
Somalia, the only homogeneous country in Africa - all its 
people being ethnic Somalis speaking the same language and 
professing the same religion - must be a lesson to those who 
espouse the idea of assimilation. In other words,
assimilation is no guarantee of political stability.
The Sudan can refer to its own history when local 
administration next gets a chance for re-examination. At the 
risk of overemphasis, during the "years of hope” , 
decentralisation policies were genuinely used not only as 
instruments for national unity but for development 
administration as well. There existed strong central 
political commitment to directing and controlling policy 
objectives set by the revolutionary government. The result 
was, as discussed earlier, quite spectacular. This period 
must teach a lesson for S u d a n ’s future local administration. 
Any redesigning of local administration in the Sudan, however, 
must be based on a realistic assessment of its human and 
financial resources and consideration of how to address the 
inequalities between different areas. Here, how China has 
used decentralisation as a tool for development 
administration, as discussed in chapter two, could provide a 
lesson to many developing countries, not least the Sudan.
Finally, what can be done with the poor state of education in 
south Sudan? Donald Curtis ( 1988) has made a suggestion for 
improving the system. As he wrote in the context of south
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Sudan: ..parents would contribute an agreed quantity of farm
produce to the school for teachers in payment for 
schooling...This local contribution would have the effect of 
releasing council funds for education support". The idea 
would have merit had the sole problem been financial. But 
Curtis did not relate his recommendation to the political 
reality and its overall effect on the educational system. 
Given the enormity and the multi-faceted nature of the 
problem, the educational system as it is would not be able to 
cope with C u r t i s ’s idea of community involvement. There are 
some major policy issues, the resolution of which must precede 
C u r t i s ’s suggestion, even assuming the existence of a strong 
state with all the implications suggested above. These are:
1. An increase in educational administrative 
capacity at all levels so as to achieve 
an acceptable level of competency.
2. Discarding the policy of universal 
primary education which has been one of 
the causes for overstretching the meagre 
resources and, in the process, achieving 
neither quality nor quantity.
3. Limiting the number of schools in 
accordance with the available resources.
4. Promoting local participation, not only 
for exploitation of resources as Curtis 
suggested, but also for sharing of 
responsibility in the management of the 
schools.
These are not _n.Qwxideas as such and the problem in the Sudan 
is not shortage of ideas. The Ministry of Education has 
elaborate policy documents (see Woldemichael:1983:7-8) full of 
many innovative sounding ideas. It is the eradication of
"state softness" and the 
climate which determines 
implementable practice.
availability of a conducive political 
whether ideas can be translated into
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C H A P T E R  9
DECENTRALISATION: A REASSESSMENT
Introduction
The complexity of decentralisation as an area of enquiry and 
as a political and administrative practice has been raised in 
several instances in the previous chapters. The Sudan case 
has demonstrated both the intensity of the expectation that 
decentralisation would be a cure-all for many of problems, 
and how its fortunes fluctuated, to a large extent, depending 
on the political will of the central government. From the 
analysis of the Sudan case some general conclusions may now be 
d r a w n .
The issues of particular concern are, firstly, should national 
integration be decided by the ultimate verdict of central 
government alone? What is the justification for the centre 
deciding at will either to give to or take away powers from 
local geographic entities? And, are there alternative 
mechanisms of managing diversity for the maintenance of 
political unity? Secondly, in light of the economic, social 
and political problems in many of the developing countries, 
can decentralisation, in the manner it has been promoted by 
governments and supported by aid organisations, continue to be 
a useful tool for development administration?
These are crucial issues that will continue to dominate the
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political and developmental debate in the context of 
developing countries. As the preceding chapters explained, 
most African countries are faced with extreme problems and 
require extreme solutions to bring them to a semblance of 
normality. The alternative strategies available are very 
limited and the discussion in this chapter will bring out the 
kind of steps that will have to be taken if the looming 
political instability in many of the developing countries, 
particularly of Africa, is to be averted.
QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION
The Basis for State-Ethnoregion Coexistence
There are not many countries in the world that are completely 
homogeneous in their ethnic composition. Some multi-ethnic 
states have found a successful formula for coexistence, 
Switzerland being perhaps the best example. In others, there 
is an ever-present tension, in yet others, open conflict. 
Some countries, like Ethiopia, the Sudan and Iraq, to mention 
only a few, have been emphasising rigidity in the management 
of ethnic nationalism and, in the process, creating an over­
centralised system of government. This has proved to be 
counter-productive because of the huge resources devoted to 
maintaining the status quo. Recent events in the east 
European countries are perhaps the best examples of the 
fallacy of that strategy which may only postpone the problem 
for it to erupt at a future time. It is imperative,
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therefore, that governments continuously seek new formulae 
that will not encourage the option of open conflict.
Decentralisation by devolution or federation has been 
advocated as a strategy for resolving ethnic claims and 
ensuring the survival of the state. Federation was, for 
example, the system of government the British left in Nigeria 
and India because it was regarded as the system best suited 
for the diverse nationalities in those countries. Since then, 
the federal arrangement in these two countries has been 
subjected to drastic changes and the fragile unity is being 
maintained in Nigeria by military force and in India direct 
rule has been imposed in certain states. In Kenya, the 
authoritarian regime’s method of handling ethnic based 
politics has been to thwart them by force. Successive 
Ethiopian regimes also followed a similar approach to their 
peril. Imperial Ethio p i a ’s annexation of Eritrea and its 
attempt to absorb it by force ended with the spectacular 
defeat of its occupying army in April 1991.
Decentralisation, in whatever form, may no longer be a useful 
concept particularly in the management of the high intensity 
ethnoregional claims in many countries, unless, yet again, a 
new definition is added to the existing long list . Genuine 
peace and stability in many African countries may only be 
possible by due recognition of the historical accident that 
brought the different parts together. The basis for power 
sharing of the different ethnoregional components of many
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African countries needs therefore to be redefined. The break­
up of the Soviet Union and that of Yugoslavia, and even the 
growing support for independence in Scotland, should bring 
home to many African countries the impending problems. The 
issue that must be faced soon, therefore, should be not 
whether power should be decentralised by devolution or any 
other form at the discretion of the centre, but whether there 
is sufficient consensus for voluntary association between the 
different units that make up the state.
The process of state legitimisation in Africa, as discussed in 
chapter two, has not helped the development of consensual 
politics. Protected by international legitimacy, many African 
governments have been ignoring calls to devise policies that 
would generate internal legitimacy. For example, the 
political attraction of a single party system in a multi­
ethnic situation in Africa has been both to maintain 
hegemonic power and to avoid the risk of political 
competition. For political elites whose constituency power 
base comes from a dominant majority, like that of Robert 
Mugabe and his majority Shona ethnic constituency, the 
attraction of a single party system is to maintain the 
hegemonic power. President Mugabe has tried to balance his 
administration by including members of other minority groups 
but this is done at his discretion rather than as an exercise
„ i a
of right. On the other hand, political elites whose power 
base come from a minority ethnic group fear political 
opposition in an open contest. For example, President Arap
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Moi of Kenya, who comes from a minority ethnic group is 
holding on to power by intimidating opposition with a stronger 
political power base (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986:238-239). 
There have been, of course, dictators who grabbed power by 
military means, like Idi Amin of Uganda and Mengistu Haile 
Mariam of Ethiopia, whose only means of staying in power was 
by the use of brutal force against any opposition.
The unjustness of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, based 
on destructive methods of holding on to power at any cost, are 
obvious and do not need elaboration. The justification of 
rule by majority in a multi-ethnic state in Africa, on the 
other hand, is particularly troublesome and deserves some 
mention. In many multi-ethnic African states, the reality is 
that politics is based on ethnic or "tribal” affiliation. The 
notion of majority rule in Africa, be it in a single or multi­
party system, has had the effect of perpetuating the 
domination of a single ethnic group over all the others. 
Thus, the smaller ethnic groups are permanently denied a 
share of power in a system based on majority rule. As 
explained previously, the monopolisation of power has been a 
cause for resentment and, hence, the breaking-out of conflict 
in many countries. Majority rule does not reflect the 
reality of the existence of separate ethnic identities and so 
it is not only unjust but undesirable.
It follows that in some multi-ethnic states in Africa, where 
the conflict has been of the high intensity type as discussed
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in chapter two, adherence to the concept of the right of self 
determination may prove to be the only viable option left to 
avoid complete disintegration. What this means is that a 
"deserving" ethnoregional entity decides by itself whether to 
join in or opt out of the union. Peter Self (1985:204) is 
right to comment, in this connection, that "no one can easily 
predict how much autonomy will satisfy a nationalist movement, 
or what use the people in question will make of such self- 
government or perhaps full independence". For precisely this 
reason, therefore, geoethnic claims must be settled by the 
claimants themselves deciding their options. Accordingly, 
the right of any geographic entity, that is, the high 
intensity type, to exercise its right to self determination 
must be given the international recognition it deserves. 
Historical accidents ought not condemn geoethnic entities for 
ever. The break-up of the Soviet Union has disproved the 
notion that ethnic differences will wither away with time. 
E r i t r e a ’s lead in ascertaining its right to self determination 
ought also to remind many African countries of their options.
The argument here is not for the promotion of dismemberment 
of the multi-ethnic state. On the contrary, the exercise of 
the right to self determination will bring the divergent 
groups closer rather than dividing them. Arguably, economic 
reality will bring home to many of them the constraints on the 
viability of going it alone. The argument is that a stable 
and lasting unity is only possible when the ethnoregional 
components decide by themselves their options, without
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coercion. Switzerland offers a good example of such
political formulation. In Switzerland, the belief in full- 
fledged democracy is such that the people are the final 
arbiters and umpires on basic questions such as constitutional 
amendments which are settled by holding a referendum. It is 
interesting to note that "since these instrumentalities were 
embodied in the constitution in 1874, they have been 
extensively used and have, generally speaking, acted as a curb 
rather than a promoter of change" Friedrich, 1968:149). The 
referendum has thus become a vital and freely functioning part 
of the Swiss political system. Friedrich (1968:152) further 
said that the referendum has become an essential integrating 
mechanism in Switzerland "for developing the federal 
relationship between the Swiss people at large and the people 
of each and every canton on a basis of mutuality and 
compromise".
In the African situation also, a decision to be part of a 
union should be on the basis of "co-habitation", that is, that 
the union is made up of willing partners. The attraction of 
the idea of "co-habitation" is that it would then be possible 
to institutionalise the apparatus of political authority. 
Arbitrary and abusive rule such as that created by the current 
personal authority type in Africa will then have no place 
since relationships are based on "co-habitation". The system 
of "co-habitation" will therefore strengthen the 
institutionalisation process of the apparatus of governance.
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How does this notion apply to the case of the north-south 
issue of the Sudan? Many Sudanese writers are eager to 
stress that any solution of the north-south conflict must be 
within the framework of a united Sudan (An-Na’im, 1987). 
This is an evasion of the lessons to be learnt from the 
S u d a n ’s own experience discussed in the previous chapter. No 
constitutional niceties that rely on the will of the centre to 
give or take as it wishes can, or should, be a framework for 
unity in the case of the Sudan. Only a recognition of the 
south as an equal partner to the north may guarantee lasting 
peace and this has to be decided on the principle of the right 
of self-determination. What is at stake here is not only the 
option for opting-out from or into the union but, as earlier 
stated, the equitable distribution of central power itself, 
that is, based on the notion of "co-habitation".
Under the terms of "co-habitation", both the north and the 
south would come to realise that there is more to gain from 
being in a united Sudan than a divided one. Their economies 
are interlinked by the might of the Nile and both would 
suffer equally from an option that involves complete 
separation. In addition, since the idea of "co-habitation" 
is based on the respect of distinctiveness of identity, 
neither would be hindered in developing its own cultural goal 
and so the issues that have remained divisive and contentious 
would no longer be there.
It is tempting, as mentioned earlier, to suggest the inclusion
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of the notion of the "right of self determination" within a 
general definition of decentralisation, such as 
"decentralisation for self determination". However, since 
the argument is about the development of relationships based 
on consensual association, a quite different idea from that of 
dependence on the c e n t r e ’s willingness to decentralise, 
inclusion of the right of self-determination is perhaps better 
left to stand on its own rather than to add to the confusion 
that already exists.
The distributive or low intensity ethnic claims, as referred 
to in chapter two, can also include many forms of aspirations 
for power sharing and hence can be potential sources of 
conflict. Here again cooperation rather than confrontation 
should be the basis for the management of territorial 
entities. The Sudan example during "the years of hope"
discussed in the previous chapter is one that can serve to 
illustrate the kind of state effectiveness that would have to 
exist to manage emerging territorial demands. An appreciation 
that the current problems in many African countries are 
associated with the weakness of the state is necessary. As 
stressed in chapters two and eight, the inability of the 
African postcolonial state to design and manage appropriate 
policies has been particularly severe. Frustrated by this 
inability, some have suggested (for example, Hyden:1983) that
i si
local government systems be based on smaller units than a 
district in order to promote community involvement . This 
suggestion is valid if it is assumed that no structural change
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can occur and that the state will remain hopelessly
ineffective and inefficient. However, small scale community 
development programmes were the main fashion of rural
development before the advent of decentralisation and failures 
abounded then too. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter two, 
community development was the main principle for development 
in India in the 1950s and 1960s and it did not work then. 
Therefore, tinkering with the problem is not going to be a 
solution in the case of the African situation. The real hope 
for political stabilty and progress is, as suggested above, an 
overhaul of the political system which may have to come
through a revolutionary movement such that attempted by
President Nimeiri in the first phase of his rule in the Sudan.
Integrative Policies
It is the responsibility of a state to ensure that policies 
promoting the consolidation of national integration are 
designed and regularly appraised to meet the changing 
aspirations of the various ethnoregional societies under its 
domain. The state should be in a position to respond to the 
growing ethnic political movements whose range of demands 
could vary from the equitable distribution of services to the 
sharing of power by devolution or federation or even 
separation. It is clear that the state needs to develop 
decision making mechanisms so that the right strategic choices 
are made, for example, in deciding what to decentralise and 
when. In the processes of forming its policies, the state 
should be seen to act on behalf of and for the well-being of
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all the people under its jurisdiction. Sincere attempts to 
balance differences in territorial development, for example, 
is the kind of integrative policy that would bring about 
harmony in inter-ethnic relations. The relative social and 
economic deprivation of the south in the Sudan has been, for 
example, one of the issues which has reinforced southern fears 
that the north is only interested in the "land” and not "the 
people". As pointed out in chapter one, whether in a 
decentralised or a centralised governmental system, the 
ability of the state to regulate inter-ethnic relations is 
paramount for processes of national integration.
One policy area that engages a considerable degree of state 
attention is the distribution of scarce resources, both human 
aind financial, among the various units of government. In many 
African countries, where inter-ethnic differentials are 
common, the setting of priorities in the distribution of the 
available scarce resources needs to be based on the principles 
of equity (Smith, 1985:113). For example, the relative 
educational deprivation in south Sudan (chapter 7) will always 
remain a source of conflict unless discriminatory policies 
are introduced to remedy it. There is a particular problem
in situations where the lack of an organised local movement, 
and therefore of any obvious threat of conflict, attracts less 
government attention. But governments must weigh their
choices carefully so that actions taken today do not become 
sources for bitter conflict in the future.
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Regulatory policies, the laws that determine the whole range 
of social relationships in a state such as regulations for 
political participation and those that relate to education, 
religion or language, have important ramifications for inter­
ethnic relations. Therefore, regulatory policies should be 
designed in such a way that, as discussed in relation to the 
Sudan and Ethiopia, they do not become sources of conflict. 
In both these countries, deep social divisions were created by 
the regulatory policies which were based on the promotion of 
hegemonic identities. Some countries have taken drastic 
actions to ensure that their regulatory policies become 
sources of unity rather than conflict. For example, Indonesia 
resolved the problem of an official language by adopting the 
language of the smallest ethnic group. Before the liberation 
of Eritrea, the official rest day of the week in the territory 
which was under the control of the Eritrean P e o p l e ’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) was Wednesday. Having Muslim and 
Christian populations in almost equal numbers in Eritrea, the 
EPLF thought that taking either Friday or Sunday would be 
antagonistic to the losing half and, on the other hand, 
adopting both days as rest days with Saturday in between was 
simply un affordable.
The areas where state intervention is needed to maintain unity 
are many and suffice it to mention here that, as with the 
Indonesian and Eritrean examples, policies must be aimed at 
having a positive impact. It was interesting that the choice 
of Wednesday in Eritrea met no resistance and the reason was
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that people saw the element of fairness involved in the 
c h o i c e .
QUESTIONS OF DECENTRALISATION 
AS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
Problems of Decentralisation
Decentralisation is frequently perceived as a tool for 
improving the management of development. A related argument 
has been that decentralisation of authority to regional or 
local governments to plan and manage development programmes 
is, as discussed above, a positive integrative policy intended 
to meet the needs of geoethnic groups. The theme that runs 
through all the arguments of decentralisation as development 
administration is the need for increasing participation so 
that development programmes become more relevant to local 
needs and conditions.
Decentralisation as a policy option for development management 
has been actively supported and promoted by international aid 
organisations. The support for decentralisation, it is 
usually claimed, was the result of frustration with over­
centralisation which causes problems for donors who are 
principally involved with small scale projects targeted 
towards the rural poor. Inefficient and ill informed
central bureaucracies are mostly blamed as the cause for these 
problems. A way of improving such developmental problems of 
over-centralisation, developing countries were advised, was
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to exploit the potential of decentralisation. The emphasis 
was on promoting popular participation and the need for the 
involvement of communities, not only in decision making but 
also in implementation of projects. It was argued that 
decentralisation speeds up bottom-up development and 
facilitates meeting basic needs, especially for the rural 
poor .
Convinced by the appeal of decentralisation, or persuaded by 
the arguments of the bilateral aid organisations, governments 
became eager to reform. In Africa, in Kenya in 1970, Sudan 
and Ghana in 1971, Tanzania in 1972, and Zambia in 1972 and 
again in 1979, radical reforms of local administration were 
introduced. Socialist T a n z a n i a ’s reforms were based on the 
recommendations of the international firm of management 
consultants from New York, McKinsey and Company, apparently 
not famed for their socialist bias.
However, the experience with decentralisation in all these 
countries has been one of disappointment. In Kenya, control 
over development planning remained a central function despite 
the existence of the decentralisation structure discussed in 
chapter two (p. 89). T a n z a n i a ’s experimentation with
decentralisation, referred to in chapter one (pp. 34-40), 
never proved to be effective in its aim for popular
- i -C »
involvement in decision making. President Nyrere himself 
explained that Tanza n i a ’s failures occured because the central 
government was unable to impose and ensure popular
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participation in planning and project implementation. In 
Zambia, the decentralisation reforms were never really 
implemented and decision making for development remained a 
central government exercise. In all these countries, the gap 
between the expressed aims and the actual accomplishments were 
very wide indeed.
At this stage it is pertinent to ask; what went wrong? 
Putting aside political motives for a moment and seeing 
decentralisation as a tool for development administration 
only, some common problems can be identified:
1. One of the main problems has been the tendency to regard 
decentralisation as having a universal applicability. 
Decentralisation policies seem to have been based on the 
assumption that a standard format of local administration 
exists. The similarities of the decentralisation programmes 
in the Sudan during "the years of hope" and that of Papua New 
Guinea were, for example, striking in spite of the marked 
political differences between the two countries. Again, as 
discussed in chapter two, capitalist Kenyan and socialist 
Tanzanian local government systems had more similarities than 
differences. The irony with decentralisation has been that 
whilst a great deal of emphasis is made on the need for local 
participation, what this local participation actually 
involves in any specific area has not been a subject of 
consideration when designing decentralisation programmes.
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2. In all the countries mentioned, decentralisation reforms 
were introduced suddenly without any prior experimentation on 
their suitability or implementabi 1 i t y . Not only did the 
sweeping changes cause much confusion but also, as the Sudan 
case study has shown, severe constraints on implementing the 
services for which the local authorities were responsible. In 
any case, the uneven level of social and economic development 
should have precluded the application of uniform 
decentralisation principles. As discussed in chapter four, 
Ma r s h a l l ’s (1949) visionary advice to future governments of 
the Sudan was to apply varying degrees of decentralisation 
depending on the economic and social development of a given 
area .
3. In spite of the complaints with over-centralisation and 
inefficient bureaucracy that a decentralisation system aims to 
improve, it is striking that the implications of these very 
’’weaknesses” for the planning and implementation of 
decentralisation have never been fully appreciated. This is 
not, of course, to forget the many weaknesses that may well 
exist at the local level. As the case of India, discussed in 
chapter two, has shown, manipulations by small , self- 
interested local groups can, for example, be obstacles to a 
decentralisation programme. But if central governments
themselves were not weak, obstacles to decentralisation 
reforms could be held in check. Therefore, it is imperative 
that the planning of decentralisation should also consider the 
planning of the central government apparatus so as to make it
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perform its duties of guiding and controlling. It is 
pertinent to mention here that no historical precedent exists 
of central government not playing a highly interventionist 
role in development. Therefore, the design of
decentralisation must be based on a clear understanding of the 
totality of any given situation, that is, political, social 
and economic.
Essentials for Development
The fluctuation of the performance of educational development 
in the Sudan, which depended on the behaviour of central 
government and how it managed regional demands, confirms the 
essential nature of consensus politics for development. It 
also demonstrates that, as the comparative analysis in chapter 
two has shown, performance in decentralisation is a function 
of central government competency.
The tendency to regard decentralisation as a panacea for 
development administration must be extinguished. The case of 
Wau Area Council shows that the mere acquisition of power was 
not enough. It was interesting to note, for example, that the 
district councils themselves questioned the wisdom of 
delegating the responsibility of education to them knowing 
that they lacked the capacity to manage it. As discussed in 
chapter seven, the problem the Wau Area council faced was that
.  .. 4t
it lacked both the capacity and the means to translate the 
substantial power delegated to it. The majority of the 
councillors were illiterate and had little understanding of
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their responsibilities, and given the level of poverty and 
hence the meagre local revenue, the mismatch of delegated 
power with the Wau reality is clear. To reiterate, it is not 
a mere top-down initiative that is the issue but rather how 
the top can make it possible for bottom-up development to be 
achieved.
There are convincing similarities in the Chinese system of 
government discussed in chapter two and that of the Nimeiri 
regime during the years of hope, in the way the respective 
party apparatus were equally controlling as well as enabling.
In both cases, the party machineries had elaborate forms of 
control running parallel with the administrative structure 
and, on the other hand, they were also enabling agencies being 
responsible for the implementation of plans. A general 
suggestion that can be made here is that, in a multi-ethnic 
and underdeveloped situation, interventionist political 
structures with enabling and controlling capabilities are the 
ones best suited to facilitating development.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
The problem with decentralisation programmes has often been 
that they are based on unrealistic assessments at the design 
stage. As the discussion above attempted to illustrate, the 
design of decentralisation requires a multi-dimensional 
investigation not only in terms of the availability of 
resources but also of the capacity for successful 
implementation. The last aspect, capacity, refers to the
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capacity at both local and central government levels. As the 
political, economic and developmental analysis of the Sudan 
case has shown, decentralisation can cause havoc both as a 
mechanism for national integration and development 
administration if an appropriate balance is not struck in its 
management.
The main objective of this thesis has been to provide an in- 
depth empirical analysis of the working of decentralisation 
policies in the Sudan and the consequences of their impact. 
Unfortunately, not many studies of the kind are available and 
direct comparisons of specific policies could not be made. It 
is pertinent therefore to point out the areas where further 
research will enhance the understanding of decentralisation.
Research Needs
Much of the literature on decentralisation and centralisation 
is of a case-study type focused on a single country. But, as 
Fesler (1968:376) observed "none of the empirical experience 
recorded in the case studies has been synthesized" . One 
result of this lack of merging of experience has been that the 
conditions under which decentralisation operates are rarely 
clarified. Furthermore, not many studies have attempted to 
measure the impact of politics in the processes of formulation
and implementation of decentralisation. The bulk of the case
. • ;
studies available are analyses of the policies and do not go 
deeper into explaining the conditions that affect the 
processes of decentralisation.
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Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the literature is that no 
empirical study exists, as far as is known to the writer, that 
compares decentralisation experiences in the developed and the 
developing countries. Such a study might have highlighted the 
existing problem with gross generalisations in the use of the 
term decentralisation. It is not the use of the term as such 
which is the problem but the policy prescriptions that emanate 
from it which tend not to take into account, as discussed 
before, the specific cultural, political and environmental 
inheritance of individual countries. For example, given the 
peculiarity of the south Sudan situation, as discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6, surely some other, more appropriate, form of 
administrative organisation could have been found instead of 
the blueprint enforced on it. In many parts of Africa where 
poverty, social division and illiteracy dominate, 
decentralisation reforms do not seem to take these realities 
into account and the elaborate council systems of local 
administration seem wholly misplaced.
Diana Conyers (1984) wrote what she called an ’’exploratory" 
article in which she discussed the similarities between 
regional planning in the South and North, that is between the 
developed and the developing countries. In it she wrote of 
"general trends in development studies, which suggest that 
there is increasing interest in the similarities - as opposed 
to differences - between North and South". Then she suggests 
that "an interchange of ideas between North and South could be 
mutually beneficial". C o n y e r ’s article was critically
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commented upon by Patsy Healy (1984) and Deryck Bernard
(1984). H e a l y ’s (1984:356) argument is of great interest:
...the fact that many countries are revising their 
strategies and organisations does not necessarily 
mean that anything is to be gained by exchanging 
experiences about a particular institutional form, 
or particular "solution” . The South has after all 
had long experience in suffering the imposition of 
institutional forms and development strategies 
devised in quite different contexts than those they 
were implanted into. Is there any point in
integrating debates about regional planning 
occurring in different countries? At what level, if 
at all, should we interchange?
...the problem in transnational discussion about, 
say, decentralisation, is that there are enormous 
variations in the organisational structure to be 
decentralised, in what is sought from
decentralisation and in the forms which
decentralisation may take.
The mistake we have done in the international 
diffusion of ideas in the past is that we have 
travelled the world full of concepts and techniques, 
divorced from culturally and historically specific 
contexts in which they have evolved. We have been 
forced to learn from such naivety. If we are now to 
interchange experience, it must be within the
equipment of theoretical and methodological
awareness and sensitivity to socio-historical
specifics. I would nevertheless expect that such 
interchange would serve to confirm the substantial 
differences between North and South in political and 
economic processes, and consequently in appropriate 
policies and institutional forms for their 
implementat i o n .
Bernard (1984) was equally critical and warned that "until 
regional planning takes greater account of the political 
realities within which it operates, one must question the 
achievements of the administrative model of regional plan 
implementation". He made a penetrating criticism dismissing 
C o n y e r ’s cross-fertilisation argument as being "limited in
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scope" and, furthermore, he said:
[The] important question may be how far in reality 
does the body of theory in regional planning in the 
Third World reflect indigenous thinking and 
experience. It may be that the perceptions of 
visiting experts and consultants and the narrowness 
of local but desk-bound urbanites has created a 
situation where most of what is described as the 
contribution of the South to the discussion is 
derived and validated in terms of Northern criteria.
These were strong exchanges but they do touch the heart of the 
problem. Participating in the same debate, Cheema (1984:361), 
whilst acknowledging the need for interchanging information, 
suggested the "launching of an international research project 
on theory and practice of intra-regional planning in the North 
and South and dissemination of the "findings by publishing 
volumes and special issues of professional journals..". But 
as said above, no comparative study seems to have been made.
Research has tended to gloss over the imperatives of politics 
in the study of decentralisation. As mentioned earlier, 
research on decentralisation has mainly concentrated on the 
administrative and organisational structures and as yet no 
comprehensive information seems to exist on the role of 
politics in decentralisation. The discussion in chapter two 
touches on some of the areas of concern and offers some 
pointers for further research.
Finally, another area where no rigorous research has been 
conducted is on the local communities’ own form of
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administration and organisat i o n . There are structures that 
local communities at village level value and a comprehensive 
study is required to understand their operation and functions. 
Therefore, further research on this may produce important 
information to draw on for a theoretical framework for the 
design of decentralised administration.
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E P I L O G U E
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVIDING THE SOUTH 
AND THE SUDAN SINCE NIMERI
The Re-start of North-South Conflict
Niraeiri had to pass one major hurdle before he could achieve the total 
dismantling of the Addis Ababa Agreement - the 6000 strong ex Anya-Nya Army 
still stationed in the south. Whilst the division debate was taking place 
Nimeiri ’’decided to send a number of southern army detachments to the 
north*' (Mawson, 1984:523) and as the process of implementing that decision 
began, several detachments refused to be transferred. The Government then 
quite foolishly decided to apply force. On June 4th 1983, the Northern 
army was deployed to quell an army garrison at Bor town that was resisting 
transfer. Inevitably, fighting broke out and more than one thousand of the 
Bor garrison mutinied and fled to the bush taking their arms with them. 
The Bor mutiny ’’caused widespread desertions in other units of the Southern 
Command and in Northern Sudan, and an exodus of refugees to bordering 
countries" (SPLM Manifesto, July 1983:16). Before long the Sudan’s People 
Liberation Army (SPLA) was born and soon after, its political wing, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) was established.
The SPLA grew in strength very rapidly and by the end of 1983 it managed 
to force the suspension of the two projects most resented by Southerners; 
the oil works and the excavation of the Jonglei canal (designed to drain 
the water of the Sudd, a swamp covering a large area in South Sudan) which 
would have increased the volume of Nile water available for irrigation in 
northern Sudan and Egypt (Woodward, 1985:966). Resentment of the eventual 
benefit from these projects going only to the north had helped to fuel the
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rapid escalation of the conflict. In November 1983, the SPLM declared the 
South a war zone and ordered its military wing in the field (the SPLA) to 
effect the declaration. Despite Nimeiri’s assurance that he would be able 
to contain the SPLA forces, the two international companies involved with 
the oil and the canal projects were not willing to take the risk (Horn of 
Africa, vol.8, No.l., 1985:52). In declaring the South a war zone, the 
SPLM was aware of its international obligations. Under a long standing 
international agreement, Egypt has a major say in matters concerning the 
Nile waters and in "its desire to respect the code of conduct of civilised 
behaviour", the SPLM wrote a letter to the Egyptian Government, through its 
ambassador in Kenya, explaining the reasons for declaring the South a war 
zone thus:
You certainly realise that the renewed fighting between South and 
North has been directly caused by the abrogation of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement by the Sudan Government because it broke the truce which 
was the byproduct of that agreement. It was and is clear to anyone 
that the agreement was sine qua non and raison d ’etre for the 
observance of peace in the Sudan by both sides. Its unilateral 
abrogation by one party automatically removed any impediment and 
obligation from the other party towards respecting that agreement. 
You will therefore agree with us that the war which was suspended 
when the agreement came into force had naturally to continue .... It 
is our hope that Egypt will exercise utmost restraint and choose a 
peaceful way to solve problems that have been created for it by a
- ■ ; -c
Government led by a lunatic in Khartoum . . . Any attempt to 
reactivate further excavation will end in disaster (see in Horn of 
Africa, Vol 8, No.l, 1985:55).
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The proclaimed aim of the SPLM is to liberate the "Sudanese masses from the 
oppression of the corrupt, racist, backward pseudo-Arab bourgeois system 
in Khartoum” (The SPLM legislation No.l, 1983). The SPLM has been 
consistent in its objective which has been to "establish a United Socialist 
Sudan, not a separate Sudan" (SPLM manifesto, 1983; 16). The SPLM 
emphasises in its manifesto that the South is an integral and inseparable 
part of the Sudan and "although the movement has started by necessity in 
the South", it aims "eventually to engulf the whole country" (see articles 
20 and 21 of the SPLM manifesto). As they are in the minority, there is 
no realistic hope that this will happen, and the SPLM would know this, but 
taking such a position would "conveniently save Ethiopia from the open 
disapproval of Organization of African Unity Leaders who deplore any and 
all secessionist movements" (Horn of Africa, Vol,8, No.l, 1985:4)
The rapid development in strength of the SPLA owes a lot to the help it has 
been receiving from Ethiopia and Libya. Ethiopian assistance is to 
counterbalance Nimeiri's unconcealed encouragement of opposition forces 
(The Ethiopian Democratic Union, for example) to the military regime there 
since the overthrow of Haile Selassie (Markakis and Ayele, 1986:161). 
Relationships between Nimeiri and Libya flourished and declined several 
times over. The final blow came when Nimeiri declared support for Anwar 
Sadat of Egypt following the latter’s agreement with Israel at Camp David. 
Libya’s support to the SPLM continued until the overthrow of Nimeiri (then 
switched to the side of the new government almost overnight) by which time 
the SPLA was "Believed to contain about 20,000". Apart from its success 
in forcing the suspension of the oil and the canal projects, the SPLA’s 
military strength was also evident in the way they managed to pin down the 
government forces to their garrisons in the urban centres. The South is
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ideally suited to guerilla warfare which Nimeiri must have known (see 
chapter 7) and, however strong an army the central Government could have 
deployed in the South, to achieve a defeat of the rebels by purely military 
means would be very difficult, even impossible (Mawson, 1984:526). By 
1985, the SPLA had become a force to be reckoned with, having been waging 
an increasingly successful guerilla war. With his self inflicted problems 
in the South mounting, Nimeiri attempted to sound conciliatory and began 
"urging the SPLM to join a dialogue to achieve peace" (the Guardian, 
January 3, 1985) . But Nimeiri had already done enormous damage which would 
be very hard to reconcile, and the irony is, national unity may not be 
secured this time without the central government having to p a y  an even 
greater concession to the SPLAI than it did in the 1972 Agreement.
The Fate of Decentralization After Division in South Sudan 
The abolition of Southern autonomy and the creation of semi-autonomous 
regions in its stead, effectively put the new regions of the South on a par 
with the regions in the North. The regional governors, the regional deputy 
governors, the regional ministers and the provincial commissioners were now 
all to be appointed by the President and hence be directly accountable to 
him. The legislative function of the Regional Assemblies had been 
drastically reduced as they were not allowed to consider any bill until 
after it had been considered by one of its specialised committees (Article 
56). By the same article, any Bill presented by a member of the Regional 
Assembly was not to be considered by the Assembly unless the committee 
decided that the Bill was suitable and in conformity with public interest. 
As a double safeguard against an unwanted Bill being passed, Article 57 of 
the Presidential Order on the division of South Sudan stated that no Bill 
would become a law until it was passed by the Regional Assembly and signed
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by the Governor of the Region. The Presidential power was greatly enhanced 
by the Order as it allowed him to dissolve any Regional Assembly if he 
considered that the public interest and the circumstances necessitated new 
elections (Article 53).
The implementation of the new regionalization programme in the South 
started almost immediately after the Presidential Order was announced on 
June 6th, 1983. No thought was given to, or time allowed for, a smooth 
transition. To effect the new policy as soon as possible, two central 
government appointed committees were set up. Their tasks were to supervise 
the division of assets and the deployment of manpower of the former 
Southern Regional Government. As they set out to do their duty the 
committees faced many problems "that were not predicted or had not been 
properly diagnosed” (Sudanow, October 1981:19). The problem the committee 
faced with the deployment of manpower was how to identify "who belonged to 
which region”. "In the end it was decided that 65 per cent of the manpower 
belonged to Equatoria Region, 20 per cent to Bahr El Ghazal Region, and 15 
per cent to Upper Nile Region" (Sudanow, October 1983:19). This was a 
somewhat arbitrary decision because the new regions were taking division 
quite literally to mean that only those employees who originate in any one 
particular region would get employment in that region. As a result, 
absolute chaos followed. Related to this was also the problem of how to 
share the grant in aid for salaries from the central government. Even 
after division, the central government’s grants-in-aid to the South 
remained the same. Equatoria Region demanded the larger portion of it, 
claiming that the majority of the manpower was being left behind in Juba, 
the former Southern capital and now Equatoria’s. As the others objected, 
friction between the regions was developing.
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The division of assets also proved to be a very difficult task. As Badal
(1985) wrote: "Almost immediately but not entirely unexpected, bitter rows 
soon ensued particularly over moveable assets {and} the sight was both 
shameful and disgusting. Scenes of angry and quarrelling officials were 
common enough, often over lawful ownership of petty and simple merchandise 
such as an office cooler or fan, a chair or office utensils of 
insignificance" (p7). As the quarrel over the division of the assets 
continued, some government officials from the south suggested that the idea 
be abandoned leaving all the assets to Equatoria Region alone and the 
national government provide funds to the two other regions. However 
sensible this suggestion seemed, it was outside the terms of reference of 
the committee, which was set up to divide the existing assets only. As the 
wrangling continued, and with no furniture arriving at the other two new 
regions, the whole work of regional governments was at a stand still for 
a long period (Nyuol and Bol, 1984:55).
Perhaps the most damaging consequence of the division of the South in terms 
of inter-regional relationships was "the enormous scale of human sufferings 
that accompanied mass deportation" (Badal, 1985:8). After the division of 
the South, an ’unwritten-law' prevailed in that it became illegal for 
anyone to live outside his/her region. People who originated from one 
region but who had lived in another all their lives, and even those with 
spouses from the local population, were deported to their region of origin 
and in the process lost their immovable property without compensation 
(Badal, 1985:8, Sudanow, November 1983:15). As Badal (1985:9) concluded,
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"the overall effect has been the creation of uncertainty and hatred among 
the Southern peoples which tend to seriously challenge and undermine social 
integration process that was already well underway" (see also Sudanow,
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March 1985:15). But Nimeiri’s main objective in dividing the South, as 
discussed above, was precisely that a divided South would cease to be an 
effective block against central government dictat.
The practice of deportation was also to cause serious problems to the newly 
created regions in many areas. The Area Councils in Equatoria region, for 
example, faced serious administrative problems because ’’most of the senior 
and experienced administrators who were managing the affairs of Area 
Councils under the former Southern Region were from the present two regions 
of Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile. With further decentralization, these 
officers left for their regions leaving Equatoria with very few senior and 
experienced officers" (Kharais, 1985:87). Deportations also brought to a 
halt the work of many of the institutions which should have remained common 
to all three regions, such as teacher training institutes, agricultural 
training schools and the multi-purpose training centre at Juba. With the 
advent of division the common practice was that each region claimed what 
was available in its region. But "not only does the region involved not 
have the requisite manpower and financial resources to run these services 
on its own but it also means that the other regions have been deprived of 
these common services (Badal, 1985:8). So decentralization, instead of 
creating a healthy atmosphere of competition between the regions in the 
South, as some of its supporters were arguing it would, became a source of 
friction. Badal (1985:7) explains what he discovered during his visit to 
the South in 1984:
Ethnic and regional animosities are on the upsurge, at one time in 
1984 Equatoria Regional authorities would not allow transit of goods 
and essential commodities destined for Bahr El Ghazal from East 
Africa. Upper Nile Region authorities allegedly did the same to
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consignment of commodities from the North to Juba. Freedom of 
movement of Southern citizens, particularly in Equatoria, is now 
severely restricted.
During the debate over southern division, one of the points its supporters 
were arguing for was that further decentralization would benefit people 
because the regions would be smaller, easier to administer [and] it would 
be easier to keep security or maintain law and order (Sudanow, September 
1983:14). A decentralized system, it was argued, would enable problems to 
be identified more accurately and, because decisions could be made locally, 
there would be speedy implementation of the decisions. To its opponents, 
leaving the question of legality aside, the practical and obvious problem 
was where the resources, both human and financial, were going to come from 
to support the intended decentralization, given the general economic 
difficulties the country had at the time. Inevitably, it was not long 
before information started emerging that all was not going well with 
decentralization in the South; as reported in Sudanow, March 1986;
Soon after the decentralization of the Southern Region into three 
regions, the infant Equatoria region found itself too poor to meet 
the financial requirements of its schools. The grant from the 
central government was too meagre and Equatoria could not generate 
enough revenue of its own. In an effort to make ends meet, the 
regional government of Joseph Tambura closed down the boarding
schools [in secondary schools]  At the intermediate and primary
levels, teachers in the rural and urban schools went for months 
without salaries. Most of these schools closed down as teachers
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battled with the government for their rights (p28)
In the post division period, the financial situation in the new regions 
became so desperate that the Governor of Equatoria admitted that he was 
travelling to Khartoum almost every month demanding more because the amount 
he had at his disposal for paying salaries was not enough (Sudanow, August 
1984:17). The financial situation in Bahr El Ghazal was also similar as 
Nyuol and Bol (1984:56) explain:
The funds released on monthly basis do not meet cash requirements of 
the Region. As a Result Chapter II (Services) have been severely 
affected. Only a few deserving special cases are catered for 
pushing the rest aside. Likewise, funds released for the 
Development Projects are inadequate and the little fund meant for 
development is diverted to other urgent priorities, leaving 
development untouched. Even in Chapter 1 (salaries), [payments] in 
some regional ministries and departments are not met regularly. 
This shortage has also affected the Area Councils whose monthly 
grants-in-aid have been experiencing severe cuts.
But, even with the situation as grim as it was, some politicians from the 
South were demanding the creation of more regions (see in Sudanow, June- 
Nov, 1983). The case of the Fertit, a small group of related but diverse 
ethnic groups in western Bahr El Ghazal Region, is an example. Basically, 
the Fertit’s demand for their own region was to enhance their identity and 
to enable them to actively participate in their own affairs which they 
claimed they could not do as a result of the Dinka domination in Bahr El 
Ghazal Region (Sudanow, November, 1982:13). To the opponents of division,
- 389 -
the claim for more regionalization emanates from the misunderstanding of 
what the new decentralization entails. They refer to the fact that, whilst 
the new regional arrangement was a mere administrative decentralization, 
the Addis Ababa Agreement was based on autonomy in recognition of the 
cultural and racial differences between the North and the South. The 
argument for more regionalization was therefore regarded as an attempt to 
trivialise the Addis Ababa Regionalisation Accord. As one opponent of 
division chided its supporters "the only surplus manpower in the south is 
politicians; the only appeal for the division is to create posts for 
politicians" (Sudanow, April 1981:18; see also Sudanow, December 1984:13).
Towards the end of 1984, Nimeiri, a desperate ruler by this time with 
problems closing in on him from every direction, gave the impression that 
he could reverse his decision on division if the southerners could 
demonstrate that they would cooperate (Sudanow, December 1984:13; Mawson, 
1984:525). According to Sudanow, Nimeiri only took the decision to divide 
the South for a trial period "in order to enable the people of the South 
to decide whether they really liked it or not". Nimeiri is said to have 
made it clear that "he would not force a region to merge with another 
against its wish" (Sudanow, December 1984:13). Made a year earlier, such 
an offer might have been enough to defuse the escalation of the conflict. 
But by now events had changed in the South. The balance of power within 
the South had fast shifted towards the SPLM whose objectives went far 
beyond simple administrative decentralization. So it was with this new 
breed of Southerners that Nimeiri had to come to terms. At the beginning 
of January 1985, Nimeiri was believed to have offered to make John Garang, 
leader of the SPLM, "vice-president and co-ordinator of economic 
development in the South" and that he was "interested about concessions for
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the South*'. Nimeiri was a politically isolated leader by this time and, 
with no other head of government taking him seriously, economic 
speculators, the billionaire Saudi Arabian Adnan Khashoggi and Tiny Rowland 
of the Lonrho group, were used as go-between to negotiate with the SPLM. 
(Khashoggi*s economic stake in the Sudan was in the oil exploration as he 
had, together with Nimeiri, set up the Sudan National Oil Company, in which 
he had half the share: Rowland’s was in the agricultural sector.
Khashoggi was also believed to have been acting as a sort of merchant 
banker for the Sudan, being involved in planning to raise billions of 
dollars for the Sudan by the forward sale of oil still in the ground) . 
Garang is reported to have rejected the proposed terms as "ridiculous" 
since the SPLM was a national and not a regional movement and saying that 
"the war did not start in order to make him vice-president" (see the 
Guardian, January 1985).
The Fall of Nimeiri
In the last two years of his reign, President Nimeiri was beset by "a 
gathering sea of crises" (The Guardian, March 29, 1985). On the political 
front, Nimeiri*s objective of winning support in the north by introducing 
Sharia law was backfiring on him. His old political opponents, sensing his 
attempt to take the wind out of their sails, were by now publicly 
protesting "at the way in which Islamic law was implemented in such unequal 
society where many could not adequately provide for themselves and their 
families within the framework of the law" (Woodward, 1985:7). Sadiq El 
Mahdi, great grandson of the Mahdi and leader of the Ansar sect, accused 
Nimeiri of political exploitation of the Sharia which was doing a 
disservice to the cause of Islam (see in Khalid, 1985:257). Criticisms of 
Sharia also came from other lesser known banned parties, the Republican
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Brothers, for example, whose leader, Mahmood Mohammed Taha, accused Nimeiri 
of being pretentious in his application of Sharia whilst heading a corrupt 
and an oppressive regime. The Republicans, a more progressive group had 
defended Nimeiri previously for no reason other than the position he had 
taken against the Islamic fundamentalists (Khalid, 1985:390). Nimeiri, 
wanting to establish his seriousness on Sharia, found a soft option in 
Taha, whom he accused of heresy. Taha, an old man of 76, was 
hanged in front of 2000 people including four of his colleagues who were
facing the same fate unless they recanted within three days.
President Nimeiri knew that his political survival depended on his
exploitation of Islam which was gaining momentum in the Sudan as well as 
in the Islamic world as a whole. On June 6th 1984, Nimeiri took his most 
daring action to date by proposing to amend the constitution which would 
transform the Sudan from a secular into an Islamic state. The proposed 
amendment would also make the President an Imam, "the leader of the 
faithful and the shepherd of the Sudanese nation" (see in Khalid,
1985:273). The proposals were submitted to the National Assembly for 
discussion and debate and there were expected to arrive at a decision by 
July 15th but this was later extended so further discussion could occur. 
As expected, heated debate followed both within the National Assembly and 
outside of it. To the Southerners this was the final assault on what 
remained of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Condemnation of the 
proposed amendment from the South was universal. Even those who supported 
division of the South were now joining hands in opposing President 
Nimeiri’s move. Jospeh Lago and Abel Alier, political rivals of the former 
Southern Regional Government came together and addressed a very critical 
letter to Nimeiri reminding him of the danger of the proposed
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constitutional amendment to national unity. Petitions against the proposal 
were also sent to Nimeiri by the newly formed Regional Assemblies in the 
South.
Opposition or not it soon became clear that Nimeiri would eventually 
declare the Sudan an Islamic state. By this time President Nimeiri’s only 
remaining political ally was the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Its 
leader, who was the Attorney General and presidential advisor on legal 
affairs, was believed to have been the main architect of the proposed 
amendment on the constitution (Khalid, 1985:275). In the debate at the 
National Assembly on the amendment to the constitution, the Attorney 
General was reported to have made the following statement:
. . . the 1973 constitution of the Sudan was achieved at the expense 
of the Muslims. Muslims were not given the full opportunity to 
carry out their religious rites. There is an evolution in the Sudan 
towards Islamization and if any attempt is made to stop or suppress 
it, it will lead to a revolution (Sudanow, August, 1984:20).
The Muslim Brotherhood Party’s support for Nimeiri was a well calculated 
political expediency, the aim of which was to take advantage of the 
situation and to emerge as the strongest party in the aftermath of 
Nimeiri’s rule (El Bashir, 1987:158-159). But Nimeiri had not completely 
lost his political instincts and he too was using the Brotherhood to give 
legitimacy to his drive on Islamization. In March 1985, President Nimeiri
•  ,• r -c
accused the Muslim Brotherhood ”of plotting to assassinate him and his 
closest aids in an attempt to undermine the [islamic] revolution" (The 
Guardian, 12 March 1985). The charges included using religion for
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political ends and that the Muslim Brotherhood had sought the backing of 
a foreign power (a reference to rumours that the leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood had made contacts with Iranians whilst on a trip abroad). As 
a result several senior members of the organisation were sacked from the 
government and many others including their leader, the Attorney General, 
were arrested. Whilst Nimeiri and his political rivals were fighting for 
power, the economy was left unattended to for far too long leaving the 
country on the verge of bankruptcy. To add to Nimeiri’s problems, the 
Sudan suffered the worst drought ever in 1984 and the once self-sufficient 
nation was now dependent on foreign aid. The economic mess left Nimeiri 
with no option but to. abide by the strict economic austerity prescription 
of the International Monetary Fund. As a result of government subsidy 
withdrawal on basic items of consumption, the price of bread went up by 33 
per cent, petrol 50 per cent and the price of sorghum, the country's staple 
food, rose five times within a year. With the political and economic 
crises escalating, students and professionals were out in the streets in 
protest and soon the riots spread across the Sudan. As the crisis 
deepened, Nimeiri flew to the United States, to ask President Reagan to 
help him out. Nimeiri was never to return and on April 5th 1985, he was 
toppled by the Army, led by the chief of staff, General Sawar al Dahab, 
whom Nimeiri had appointed to the post only two weeks before his departure.
The Sudan Since Nimeiri
The military junta which toppled Nimeiri called itself the Transitional 
Military Council (TMC). Immediately on coming to power, the TMC declared
-  ,• i . *
its role as "transitional" and being to see the country return to a 
civilian democratic government. A Civilian Council of Ministers was 
established to manage the affairs of the country.
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In April 1986, one year after the TMC took over power, elections were held 
and brought a coalition government into power under the prime ministership 
of Sadiq al Mahdi, leader of the Umma party. As the civil war in the south 
was raging elections were held in some parts only. History was repeating 
itself, and the arguments within the coalition government and between the 
different parties was such that the affairs of the country wer.e neglected. 
Corruption and government inefficiency further crippled the country. In 
June 1989, the military, led by General Omar al-Beshir ousted the civilian 
government and took over power. General Beshir’s regime has embraced 
Islam as its guiding principle in government. The civil war in the south 
goes on unabated. The tragic civil war and the drought of recent years 
has driven the Sudan into decay.
The north-south divide is back where it was when the country became 
independent in 1956. The country is indeep trouble all round and what the 
future holds for it is anybody’s gues.
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Notes and References
1.1 The Indiscriminate use of the term decentralisation for all 
situations and conditions has been causing major problems. For 
interesting exchange of ideas see the comments by Patsy Healey and 
Derek Bernard on Diana Conyer's article, "Bridging Gap Between North 
and south". Third World Planning Review, vol. 6 No. 4, 1984.
1.2 An expression used to describe indigenous political sistems
1.3 Provincial was used instead of the term "state" to avoid confusion.
2.1 The Eritrean struggle had very often been mistakingly confused with 
separatism and secession - the Eritrean struggle was for the right 
of self-determination from a colonial occupation, a process that all 
former colonies had passed through. The complication in Eritrea was 
that the colonial power happened to be an African power and a 
neighbouring country - Ethiopia.
2.2 The liberation of Eritrea, as mentioned above, is not part of this 
consideration being a colonial issue.
2.3 POTHOLM, C. P. (1979), "The Theory and Practice of African
Politics", described that there was a good deal of competetion
within the single party. For example, in 1970, all but 6 of the 120
elective constituencies had competing candidates. Three cabinet 
ministers were defeated and fairly large numbers of MPs lost their 
seats. .
2.4 This should be contrasted with Hyden's (1983) theory of "economy of 
affection". Hyden regards the "traditional African Egaliterianism” 
as anti-developmental p.13.
2.5 The single party system was copied from Tanzania, a "popular
socialist" country, whose party system was based on the principle of
democratic centralism of the communist countries.
2.6 I have heavily relied for the description of China's political 
structue upon Waller's book (1981), chapter 3, "The Government and 
Politics of the People's Republic of China".
2.7 See Woldai Futur (1988), "Economic Growth Models: Models, Choices 
and Implications for Eritrea", Proceedings of the first conference 
on research and development in Eritrea. Research and Information 
Centre of Eritrea.
3.1 Most of what is now northern Sudan was under the rule of the 
Kingdoms of Funji and Fur from the early sixteenth century onwards.
3.2 Generally known as the Turkiya because Egypt was then technically a 
province of the Ottoman Empire.
3.3 The title given to the head of the Turkish empire.
3.4 Samuel Baker's first visit was during his travels to "discover the 
source of the Nile" in the early of 1860s. His second visit was as 
an employee of the Khedive of Egypt with a brief to "annex to Egypt 
all the territories in the Nile Basin". See in Holt, 1970:76).
3.5 A spiritual title meanining "the Divine Guided Saviour".
3.6 Belgium and France were acquiring more territories in the south, the
former through the Belgium Congo and the latter through central 
Africa.
3.7 A French expedition commanded by Captain Marchand occupied Fashoda
10 July 1898, a place south of present day Malakal town in south
Sudan, which alarmed the Condominium's governor general. As word 
reached him, he set out to Fashoda and told Marchand "the presence 
of a French force at Fashoda and in the valley of the Nile was
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regarded as a direct infringement of the rights of the Egyptian 
government and of Great Britain”. After a period of great tension 
the French gave way.
4.1 This definition only relates to the region now called north Sudan.
4.2 Egypt made use of European experts to take key posts in the Sudan. 
The exploreres Samuel Baker and Richard Burton, for example, were at 
the service of the Viceroy at different times.
4.3 They were: education, interior, religious affairs, youth and sports, 
co-operation, social affairs and commerce and supply.
4.4 These were: education and guidance and cooperation,commerce and 
supply.
4.5 They were: finance, agriculture,health and construction.
6.1 In practice, the commisioners were responsible to the regional
Executive Authority.
7.1 This definition was applied in the general population census of 
1973.
7.2 The Plan was initially made for 5 years and later extended by two 
years and hence the amended five year plan.
7.3 Consultancy reports like that produced for UNICEF by the author are 
the resposibility of the consultants.
7.4 Shortly after the completion of the survey, a new law was passed in
the Sudan by which the old Bahr El Ghazal Province was divided into 
two provinces - East and West Bahr El Ghazal.
7.5 The 1981 Act delegated powers to 25 District Councils in South
Sudan. Before that, the legislative units of Local Government were
the former six provinces.
7.6 After the division of the south into three regions in 1983, Wau town 
became the regional capital of Bahr El Ghazal Region. One of the 
five ministries that were created to operate in each region was the 
ministry of services which includes education.
7.7 The govemmet used to provide lunch for students which stopped as 
the Area council could no longer afford to support it.
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2. ..V.."...................................
6.25 DO TEACHERS PARTICIPATE IN COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SCHOOL 
OTHER THAN SCHOOL ACTIVITIES
1............................................
2..............................................
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6.26 TEACHERS ACCOMMODATION
6.261 WHERE ARE TEACHERS HOUSE LOCATED NUMBER
1. ON THE SCHOOL GROUNDS.....................
2. IN A NEARBY VILLAGE .....
3. OTHERS (SPECIFY) .....
6.262 WHO BUILT THE TEACHERS HOUSES NUMBER
1. THE GOVERNMENT............................
2. THE COMMUNITY .....
3. THE TEACHERS THEMSELVES .....
4. OTHERS (SPECIFY) .....
7.0 NON-TEACHING STAFF
OCCUPATION NO. OCCUPATION NO.
1. WATCHMAN 6. LABOURERS
2. HEAD LABOUR 7. COOKS
3. CARPENTERS 8.
4. MESSENGERS 9.
5. BUILDER 10.
8.0 SCHOOL SUPERVISION AND INSPECTOR
8.10 WAS YOUR SCHOOL INSPECTED THIS YEAR YES [ ] NO [ ]
8.11 IF NO, WHEN WAS IT LAST INSPECTED .................
9 .0  SERVICES AVAILABLE
9.10 WATER TOWN
SUPPLY
BORE
HOLE WELL RIVER NONE
9.101. SOURCE
9.102 DISTANCE
9.103 CONDITION
9.104 IF NO WATER SOURCE, WHERE IS WATER AVAILABLE
9.11 sanit;\ R Y
PIT
LATRINE
BUCKET
LATRINE NONE
9.111 TYPE
9.112 CONDITION
INSTRUCTIONS 1. FOR 9.102 WRITE DISTANCE IN MILES
FOR THIS PAGE 2. FOR 9.103 AND 9.112 WRITE GOOD, FAIR OR BAD.
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9.12 NEAREST HEALTH SERVICE
9 . 1 2 1  TYPE
9 . 1 2 2  DISTANCE
9.123 CONDITION 
OF SERVICE
9.124 IS THERE MEDICAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR HEALTH
CONSULTATION YES [ ] NO [ ]
9.125 IF YES, SPECIFY QUALIFICATION
1. DOCTOR [ ]
2. MEDICAL ASSISTANT [ ]
3. NURSE [ ]
4. COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKER [ ]
5. DRESSER [ ]
6. NATIVE MEDICAL PRACTITIONER [ ]
9.126 DOES THE MEDICAL PERSON VISIT THE SCHOOL TO PROVIDE
HEALTH EDUCATION? YES [ ] NO [ ]
9.127 IF YES, HOW OFTEN? .............................
9.128 IS THE HEALTH SERVICE AVAILABLE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF STUDENTS & TEACHERS IN YOUR SCHOOL
YES [ ] NO [ ]
9.129 IF NO, SUGGEST ALTERNATIVES OF HOW TO IMPROVE HEALTH
SITUATION (RECORD VERBATIM)
1...............................................
2.................................................
3.................................................
9.130 WHAT ARE THE COMMON DISEASES IN THE AREA?
1...............................................
2.................................................
 3.................................................
 4.................................................
 5.................................................
H O S P I­
TAL
RURAL
HEALTH
CENTRE
D ISPEN
-SARY
PHCU DRESSING
STATION
INSTRUCTIONS FOR 1 .  PHGU = PRIMARY HEALTH CARE UNIT 
T H IS  PAGE
2 .  FOR 9 . 1 2 3 ,  WRITE GOOD, F A IR  OR BAD 
- 420 -
9.130 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
YES NO
9 . 1 3 1 REGULAR
9 . 1 3 2 NOT REGULAR
9 . 1 3 3 NONE
10.0 TEACHING MATERIALS
10.10 HAVE YOU BEEN PROVIDED UNICEF TEACHING KIT YES [ ] NO [ ]
10.11 IF YES, WHEN DID YOU RECEIVE IT .........
10.12 HAVE YOU RECEIVED TEACHING MATERIALS FROM OTHER SOURCES
YES [ ] NO [ ]
10.13 DOES YOUR SCHOOL HAVE SUFFICIENT TEXT BOOKS YES [ ] NO [ ]
10.14 WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOUR SCHOOL RECEIVED TEXTBOOKS ___
11.0 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
11.10 IS THERE A COMMUNITY WORKER IN YOUR AREA YES [ ] NO [ ]
11.11 IS THERE A PARENT/TEACHER ASSOCIATION YES [ ] NO [ ]
11.12 IF YES, WHAT TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AT LAST MEETING
1.................................................
2...................................................
 3...................................................
 4 .................................. ................
11.13 HAVE ANY ACTIVITIES BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE ASSOCIATION
YES [ ] NO [ ]
11.14 IF YES, WHAT ACTIVITIES WERE CARRIED OUT?
1.................................................
2...................................................
 3...................................................
 4 ...................................................
11.15 IF NO, WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR ITS NOT BEING ACTIVE
1.................................................
2...................................................
3. ..............................................
4 ...................................................
INSTRUCTIONS FOR 1 .  PLEASE WRITE CLEARLY IN  CAPITAL LETTERS 
T H IS  PAGE
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12.0
13.0
COMMUNITY ATTITUDES TOWARDS EDUCATION
12.10 DO PARENTS WANT TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL
YES [ ] NO [ ]
12.11 IF NO, STATE REASONS
1................................................
2 ...................................................
3.  
3 2.12 WHOM DO PARENTS PREFER TO SEND TO SCHOOL:
BOYS [ ] GIRLS [ ] BOTH [ ]
12.13 IF PARENTS DO NOT PREFER TO SEND GIRLS TO SCHOOL, WHAT 
ARE THE REASONS?
1................................................
2...................................................
 3...................................................
 4 ...................................................
FINANCES
13.10 DO PARENTS CONTRIBUTE MONEY TOWARDS THE SCHOOL
YES [ ] NO [ ]
13.11 IF YES, HOW MUCH WAS RAISED Ls ...............
13.12 IF ANSWER IS NO, WHAT ARE THE REASONS:
1................................................
2 ...................................................
3...................................................
13.13 STUDENT FEES
13.131 DO STUDENTS PAY SCHOOL FEES YES [ ] NO [ ]
13.132 IF YES, HOW MUCH? Ls ...................
13.15 SCHOOL GARDENING
13.151 DOES THE SCHOOL HAVE A GARDEN YES [ ] NO [ ]
(IF NO, GO TO 13.154 BELOW)
13.152 LIST MAJOR ITEMS GROWN IN THE GARDEN
1.......................................
2.........................................
3.........................................
13.153 WHAT DO YOU DO WITH YOUR HARVET
1.......................................
2.........................................
3.........................................
13.154 IF THERE IS NO GARDEN, WHAT ARE THE REASONS
1.......................................
2  ..............................
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14.0 RESOURCES AVAILABLE
LOCAL MATERIALS
PLACE DISTANCE COST PER UNIT
14.101 SAND
14.102 GRAVEL
14.103 STONE
14.104 TEAK
*
14.105 GRASS
14.106 BAMBOO
14.11 SKILLED LABOUR AVAILABLE
YES NO DAILY WAGE
14.111 CARPENTER
14.112 MASONS (BUILDERS)
14.113 BLACK SMITHS
14.114 LABOURERS
14.12 DO PEOPLE KNOW HOW TO PRODUCE BURNT BRICKS? YES[ ] NO[ ]
14.13 MAIN SOURCE OF CASH INCOME OF COMMUNITY
14.131 PAID JOBS [ ]
14.132 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE [ ]
14.133 ANIMAL HUSBANDRY . [ ]
OTHERS (SPECIFY)
14.14 ARE THERE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PAID JOBS IN YOUR AREA?
MEN YES [ ] NO [ ]
WOMEN YES [ ] NO [ ]
14.141 IF YES, INDICATE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOBS
1. ............................
2 . ..............................................................................
3.  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR 1. WRITE HOW MUCH MATERIALS AND LABOUR COST FOR 
THIS PAGE 14.10 AND 14.11.
14.15 DO MANY PEOPLE LEAVE YOUR AREA FOR PAID JOBS ELSEWHERE?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
14.151 IF YES, WHERE DO THESE PEOPLE GO?
1. .........................
2 . ...............................................................................
3.  
14.16 DO MANY PEOPLE LEAVE YOUR AREA FOR OTHER THAN PAID JOBS?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
IF YES, PLEASE FILL IN TABLE BELOW.
PLACE THEY GO MONTH THEY 
LEAVE
MONTH THEY 
LEAVE
REASONS FOR 
LEAVING
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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15.0 SKETCHES OF THE SCHOOL SITE CODE
15.10
TYPE 
STAFF HOUSING
NO.
15.11 CLASS ROOMS
15.12 STORES
15.13 LABORATORIES
15.14 LIBRARY
15.15 DORMITORIES
15.16 DORMITORY CAPACITY
15.17 OFFICE FOR HEAD/MASTER
15.18 OFFICE FOR TEACHERS
15.19 WORKSHOPS
15.20 KITCHEN
15.21 TOILET FACILITIES
15.22 WATER
OTHERS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
DOES THE SCHOOL HAVE SUFFICIENT LAND AREA? YES [ ] NO [ ]
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6.0 PHYSICAL FACILITIES
BLOCK OR 
HOUSE NO.
FUNCTION 
OF ROOMS
DIMEN- .CONDITION OF BUILDING 
TION FLOOR 1 WALLS IROOF 1DOORS IWINDOfc
. CONDITION OF.FURNITURE 
IS ICHAIRS ITABLES IDESK . 1BLACK. .1 CUPBOIIRD
f.
RP
MATERIALS
ELEMENTS
CONCR. STEEL WOOD STONE CEMENT
BLOCKS
MUD
BRICK
MUD DAUB & 
WATTLE
C.I.
SHEET
THATCH PLASTER
FINISH
CEMENT
POINTING
NONE
FOUNDATION
SKELETON
OUTSIDE WALLS
PARTITION WALLS
FLOOR
DOORS
WINDOWS
ROOFm m
EXT. FINISHES
INSTRUCTION! Fol 1 . GC= GiOOD con!)ITION; RS = 1kESTORAB !>E; RP = TO BE REPLACED.
THIS PAGE 2. HARK " 11 UNDER CORRESPONDING COLUMNS.
3. WRITE NUMBER OF FURNITURE UNDER CORRESPONDING CONDITION.
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APPENDIX II
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN QUESTION 
BY PRESIDENT NIMEIRI, 9TH JUNE 1969
Dear Countryaen! V a n  congratulations and greetings to yon on this historic occasion of yonr revolution.
No doubt yon have heard of the broad aias of the revolution outlined in ay speech and in that of the Priie 
Minister which was broadcast on 25 May. Our revolution is the continuation of the October 21 popular 
revolution. It works for the regeneration of life in our country, for social progress and the raising of 
the standard of living of the aasses of our people throughout the country. It stands against iaperialisi, 
colonial iso, and whole-heartedly supports the liberation aoveaents of the African and Arab peoples as well 
as other peoples throughout the world.
A Historical Background
Dear Countryaen, the Revolutionary Governaent is fully aware of the magnitude of the Southern problea and 
is deterained to arrive at a lasting solution.
This problea has deep-going historical roots dating back to the last century. It is the result of the 
policies of British colonialisa which left the legacy of uneven developaent between the Northern and 
Southern parts of the Country, with the result that on the advent of independence Southerners found 
thenselves in an unequal position with their Northern brethren in every field.
The traditional circles and parties that have held the reins of power in our country since independence 
have utterly failed to solve the Southern question. They have exploited state power for self-enrichment 
and for serving narrow partisan interests without caring about the interests of the lasses of our people 
whether in the North or in the South.
It is important to realise also that lost of the Southern leaders contributed a great deal to the present 
deterioration of the state of affairs in that part of our beloved country. Over the years, since 1950 to 
the present day they have sought alliances with the Northern reactionary circles and with iaperialisi, 
whether froi inside or outside the borders. Personal gain was the mainspring of their actions.
Dear Countryaen, the eneaies of the North are also the eneaies of the South. The coaaon eneay is 
iaperialisa and neo-colonialisa, which is oppressing and exploiting the African and Arab peoples, and 
standing in the way of their advance. Internally, our coaaon eneaies are the reactionary forces of 
counter-revolution. The 25 May Revolution is not the saae as the coup d'etat of Noveaber 1958. That was 
a reactionary aove stage by the iaperialists in alliance with local reaction in and outside the aray. It 
was aade to silence the deaands of the aasses of our people both in the North and South for social change 
and genuine deaocracy.
The Revolution of May 25 is the very opposite of the coup d'etat of 1958. Our revolution is, we repeat, 
directed against iaperialisa, the reactionary circles and corrupt parties that destroyed the October 
Revolution and were aiaing at finally liquidating any progressive aoveaent and installing a reactionary 
dictatorship.
Dear Countryaen, the revolutionary Governaent is confident and coapetent enough to face existing realities. 
It recognises the historical and cultural differences between the North and South and firaly believes that 
the unity of our country aust be built upon these objective realities. The Southern people have the right 
to develop their respective.cultures and traditions within a united socialist Sudan.
In furtherance of these objectives the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Minister held joint 
meetings and after a full discussion of the aatter resolved to recognise the right of the Southern people 
to Regional Autonoay within a united Sudan.
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Regional Autonomy Prograne
You will realise that the building of a broad socialist-oriented democratic noveient in the South, forning 
part of the revolutionary structure in the North and capable of assuning the reins of power in that region 
and rebuffing imperialist penetration and infiltration fron the rear, is an essential prerequisite for the 
practical and healthy application of Regional Autonomy.
Within this framework and in order to prepare for that day when this right can be exercised, the 
Revolutionary Government is drawing up the following programme:
1. the continuation and further extension of the Amnesty Law;
2. economic, social and cultural development of the South;
3. the appointment of a Minister for Southern Affairs;
4. the training of personnel.
The Government will create a special economic planning hoard for the South and will prepare a special 
budget for the South, which aims at the development of the Southern provinces at the shortest possible 
time.
Dear Southern Countrymen, in order that we may be able to carry out this programme it is of the utmost 
importance that peace and security should prevail in the South and that life return to normal. It is 
primarily the responsibility of you all whether you be in the bush or at home to maintain peace and 
stability. The way is open for those abroad to return home and co-operate with us in building a prosperous 
Sudan, united and democratic.
- 428 -
APPENDIX III
THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON 
THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH SUDAN
Draft Organic Law to organize Regional 
Self-Government in the Southern Provinces of 
the Democratic Republic of Sudan
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Deiocractic Republic of the Sudan and in 
relization of the neoorable May Revolution Declaration of June 9, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces 
of the Sudan Regional Self-Governaent within a united socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the principle 
of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people participate activiely in and supervise the decentralized 
systei of the governaent of their country, it is hereunder enacted:
Article 1.
This law shall be called the law for Regional Self-Governaent in the Southern Provinces. It shall 
coae into force on a date within a period not exceeding thirty days froi the date of the Addis 
Ababa Agreeaent.
Article 2.
This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be aaended except by a three-quarters 
lajority of the People's National Asseibly and c onfined by a two-thirds aajority in a referendua 
held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.
CHAPTER II: DEFIVITIOVS
Article 3.
(i) 'Constitution' refers to the Republican Order No.5 or any other basic law replacing or aaending
it.
(ii) 'President' aeans the President of the Deaocratic Republic of the Sudan.
(iii) 'Southern Provinces of the Sudan' leans the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile
in accordance with their boundaries as they stood in January 1, 1956, and any other areas that 
were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern Coiplex as lay be decided by a 
referendui.
(iv) 'Peoples Regional Asseibly' refers to the legislative body for the Southern Region of the Sudan.
(v) 'High Executive Council' refers to the Executive Council appointed by the President on the 
recouendation of the President of the High Executive Council and such body shall supervise the 
adiinistration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region of the Sudan.
(vi) 'President of the High Executive Council' refers to the person appointed by the President on the 
recouendation of the People's Regional Asseibly to lead and supervise the executive organs 
responsible for the adiinistration of the Southern Provinces.
(vii) 'People's National Asseihly' refers to the National Legislative Asseibly representing the people
of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution.
(viii) 'Sudanese' refers to any Sudanese citizen as defined by the Sudanese Nationality Act 1957 and any
aiendients thereof.
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CHAPTER III
Article 4.
The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Eqnatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3 (iii) shall 
constitute a self-governing Region within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and shall be known 
as the Southern Region.
Article 5.
The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and powers of which 
are defined by this law.
Article 6.
Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan and English the principal language for the 
Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any other language or languages which lay serve 
a practical necessity for the efficient and expenditious discharge of executive and administrative 
functions of the region.
CHAPTER IV
Article 7.
Neither the People's Regional Asseibly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise 
any powers on natters of national nature which are:
(i) National Defence
(ii) External Affairs
(iii) Currency and Coinage
(iv) Air and Inter-Regional River Transport
(v) Conunications and Telecomunications
(vi) Custois and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain couodities which the Regional
Governnent nay specify with the approval of the Central Governnent.
(vii) Nationality and Immigration (Enigration).
(viii) Planning for Econonic and Social Developient
(ix) Educational Planning
(x) Public-Audit.
CHAPTER V: LEGISLATURE
Article 8.
Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a People's Regional Asseibly elected 
by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern Region. The constitution and conditions of 
■eibership of the Asseibly shall be deteriined by law.
Article 9.
Heibers of the People's Regional Asseibly shall be elected by direct secret ballot.
Article 10.
(i) For the First Asseibly the President lay appoint additional leibers to the People's Regional 
Assseibly where conditions for elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in 
Article 9, provided that such appointed leibers shall not exceed one-quarter of the Asseibly.
(ii) The People's Regional Asseibly shall regulate the conduct of its business in accordance with rules 
of procedures to be laid down by the said Asseibly during its first sitting.
(iii) The People's Regional Asseibly shall elect one of its leibers as a speaker, provided that the
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first sitting shall be presided over by the Interii President of the High Executive Council. 
Article 11.
The People's Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, internal 
security, efficient adiinistration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, 
econoiic and social fields and in particular in the following:-
Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and adiinistration 
of the Southern Region.
Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Adiinistration.
Legislation on traditional law and custoi within the framework of National Law.
Establishment, maintenance and adiinistration of prisons and reformatory institntions.
Establishment, maintenance and adiinistration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with 
National Plans for education and econoiic and social development.
Promotion of local languages and cultures
Town and village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and 
programmes.
Proiotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders' licences and 
formation of co-operative societies.
Establishment, maintenance and adiinistration of public hospitals.
Adiinistration of environmental health services; laternity care; child welfare; supervision of
markets; coibat of epidemic diseases; training of ledical assistants and rural midwives;
establishment of health centres, dispensaries and dressing stations.
Proiotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and trade.
Establishment of zoological gardens, luseuis, organizations of trade and cultural exhibitions.
Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the 
discovery of natural gas and minerals.
Recruitment for, organization and adiinistration of Police and Prison services in accordance with 
the national policy and standards.
Land use in accordance with national laws and plans.
Control and prevention of pests and plant deseases.
Development, utilization and protection of forests, crops and pastures in accordance with national 
laws.
Promotion and encourageient of self-help programmes.
All other matters delegated by the President or the People's National Asseibly for legislation.
Article 12.
The People's National Assembly may call for facts and information concerning the conduct of
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adiinistration in the Southern Region.
Article 13.
(i) The People's Regional Asseibly lay, by a three-quarters lajority and for specified reasons 
relating to public interest, request the President to relieve the President or any leiber of the 
High Executive Council froi office. The President shall accede to such request.
(ii) In case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the High Executive Council, the
entire body shall be considered as having automatically resigned.
Article 14.
The People's Regional Asseibly lay, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to postpone 
the coiing into force of any law which, in the view of the leibers, adversely affects the welfare 
and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President lay, if he thinks fit, accede 
to such request.
Article 15.
(i) The People's Regional Asseibly lay, by a lajority of its leibers, request the President to 
withdraw any Bill presented to the People's National Asseibly which in their view affects 
adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern Region, pending 
couunication of the views of the People's Regional Asseibly.
(ii) If the President accedes to such request, the People's Regional Asseibly shall present its views
within 15 days froi the date of accession to the request.
(iii) The President shall couunicate any such views to the People's National Asseibly together with
his own observations if he deeis necessary.
Article 16.
The People's National Asseibly shall couunicate all Bills and Acts to the People's Regional 
Asseibly for their infonation. The People's Regional Asseibly shall act siiilarly.
CHAPTER TI: TIE EXECUTIVE
Article 17.
The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on behalf of 
the President.
Article 18.
The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departients in the Southern 
Region provided that on latters relating to Central Governient Agencies it shall act with the 
approval of the President.
Article 19.
The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed and relieved of office by the 
President on the recouendation of the People's Regional Asseibly.
Article 20.
The High Executive Council shall be coiposed of leibers appointed and relieved of office by the 
President on the recouendation of the President of the High Executive Council.
Article 21.
The President of the High Executive Council and its leibers are responsible to the President and 
to the People's Regional Asseibly for efficient adiinistration in the Southern Region. They shall 
take an oath of office before the President.
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Article 22.
The President and leibers of the High Executive Council lay attend aeetings of the People's 
Regional Asseibly and participate in its deliberations without the right to vote, unless they are 
also leibers of the People's Regional Asseibly.
CHAPTER VII
Article 23.
The President shall froi tiie to tiie regulate the relationship between the High Executive Council 
and the central linistries.
Article 24.
The High Executive Council lay initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public Service. These 
laws shall specify the t e n s  and conditions of service for the Regional Public Service.
CHAPTER Till: FIIAICE
Article 25.
The People's Regional Asseibly lay levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National and 
Local duties and taxes. It lay issue legislation and orders to guarantee the collection of all 
public lonies at different levels.
(a) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:-
(i) Direct and indirect regional taxes.
(ii) Contributions froi People's Local Governient Councils.
(iii) Revenue froi couercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in accordance with 
the national Plan.
(iv) Funds froi the National Treasury for established services.
(v) Funds voted by the People's National Asseibly in accordance with the requireients of the Region.
(vi) The Special Developient Budget for the South as presented by the People's Regional Asseibly for
the acceleration of econoiic and social advanceient of the Southern Region, as envisaged in the 
declaration of June 9, 1968.
(vii) See Appendix B.
(viii) Any other sources.
(b) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to leet the expenditure of regional 
services, security, adiinistration, and developient in accordance with national plans and prograues and 
shall subiit it to the People's Regional Asseibly for approval.
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CHAPTER IX: OTHER PROVISIONS
Article 27.
(i) Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the People's Armed 
Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the region.
(ii) The use of the People's Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national 
defence shall be controlled by the President on the advice of the President of the High Executive 
Council.
(iii) Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the People's Armed Forces in the Southern 
Region are provided for in the Protocol On Interim Arrangements.
Article 28.
The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions of the National 
Constitution provided the People's Regional Assembly, after receiving the President's views, may 
reintroduce the Bill.
Article 29.
The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the People's Regional 
Assembly.
Article 30.
Any member of the People's Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided that financial Bills 
shall not be presented without sufficient notice to the President of the High Executive Council.
Article 31.
The People's Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect the 
spirit of the National Constitution.
Article 32.
All citizens are guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, provided 
restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named citizen or citizens solely on 
grounds of public health and order.
Article 33.
(i) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education, 
employment, commerce and the practice of any profession.
(ii) No law may adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis 
of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.
Article 34.
Juba shall be the Capital of the Southern Region and the seat of the Regional Executive and 
Legislature.
APPENDIX A: APPENDIX A:
FHIDAMERAL RIGHTS AID FREEDOMS
The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.
1. A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship.
2. Equality of citizens'/'
(i) All citizens, without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sex, 
economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law.
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(ii) All persons should be equal before the courts of lav and should have the right to
institute legal proceedings in order to reiove any injustice or declare any right in an
open court without delay prejudicing their interests.
Personal liberty.
(i) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishient should be
prohibited.
(ii) The accused should be presuied innocent until proved guilty.
(iii) Retrospective penal legislation and punishient should be prohibited.
(iv) The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be
guaranteed.
(v) No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the due
process of law, and no person should reiain in custody or detention for lore than twenty- 
four hours without judicial order.
(vi) No accused person should be subjected to induceient, intiiidation or torture in order to
extract evidence froi hii whether in his favour or against hii or against any other
person, and no humiliating punishient should be inflicted on any convicted person.
Freedoa of Religion and Conscience.
(i) Every person should enjoy freedoi of religious opinion and of conscience and the right
to profess thei publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subject 
to reasonable limitations in favour of morality, health or public order as prescribed by 
law.
(ii) Parents and guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those
under their care in accordance with the relation of their choice.
Protection of labour.
(i) Forced and coipulsory labour of any kind should be prohibited except when order for
military or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishient prescribed by law.
(ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.
Freedoi of linority to use their languages and develop their culture should be guaranteed.
DRAFT ORDINANCE 01 ITEMS OF REVENUE AID 
GRANTS-II-AID FOR TIE SOUTHERN REGION
Profits accruing to the Central Governient as a result of exporting products of the Southern 
Region.
Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the central list of the Ministry 
of Treasury.
Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consuied in the Southern Region.
Profits on sugar consuied in the Southern Region.
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5. Royalties on forest products of the Southern Region.
6. Royalties on leaf Tobacco and Cigarettes.
7. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance.
8. Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Governaent Projects (5 per cent of net profits of factories, 
co-operative societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas).
9. Revenue accruing froa Central Governaent activities in the Southern Region provided the Region 
shall bear oaintenance expenses e.g. Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forus and docunents, 
staip duties and any other itea to be specified froa tiae to tiae.
10. Licences other than those provided for in the People's Local Governaent Act, 1971.
11. Special Developoent Tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region the rate of which should 
be decided by the People's Regional Assembly.
12. Incone Tax collected fron officials and eaployees serving in the Southern Region both in the local 
and national civil services as well as in the Arny, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and Political 
Establishnent.
13. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project established in the Region but not run 
by the Regional Governaent (5 per cent of the initial cost).
14. Contributions froa the Central Governaent for the encourageaent of construction and developoent; 
for every agricultural project, industrial project and trading enterprise (20 per cent of the 
initial cost as assessed by the Central Governaent).
15. New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any of its Local Governnent units, 
and for which funds are allocated, shall received grants froa the National Treasury in the 
following nanner:
- Education institutions, 20 per cent of expenses.
- Trunk and through Roads and Bridges, 25 per cent of expenses.
- Relief and Social anenities, 15 per cent of expenses.
- Tourist attraction projects, 25 per cent of expenses.
- Security, 15 per cent of expenses.
- Grants for Post Secondary.and University education within the Sudan, 20 per cent of grants, 
outside the Sudan 30 per cent of grants.
- Contribution for Research, Scientific Advanceaent, and Cultural Activities, 25 per cent of 
expenses.
AGREEMENT ON TEE CEASE-FIRE IN TIE SOUTHERN REGION
Article 1.
This Agreeaent shall coae into force on the date and tiae specified for the ratification of the 
Addis Ababa Agreeaent.
Article 2.
There will be an end to all ailitary operations and to all araed actions in the Southern Region 
froa the tiae of cease-fire.
Article 3.
All coobat forces shall reaain in the area under their control at the tiae of the cease-fire.
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Article 4.
- Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of violence.
- Any underground activities contrary to public order shall cease.
Article 5.
Movements of individual aeabers of both coabat forces outside the areas under their control shall 
be allowed only if these individuals are unaraed and authorized by their respective authorities. 
The plans for stationing troops froa the National Aray shall be such as to avoid any contact 
between thea and the Southern Sudan Liberation Noveaent coabat forces.
Article 6.
A Joint Coaaission is hereby created for the iapleaentation of all question related to the cease­
fire including repatriation of refugees. The Joint Coaaission shall include aeabers froa all the 
countries bordering on the Southern Region as well as representatives of the International 
Coaaittee of the Red Cross, Vorld Council of Churches, All Africa Conference of Churches and 
United Nations High Coaaissioner for Refugees.
Article 7.
The Joint Coaaission shall propose all aeasures to be undertaken by both parties in dealing with 
all incidents after a full inquiry on the spot.
Article 8.
Each party shall be represented on the Joint Coaaission by one senior ailitary office and a 
aaziaua of five other aeabers.
Article 9.
The headquarteres of the Joint Coaaission shall be located in Juba with provincial branches in 
Juba, Malakal and Van.
Article 10.
The Joint Coaaission shall appoint local coaaissions in various centres of the Southern Region 
coaposed of two aeabers froa each party.
PROTOCOLS 01 INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS 
CHAPTER 1: INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
(Political, Local Governaent and Civil Service)
Article 1.
The President of the Deaocratic Republic of the Sudan shall, in consultation with the Southern 
Sudan Liberation Moveaent (S.S.L.H.) and branches of the Sudanese Socialist Union in the Southern 
Region, appoint the President and aeabers of an Interia High Executive Council.
Article 2.
The Interia High Executive Council shall consist of the President and other aeabers with 
portfolios in:
a) Finance and Econoaic Planning.
b) Education.
c) Inforaation, Culture and Tourisa.
«) Coaaunication and"Transport.
e) Agriculture, Aniaal Production and Fisheries.
f) Public Health.
9) Regional Adainistration (Local Governaent, Legal Affairs, Police and Prisons).
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h) Housing, Public Uorks and Utilities.
i) Natural Resources and Rural Development (Land Use, Rural Vater Supply, Forestry and Co­
operatives).
j) Public Service and Labour,
k) Minerals and Industry, Trade and Supply.
Article 3.
The Interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national laws, establish a Regional 
Civil Service subject to ratification by the People's Regional Assembly.
Article 4.
The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive Council, determine the date 
for the election to the People's Regional Assembly, and the Interim High Executive Council shall 
make arrangements for the setting up of this Assembly.
Article 5.
In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central and regional institutions, 
the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement shall compile and communicate lists of citizens of the 
Southern Region outside the Sudan in accordance with details to be supplied by the Ministry of 
Public Service and Administrative Reform.
Article 6.
The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform 
shall undertake to provide necessary financial allocations with effect from the 1972-73 Budget 
for such placements and appointments.
Article 7.
The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a period of 18 months.
CHAPTER II: TEMPORARY ARRANGEMEITS FOR THE 
COMPOSITION OF UHITS OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES II
THE SOUTHERN REGION
Article 1.
These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years subject to revision by the 
President on the request of the President of the High Executive Council acting with the consent 
of the People's Regional Assembly.
Article 2.
The People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the 
Southern Command composed of 12,000 officers and men of whom 6,000 shall be citizens froa the 
Region and the other 6,000 froa outside the Region.
Article 3.
The recruitaent and integration of citizens froa the Southern Region within the aforementioned 
Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military Coaaission taking into account the need for initial 
separate deploynent of troops with a view to achieve snooth integration in the national force. 
The Coaaission s h a L L e n s w e  that this deployment shall be such that an atmosphere of peace and 
confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.
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Article 4.
The Joint Military Coaaission shall be conposed of three senior nilitary officers froi each side. 
Decisions of the Joint Military Coaaission shall be taken nnaniionsly. In case of disagreeient 
snch latters shall be referred to the respective authorities.
CHAPTER III: AMIKSTT AID JUDICIAL ARSAIGEHEXTS
Article 1.
No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil or criiinal, shall be instituted against 
any person in any court of law for or on account of any act or latter done inside or outside the 
Sudan as froi the 18th day of August 1955, if such act or latter was done in connection with 
nutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region.
Article 2.
If a civil suit in relation to any acts or oatters referred to in Article 1 is instituted before 
or after the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreeaent such a suit shall be discharged 
and aade null and void.
Article 3.
All persons serving teris of iiprisonient or held in detention in respect of offences herein 
before specified in Article 1 shall be discharged or released within 15 days froi the date of 
ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreeaent.
Article 4.
The Joint Cease-Fire Coaaission shall keep a register of all civilian returnees, which register 
shall serve to certify that the person therein naied are considered indeanified within the aeaning 
of this Agreeaent provided that the Coaiission aay delegate such power to the Diploaatic Missions 
of the Deaocratic Republic of the Sudan in the case of citizens froi the Southern Region living 
abroad and to whoi the provisions of this Agreeient apply.
Article 5.
In the case of aried returnees or those belonging to coibat forces the Joint Military Coaaission 
shall keep a siiilar register of those persons who shall be treated in the saie lanner as provided 
for in Article 4.
Article 6.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 above a Special Tribunal and ad hoc judicial 
powers shall be established to ezaiine and decide on those cases which in the estimation of the 
authorities do not aeet the conditions for ainesty specfied in Article 1 of this Agreeient. The 
Special Tribunal shall be coiposed of a President appointed by the President of the Republic and 
not lore than four leibers naied by the Cease-Fire Coiiission.
Article 7.
Cases referred to in Article 6 shall be brought to the attention of the Special Tribunal by 
request of the Minister of Justice.
Article 8.
The Ainesty Provisions contained in this Agreeient as well as the powers of the Special Triunal 
shall reiain in force until such tiie as the President after consultation with the couissions 
referred to in this Agreeient, decide that they have fulfilled their functions.
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CHAPTER IT:
REPATR1ATI0I AID RESETTLEMEIT CORKISSIOI
1: Repatriation 
Article 1.
There shall be established a Special/Couission inside and where required outside the Southern 
Region charged with the responsibility of taking all administrative and other leasures as nay be 
necessary in order to repatriate all citizens froi the Southern Region who today are residing in 
other countries and especially in the neighbouring countries.
The headquarters of the Coniission shall be in Juba.
Article 2.
The Coooission shall be coiposed of at least three leibers including one representative of the 
Central Governnent, one representative of the Southern Region and one representative of the U.N. 
High Couissioner for Refugees. For those coiiissions operating outside the Sudan, a 
represetative of the host Governnent shall be included, plus the Central Governnent representative 
who shall be the Anbassador of the Sudan or his representative.
Article 3.
The control of repatriation at the borders shall be assuned by the conpetent border authorities 
in co-operation with the representatives of the Resettlenent Coniission.
Article 4.
The repatriation coniission shall work very closely with the Coniission for Relief and 
Resettlenent to ensure that the operation and tiling of the returning of refugees froi across the 
borders is adequately co-ordinated.
II: Resettlenent
Article 1.
There shall be established a Special Coniission for Relief and Resettlenent under the President 
of the Interin High Executive Council with headquarters in Juba and provincial branches in Juba, 
Malakal and Van. The Coniission, its branches and whatever units it nay deen fit to create in 
other localities in order to facilitate its functions, shall be responsible for co-ordination and 
inplenentation of all relief services and planning related to Resettlenent and Rehabilitation of 
all returnees, that is:
a) Refugees froi neighbouring countries;
b) Displaced persons resident in the nain centres of the Southern Region and other parts of
the Sudan;
c) Displaced persons including residual Anya Nya personnel and supporters in the bush;
d) Handicapped and ophans.
Article 2.
Although resettlenent and .rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons is adninistratively 
the responsibility of the Regional Governnent the present conditions in the Southern Region 
dictate that efforts of the whole nation of the Sudan and International Organizations should be 
pooled to help and rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The Relief and Resettlenent 
Coniission shall co-ordinate activities and resources of the Organizations within the country.
Article 3.
The first priority shall be the resettlenent of displaced persons within the Sudan in the 
following order:
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a) Persons presently residing in overcrowded centres in the Southern Region, and persons 
desirous to return to their original areas and hoies;
b) Persons returning froa the bush including Anya Nya Supporters;
c) Handicapped persons and orphans.
Article 4.
The second priority shall be given to returnees froa the neighbouring and other countries 
according to an agreed plan. This plan shall provide for:
a) Adequate reception centres with facilities for shelter, food supplies, aedicine and 
aedicaaents;
b) Transportation to peraanent resettlenent villages or places of origin;
c) Materials and equipaent.
Article 5.
The Relief and Resettlenent Coaaission shall:
a) Appeal to international organizations and voluntary agencies to continue assistance for
students already under their support particularly for students in secondary schools and 
higher institutions until appropriate arrangeaents are aade for their repatriation;
b) Coapile adequate inforaation on students and persons in need of financial support froa
the Sudan Governaent.
Article 6.
The Relief and Resettleaent Coaaission shall arrange for the education of all returnees who were 
attending priaary schools.
This Agreeaent is hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the aonth of February in the year 
one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D., in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the
Governaent of the Deaocratic Republic of the Sudan on the one hand and the Southern Sudan Liberation 
Moveaent on the other. It shall coae into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification by the 
President of the Deaocratic Republic of the Sudan and the Leader of the Southern Sudan Liberation Moveaent. 
It shall be ratified by the siad two Leaders in person or through their respective authorised
Representatives, in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the twelfth hour at noon, on the twelfth day of 
the aonth of March, in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D.
In witness whereof, We the Representatives of the Governaent of the Deaocratic Republic of the
Sudan and the Representatives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Moveaent hereby append our signatures in 
the presence of the Representative of His Iaperial Majesty the Eaperor of Ethiopia and the Representatives 
of the Vorld Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN
1. Abel Alier-Wal Kuai, Vice-President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs.
2. Dr. Mansour Rhalid, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
3. Dr. Gaafar Mohaaaed Ali Bakheit, Minister for Local Governaent.
4. Major-General Mohaaed A1 Baghir Ahaed, Minister of Interior.
5. Abdel Rahaan Abdalli,. Minister of Public Service and Adainistrative Refora.
6. Brigadier Mirghani Suleiaan.
7. Colon Kaaal Abashar.
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FOR THE SOUTHERN SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT
1. Ezboni Hondiri Gwonza, Leader of the Delegation.
2. Dr. Lawrence Wol tfol, Secretary of the Delegation.
3. Hading deGarang, Spokesman of the Delegation.
4. Colonel Frederick Brian Maggot, Special Military Representative.
5. Oliver Batali Albino, Menber.
6. Angelo Voga Morjan, Menber.
7. Rev. Panl Pnot, Menber.
8. Job Adier de Jok, Menber.
WITNESSES
1. Nabiyelnl Kifle, Representative of His Inperial Majesty, the Enperor of Ethiopia.
2. Leopoldo J. Niilns, Representative of the World Council of Churches.
3. Kodwo E. Ankrah, Represenative of the World Council of Churches.
4. Burgess Carr, General Secretary All Africa Conference of Churches.
5. Sanuel Athi Bwogo, Representative of Sudan Council of Churches.
ATTESTATION
I attest that these signatures are genuine and true.
BURGESS CARR, Moderator.
